


# PEOPLES, IDENTITIES AND REGIONS

Spain, Russia and the Challenges  
of the Multi-Ethnic State



**INSTITUTE ETHNOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY  
RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES**

**PEOPLES, IDENTITIES AND REGIONS.  
SPAIN, RUSSIA AND THE CHALLENGES  
OF THE MULTI-ETHNIC STATE**

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This book marks the beginning of a new phase in what we hope will be a fruitful collaboration between the Institute Ethnology and Anthropology Russian Academy of Science and the University of the Basque Country. Researchers from both Spain and Russia, representing a series of scientific schools each with its own methods and concepts – among them anthropologists, political scientists, historians and literary critics-, came to the decision to prepare a collective volume exploring a series of vital issues concerning state policy in complex societies, examining different identitarian characteristics, and reflecting on the difficulty of preserving regional cultures. Though the two countries clearly have their differences – political, economic and social –, we believe that the comparative methodology and the debates it leads to are valid and indeed important not just at a theoretical level, but also in practical terms. The decision to publish the volume in English is precisely to enable us to overcome any linguistic barriers there might be between Russian and Spanish academics, whilst simultaneously making these studies accessible to a much wider audience, since the realities behind many of the themes touched upon in this volume are relevant in many other parts of the globe beyond our two countries.

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## **SPAIN, RUSSIA AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE MULTIETHNIC STATE**

*Marina Martynova, David Peterson,  
Roman Ignatiev & Nerea Madariaga*

This book marks the beginning of a new phase in what we hope will be a fruitful collaboration between the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Science and the University of the Basque Country. Researchers from both Spain and Russia, representing a series of scientific schools each with its own methods and concepts – among them anthropologists, political scientists, historians and literary critics – came to the decision to prepare a collective volume exploring a series of vital issues concerning state policy in complex societies, examining different identitarian characteristics, and reflecting on the difficulty of preserving regional cultures. Though the two countries clearly have their differences – political, economic and social –, we believe that the comparative methodology and the debates it leads to are valid and indeed important not just at a theoretical level, but also in practical terms. The decision to publish the volume in English is precisely to enable us to overcome any linguistic barriers there might be between Russian and Spanish academics, whilst simultaneously making these studies accessible to a much wider audience, since the realities behind many of the themes touched upon in this volume are relevant in many other parts of the globe beyond our two countries.

Our collaboration started in 2011 when, to commemorate the Dual Year Russia-Spain, the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences organised an International Congress with the title *Pueblos, regiones y unidad de estado: España y Rusia / Народы, регионы и государственное единство: опыт Испании и России* (*Peoples, regions and state unity: Spain and Russia*). The papers published in this volume were first presented at either the conference itself in Moscow in September 29-30<sup>th</sup> or at a related event held in Vitoria-Gasteiz (Spain) some weeks later (October 18<sup>th</sup>).

The initiative for this joint venture came from the Russian Academy of Sciences and its desire to explore the reality and future of the multi-ethnic state. However, rather than directly comparing Rus-

sian and Spanish approaches to the problem, it was decided to adopt an asymmetrical approach: on the one hand the view from Moscow of the challenges faced in one of the most multi-ethnic states in the world, and on the other hand the experiences of one of the ethnic minorities that has historically proved one of the greatest challenges to a unitary Spain, namely, the Basques.

In both cases we are dealing with largely unresolved issues, and perhaps even unresolvable ones. Indeed, in the years between the original conference and this publication, that has become even more the case as recent events in Catalunya and Ukraine amply demonstrate. In this series of articles, different authors from different perspectives address how these issues, and indeed they are a plurality of issues, have been tackled in the past and might be addressed in the future.

The volume is split into four sections, in the first of which (**“Ethnic policies in Spain and Russia”**) many of the themes tackled in more detail in subsequent papers are outlined. In a broad introduction to the multi-faceted reality of cultural diversity around the globe, Valery Tishkov touches on the range of themes and problems which makes this issue so complex, with special reference to ethnicity, linguistic diversity and xenophobia. Aleksandr Kozhanovski then sketches a series of striking historical parallels between Russia and Spain, above all their imperial past, their rather complex relationship with Europe and their democratic reinvention in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Indeed, this historical parallelism fed directly into the decision to host the bipartite congress, regarding the Spanish experience -in both success and failure- as a possible model for Russian policy. This leads us to Asier Blas’s article outlining the Spanish Constitution’s (1978) approach to the problem of ethnic diversity, the State of Autonomies, while also exploring the parallels with the Russian case. This paper immediately warns us that, viewed from within though at the same time from the periphery, the Spanish solution to the riddle of accommodating ethno-cultural diversity is far from perfect, while also introducing us to the diversity of the Spanish state.

The second part of the volume (**“Euskal Herria and Basque identity within Spain”**) sees a change of approach. In a series of essays which, while wide-ranging in themes and chronology, all focus on just one region of Spain: the Basque Country, also known as Euskadi. Going back to the Middle Ages, David Peterson shows how the Basques were fully integrated into the nascent Christian kingdoms, to the point of invisibility, and compares their situation to that of other

ethnic minorities such as Jews and Muslims, fewer in number but much more prominently legislated for in texts of the period. Iñaki Bazán then traces the emergence of different Basque political institutions, many of which have survived until today in name at least and which are fundamental to an understanding of Basque history, as an originally feudal system gradually mutated into the current one, leading us up to the constitution of 1978. This dovetails neatly with the emergence of a number of cultural institutions during the 18th century, contributing towards the crystallisation of Basque identity, the theme of Joseba Zuazo's paper. Santiago de Pablo then completes this progression through Basque political and social history with an analysis of Basque nationalism from its late nineteenth-century origins, touching on the short-lived autonomous government of 1936-37, the Civil War and the birth of ETA, and leading us through to the more peaceful present. Covering essentially the same period, but from an economic and geographical perspective, Iñaki Moro charts a series of transformations in Basque society and its economy, from the beginnings of the industrial period through to the post-industrial present, and moreover raises the question of the region's prospects in the twenty-first century.

Another two papers approach the subject of the Basque language, also known as *Euskera*, from different perspectives. Aritz Irurtzun & Nerea Madariaga provide a general introduction to this fascinating language isolate (from the genetic point of view), the only surviving non-Indoeuropean language in Western Europe, and provide a sociolinguistic radiography of the language's differing situation in the Basque Country itself, in neighbouring Navarre (also in Spain) and in France, demonstrating how government policy can directly affect the vitality of minority languages. Virginia Díaz Gorriti looks at the role the language plays in the education system in Euskadi, while also contemplating the integration into Basque society of extra-Peninsular immigrants, a relatively new but increasingly important phenomenon in the region and which, despite the seemingly mono-ethnic (Basque) focus of this section, serves to remind us of the important point that underlies much of this volume: that in reality no society is ethnically monolithic as we will see so clearly when we turn to the next section: **"The challenges facing multi-ethnic Russia"**.

Concentrating now on the Russian experience, firstly, Alexandr Buganov traces the historical development of Russian identity, its close links with Orthodoxy, the existence of the two forms of Rus-



sian nationalism -*Russkost* and *Rossiyskaya*, the former ethnic and the latter more overtly political and indeed imperial-, and the contradictions of the Soviet period. Sergei Cheshko then plunges into what is at once one of the most intractable of problems and also one of the most topical ones, the right to self-determination of competing ethnicities within one area, drawing on the cases of the Crimea and south-eastern Ukraine, as well as other less internationally known cases such as Transnistria and Gagauzia. Not all identity is so clearly territorial, though, as Sergei Sokolovskiy shows when introducing us to some of the myriad minor ethnicities within the Russian state, among them several nomadic peoples. He explores the range of definitions that have and can be applied to the concept of indigeneity, a range which in itself is an eloquent testimony to the complexity of the issue.

If Spain struggles to reconcile the diverse interests of its 19 autonomous territorial units and four main languages, the Russian reality far outstrips such figures in both categories. Elena Filippova uses the 2010 Census to further illustrate the complexity and range of challenges facing multi-ethnic Russia, with particular reference to how the population self-identifies in ethnic terms: a staggering 1,450 possible ethnic-identifiers being contemplated by the Census, reduced to a 'short' list of 196 nationalities, including those referring to immigrants. The unique linguistic tapestry of Russia is Marina Martynova's theme, set above all in the context of the education system. In terms of major languages the situation is not so different to Spain -a state language understood by 99% of the population, and a handful of important regional languages (only five having over a million speakers: Tatar, Chechen, Bashkir, Ukrainian and Chuvash)- but the spectacular difference is in the number of minority languages, 174 in Russia, more than three times as many as in the whole of Europe combined.

Each of these hundreds of ethnicities or regions has its own complexities and specificities, is indeed in its own world, and generalisation and overviews can only take us so far. Accordingly we look in closer detail at several such cases from a range of perspectives and problems, observing local specificities but conversely noting how such case studies also serve to illustrate wider phenomena. Thus, for example, Sergei Alymov explores the impact of the post-Soviet period on local politics and identity in the Sosnovska district in Tambov province. In doing so he is charting "a cardinal change of the whole social order that took place throughout the late 1980s and 1990s", but moreover he is explicit in suggesting that the experience is applicable

not just to Sosnovka itself, but also to “the many Russian places like it”. Similarly, Galina Komarova opens up a whole new dimension to the complexity of the Russian ethnic tapestry –to borrow Martynova’s phrase- when examining how the different dietary habits of Orthodox and Muslim communities impact on their survival chances in the face of the “Maiaik” environmental disaster in Techa river basin in the southern Urals. Further north in the Urals, Elena Pivneva observes how the indigenous culture and indeed ethnicity of minority groups, in this case the Khanty-Mansi peoples (also known as the Yugra), have prospered in recent years, even though constituting only 2% of the population in ‘their’ own in itself scarcely populated region. Much further south, the Islamic dimension first touched upon by Komarova is of even great significance in the framing of the identity of the peoples of the North Caucasus, as studied by Irina Babich, with reference to the interplay between legal, national and religious identity, and resulting in a rivalry between competing legal systems (traditional (*adat*), state and sharia) which is diachronic and inter-generational as well as confessional, as sharia surges among younger more Islamicised generations. Finally Natalia Belova examines the hardening attitudes of the local population to migrant workers in provincial Russia, specifically in the Kostroma region, with suspicion if not downright rejection of what are perceived as alien and / or closed diasporas, with the Tajiks and certain Caucasian peoples suffering the brunt of such reactions, while politics also play an important role in dictating people’s attitudes as seen currently in their contrasting responses to Belarusian and Ukrainian immigrants.

Last but certainly not least, and in the spirit of international co-operation from which this whole initiative was born, the cultural and academic links between Russia and the Basque Country are explored in two papers in the final section, “**Towards cultural interaction: Russia and the Basques**”. Firstly, Roman Ignatiev gives us an historical vision of Basque studies within Russia across a range of disciplines, though with particular reference to language and ethnography, and inevitably touching on the fascinating though largely discredited sub-discipline of Basque-Caucasian studies already mentioned by Irurtzun and Madariaga. A tangible side-product of this Russian interest in the Basques, their language and culture is the burgeoning edition of Basque literature translated into Russian, as described by Jon Kortazar.

## GREETINGS

***Iñaki Bazán***

***Dean of the Faculty of  
Arts (University of the  
Basque Country)***

***4th May 2015***

In 2011, we celebrated the Dual Year Russia-Spain, that is, the Year of Russia in Spain and of Spain in Russia, with a bilateral project including educative, cultural, scientific and economic initiatives that would serve to both demonstrate the relationship between the two countries and to enhance it; at once strengthening bilateral relations and focussing on new fields for collaboration.

The Dual Year project arose from an initiative shared between the president of the Russian Federation, Dmitri Medvedev and the President of the Spanish Government, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, adopted in the Yaroslav Conference of September 14th, 2009, and was conceived as the perfect opportunity for illustrating the culture of the two states and creating opportunities for future collaboration.

As part of the Dual Year, the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences Moscow and the Faculty of Arts of the University of the Basque Country (Vitoria-Gasteiz) celebrated an International Congress with the title *Peoples, Regions and State Unity: the case of Spain and Russia*, and with the goal of exploring historical, sociological, anthropological and linguistic aspects of the Russian and Basque society and culture. The comparative towards the diversity and similarities in our political, institutional, socio-economic and cultural features helps us to understand them better and to find possible solutions for situations, which might a priori seem impossible to resolve. The two countries share many characteristics, having been through a political transition, having complex sociolinguistic situations, rich folkloric traditions, a number of different nationalities, etc. In other words, there are many reasons for these two countries to work together and explore our past and present, and the bilateral conference was conceived above all as an opportunity for improving our knowledge of each other.

The first part of the conference took place the 29 September 2011 in the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. The opening address was by Marina Martynova, Head of the Centre for European and American Studies at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and by Javier Garcia-Larrache, Counsellor for Cultural Affairs at the Spanish Embassy in Moscow. Alongside the intense academic sessions, we also had the opportunity to sample Russian gastronomy and observe the rich historical and artistic legacy of Moscow. On behalf of all the scholars from the Basque Country who travelled there between the 28 and 30 September to take part in the conference I would like to thank the Russian Academy of Sciences for its kindness and hospitality. We discovered a friendly country, a charming city and delicious gastronomy. Thank you for making it possible for us to enjoy an unforgettable experience.

The second part of the bilateral conference took place at the Faculty of Arts of the University of the Basque Country in Vitoria-Gasteiz on October 18<sup>th</sup>, 2011, and was inaugurated by Iván Igartua, Director of Research and Coordination of Linguistic Policies of the Basque Government, by Esther Rodriguez, Academic Secretary of the Campus of Alava, and by myself, Iñaki Bazán, Dean of the Faculty of Arts. As hosts, we welcomed our guests supported by our public institutions and also by a number of individuals who personally and disinterestedly contributed towards the organization of the stay of the Russian delegation, preparing an intense program of cultural and gastronomic activities. I would like to thank all of them for rising to their task and for their help in the Basque part of the bilateral conference: Antonio Rivera, Deputy of the Regional Minister of Culture of the Basque Government; Oscar Beltran de Otalora, Director of the Cabinet of the General Deputy of Alava, Ana Lasarte, Chief of Congresses and Tourism of the City Council of Vitoria-Gasteiz, Ignacio Lana and Julio Fojo from the Society Amabost in Vitoria, and the inestimable Cristina Vicandi and her husband Patxi Viribay.

The reader has in his hands the results of these twin sessions of academic and scientific interchange, co-organized by the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Faculty of Arts of the University of the Basque Country, a conference which would simply have not been possible without Roman Ignatiev's and Nerea Madariaga's organisational work behind the scenes. Special thanks go to David Peterson, who has performed the huge task of revising the English versions of this volume.

## **PART 1. ETHNIC POLICIES IN SPAIN AND RUSSIA**

### **UNDERSTANDING AND GOVERNING DIVERSITY IN COMPLEX SOCIETIES\***

*Valery Tishkov*  
*IEA RAS*

#### **1. Evolution of political attitudes and scholarly approaches**

From the moment of formation of modern (nation) states, there has been an old collision between the doctrine and policy of nation-building on the basis of the people under the jurisdiction of a sovereign state, and on the basis of group differences by culture, religion or historical and regional features. Obviously, the culture and language of the predominant majority generally serve as the cultural basis for formation of political (civic) nations, but it is also true that any state and the society within its borders embraces ethnic and regional complexities. The cultural and, even more so, social homogeneity of nations has been an ideal and political doctrine from the start of the very existence of national states. This doctrine was put into practice through the policy of assimilation and cultural remoulding of heterogeneous populations into some desired “national type”. Assimilative and integrational models, alongside principles of civil equality, dominated nation-building from the times of the French Revolution till World War II. But democracy and equality did not apply to everyone even in the area of Euro-Atlantic civilization. Discrimination and segregation of so-called coloured and native (aboriginal) people existed for a long time in the countries of the Western hemisphere. Colonialism reigned in other regions of the world through the system of so-called indirect rule. Acknowledgement of cultural diversity and the rights of minorities were not even mentioned, and all the more so for tribal populations of the colonial periphery. The rights of minorities as a category of law and politics appeared only in the era of World War I and the League of Nations with the purpose of

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state formation in the area of the disintegrated Dual Monarchy of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.

New doctrines of self-determination, nation-building, and citizenship, individual and collective rights were developed in the second half of the twentieth century, when the global colonial system was dismantled, dozens of new states emerged into the political arena, there was mass migration, and globalization and democratization became the predominant trends of political evolution. These doctrines included a set of national and international mechanisms for coping with racial and other forms of discrimination, and the protection of rights of the persons belonging to ethnic, racial, religious or linguistic minorities. Doctrines of unity in diversity, multiculturalism, rights to difference and identity, etc. appeared in both intellectual discourse and in political practice. Similar policies of the “flourishing and convergence of socialist nations”, internationalism and the friendship of the peoples became an official motto in the USSR and the zone of its influence, irrespective of the different political and ideological regimes. The concept of the Soviet people (“sovetskii narod”) – the community, which was a reality as a form of identity on the basis of common history, culture and ideological indoctrination of the residents of the country was added to said policy in the 1970s.

The policy of multiculturalism in its various versions became established in the countries of Western democracy in the 1970s and the 1980s – from Canada and Australia to France and Germany. Features common to all variants were the acknowledgement of the heterogeneity of modern civil nations, the acknowledgement and support of cultural differences, including not only so-called historical minorities but also immigrant groups differing in culture and / or religion, who in many cases became citizens of the country of new residence. The concept of collective rights and so-called consociation democracy (the democracy of consent) is becoming more and more popular. It deviated from the formula of individual equality in favour of members of minority groups with diminished status because of discrimination and other past and present injustices.

This policy gave positive results, but it included the risk of stiffening (making more rigid) group boundaries and the possibility of positive discrimination, i.e. the limitation of rights of the majority and subsequently a response in the form of xenophobia and chauvinism. We wrote about the contradictory character of multiculturalism and the need for it to be complemented with a policy of common identity formation for all citizens at the international conference dedicated to mul-

multiculturalism in Moscow in 1999 (Tishkov 2002). Similar analyses and assessments of the concept of multiculturalism were offered by Western scientists, including the philosopher and political scientist of Turkish origin Seyla Benhabib. She wrote about the problem of strengthening the influence of cultural factors on political processes under the pressure of mass international migration and globalization. Based on the examination in various countries of existing forms of interaction of traditions and norms, customs and laws, S. Benhabib tried to answer the question of to what extent and how is it possible to combine the desire of cultures to maintain their dignity with the basic liberal values of Western democracy – freedom and equality (Benhabib 2003).

As regards the Russian Federation, even after the disintegration of the USSR, the concept of a “multinational people” has been ingrained in the Constitution of 1993, and equality between the representatives of all Russian nationalities as well as support for their cultures, were at the centre of the creation of the new democracy. This policy of “multinationality” (or polyethnicity) was carried out in post-Soviet Russia notwithstanding the fact that simultaneously periphery ethnic nationalism was putting the country under threat of a new round of disintegration. It revealed itself in the 1990s in the “parade of sovereignties” of Russian ethnic autonomies and in armed separatist conflict in Chechnya (On Chechnya see 2004).

During recent years, Russian scholars carried out important social science research projects on interethnic relations, migration, tolerance and xenophobia. Unfortunately, the level of domestic social studies in these fields leaves much to be desired as most problems are treated on the primordial vision of ethnicity and ethnonationalistic views of state building and state policy in polyethnic societies. Socio-biologic and ethno-nationalist approaches were supplemented with the ideology and praxis of new racism, which is based on the non-acceptance of cultural differences (Shnirelman 2011).

The same tendency can be also observed in parts of the Western scientific community, to say nothing about extreme right-wing and ultra-nationalistic policies. It was there that the turn towards neo-conservatism started, which selected the liberal concept of multiculturalism and the policies of cultural diversity and cultural freedom as targets for criticism. It was a kind of reaction not only to the costs of the liberal economic model, but also to the inability of Western democratic societies to find an adequate answer for the socio-cultural consequences of mass immigration to their countries during the period of post-war

development. An especially acute reaction in recipient societies was brought about by the problematical integration of Islamic migrant groups. A cohort of publicists and political activists began not only to preach ultra-right, xenophobic views, but also to revive the ideas of forceful assimilation or deportation of “aliens” as well as formulating new forms of cultural racism. Public statements by national leaders (A. Merkel, N. Sarkozy, D. Cameron) became a kind of premature funeral for multiculturalism. These statements met enthusiastic applause among Russian neoconservatives as well as the works by S. Huntington and P. Buchanan translated and published in Russia. Superficial chimeras of “archetypes”, “mentalities”, “genetic funds”, cultural incompatibility and insurmountable conflicts strongly influenced Russian public thinking and negatively affected the views of many Russians.

In meantime, our position is that notwithstanding the disappointment stemming from the policy of multiculturalism and tolerance, the real political practitioners and the majority of intellectual elite in liberal democratic countries acknowledge the irreversibility of the changes that have taken place under the influence of mass immigration, including immigrants from the countries of the Islamic cultural area. We should concentrate on improving the governance of complex societies rather than replaying the past and denying democracy.

## **2. New Understanding of Cultural Diversity**

The problems that have turned out to be most difficult to resolve are related to understanding and managing cultural diversity at the level of regions, states, local communities and even individuals. This is the case because neither sufficient material nor financial resources have been devoted to them while issues of value and world outlook have been factored in. In cases of conflict such matters are not easily resolved on the basis of quantitative calculations, bargaining or exchange, but require finer humanitarian technologies. Values are particularly ill-suited to compromise solutions, and as a result conflicts based on cultural (ethnic, racial, religious, language) differences can become extremely bitter, and the hatred sown by them can survive several generations.

The problem being examined is significantly projected into politics at all its levels: geopolitical and continental, national and state, regional, intra-state and inter-state. The most important of the political functions of ethnicity, culture in a broad sense, is the working out of a formula for managing cultural diversity, adequated to each



society and specific situation, working out mechanisms for ensuring civil harmony and preventing conflicts. In other words, what policy should be adopted in order for society and the country not to be involved in inter-group feuds, in order not to be affected by xenophobia and sectarian hatred for reasons of looking different, speaking another language, or praying to another God? It seems to be a simple question, but it includes so many irreconcilable beliefs and convictions, virtually indomitable narrow-mindedness and cynical calculations!

The problem of understanding and managing polyethnic societies in the context of modern politics is central to our analysis. It certainly is the case when a crisis of misunderstanding is all too often followed by the premature abandonment of the policy of multiculturalism, while simultaneously there are attempts to discredit tolerance as the most important spiritual and moral value, one of the key components of a mature and effective state policy. The problem of tolerance and xenophobia is not new. However the human beings change considerably and quickly, and scientific approaches and political priorities change with them. Note that, faced with cultural complexity, the traditional view understands the presence of distinct cultural units in society, being components of that society while also being both independent and complete, and sharing similar structural features, but which nonetheless differ in content and external characteristics. Many ethnologists, sociologists and psychologists not only assume the existence of such subjects but allegedly unveil “ethnic codes”, “cultural distances”, “civilization (in)compatibility” and other constructions that intrigue neophytes and politicians. Whence and for what reason did an obsession with cultural particularism flourish in Russian public and scientific thinking, ignoring the existence of cultural similarity? The similarity and affinity of the people of Russia is expressed not only in the Russian language, used for communication, and world outlook, but also in moral, ethical and behavioural aims, which are quickly learnt by outside observers, but which internal experts do not want to recognize.

In the opinion of some experts, there is no common nation in Russia precisely because of ethnic diversity and civilizational differences. Deniers of pan-Russian identity refer to the fact that there is no civil society or democratic institutions in Russia either and consequently that there is no civil nation<sup>1</sup> (See analysis of critics 2013). As in some other European countries, the doctrine of polyethnicity (multinationality) and the Russian project of nation building are opposed in our country by the lefts’ liberal thesis on civil equality and freedom as

well as by the right's conservative view on the preferential right of the majority without special attention to small groups and cultures ("If they want to live in Russia, let them all consider themselves ethnic Russians"). How is it possible to dismantle these unfounded views and build a new vision of polyethnic societies and then to renew policy and the management system?

First of all it is necessary to distinguish between the ethnic and the national. For a long time, description of ethnic groups in Russian social studies consisted of the establishment of such units in themselves (a kind of catalogue of peoples-ethnoses), studying and describing their structural elements, and drawing evolutionary trees and ethnic maps based on language groups and even racial typology. This approach to studying human society proceeds from the fact that both man and historic phenomena and cultural traditions each have a starting place and periods of evolution. Human cultures go through the phenomenon of cultural genesis in all its diversity depending on the environment, socio-historic factors and collective human strategies. The start of evolutionary ascendance in relation to ethnic societies is formed by ethnogenesis, which presumes the birth of ethnos (in L.N. Gumilev's works – from some external impulse). After the "birth" a kind of ethnic picture of the world and ethnic hierarchy (ethnoses, superethnoses, etc.) are formed, and there are ethnic processes going on inside those ethnoses.

One should note that similar views on ethnos formation and ethnic processes were held in Russian social studies before the present day theoreticians, though without any biological racism. They were looked upon as genuine sociological operations of merger, division, and reformulation from old forms or their separate parts. There is chronological periodisation established for them as well as historical dates for starting points, maturity and completion. Similarly "the objective distinctive features of nations" and even the historical moment when nations are born are determined in this way. All this leads to cultural racism in science and politics, when people of the same distinctive ethnic features are looked upon as biological or biosocial unities, being in incomplete or even incompatible states in relation to each other. Moreover, according to this theory there are young ethnoses and old ethnoses, there are passionate ethnoses and even ethnoses-parasites, which eat away at decompose the body of another ethnos from within<sup>2</sup>.

Inter-group borders connected with migration and migrants from

the states of the former USSR were added to all those constructions in the post-soviet period. Thus “native people” and “those who came” appeared, as well as “blacks” and “Asians”, “people of Caucasian nationality”, etc. All those are actual categories, i.e. they are given not only a cultural and ethnic sense but a racial one as well.

Let us examine the main spheres of existence of cultural diversity in modern states, including in the Russian Federation as well as what problems arise in modern states and how they are solved with different degrees of success.

### **3. Ethnic and National Communities**

An integral part of modern human communities and even a condition of their development is the phenomenon of cultural complexity. This complexity is constantly reproduced under the influence of various factors, bringing about problems of inter-cultural communications, inter-ethnic relations, and ethnic conflicts. On the other hand, cultural homogeneity would mean social entropy, i.e. the cultural death of the mankind. It is precisely for this reason that we study different cultures, cultural differences and interactions. Not in order to eliminate cultural diversity, but to conserve it. What then are the weaknesses of traditional approaches in this matter? In the fact that we are inclined to look upon cultural systems as collective bodies or a map-atlas which, irrespective of its filling in and decoration with ethnographic types, is merely a provisional static reflection of the inimitable richness of the landscape. The primordial approach, which from the outside seems close to reality, founded on turning to the standard (often called tradition) and on the “reality of ethnos”, does not in fact properly reflect the phenomenon of the cultural mosaic, failing to explain certain situations and neglecting examples from real life.

Viewing culture as an archetype rather than as fluid and multiply ethnic identity -as a biosocial organism that negates the movement and development of cultural forms- ignores the impact of the activities of people, political prescriptions and managerial procedures. For example, the contents of the words “Russian” and “Tatar” changed so much over different periods that historical and demographic tables and maps mean little unless one takes into account the fact of those changes in meaning. Ancient and medieval mosaics of the names of tribes and peoples are almost completely different to the nomenclature of more recent times, but the movement of names (ethnonyms) in space

does not always mean the “dying out of ethnoses” or the “migration of peoples”. The mental maps, imagination and observations of travellers travel in reality, while the ethnographic reality itself may stay the same.

And vice versa: the material included in the concept of a cultural unit may change partially or radically, and yet the concept continues its existence. In pre-revolutionary Russia all three Eastern Slavic peoples were considered Russian, as indeed were all those who converted to Orthodoxy. The meaning of “Russian” had changed considerably when ethnographers recommended the introduction of a prompt into instructions for the census takers during national census of 1926, “If he calls himself Russian, then specify what he (she) is – Great Russian, Little Russian or Byelorussian”. Henceforth only the first were registered as Russians, and Little Russians became Ukrainians, Russian Byelorussians became just Byelorussians.

A cultural flow can be organized in different ways and even turned back if there are enough arguments and resources. Thus, before the period of socialist nation building in Russia, all Turkic people including Azerbaijanis were called Tatar. Then Kazan Tatars (Kazanly) took the name Tatars as their exclusive property, though there were Siberian Tatars and Crimean Tatars to say nothing of Kryashens, who differed from the other Tatars on account of their Orthodox belief. There were a lot of other ethnic constructions and reconfigurations (Sakha instead of Yakut, Sami instead of Lapp, etc.), and many new or revived group identities emerged. Over twenty years the number of nationalities in Russia grew from 128 (1989) to 182 (2002) and during the national census of 2010 about ten more were added. The list of minority indigenous peoples with some specific group rights nearly doubled after a federal law has been passed in 1999 in support of this category of population.

We do not know in which direction the world is moving from the perspective of evolution of cultural forms and systems: towards unification or towards reproduction and complication of diversity, but we know definitely that this complexity itself has become different. New tendencies and manifestations of cultural complexity appeared, as did new technical and information resources for the destruction of cultural norms, and the phenomenon and concept of cultural hybridism or *mélange*. This process is of global and, most likely, of irreversible character. States and regions, which find adequate political responses, will win, those that move backwards in a search of lost “cultural norm” of “old good time”, will lose. And if it is so, then we should look different-

ly upon the socio-cultural nature of modern nations – the all-embracing and most powerful social coalitions of people. We are speaking about communities, encapsulated within state borders, which are usually called peoples or nations (Chinese, Indians, Russians, Brazilians, Canadians, etc.). Attempts to divide countries into “nation states” and “multinational states” only hide and obscure the problem as there are just no such categories in international law or in academic classifications. It is communities by states (co-citizenships) and not ethnic groups or religious communities that are the main producers of cultural capital in the modern epoch. It is they who support, preserve and protect ethno-cultural diversity inside a country and even outside its borders from internal and external challenges, especially as regards kin-diasporas.

Economic bases created by national communities as well as educational and information institutions, security legislation, authorities and public organizations, high-level (professional) culture and many other things are key factors for the conservation (or destruction) of ethnic, language, religious and other culturally different systems within national communities. International mechanisms were added to the protective factors during the most recent decades but they are also created by representatives of nation-states and depend on their monetary contributions.

What are modern nations? There is methodological confusion and politicized discussion in social studies on the matter. In Russia, in contrast to in most countries, there was for a long time and still remains the understanding of nation exclusively in the ethnic sense. The understanding and use of this category in double (civil-political and ethno-cultural) and not mutually exclusive sense, as suggested fifteen years ago (*Tishkov* 1995, 2000), and has become acknowledged in Russia only during the last few years. And still this acknowledgement often takes a rather forced form, bordering on intellectual schizophrenia and excessive debate.

To take a similar example using a Spanish case. At the time of the Football World Cup in the Republic of South Africa (2010), during the first part of the championship, there was information in the media about a mass demonstration in Barcelona against the decision of the Supreme Court in Madrid to consider non-constitutional the designation of the people of the Catalonia region in their own Statute as a “Catalan nation”. That right has been recognized as the exclusive right of all the Spanish people, including not only Castilians but also Basques, Galicians, Catalans and the other regional communities of the country. Catalan nationalists waited for the court decision for nearly two years and it turned out to be not in their favour. Madrid recognizes only

linguistic variety (a big difference from France, where the French language is completely dominant), but denies the ethnic division of the Spanish nation into other nations (in this respect, as in France!).

However an important difference between Spain and Russia is that the Catalans do not consider themselves an ethnic community; they consider themselves a self-governing region-nation. The Catalans are the entire population of the region and not just those of Catalan origin and /or speak the Catalan language. The acute conflict was happily resolved by the final of the Football World Cup in South Africa. The whole of Spain celebrated the victory of the national (!) team, among which there were many football players from Barcelona and also a player from the Basque country. Thus there are disputes going on in many countries as to whom to call a nation, but the most wide-spread case is the refusal by the state, as represented by the central authorities, to recognize ethnic or regional communities as nations. In China, for example, all the officially recognized 55 nationalities, including the *Han* majority and national minorities (nationalities), are not considered nations but all the Chinese – citizens of the country are considered a nation (*jonhua mind-zu*). However, this official formula existing in many countries does not stop the Uighur in China, Bengalis in India, Hawaiians in the US, the Quebecois in Canada, or the Scots in the UK and other ethnic activists and politicians from using *nation* as a self-categorization. Many ethnic communities (peoples and nationalities) in many countries were “nationalized” in mental and linguistic senses a long time ago. It is useless to usurp this self-categorization exclusively in favour of the dominant majority or in favour of the general civic community.

However let us return to France. Starting with the Jacobin persecution of the minorities and regional languages, French as a more or less common though loose identity appeared only one hundred years after the French Revolution. The French nation existed and continues to exist first of all as a doctrine, as a legal standard and as a collective agreement. It is considered that there are no ethnoses in France and that all the citizens are one people – the French with important historical and cultural diversity of territories and places, which generate their own identities. But what are the French as a nation then? This is an historical, cultural and socio-political community within the limits of the state, with a cultural complexity that shrank in the years of political centralization and general civil upheavals, but has since acquired new diversity in the epoch of democratization, decolonization and mass migrations. The modernized tradition in France is not nec-

essarily civil and ethnic, though that also exists (Corsican or Breton), but France continues to be divided by cultural and territorial identities, by locality or regionalism (Pays) rather than ethnicity (*Filippova* 2010), a cultural heterogeneity that maddened Charles de Gaulle ‘How can you govern a *country* which has 246 varieties of *cheese*?’.

The situation has become even more complex since then. Today the 65 million citizens of the French nation consist of not only “the French proper”, i.e. citizens with a traditional French origin, but another 13 million citizens of different origins: 5 million have European roots (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Polish, Russian and others), 5 million are representatives of Berber and Arab peoples, half a million are Turks, another half million are North African Jews, and 700 thousand more are ethnic French from the French colonies. The religious situation in France has also become more complex: of the 70% of French who are Catholics, only 10% go to church and there are a further 22% of agnostics and atheists, alongside growing numbers of practising Moslems (5-10% of the population).

We are not discussing the future of the French nation, but want to highlight the phenomenon of the complication of the ethno-religious composition of the nation, while also drawing attention to the fact that monoculturalism has never been a reality in this country. There was only ever a doctrine of monoculturalism, not acknowledging the so-called *ethnies*. In reality, regional and local cultural identities on the basis of different specific features (from historic and proto-state references to sorts of wine and cheese) served as points of references for group identities instead of trivial ethnic groupings. Perhaps only the language remains from the French monoculture, but the French language sometimes seems the last bastion before the attack of immigrants speaking other languages. This French bastion is protected by a special constitutional law of 1992 on protection of the linguistic heritage and a number of other state decrees. And still it seems that France takes the problems of *hijabs* and *pogroms* in the Paris outskirts more calmly than the Russian interpreters of the events in the country.

It is difficult to use the USA as an example for a Russian audience as there are nearly always reproaches following alleged promotion of American recipes by liberal Westerners, which prove unsuitable for the uniqueness of Russia. However we should note that the image of the USA as an integrated nation is primarily a rhetorical and political device. These presentations was initially embodied in the doctrine of the melting pot, though America has never been monocultural and even less in social

harmony. There have always been numerous ethnic and racial groups and there have always been many languages, to say nothing about past and continuing discrimination of the Native Americans, Afro-Americans and immigrants. But what of the growing complexity of the American nation then questioned today by the opponents of multiculturalism)?

We'll answer the question in the following way: the formula of unity in diversity (*E pluribus unum*), inscribed on the American coat of arms and coins, came true in the country. It has been the basis and condition for the existence of the American nation for a long time. The cultural complexity of the Americans does not decrease but instead increases with ongoing immigration. Mass migration takes place against the background of growing American nationalism in an expansionist (to be more exact – messianic) form and the strengthening of religious fundamentalism among Christian Americans (see: *Lieven* 2004). The growing complexity of the American nation is revealed in the continuing devotion to immigration and the increase of the share of population of foreign origin. There is an impression that the USA has reached such a level of ethnic, religious and linguistic heterogeneity, that any political discussions and scientific studies of the “core culture”, which allegedly constitutes the basis of the American nation, has lost sense for them. Discussion of WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) and 100% Americans stopped two or three decades ago. But there are no talks now about any referent (dominant) component of the nation. Modern USA is a nation of minorities, the nation of cultural hybridism or, as Hillary Clinton said during her presidential campaign, “we are the nation of nations”. All that is supplemented by another process of complication, namely the recognition of multiple racial belonging in addition to recognition of multiple ethnic identity (starting with the national census of 1980).

Let us now examine a European example, which is closer to the Russian experience: the ethnic and religious composition of Great Britain and the dynamics of its national development as a polyethnic society. According 2011 Census, there are 62.3 million people living in the country, among them White (includes autochthon English, Scots, Welsh, and Northern Irish) make 87%, Asian 6,9% (Indian 2,3%, Pakistani 1,9%, Bangladeshi 0,7%, Chinese 0,7%), Black 3%, Mixed 2%, Other 1%. There are no reliable statistics concerning ethnic Russians and former Soviet people, though the number of Russians and Russian speaking people grows quicker than other categories (according to some data, there are over 100 thousand Russian students at British universities and colleges). Christians of various confessions make up



72% of the population and Moslems total 4%. Where is *ethnos* here and where is *nation*? And what is this nation called? Or is there no nation in the United Kingdom of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland?

This nation is called the British people, and the change from Englishness to Britishness took place as the result of public debates and activities of historians (See: *Colley* 1992) and the specially appointed Royal Commission on the British identity in the 1980s. This change of designation of national identity was in no way disturbed by the latest riots in British cities.

The modern complexity of Great Britain as a nation is revealed in several ways; the great ethnic and religious diversity of the modern urban population and the growth of so-called regional languages is a remarkable phenomenon: about 30% of the people in Scotland speak Scots, about 60,000 speak Scottish Gaelic, 20% of the people in Wales speak Welsh, about 10% in Ulster speak Irish, about 3,000 people speak Cornish. This is present day UK with allegedly monolingual English nation!

#### **4. Language Diversity and Linguistic Policy**

The traditional view on the situation with languages comes down to the fact that new languages do not appear in the modern world and the disappearance of languages as a result of globalization proceeds apace. Some experts say that by the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century there will be only 400-500 languages left in the world instead of 4,000-5,000, the figure during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. There is much speculation and many political statements in relation to the problem of “dying languages” and much composition of lists of endangered or vanishing languages. Declarations and charters on the questions of protection of language diversity were approved at the UNESCO and European Council levels. The most well-known international document in the sphere is the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages approved by the cabinet of ministers of the EC as a convention in 1992. The Russian Federation joined the Charter in 2001 but has not ratified it yet.

To a certain extent, it is an illusion that the world is becoming more monolingual because of globalization. It is true, that top languages such as English increasingly conquer the world language space, and to an extent these worries are justified. However the world language situation is rather more complicated, a complexity that lies in the following processes. The first is the blurring and mixing of language areas in such a way that today no one risks composing lan-

guage atlases as it was done in the 19th century or how it could still be done for ethnicity and religion in the 20th century. The second is the complexity of the language repertoire of modern humans and the spread of multilingualism among the population of many countries. Finally, there is a tendency for the revitalization of languages, i.e. languages coming back to life after decades of oblivion. Breton in France, Gaelic and Cornish in Great Britain, Hawaiian in the USA are some of the examples.

From the experience of our own country, we cannot share the concept of a global “dying out of languages”. Not a single language disappeared in Russia in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, except the Sireniki dialect of the Eskimo language (because of the liquidation of the Sireniki settlement in Chukotka in the 1960s). Notwithstanding the dramatic forecasts of some scientists and politicians, linguistic diversity will survive when language situations within modern nations complicate and when the language repertoire of individuals widens. State language policy in its turn will develop towards the recognition and support of multilingualism, including official ones at both state and regional levels, and spheres of language servicing will become more complex too. Bureaucracy and services will increasingly speak the language of taxpayers and not vice versa.

Several questions for science and politics follow from these assessments. First, how long will the single understanding of the “native language”, which is becoming obsolete, stay in public practice, including in Russian national censuses, and what does this category mean in general? Is it “the principal language of knowledge and communications”, or is it “the first language learnt in childhood (the so-called *mother tongue*)”, or is it something else, for example, the language of one’s nationality, no matter its knowledge and use? The Federal Law of 2001 on the all-Russian national censuses makes it necessary to collect data on “the native language”, but it has not become clear what this is nor how to do it from the censuses carried out in 2002 and 2010.

We welcome the approach of the European Language Charter, as it aims to protect the languages themselves rather than groups of speakers. The Charter does not use the concept of the native language and does not strictly bind the language to ethnic identity. For example, in theory, if you are a Buryat, your native language should obligatorily be Buryat, and similarly, if you are a Tatar, your native language should be Tatar, with no other languages in their stead or alongside to be regarded as native languages. In reality, the state of affairs is rather different: dozens if not hundreds of millions of people switch from

one language to another or learn and use several languages equally. This state of affairs is widespread in European countries, and is not an exception in Russia either as a result of widespread mixed marriages, settlements pattern and the high level of education.

The second question – to what extent are the modern state and its people responsible for preserving the linguistic map of their country and the language of learning, culture and information? There is no doubt that native speakers themselves preserve and protect their language systems of communication, but there are some new tendencies in the matter. Public activists, linguists and ethnographers, some international institutions with the prescribed mission of conservation of intangible cultural diversity are concerned for people to continue speaking in the way as they did a hundred or two hundred years ago, and for this diversity to survive in a similar way to the diversity of species in wildlife. It is not without reason that the phenomenon of the “red list” of languages appears, analogous to the list of endangered species. There are also those who pursue the policy of linguistic nationalism, thinking that a sovereign state has the right to demand from all its citizens the obligatory study of and command of the state or official language, with no compromise in relation to official bilingualism or multilingualism. This leads to indirect violence and open discrimination; moreover in a number of states of the former USSR this language discrimination has a mass character.

Thirdly, there is the problem of linguistic romanticism and nationalism, when the matter of language becomes an instrument of limitation of human rights and even civil rights, a mechanism of political pressure and manipulation, an element of geopolitical rivalry, including the exertion of pressure on states and societies. The real language situation and personal strategies become to an extent hostages of romantic and politicized views on what language is and what policy should be pursued. For the last two decades, policy-makers of some post-soviet states as well as international organizations, including UNESCO and OSCE, carry a certain degree of responsibility for ignoring the linguistic rights of millions of Russian-speakers as well as for making politically motivated recommendations to national governments.

At present there are private funds operating in European countries (Great Britain, Germany) with programs for languages under the threat of extinction. However, to what extent does this concern and even political mission respond to the peculiarities of each country, its regions and, most importantly, the interests and strategies of its people? If we acknowledge the principle of cultural freedom, then the right to lan-

guage shift (or assimilation) should be acknowledged as well, and not only for the conservation of the language spoken by a part of the representatives of this or that group of people (ethnic, religious or of migrant origin). In this situation the languages of world cultural systems (top world languages), which include Russian as well as English, Spanish and French, will always be in a privileged position even in a case of formal equality of all the languages. The explanation is simple: command and use of those languages gives more possibilities for success in life than minority languages. Because of that the demand for “language parities” on an inter-state level is not always just and realistic, if primarily we take into account the requirements and interests of the people themselves. There are “double standards” in this matter, which are not necessarily always the fault of politicians. For example, a switch of an emigrant from Russia of Chuvash or Chechen origin to English or German in the country of emigration (USA, Great Britain, Germany or Austria) is considered a required norm of integration, and a similar process of switching to the Russian language in Russia by representatives of non-Russian nationalities may be treated by language nationalists and external monitors as a policy of forceful assimilation.

The matter of conservation of language diversity is especially important, including its political projections, for Europe, including the Baltic states and states of Eastern Europe as well as for Russia and other CIS states. A considerable part of the population of Western Europe already has command of two or more languages, but the question of language policy in the EU is far from being resolved, as is evidenced by the prolonged process of ratification of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages.

Russia’s position on the matter is still being developed. After signing the Charter in May, 2001, Russia examined the possibility of joining this document by ratification. Russia is not the only state, which postponed ratification. For example, France and Ireland both signed the Charter in 1999, but have not ratified it yet. There are special features in Russia as in many European countries and even more than anywhere, and they may prevent a positive solution of the matter. These are a great variety of languages, together with the unequal social and cultural development of certain Russian territories and the undesirability of introducing the matter of language to a political level in regions where potential for conflict exists. And finally there are considerable financial expenses which follow ratification.

At this stage a language (or languages) is not only a means of com-

munication of this or that group of people, but is independent and to a certain extent autonomous from its speakers' own cultural values, and which can be lost just as any other value can, though in this case we are not speaking about the physical dying out of people. A switch to another language does not necessarily mean a loss of identity, i.e. an understanding of belonging to this or that people. Religious, emotional and spiritual connection with the country and its culture and other components of identity can serve as alternative supports for self-consciousness.

The problem of the autonomy of cultural values and their loss without endangering the cultural life of a people has become more acute in the epoch of globalization. At the same time many states already understand that cultural losses, such as the loss of non-dominant languages, cause damage to the cultural patrimony of living and future generations, creating an atmosphere of dissatisfaction and degradation. Unfortunately, Russia has not learnt yet how to react correctly to these modern challenges. Its legislation, legal praxis and linguistic policy are all still based on the concept of "the language of an ethnic group", "the language of a nationality" and lead to debates about equality and discrimination of some groups in relation to others, when the debate should concentrate on differences in the status and vulnerability of some languages in comparison with others.

Not everything is perfect with the language policy of other countries, including those which ratified the Charter. For example, Great Britain, which ratified the Charter and in which many languages function, limited its list to three languages – Welsh, Scottish Gaelic and Irish. Switzerland named only two "protected" languages – Romansh and Italian as "the least used official languages". The Ukraine ratified the Charter in 2005, nine years after signing it, and 13 of its languages were included on the ratification list. At the same time a number of languages used in the country with considerable numbers of speakers were not included in the list. In particular, Armenian, Gipsy, Georgian and Tatar. Ruthenian is not regarded as a language either.

The state of affairs with language diversity in Russia is much more complicated. It is evident that only two or three dozen languages out of the more than a hundred spoken in Russia, can be originally included in the ratification list. But even inclusion of this number will mean considerable organizational and financial pressure in view of the territorial scattering of those languages. With the promotion of language policy in Russia, the list of languages can be further expanded. Consequently, the process of the Charter's implementation in our coun-

try will take decades, but that should not be regarded as prioritising some nationalities and discriminating against others. New approaches to language policy will improve the possibilities of social management in the environment of growing linguistic pluralism, generated by large-scale migration as well as the interests of new generations in their cultural heritage, and will help citizens of Russia to develop the feeling of wholeness and unity with the common Motherland.

As to the current state of affairs in the key field of language learning, the conditions of teaching the so-called native languages in Russia correspond to international standards to a considerable extent. However state efforts in this direction need to be more coherent. The same can be said about the state of affairs in Russian mass media and in the support of cultural events in different languages. Thus the most effective and democratic policy for a modern state in relation to linguistic diversity is the policy of providing official status as state languages to one or more languages, which should then be provided with the necessary conditions for its (their) development and functioning at the expense of the state. The purpose of the Russian state is to provide for the learning of the Russian language in full accordance with state standards throughout its territory and for all its citizens. At the same time the state, its regional authorities and local self-government bodies together with public organizations and private business should support the language requirements of its citizens, especially in the fields of education, administration of justice, social services and information.

## **5. Migrantophobia and Neoracism**

Russia has experienced large-scale migration processes during the last two decades. According to official data only, more than 5 million immigrants came to the country in the 1990s, among which 3.3 million were ethnic Russians. About 1.2 million of these migrants were forced migrants and refugees. According to expert opinion, the total number of immigrants and forced migrants and refugees among them was approximately double the official figure. The so-called illegal (i.e. unregistered) migrants numbered up to 6 million people, and by the middle of the 2000s they amounted to 10 million people (*Ryazantsev* 2007). According to data from the Federal Migration Service, there were about 5 million foreign citizens in Russia in 2010, among which less than 1 million people were employed legally. The first wave of migrants consisted of people leaving zones of armed conflict in Transcaucasia (Azerbaijan

and Georgia) and Central Asia (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). They were mostly Russians, Armenians, Meskhetian Turks and Southern Ossetians. Then there was mass immigration by ethnic Russians mostly from Kazakhstan and the countries of Central Asia, Transcaucasus, Ukraine and Baltic states in the first half of the 1990s. Mass labour migration started from the mid-1990s, and the proportion of the ethnic Russians in it was a minimum. They were mostly temporary labour migrants from Ukraine and Moldavia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kirghizia (Tishkov 1997, Vitkovskaya 1998). They were followed by migrants from Turkey, China and Vietnam.

The share of labour migrants from the countries of Central Asia increased noticeably in the 2000s. People originally from rural areas, who know Russian culture and language only poorly, prevailed in this migration wave. It was this group of migrants that became the object of downright exploitation, and migrantophobia on the part of the dominant population. This group of migrants occupies the less prestigious niches in the labour market, and are mostly used as unskilled labour in construction (40% of migrants in 2009), in commerce (30%) and municipal works. The share of migrants before the financial and economic crisis of 2008 amounted to about 7-8% of the country's labour resources. This is less than the share of immigrants in the labour resources of Switzerland (22%), USA (15%), Austria (10%), Germany (9%). As for the overall product produced by migrants (the cost of labour performed, goods manufactured, services provided), it amounts to 10% of Russian GDP. It exceeds the amount of financial resources sent by migrants to their countries of origin many times over. Though it is the latter figure of several hundred million dollars that constantly appears in assessments of migration, the results of migrants' labour for the national economy and their contribution to the everyday life of the Russian people are practically never assessed.

Migration influences the ethnic composition of the population of the country, especially the regions, where migrants of the first wave settled for permanent residence and where there are a particularly high proportion of temporary labour migrants. Thus, the composition of the population of the Southern regions of Russia changed noticeably in the 1990s. A lot of migrants of Armenian nationality came to the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions as well as the Rostov region, and tens of thousands of Russians from the republics of the Northern Caucasus as well as from the North and Far East moved there as well. Many Azerbaijanis and Armenians, as well as internal migrants from the republics of the

Northern Caucasus, came to the central regions of Russia and stayed there for permanent residence. The most perceptible and painful effects were as a result of rapid demographic changes in the composition of the population by groups which had never before lived in those regions. This phenomenon applies to both small towns and big cities. Especially alarming were the assessments of some politicians and experts in relation to Moscow, which was allegedly full of immigrants. In reality such changes had been exaggerated, both in Moscow and in the Southern Russian regions. Nevertheless, immigration started being regarded as a negative factor, as a threat to the existing culture and way of life and to national security, as regards crime and terrorism.

After the approval of the new law on citizenship and the transfer of the Federal Migration Service to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2001, the fight against illegal migration became the essence and prime purpose of migration policy. A negative image of a migrant as a potential criminal, unwanted rival, parasite and hanger on, who uses the opportunities offered by Russia and the services of its people, was created to justify this policy. This coincided with the mercenary and selfish interests of numerous employers, as the frightening and humiliation of immigrants allowed employers not to pay them in full and to evade responsibility for their living conditions and health. The problem of migration actually became a moral problem for the whole of Russian society, which in the final analysis did not pass this exam. Migrantophobia reached the highest level in Russia in the 2000s, including numerous cases of violence and the cruel murders of migrants. Groups of youths with nationalistic sentiments were engaged in all this under the influence of well-known politicians, journalists and a whole cohort of experts on migration and demography. As V.A. Shnirelman notes, these anti-migrationists “referred to migration exclusively in terms of ‘migrationary flood’, ‘army of barbarians’, ‘close-knit and self-contained groups’, ‘aggressive potential’, ‘aggression from the alien South’ and ‘aggression against white men’” (*Shnirelman* 2011: 18–19).

One of the most wide-spread provisions in anti-immigrant rhetoric is the “disturbance of the interethnic balance”, the essence of which is the alleged destruction of the culture and way of life of the autochthonous population if the proportion of immigrants comes to exceed of a certain level. As V.A. Shnirelman thinks, “this is a core idea of cultural racism, supporters of which adhere to an essentialist view of culture and think that, firstly, a man absorbs certain cultural codes practically with his mother’s milk, secondly, that those codes then accompany him



during his whole life unchanged and he himself can change nothing, and thirdly, that he is a carrier of one and only one culture” (Ibid: 19). The accent on inalterability of “cultural codes” leads to the idea of an allegedly inevitable conflict of cultures and civilizations and from there to the inherent malignancy of immigration. In this case cultural identity is looked upon as the main form of identity, as opposed to civil or political identity, and the interests of the individual are subjugated to those of a collective called “the people” or “nation”.

Ethnic nationalism among the elites of new states and the desire of the so-called international community and in essence Western countries to distance the Russian Federation from newly emerged countries and extend their own influence there explain the moral and political as well as academic support for the thesis of the disintegrated empire and the Russians as “occupants” and “colonizers”. This support of evident discrimination against large groups of people because of their “imperial” ethnicity were one of the factors that made the problem of migration in the post-soviet space so acute. “Ethnic compatriots” that had moved to Russia were later among those most negatively disposed towards new states and their peoples and all the more so against those who came to Russia as labour immigrants.

Meanwhile migrantophobia spread in Russia during the second half of the 2000s. Migrants were accused of taking the jobs of local people, preventing any increase in wages, not allowing the full development of high-tech production, occupying prestigious apartments and tending to set up “ethnic enclaves”. Moreover, migrants were accused of heightening social tensions, bringing diseases, committing criminal offences, not wanting to integrate and trying to force their own culture on others. All this rage of anti-immigrant ideas is fairly well-known from other countries taking immigrants in, but in addition Russia has its own specific features, such as the reaction of society to these myths, and other unscrupulous and baseless information. First of all, a whole political philosophy of anti-immigrationism has developed in this country, the basis for which is a series of racial and ethnic arguments and images. They assign negative characteristics to representatives of whole ethnic groups and even use ideas of collective responsibility to urge for, for example, the deportation of all Georgians or Tajiks from the country.

This political philosophy of new racism is of both an economic (widespread and bringing profits to many people) and a social (as a reaction to Russians labour’s adaptation to the competitive environment of a market economy) nature. Furthermore, this philosophy has its moral and psychological aspects, namely the crisis of identity of the Russian political and

intellectual elite, at a time during which the place of former inter-ethnic tolerance was replaced by bitterness towards new neighbouring states which many present day residents had had to leave suffering moral and material losses as a result. But more importantly, anti-immigrationism also has a criminal and corruption component, as it justifies illegal actions and direct violence in relation to temporary residents of Russia and even Russian citizens – migrants from other regions of the country. A secondary but still dangerous result of the political philosophy of anti-immigrationism is the rise of extreme forms of xenophobia and racism, which spread rather quickly among young people. Even so, representatives of the educated elite and leaders of public organizations and political parties often perform as the ideologists and instructors of these extremist groups. Legal sanctions and even the prohibition of such organizations including publishing houses, Internet sites and editorial offices have improved the situation to a certain extent, as have judicial proceedings against murderers and terrorists from nationalist and racial extremists. But on the whole modern Russia has encountered a problem for the effective solution of which there is still a deficit in state competence and power and in the necessary potential for tolerance in the institutions of civil society.

We should note that xenophobia and racism are practiced in democratic countries in much milder forms than in countries with totalitarian regimes. However democracy is not a panacea for racism. Democratic norms and freedoms actually permit ethnically selective discrimination, originally assigning the status of culturally different communities (minority or race) to a part of the residents of the country through various bureaucratic procedures (for example, national census) and political declarations, then endowing these communities with the images of being “aliens” and people of “different blood”, which ultimately gives rise to racist practices. Such practices exist in both democratic states and in the Russian Federation and as yet have not been studied and discussed sufficiently.

Secondly, there is political racism, based on party ideology, when parties and other organizations active in many countries have open or hidden forms of ethno-racial irreconcilability and enmity as the basis for their programmes and activities. A number of such organizations have been prohibited in Russia by court decisions during recent years, but the programmes produced by them still remain in circulation through the publication of extremist literature, informal alliances, flash-mobs and social networks on the Internet.

Thirdly, there is institutional racism, characteristic of some social institutions (army, school, medical aid, social service, religious or-

ganizations, etc.). A great deal of experience of this phenomenon has been accumulated in the Western countries during the many years that the policy of political correctness has been implemented, and this experience deserves the attention of Russian politicians and scientists.

Finally, there is state racism, which can be found in legislation, principles of formation of state services, and some practices sanctioned by the state. Constitutional and legal standards and regulations in Russia correspond to the requirements of democratic societies, but in practice Russian society often fall behind those standards.

The formation of racist ideology and worldview as well as of neoracist practices in post-soviet Russia can be explained by the following factors. Firstly, communist ethnopolitics, despite all the slogans proclaiming internationalism and the people's friendship, included practices which were justly considered racist in the West – for example, the treatment of ethnicity not as a form of identity but as strict collective bodies (with their territory, statehood, culture and character), and the existence of a hierarchy of peoples with unequal political statuses assigned to them. The collapse of the communist utopia and the transformation from “real socialism” to real capitalism cleared the way for racist ideas and their political manifestations. This ethno-nationalism, inherited from Soviet times, strengthened its influence during the last Soviet decades, when Marxism finally became a dogma at the service of the conservative leaders of the country. The ethnic paradigm became more attractive then and even acquired a solid academic sheen in the form of the *ethnos* theory.

Secondly, the disintegration of the USSR took place against the background of a kind of “national renaissance”, i.e. a powerful outburst of provincial ethno-nationalism, which was often looked upon by some domestic politicians and scientists and certainly by the Western community as “an ally of democracy” and as a form of “national liberation” from Soviet colonialism. It was during those years of disintegration that extreme forms of ethnic (based on “soil and blood”) nationalism and chauvinism (nationalism of the majority) flourished alongside it. Finally, the immigration and internal migration (for example, from the Northern Caucasus republics) which followed the disintegration were regarded and publicly described in cultural terms as a “collision of cultures” and a problem of “cultural incompatibility”.

Thirdly, liberal reforms considerably undermined the status of part of the intellectual stratum, of personnel from the military-industrial sector and of the secret services, causing uncertainty as to the life prospects of many Russians that inevitably led to social protest. Many people, who

did not take to the new way of life, turned out to be sensitive to various kinds of xenophobic ideology, which started to appear profusely in books, media and educational spheres. A particularly negative role was played by a number of professors of the older generation who engaged in the indoctrination of young people as regards the “breaking up of the country”, “international Zionist conspiracies”, “agents of the West”, etc. The xenophobia of the young was fed by primitive patriotic upbringing and anti-Western and anti-American preaching by influential commentators and charismatic politicians speaking of the protection of the country from internal and external enemies. The latter were most often associated with immigrants, who in turn that came to be called “invaders” and “occupants”. Hatred of liberally inclined people, scientists and public activists who cooperated with Western colleagues and enjoyed the support of foreign scientific and other funds, also developed during this period. Not only “aliens”, but local “grant suckers”, “Westerners”, “agents of influence” all became the objects of the xenophobes’ and false patriots’ attacks. Racist sentiments, discrimination by ethno-racial features and attacks on “racially alien people” spread fairly quickly in Russia, as was noted by both Russian experts and Western observers. In 2006 Amnesty International, an organization working to protect human rights, came to the conclusion that “the state of affairs with racism in Russia is incompatible with the place which the country occupies on the international scene, and undermines its position in the world” (Cited by *Shnirelman* 2011: 468). The UN Human Rights Committee Special Rapporteur Doudou Diene also mentioned the growth of racially orientated political parties in Russia, the formation of a racist and xenophobic culture and an increase in violence based on it (*Diene* 2007).

In the 2000s the economic position of the country and the people improved considerably, but no decrease in xenophobia was observed. Some experts think that the dynamics of changes in well-being and radical differences are sensed by people more acutely than a stable financial position. Xenophobia and outbursts of mass aggression can be connected with social expectations set too high or disappointments with liberal reforms, with the growth of neotraditionalism with its nostalgia for the past, and with the painful adaptation of the ethnic majority to its new position after the disintegration of the USSR (*Pain*, 2003: 90; 2004: 219).

Really, we should admit that the beginning of the 2000s was marked by the triumph of a conservative “nationalist elite”. Public sentiment in Russia (as in a number of other countries) turned out to be under a great deal of influence from neotraditionalism, nostalgic

for “good old times” and suspicious of change. These sentiments turned out to be especially widespread among representatives of law enforcement bodies, part of the technical intelligentsia and some trends in the arts and pop-culture. A lot of Russian intellectuals, adhering to the idea of conservatism, are desperately looking to it for support and find in it “eternal values”, the “people’s mentality”, “traditional principles”, an “ethnocultural portrait” while some scientists (especially psychologists and culturologists) attempt to ascribe a biological basis for these beliefs. Thus “biology becomes a symbolic guarantor against new upheavals” (*Shnirelman* 2011: 475).

One should listen to those sociologists who emphasize that traditionalists, who now constitute the majority of the population, are not so much dissatisfied with market relations themselves as with the fact that they themselves failed to get the expected benefit from them (*Gorshkov, Tikhonova* 2005: 96–97). For this reason, the explanation for the high level of xenophobia should centre not on resistance to modernization, nor on disappointment with its course and results, but on the fear of missing out on the opportunities presented for a rise in the personal standard of living. In this case the threat is seen to come from “aliens” and, being afraid of their competitiveness, people try to defend themselves, relying on the support of the state. Here is where the wish, especially of ethnic Russians, i.e. the majority, to get certain preferential rights springs from, accordingly limiting the rights of ethnic minorities, “non-natives” and “foreigners”. These events alongside the mass riots in Moscow of December 2010 demonstrate the seriousness of the problem which Russia has to deal with and which may become an obstacle for the modernization of the country and its development along a democratic path. If there is no proper understanding of the situation, no effective mechanisms of management will be found, i.e. so-called good governance.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> See analysis of critics of the Russian civic nation project: V.A. Tishkov. The Russian People. History and Meaning of National Identity (Moscow, Nauks, 2013). In Russian.

<sup>2</sup> See numerous publications of works by L.N. Gumilev and by its followers.

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## **PARALLELS BETWEEN THE SPANISH AND RUSSIAN POST-IMPERIAL EXPERIENCES\***

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I hasten to say that the mere subject of historical similarity between Spain and Russia, as far as one can judge, is more popular in our country than in Spain, though the parallels observed in some aspects are at first sight quite remarkable. Both countries are situated in outlying areas of Europe, bordering the world of other cultures: Russia with Asia and Spain with North Africa, and thus both, in a general sense, bordering on the Orient, and more specifically with the culture of Islam. Both countries were to defend themselves and gain a foothold both in interaction and fighting with this world over many centuries. In the case of Spain and Russia such circumstances imposed the strongest imprint on the historical evolution of each country and its population, on their character, on their relationship with their European neighbours and on perception of them by these neighbours (suffice to recall the famous saying of Dumas: “Africa begins at the Pyrenees”, or Gogol’s mention in one of his novels that Europeans perceived Russia as an entirely Asian country). Both states have over time accumulated significant backwardness with respect to leading European countries in economic, technological and socio-political terms, and both went down the route of so-called “catching-up development”. Several authors consider it possible to talk in terms of an inferiority complex in both countries with regards to “advanced Europe”. At the same time, both Spain and Russia are characterized by their imperial past, followed by the subsequent loss of such influential positions in the world, severe reductions in their territory, and the loss of formerly peripheral lands which have in turn become independent states.

All these and many others traits of real or imagined similarity between our two countries, perceived mainly by educated Russians, gave birth to a quite natural desire to use what they regarded as the successful Spanish experience in solving important social and political issues under conditions that seemed to be analogous.

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This was the case, for example, in the late 1980s, when some of our analysts directly pointed towards Spain as an exemplary model for our domestic *perestroika*.

The high point of this approach came with the outstanding conference held in Moscow and dedicated precisely to the experience of the “Spanish *perestroika*” some ten years earlier (the transition from Francoism to a liberal-democratic regime). Authoritative Spanish lecturers explained to a large Soviet audience how Spain, in the course of an all-embracing political transformation, managed to avoid the break-up of the state, internal armed conflicts, a sharp decline in living standards and many other potential disasters, while ensuring the future development of the country on a largely new footing. Later on this theme – the value of the Spanish experience – continued to be heard in post-Soviet Russia, only gradually fading into the background. It became clear, however, that while the Spanish experience was discussed it was rarely implemented; its road-map, though seemingly reliable, was hardly used. It is obvious that the actions and behaviour of the authorities in Russia, and indeed of Russian society as a whole, are determined ultimately by their own historical traditions and specific circumstances; alternatives prove unworkable no matter how desirable they might be.

Moreover, a more careful analysis reveals that if we, Russians and Spaniards, understand each other, it is not always perfectly, but within certain constraints -conditioned by our own exceptional experiences, our own realities, our long-standing belief systems- and, moreover, that this occurs almost independently of our consciousness.

It is known that foreign words, coming into Russian and embraced by it, occasionally lose their original stress and find a new, domestic pronunciation. Similarly, Basque proper names entering Russian speech often adopt a different stress: *GuErnica* instead of *GuernIca*, *IbarrUri* instead of *IbArruri* et cetera. More significantly, fundamental terms such as “nation”, “people”, “the Spaniards”, “the Catalans”, mean different things in Russia and in Spain. The cultural and linguistic variety of the Spanish population is conceived of and described in Spain in radically different terms to how we imagine it ourselves. In fact, our ideas with regards to Spanish regionalism are actually an unconscious extrapolation onto Spanish material of our Russian reality, with “ethnic communities” (ethnoses) as a dominant concept, even though the Russian ethnocultural sphere is in fact quite distinct from the Spanish.

Even so called “nation-building”, a fashionable concept in both countries, means different things. In Russia we usually understand



this as the formation of a united and cohesive all-Russian civil community which should prevail over all other distinctions between the country's citizens, such as, most notably, ethnic diversity. But even the name of the nation – “Rossiyane” – is not accepted by all its citizens; many compatriots see here a predominantly artificial construction invented by the administration for political expedience. In Spain, by contrast, particularly topical are the attempts of a number of autonomous communities to set themselves up as distinct nations in opposition to the original concept of a single Spanish civil nation.

Does all this mean that the comparison of two such distinctive patterns of cultural and linguistic diversity, co-existence and understanding (i.e., the Spanish and Russian models), is devoid of any practical perspective and thus useless when it comes to resolving problems related to these issues?

Practice has shown that the direct borrowing of a model taken from the another country without considering native traditions is either impossible to do at all or leads to unexpected results. On the other hand, a scrupulous study of the day-to-day realities of another country, stimulated by the desire to improve the situation at home, offers a lot by way of improved understanding of the domestic situation. Only then should one turn to the question of optimization and implementation, always based firmly on one's own opportunities and traditions.

In this respect, the mere awareness of Russians that our current (i.e. post-Soviet, though to a large extent similar to the preceding Soviet one) ethnopolitical situation, is not universal, is in itself a first and important step towards further successful development. The power that firmly established collective stereotypes wield over society is well known. A useful example in this sense, though it might seem here rather extravagant, is that of the natives of the Trobriand Islands in north-western Melanesia, as described by distinguished British social anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski. Their society was traditionally subdivided into four totemic clans, affiliation to one of which was obligatory for each indigene and did not change from birth to death. This clan division was of such great value to them, and so penetrated and dominated their interior lives, that none of them could comprehend that other societies could be based on any principles other than that of the four totemic clans. For this reason they necessarily and persistently enquired of each stranger, including Europeans happening to pass through the Trobriand Islands, to which of above-mentioned clans they belonged. The islanders were simply unable to comprehend and refused to accept the

negative answers they received (*Malinowski* 1929).

In the same way, from the Soviet perspective, everyone on Earth had a well-defined ethnic affiliation or ethnicity, as an objective characteristic inherited from their parents and not liable to change, regardless of where they reside or move. In Soviet society this ethnic affiliation was recorded in official documents certifying and characterizing the individual. Although historical events in our country showed unequivocally the negative consequences of such strict ethnical “assignment” of the population (both in terms of human relations and as regards the well-being of the country), many compatriots even today perceive any attempt to minimise the ethnic factor as an attack on their identity and a slavish adherence to alien foreign models.

Meanwhile, we can also talk about the restitution of norms of a not so distant era of Russian history when the situation was entirely different to that of the Soviet period. For example, the Don Cossacks are designated as “Russians” in the currently accepted paradigm, and no one doubts that this people constitute an integral part of the Russian people, the Russian ethnic community. However closer acquaintance with the peculiarities of their identity, their ideas (well-described in classic Russian literature), and with specific reference to the Don Cossack community in czarist times, reveals that they firmly distinguished themselves not only from Ukrainians, Caucasians and other ethnic communities, but also from the Russians of neighbouring regions: everybody who was a newcomer in Don region was perceived by the Cossacks as a stranger. Their self-consciousness in the intrastate context was based on a local (regional) and class criterion rather than on an ethnic one. They even distinguished themselves terminologically from Russians of other regions, identifying themselves as “Cossacks”, but those others as “Russians” (“Russkie”) or “Moskali”, immediately distinguishing an “us” from within the total Russian-speaking mass. Slogans in favour of autonomy and even independence for the Don region had a great impact on the area. Many of them dreamed of “a future carefree life on the darling Don, when there will not be a single Rusak (Russian) within the region”. In Sholokhov’s famous novel *And Quiet Flows the Don* an old Cossack teaches his son: “the stinking Rus (Russia) should not reign over us!” (*Sholokhov* 1956–1960). At the same time, though, Don Cossacks conceive themselves and are perceived by those around them as “Russians”, when they find themselves in broader, supra-regional contexts: at war with other states or in the midst of political struggle.

Then they are spoken of as “Russian Cossacks”, “Russian officers” and so on – but this implies belonging not to the Russian ethnic community, but rather to the Russian state.

Another example is from the late nineteenth-century memoirs of Countess Maria Kleinmichel: “My father, count Keller, not having a single drop of Russian blood, would be extremely surprised, if somebody told him he is not Russian, or qualified him as a foreigner...” (Quoted from *Istoriya Rossii* 2009: 132).

It is clear that this model of existence, and the understanding of historical and cultural distinctions displayed in the above examples (in reality their number is countless), was decisively rejected in the succeeding Soviet period when there was a real “reformatting” of society and the state on ethnic criteria. But it seems to me that the above-mentioned model in its essential features is very similar to the Spanish one: both due to predominant role played by historical regions (rather than ethnic communities), and due to the ways in which the self-determination of personality materialized; for instance, allowing Miguel de Unamuno to sincerely consider himself simultaneously both a Basque and a Spaniard. If this model had survived, if it had not been transformed during the 1920-30s, in accordance with new ideological and political postulates, we would in all likelihood now have solid grounds for analytical comparison and perhaps even for the direct application of some of the successful solutions to specific problems. We could, for example, within a single framework of concepts and terms, discuss the limits of regional competences and responsibilities, or the possibility of the abandonment of the concept of a unified civil nation.

It is interesting to see how world views based on the pre-revolutionary model and deeply rooted in the consciousness of Russians continued through inertia to manifest themselves much later, occasionally in extremely serious circumstances. The famous Soviet scientist and academician Raushenbach, who was a Russian ethnic German by origin, described in his memoirs the deportation of ethnic Germans (Soviet citizens) from the Volga region, where they had enjoyed territorial autonomy, in 1941, during the early part of the war. The deportation was carried out on strictly formal grounds, i.e. according to the entry in the passport (principal identity document) of each individual’s “nationality” (i.e., in this case, ethnical affiliation). An entry saying “German” automatically meant forced placement in a labour camp. As a result, there were cases when some of these Germans produced old church documents dating back to czarist times

and certifying that they had been baptized into the Orthodox Church, in other words converting to Orthodoxy from Catholicism or Protestantism. Subsequently, those implementing the cruel order exempted such Orthodox Germans, “because there was no legal concept of nationality in the Russian Empire, only that of religion. An individual baptized in an Orthodox church was considered to be Russian”, noted Rauschenbach (*Rauschenbach* 1990: 32).

Nowadays, in post-Soviet Russia, one can clearly feel a tendency to reduce, at least at the official level, the weight of the political component in the ethnic factor, in simultaneous existence with a powerful inertia that acts as a brake upon this tendency: the decades long Soviet practice of regarding cultural, historical and linguistic diversity from an ethnicized perspective. One important part of this approach is the belief in “collective responsibility” by ethnicity. Though this is no longer a legal or political responsibility, as it often was in the past, the idea persists of the moral responsibility of all the representatives of an ethnic community (where membership implies a common origin) for the words and acts of its individual members.

To take a typical example, one of many such cases, Nobel laureate A.I. Solzhenitsyn, in one of his last books, published in early 2000s (*Solzhenitsyn* 2002), insists that each people, each nation (in both cases clearly he refers not to the state, but to ethnic communities) must bear the moral responsibility (in the form of collective repentance) for those people from within their community who caused harm to the rest of humanity. In other words, in the case of the Russian revolution of 1917, which the author and like-minded persons explicitly interpreted as a national disaster, it is necessary – in accordance with such an approach – to determine the ethnicity of each of the prominent revolutionaries to appreciate clearly the proportion of liability of each of the ethnic groups inhabiting the country. Georgians will repent for Stalin and other ethnic Georgians among the revolutionaries, Jews will repent for Trotsky and other Jews, Russians will repent for Lenin and other Russians, and the same applies to Latvians, Ukrainians, Poles and so on. That is why, by the way, some authors insist on the predominance of non-Russian ethnic component in Lenin’s origin. Thus, his actions receive a comprehensive explanation from this point of view, removing responsibility for what happened from the vast majority of the population (that is, ethnic Russians) and placing it with those peoples (ethnic communities) who’s blood coursed in Lenin’s veins.

The question is, which approach will ultimately prevail in Russian society with respect to understanding our cultural, historical and linguistic diversity? It is an important question, and not just for researchers, though it is clearly of great interest to them as once again History carries out an experiment within our country. Indeed, despite the fact that the “czarist” approach was formed naturally, while the “soviet” one had a more conceptual character and was introduced from above, both approaches are deeply rooted in the Russian national tradition, and in the collective consciousness of our compatriots. Unfortunately, final conclusions about which of the two trends will prevail are, in all probability, still a long way away.

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## **THE SPANISH STATE'S RESPONSE TO ETHNO-CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN SPAIN**

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The recognition and political accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity remain two of the unresolved issues of the liberal-democratic agenda. In the case of Spain, after Franco's dictatorship, a response to these two issues was given by creating the State of Autonomies. The Spanish Constitution provided a legal/political/administrative tool to answer the requests of a number of ethnic minorities and peripheral nationalist movements for linguistic and cultural recognition. However, this approach did not imply automatic recognition of the co-officiality of minority languages nor the practice of cultural autonomy. The Spanish Constitution simply created a competitive path to give access to the recognition and development of ethno-cultural rights. This is what explains the differences in degrees of recognition, protection and development of the different languages within the Spanish State.

### **1. The starting point for the interpretation of plurality**

Before we turn to the analysis of plurality in Spain and its management, it is necessary to understand the paradigm of ethno-cultural diversity in the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Spain, given that, as a result of extremely unequal historical, geographical and political evolution, the approach to this diversity in both cases is based on very different principles that affect the management of recognition and political accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity, two issues of the liberal-democratic agenda that have never been satisfactorily resolved (*Requejo* 2009: 164).

Both Russia and Spain are the heirs of empires. However, while the Russian Empire was at its peak, the Kingdom of Spain was falling into decline. Its decease was certified in the 19<sup>th</sup> century when it lost practically all of its overseas colonies, which effectively confined the Spanish nation's territorial limits to the Iberian Peninsula. This symbolic territorial

idea was strong already during the imperial times, as peninsular Spain was disconnected from the rest of the territories controlled by the Monarchy. Russia, however, had expanded into geographically connected territories, thus making identification of any clear territorial borders delimitating the Russian nation difficult. What Russia is today may not be so tomorrow, and what is not there today, may come tomorrow. This motivated significant dispersion of the Russian population, forming different degrees of representation in each territory (subject to status changes).

This multiform reality, along with the survival of the Russian Empire up until the 20<sup>th</sup> century and its subsequent transformation into the Soviet Union provided for a German style romantic perception of nation and nationality, i.e., based on primordial criteria of a cultural nature, rather than geographical and institutional boundaries. In this regard, Michael Walzer (*Walzer* 1996: 37–53) explains that historically, empires have been more tolerant of diversity compared to the nation-states, as up until the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century the latter have shown mainly aggressive attitudes toward ethno-cultural diversity within their borders. This is what allows for a tolerant interpretation of the primordial perspective of nationality applied in empires like the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian or Russian ones. Empires used to distinguish between nationality and citizenship, whereas nation states equate nationality with citizenship. In the latter case, if the criterion were primordial, the state would be excluding ethno-cultural minorities. If, however, the state has liberal foundations, it would embrace all citizens, while denying the existence of all nations other than the one supported by the state, i.e., it would basically try to reject or minimize all ethnic and national diversity.

It is important to highlight this difference of approach in order to define a framework for interpreting the ethno-cultural diversity of Russia and Spain. In the first case, there is a distinction made between nationality and citizenship, without incurring selective application of the citizenship rights of its inhabitants (a different question is, to what extent the ethnic groups and nations of Russia have been respected during different moments of its history). Therefore, the Preamble and Article 3 of the Russian Constitution defines Russia as a multinational reality. Spain, on the other hand, had already started building a nation-state based on liberal criteria in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, associating citizenship and nationality and rejecting the existence of different nations within the State. For that purpose, uniformization processes have been launched in various occasions of Spanish history, leading

to a high degree of hostility towards ethno-cultural diversity. This historical evolution has been registered in the Spanish Constitution (SC) of 1978, where the nature of the nation-state of the Kingdom of Spain is specified in Article 1.2: "National sovereignty belongs to the Spanish people, which is the source of the powers of the State".

It basically means that the distinction between romantic (ethnic) and liberal (civic) nationalism, no matter how useful, is still quite vague. As Miquel Caminal (*Caminal* 2008: 145–164) explains, usually civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism coincide because historically both have always had the same objective of cultural homogeneity:

"The chain-principle of a state – a nation – a culture – a language is part of the construction of a nation-state. Where it has not been possible due to the existence and continuity of other cultural communities, imposition of one dominant nation has been necessary, with its culture and language binding for all state's population." (Ibid: 152).

A telling example is provided by the SC of 1978, where rights and obligations of the citizens are restricted by ethnic elements such as language. Thus, Article 3.1 states that "Castilian<sup>1</sup> is the official Spanish language of the State. All Spanish [citizens] have **the duty to know it** and the right to use it". It is particularly surprising that the majority language in Spain, known by virtually 100% of the citizens, would have to impose itself by constitutional means, while the rest of the languages spoken in the State are considerably weaker and less known.

To summarize the above, historically, Russia's difficulty with handling ethno-cultural diversity derives from the acceptance of a multinational reality within the Federation, whereas in the Kingdom of Spain the problem lies in the idea of building a nation-state, which entails fighting and denying the multinational reality.

## **2. Irruption of nationalities into the Spanish Constitution**

Denying reality does not make it disappear, therefore, contrary to the claims of Spanish nationalism in Spain, there are other ethnic groups and indigenous nationalities within its geographical boundaries, as the nation is defined as "an ethnic group that has become politically conscious of itself" (*Moulines* 2001: 38)<sup>2</sup>, this resulting in the existence of clearly differentiated national-political projects. However, the Spanish constitutional choice is not innocent, as "making the state and the nation coincide with each other in theory, practically means the reduction of the status of all other nationalities that



may exist within the borders to that of vassals” (Caminal 2008: 149).

The problem arises when a state has one single national title, despite governing a multinational territory. In this case, the nations deprived of such title are “bound to conflict with the existing state nationalism, as they compete for the same territory. If these nationalisms succeed in forming their own independent state, they do not disappear, but are transformed into state nationalism” (Ibid: 153). Therefore, the problem does not end there if the newly independent territory, too, is multinational.

The conflict in multinational territories is usually directly related to the territorial heterogeneity within a state or a federation. It is of course possible for a state to have its coexisting nations homogeneously distributed throughout the territory, yet it is not very common. Usually, the state is the institutional tool in hands of one ethnic group of the dominant nation that outnumbers the rest and has, therefore, the capacity to achieve its own goals while dissolving those of the minority groups that are at numerical disadvantage (Walzer 1996: 47). These ideas have been similarly expressed by Ulises Moulines:

“In the vast majority of cases, the actually existing multinational states, for contingent historical reasons, were not formed by consensus of different ethnic groups which are their components, but by choice, often an extremely violent one, of a single dominant ethnic group. In short, we are dealing with *hegemonic* nation-states (i.e., states promoting hegemony of one single ethnic group over the others). There is a nation in them that dictates to the other or others how things should be, in political, legal, linguistic, religious, economic, international relation contexts, etc. Generally, the dominant nation within a multinational state has become one simply because of its demographic weigh, as it is the one that integrates most of the population” (Moulines 2001: 46).

In any case, demography admits more than one interpretation. The majority in a state is usually composed of one hegemonic nationality which acts based on majority criteria, yet this logic can turn against itself if the correlation of forces in different regions within the state’s borders puts the majority-hegemonic nationality at a disadvantage (beyond the degree of its tolerance of the other nations). And this is exactly the problem in Spain, especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where Basque and Catalan nationalism receives more support than Spanish nationalism. To ignore this reality would be virtually impossible in a democratic system, therefore the SC in its Article 2 acknowledges the right of the nations and regions to autonomy: “The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation,

the common and indivisible homeland of all Spanish citizens, and it acknowledges and guarantees the right to autonomy of the constituent nationalities and regions and the solidarity among them all.”

### **3. The Spanish state model**

Spain is a unitary and uni-national state, but it acknowledges the autonomy of regions and nationalities, thus contradicting its own national character. The wording of Article 2 and its spirit in the Constitution are conflicting, but it was introduced as a concession to the pressure of peripheral nationalism, yet without undermining its nature as a unitary nation-state.

The explanation goes back to what Juan José Linz (*Linz* 1973: 32–116) defined as the failure of the construction of the Spanish nation-state. Josep Maria Colomer's statement is more vehement and clear. He points out that “Spain is probably the clearest example of failure in the attempt to build a great nation-state in Europe.” (*Colomer* 2008: 43). It is for this reason that Spanish nationalism has kept its rather aggressive attitude towards peripheral nationalists from the standpoint of political hegemony. In this regard, Caminal says that “Spain, like all political nations that correspond to the State, has always claimed and claims to be a cultural nation, too, if we analyse retrospectively what has happened in the modern and contemporary history of Spain.” (*Caminal* 2008: 150). Justo Beramendi, for his part, has pointed out that however hard the central government has tried to conceal it or push it into the background (mainly, behind the violence of ETA, still active at the time), the problem in Spain remains “the conflicting coexistence of various socio-politically real nations in a state whose constitution only recognizes one” (*Beramendi* 2005: 99).

However, the SC is ambiguous enough (among others: *Colomer* 1998: 40–52; *Moreno* 2007) to allow for its further elaboration to lean either towards homogenization and centralization or towards the acceptance of multinational nature and its asymmetric and federal development. Therefore, the constitutional agreement could be characterized as a way of ensuring subsequent competition between different perspectives. Most scholars of the subject confirm this and, according to Maíz and Losada (*Maíz, Losada* 2009: 181–222), in view of the results, a strategy of re-symmetrisation and re-centralization has been imposed so far, thus moving even further away from a plurality management approach, respecting and accepting differences.

In any case, not all academia shares the latter viewpoint. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish between authors who are committed defenders of the “federalization process” in Spain (Among others: *Moreno* 1997; *Agranoff, Bañón* 1998; *Eliseo* 2003; *Linz* 1999: 7–40) and those who criticize the absence of essential federal elements and the recognition of national plurality (Among others: *Beramendi* 2005; *Caminal* 2009: 475–540; *Requejo* 2005a; *Letamendia* 2000; *Losada, Maíz* 2005: 437–453). The first argue that Spain is a federalist, quasi-federal or federal state positioned near or completely identified with national federalism. Nevertheless, others try to present it in more flexible and diversity-friendly ways. *Eliseo Aja*, for instance, argues in favour of considering the distinguishing elements as enriching aspects of the Spanish political system; *Luis Moreno* speaks of Spain as a “plural national state” (*Moreno* 1998a); the same author<sup>3</sup> together with *Juan José Linz* has also referred to Spain as a “federal multinational state” (*Linz* 1999). Now, the multinational nature refers to the context of a federal veneer rather than the definition of a state. As *Mario Zubiaga* outlines, the foundational basis of the autonomous regime emerged “as a concession by the centre and not as a voluntary association of the political communities involved” (*Zubiaga* 1999: 124). This is how *Francisco Letamendia* explains where the state of autonomies has its origins:

“The State of Autonomies is the result of the transformation of the Unitary State and constitutes the latest response to its crisis. Its genesis is therefore the inverse of that of the Federal State; where the latter’s primary drive was towards the unity of the parts of a Confederation, the State of Autonomies records the failure of the Unitary State while constituting its decentralizing solution. The influence of the Unitary State is however strongly felt in the State of Autonomies: the constituent parties enjoy their autonomy and can exercise the prerogatives of the three branches of government, but they do not contribute to the will of the central government, which enjoys absolute freedom of action. Likewise, the centre, which holds the exclusive sovereignty of the State, is the power source of the parties, the latter therefore not being sovereign. It is this lack of sovereignty of the state’s components that differentiates States of Autonomies from Federal States, and not the degree of assumed power of capacity” (*Letamendia* 1997: 35–36).

The diagnosis of low participation by the autonomies in central government is shared, to a greater or lesser degree, by those who are convinced by the process of uni-national federalization and by the crit-

ics who advocate a multinational and asymmetric system. Both sides suggest that the participation of the autonomies in the central government be enhanced. Currently, the autonomies take virtually no part in the legislature<sup>4</sup> and the judiciary<sup>5</sup>. Besides, there is a lack of authorities for multilateral coordination between institutions and autonomies, in a context dominated by competitive bilateral relations. This makes Colomer (*Colomer* 1998: 40–52) affirm that the State of Autonomies is a non-institutional federalism. His perspective is critical to the evolution of the move towards autonomy, and he calls for cooperative federalism capable of overcoming “competitive and divisive logic”.

To sum up, of the two problems of liberal-democratic agenda related to ethno-cultural diversity, the progress of the Spanish State is rather modest in terms of recognition, yet advanced and remarkable if viewed from the angle of political accommodation. In Russia, on the contrary, the recognition issue is well underway and, consequently, the focus is on how to address political accommodation.

#### **4. Ethno-cultural plurality in 19 autonomies: 17 regional communities and 2 cities**

With the approval of the Basque and Catalan statutes in 1979 the process of political and administrative decentralization in Spain began, and the territorial organization of the Spanish state was established with 19 autonomies. 17 Autonomous Communities (ACs) approved their basic regulations between 1979 and 1983, and two autonomous cities agreed to the status by approving their respective statutes in 1995. The powers among all of them have been gradually equalized, and today, the ACs are territorial units operating within the same political framework and share a number of characteristics that can be controlled. From the regulatory point of view, this is covered by the Spanish Constitution which establishes the basic institutional structure of the CAs acceding to autonomy status via Article 151<sup>6</sup>. This Article and the subsequent decisions of the State Council, as well as laws passed by the Spanish Parliament, explicitly enshrine the *principle of homogeneity* of governance and the institutional structure of the State and its analogues in the ACs (*Albertos Carazo* 2006). For example, they all have education and health, as well as most of social services related to the welfare state, within their realm of responsibilities.

Among all the ACs, however, the Basque Country and Navarre stand out for having broad financial autonomy, which allows them to

collect all taxes within their own territories and pay an annual fee to the central administration for various services, such as the army, the Crown or embassies, among others. On the other hand, the nineteen territories have an endless list of differences ranging from geographical to linguistic, and including institutional, demographic, social, cultural, economic, etc. If we focus on the ethnic-national features, two criteria have been used for the example below: linguistic distinction as the objective element (Table 1) and perceptions of sense of identity as the subjective element (Table 2).

**Table 1**

*Degree of pluralism and linguistic homogeneity in 19 Autonomies*

	Non-plural society (0,5)	Semiplural society (1,5)	Plural society (2,5)
Linguistically homogeneous (0,5)	Murcia, Castile-La Mancha, Madrid, La Rioja (1,0)	Andalusia (2,0)	Canary Islands (3,0)
Linguistic heterogeneity in part of the territory: acknowledgement problems and threatened diversity (1,5)	Castile and León, Cantabria, Extremadura (2,0)	Aragón (3,0)	
Linguistically heterogeneous with acknowledgement problems (2,0)		Asturias, Ceuta, Melilla (3,5)	Navarra (4,5)
Linguistically heterogeneous (2,5)	País Valenciano (3,0)	Balearic Islands, Galicia (4,0)	Euskadi, Catalonia (5,0)

*Source: prepared by the author.*

A first straightforward classification is the one that differentiates the ACs originally referred to as historic nationalities – Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country –, from the rest. These three were the only ones that were able to approve their statutes during the Second Republic and, with the arrival of democracy, were also the first ones to initiate their reinforced autonomic processes in accordance with Article 151 of the SC. Andalusia joined the three communities with the approval of

its statute of autonomy by the same (fast) track. Afterwards, the ACs that gained autonomy by the *slow track* defined in Article 143 of the SC, have been gradually matching their areas of competence. What's more, some regions have been symbolically renamed "nationality" or "historic nationality", following the examples of Euskadi (the Basque Country, 1979), Catalonia (1979, and in the new Statute of 2006 with the definition of "nation") and Galicia (1981). The first one to join this group was Andalusia in its statute of 1981 (later on, in the statute of 2006, it defined itself as a "national reality"). Fifteen years later, Aragon (1996) and Canary Islands (1996) did the same thing and, more recently, the Valencian Community (2006) and the Balearic Islands (2007) have recorded their status in their statutes of autonomy.

However, there are a number of other important elements that help distinguish the degree of plurality of the ACs. Table 1 shows a simple classification that distinguishes between the indigenous linguistic diversity of the autonomies, on the one hand, and the degree of plurality associated with the sense of identity, on the other.

The first criterion classifies the autonomies into four categories. The first category defines linguistically homogeneous ACs (graded with 0.5), among which we count Murcia<sup>7</sup>, Castilla-La Mancha, Madrid, La Rioja, as well as Andalusia and the Canary Islands, although in the latter two, Spanish dialects with important distinctive features are spoken.

The second category (graded with 1.0) lists the ACs with their linguistic heterogeneity under threat in one part of the territory and with no official status thereof: Castile and León, Extremadura, Aragon and Cantabria. In one part of the provinces of León and Zamora (Castile and León) Asturian-Leonese is spoken in its Leonese version; in addition, in the region of Bierzo (León) and in a few municipalities of Zamora, apart from Asturian-Leonese, Galician is spoken, too. Among other problems that Asturian-Leonese is facing, we can mention its low degree of linguistic recognition, lack of official status and poor regulation of its use and promotion<sup>8</sup>. These factors partly explain why the linguistic diversity of Castile y León is endangered. Despite some relative success in recent years, the extremely harsh reversals experienced in the 20<sup>th</sup> century have left this language in a situation of undeniable vulnerability and at risk of extinction, according to UNESCO (UNESCO 2009). The scenario repeats itself in the case of Extremeño, a form of Asturian-Leonese spoken in the northwest of Cáceres and in a small part of Salamanca (Castile and León). Something similar happens in Cantabria where Cantabrian or "*montañés*", a form of Asturian-Leonese, has undergone substantial

Castilianisation and clear deterioration throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

We should also mention *Fala*, a Romance language of the Galician-Portuguese subgroup spoken in the valley of Jálama (Extremadura) and in danger of extinction. The number of speakers is estimated at somewhere between 6,000 and 10,000 people, yet even though proportionally this is a relatively high figure, as well as the general difficulties suffered by languages like Asturian-Leonese, *Fala* faces other problems. For example, it has never had a large number of speakers due to its restricted geographic territory, which, in addition, belongs to an area that has historically suffered from economic underdevelopment leading to large-scale emigration.

Another weakened language is Aragonese (or *fabla aragonesa*), spoken by roughly 10,000 people in several Pyrenean areas of northern Aragon. However, in recent times some significant steps have been taken towards its regulation and consolidation of legal status. Even without being one of the co-official languages, its use has recently been legislated for and it has been acknowledged as an autochthonous language by Regional Law 10/2009, which stipulates the terms of “use, protection and promotion of Aragon’s autochthonous languages”. Under this act, Spanish is the sole official language, but Aragonese and Catalanian (spoken on the eastern border with Catalonia) are admitted as autochthonous languages, whereby learning, schooling and language use in public administration are regulated in four areas: the first, Aragonese-speaking, the second, Catalanian-speaking, the third one, mixed Aragonese- and Catalanian-speaking, and the fourth, exclusively Spanish-speaking, with a mere reference to the dialects and autochthonous speeches.

The third category includes linguistically heterogeneous autonomies (graded as 1.5) with a greater or lesser degree of recognition problems and presence of the indigenous (regional) language across the territory (regardless of distribution). From the point of view of legal recognition, the most critical situation is observed in Ceuta and Melilla. In Ceuta, nearly half of the native population is of Muslim origin and/or Arabic speaking. In Melilla, the situation is similar, but in this case the native language is Tamazight, the dominant version of Berber. In both cases, various political and social associations representing Muslims have recently begun to push claims for recognition of their languages as a first step towards co-officiality.

In Asturias, Asturian-Leonese in its Asturian form is undoubtedly the healthiest of the non-coofficial languages, in terms of the number of speakers, territorial extension, presence in urban areas and organizational capacity to claim officiality. The language is standardized by

the Royal Academy of the Asturian Language, and its use and promotion was powered by Law 1/1998 of 23 March. This regulation acknowledges Asturian as a language to be protected, promoted and spread in the media and in education. In this sense, a step forward was made by the Asturian Social Normalization Plan 2005-2007 for encouraging the use and promotion of the Asturian and Galician-Asturian (a form of Galician spoken in the western part of the autonomy) languages. Nonetheless, Asturian, just like Aragonese, is classified as a language at risk of extinction in the UNESCO report.

The last case of the third category is Navarre. Here, the retreat of Euskera (the Basque language) during recent centuries and especially the 20<sup>th</sup> century was particularly severe, affecting mostly the central and southern areas of the region. However, the northern part of the Community remains one of the areas with most Basque-speakers in Spain. This multiform reality was regulated under the Law on Basque, passed in 1986, which organized the territory into three areas. The first is referred to as the Basque-speaking area, in the northern part of the Community, where Basque is the co-official language. The second zone, the one with the largest number of Basque speakers, is referred to as *mixed* (the central part which includes Pamplona, the capital) and therefore Basque is not co-official there, although it is subject to certain preservation and promotion regulations, which grant it the right to be a vehicular language in education and to be used in dealings with the public administration, although a response in Basque is not guaranteed. Finally, the third area known as “non-Basque” covers the southern part of Navarre, where the Basque language has no recognition at all.

The regulations based on the Law on Basque, especially those published after 1996, have been widely criticized by the advocates of the Basque language. Likewise, a report by the expert committee of the European Council on the implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (2005) in Navarre, investigated the situation of the Basque language in the Basque-speaking area (where it is co-official) and concluded that many of the commitments made by the Spanish government by signing the Charter are not complied with in Navarre.

The final ordinal category of the linguistic variable encompasses the heterogeneous autonomous communities where there are two co-official languages acknowledged throughout the territory (graded 2.5). The weakest among them is Basque, classified as vulnerable in the UNESCO Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger, despite being a co-official language in the Basque Country. Outside this classi-



fication are Galician, the co-official language in Galicia, and Catalan, co-official in Catalonia (additionally, in the Aran Valley, a variation of Occitan is also co-official), in the Valencian Community (in its Valencian variation) and the Balearic Islands (in its insular variation). The Catalan language is the strongest of all those mentioned and one of the most widely spoken in Europe. However, its recovery and promotion is not exempt from controversy, especially in Valencia where there are repeated attempts (without any sound philological arguments) to separate and differentiate the Valencian dialect from Catalan, often by *Castilianising* it.

**Table 2**

*Prevailing autonomic sense of identity (2005) in 19 autonomies*

<b>Autonomies</b>	<b>Prevailing autonomic sense of identity</b>	<b>Autonomies</b>	<b>Prevailing autonomic sense of identity</b>
Basque Country (CAV)	45,80	Extremadura (EXT)	10,30
Catalonia (CAT)	37,70	Cantabria (CNT)	9,60
Navarre (NAV)	36,80	Valencian Community (VAL)	9,30
Canary Islands (CNR)	36,50	Ceuta (CEU)	8,00
Galicia (GAL)	24,70	Murcia (MUR)	4,90
Balearic Islands (BAL)	23,80	Melilla (MEL)	4,20
Andalusia (AND)	16,00	Madrid (MAD)	4,00
Asturias (AST)	15,80	Castilla-La Mancha (CLM)	3,20
Aragón (ARA)	13,20	Castile and León (CYL)	2,50
La Rioja (RIO)	11,20		

*Source: CIS (Social Investigation Centre) Study 2610, First Autonomic Barometer (December 2005).*

The second variable used in Table 2 represents the degree of political plurality in society. To illustrate this, I have used the response to the question “which of the following statements identifies you best?” asked by the CIS in its Autonomic Barometer of December 2005 to test the sense of identity. The frequencies were classified into five categories: apart from “do not know” or “no answer”, there are “I feel exclusively Spanish”, “I feel more Spanish than belonging to the Autonomous Community”, “I feel as much Spanish as belonging to the Autonomous Community”, “I feel belonging to the Autonomous Community rather than Spanish”, and “I feel belonging to the Autonomous Community only”. Of these categories, the last two show predominance of autonomic identity, therefore I have summed up these answers in each AC to obtain the degree of the prevailing regional sentiment.

Table 2 shows the percentage of prevailing identity sentiment in each autonomous community in descending order. The average (mean) for all of them is 16.71%, whereas the median is 11.20%. The range is wide: from 2.5% in Castile and León, to 45.80% in the Basque Country. Along with the latter, Catalonia, Navarre and the Canary Islands are the communities where the prevailing sense of identity exceeds 30%. Galicia, the Balearic Islands, Andalusia and Asturias pass the barrier of 15%, which is why they are considered semi-plural societies along with Aragon with its 13.20% of autonomic identity prevalence. In the case of Ceuta and Mellila, their classification as semi-plural societies stands due to a variable only applied as a distinctive feature in these two autonomous cities, namely, the religious denomination. 21.9% of Melilla's population and 22% in Ceuta confess to being followers of a different religion (i.e., Islam as opposed to Catholicism). Finally, the rest of the autonomous regions are considered to be “non-plural” societies in the sense described by Lijphart (*Lijphart* 1999), i.e., there is no positive statement about them being homogenous societies, but their social division is not viewed as profound.

To summarize, the analysis of the linguistic plurality of the ACs and the variety of their identity sentiments lets us conclude that the least plural ACs are Murcia, Madrid, La Rioja and Castile-La Mancha, while the most plural ones, in descending order, are the Basque Country, Catalonia, Navarre, the Balearic Islands, Galicia and Valencia.

## **5. Competitive management of ethno-cultural plurality**

From the very beginning, Spain has been handling the mechanism for access to autonomy as a kind of competition between choices. The

Constitution does not designate the autonomous territories; it merely describes the procedure to follow in order to become an AC (Art. 143.1). Similarly, when referring to other “Spanish languages”, the Constitution points out that they shall be official in their respective Autonomous Communities in accordance with their statutes (Article 3.2), which implies not guaranteeing co-officiality (next to Spanish) to those languages incapable of obtaining a political majority in their home AC. The activation of self-determinative rather than pre-determinative mechanism makes access to co-officiality particularly difficult for languages (a) with a reduced number of speakers, (b) limited to a part of a region, or (c) languages which have not been used as a foundation for nationalist claims. All these non-official languages are under threat of future extinction, the only way out being the politicization of the language, which under the current legal and institutional structure of Spain seems to be the only viable path to follow. Some minority languages, such as Aragonese, have been able to revive and upgrade from “certain death” to “probable death” by taking this exact path.

The root of the problem lies in the Spanish State refusing to politically admit its multinational nature, which results in dissociation between the social and political realities not only at state level (central government), but also on sub-levels as described by Justo Beramendi:

“The semantic transfer from the name of a national group to the name of the territory inhabited by this group would only be fair if the entire population of the territory in question saw themselves as a single nation. However, given that this is not the case, the only undeniable fact is the existence of the Catalan, Basque and Spanish nations, which is something completely different. And it is different because in Catalonia, for example, the Spanish nation is represented alongside the Catalan nation as long as there is a part of Catalonia’s population, regardless of how large or small, who consider themselves Spanish, even if some of them are ethnically just as Catalan as the others. The same can be stated about the Basque Country, Spain or in other territories” (*Beramendi* 2005: 93).

Just as Caminal (*Caminal* 2008: 150) says, Spain is not willing to share the concept of political nation with the rest of the nations residing within the Spanish state. By way of compensation and under democratic pressure from the other nationalities, Spain offers acceptance of cultural nationality as a concept for referring to the Catalan and Basque territories as a whole, which, according to Caminal, “is false”, as “the Basque Country and Catalonia are presently not homogeneous and monolingual cultural nations”.

The consequence of this policy is the absence of ethno-cultural au-

tonomy at state level. Instead, territories are given autonomy based on cultural criteria, even if these territories are characterized by cultural plurality. This in turn hinders the development of national autonomy policies within a territory, given that just as state power is associated with one nation, territorial autonomy, in terms of culture, is meant for the Basque, Catalan or Galician people only. Caminal points out that “the perfect solution lies in separating the state from the nation, just like earlier the state stopped being identified with its official religion. Clearly, this solution would also require the separation between self-government and the nation because you cannot require from the state what you do not want for your own territory accepted as a nation” (Ibid: 149).

However, in the Spanish case, there is no such separation, therefore autonomy is purely territorial and can be managed following the preferences of the majority. As a result, the prevailing practice is that of assimilation of national groups rather than their autonomy. The winner imposes his judgment of what cultural autonomy is, the linguistic issue being a good example thereof.

For instance, if the autochthonous language is weak and the region is not linked to any political nationalist movements, the language does not receive official status because its officiality would supposedly affect all the inhabitants of the territory in some aspect of their life. This is exactly the case with the variations of Asturian-Leonese or Aragonese. The same mechanics explain the different degree of recognition of one and the other. The situation is more favourable in Asturias than in Aragon, simply because Asturian has far greater quantitative and qualitative weight than Aragonese. That, expressed in votes, is what determines the degree of legal protection of one language or another.

However, if the autochthonous language plays an important role in a peripheral nationalism, it is perfectly possible that even despite being clearly a minority language in the territory, it obtains the co-official status. This happens if the peripheral nationalism (with voluntarist basis) defending the language represents the majority and therefore captures support that transcends the linguistic community and consequently achieves power. The latter describes the case of *Euskera* in the Basque Country. Other more widely spoken languages, such as Galician and especially Catalan, on the other hand, have more opportunities to ensure their status of co-officiality through the competitive system of access to linguistic autonomy.

Now, the real (practical) meaning of co-officiality diverges accord-

ing to the competitive mechanism. If we take education as an example, we can observe that in Catalonia, the language immersion method applied stipulates that only Catalan be used as the teaching language. This does not occur even in the Baltic States, where survival of Russian public schools has been ensured, though a high percentage of subjects are taught in the official languages. In the Valley of Aran (Catalonia) the co-officiality of three languages shows the multilingual complexity characterizing the linguistic design in education. At kindergarten level, language immersion fosters the use of Aranese; from primary school on, it gradually loses its weight in favour of Catalan and Spanish; in secondary school, Aranese is a subject itself, while the rest of the subjects are taught in Catalan, Spanish and French.

Regarding Galicia and the Balearic Islands, the introduction of the autochthonous language as the teaching language in education has been slow and did not gain a foothold until the second half of the 1990s. In Galicia, there is now a trilingual method, using Spanish, Galician and English. Prior to this, the established system, similar to that of the Balearic Islands, stipulated the minimum percentage of classroom hours to be taught in the minority language. In both cases, the starting percentage was/is set to 50%, and each education centre has the liberty of increasing it as it sees fit. Alternatively, other autonomous communities such as the Basque Country or Valencia provide more than one linguistic system for education, i.e., they apply a language separation method offering three options: studying in the minority language (Basque or Catalan / Valencian), studying in Spanish, or the bilingual option (each language representing approx. 50%). This method is also used in one part of Navarre, where one can choose between Basque and Spanish as the teaching language. The other part of the territory authorizes Spanish only. As for the non-official languages, they can only be chosen as an optional subject.

The problem lies in the following discrepancy. Spanish law stipulates that upon graduation, students are supposed to be fluent in both co-official languages, in order to be able to communicate both verbally and in writing. However, the achievement of this objective has been severely hindered by linguistic policies offering only one subject/course in the minority language of the AC. It has especially affected the Basque Country due to the linguistic distance between Basque and Spanish. This situation has prompted more and more Basques to choose to receive education exclusively in the Basque language (approximately 70% of pupils in primary school and over

95% in preschool), a policy fostered by the institutions governed by Basque nationalist parties and by utilitarian considerations, as the above-described model is the one that best ensures fluency in both official languages. This, by contrast, bothers the Spanish nationalists in the Basque Country, because even if the value of being able to function in both official languages seems obvious and, in order to comply with political correctness, is acknowledged by Spanish nationalists, they actually feel concerned by the high correlation between knowing the Basque language and pro-independence positions.

Catalonia is in a similar situation, although here there is no need for language immersion to learn both co-official languages. Due to Catalan's proximity to Spanish (both are Romance languages), for a Spanish speaker Catalan does not require exclusivity as a teaching language (the case of the Balearic Islands (*Pons, Vernet* 2009: 166–169) serves as a proof) to be learnt properly. In the case of Catalonia, linguistic exclusivity is clearly a political measure for assimilation or integration, depending on one's interpretation. Nonetheless, the demands of those Catalan citizens who ask for the right to use Spanish as the medium for their classroom instruction are not met, as cultural autonomy is applied to the territory, not to its citizens. Similar criticism by Spanish nationalist sectors of Catalonia is directed against laws that compel Catalan businesses to display signs in Catalan, but once again, by not admitting its multinational nature, the Spanish political system has laid the foundation for the ACs to act in their respective territories just like the central administration in its remit.

However, it is no less true that the central administration and, consequently, Spanish majority nationalism (at state level), has a number of tools to protect language and culture in the ACs where they could otherwise become institutionally marginalized, as opposed to minority languages/cultures that do not get any political majority support in their territories. The majority status grants a privileged position to the Spanish nation over the other autochthonous nations of the state, as well as the right to impose a veto on other communities' decisions in linguistic, educational and cultural matters. For example, in the first decades of the Spanish democracy, the Constitutional Court enshrined the method of language immersion for Catalan, yet a few years ago, the same court changed its doctrine and by a judgment which invalidated and reinterpreted a number of articles of the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy (2006), pointed out the need to safeguard certain linguistic and cultural rights of Spanish in Catalonia.

One of the consequences of this was that the Catalan High Court of Justice ruled in favour of Spanish being included in the Catalan educational system as a teaching language. The court went as far as to set a deadline expiring in November 2011. Eventually, the deadline was dropped, and the ruling has returned to the file of “resolutions pending compliance”, just like all other resolutions regarding the language issue which are generally not complied with in Catalonia, nor does the central government make any particular effort to ensure compliance. Considering that these resolutions, by and large, contradict the majority will of the Catalans, it would aggravate centre-periphery tensions rather than intensify the Catalans’ desire for independence.

## **6. Conclusions**

Faced with the challenge of recognition and political accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity, the Spanish state has established a competitive route for the ethnic groups and minority languages to follow in order to defend their rights effectively in institutional spaces below state authorities, i.e., Autonomous Communities. Spanish nationalism has consolidated its share of power and privilege at state level, and is not willing to share it with the minorities but, in response to democratic pressure coming from other nationalities and linguistic-cultural minorities, it has created smaller territorial spaces where the same operational logic is applied as at state level, and where what are minorities at state level are entitled to regulate and promote their language, culture and identity by obtaining regional majority status. This results in two problems. On the one hand, those ethnic and linguistic minorities without enough political power to defend their rights are left unprotected and facing an uncertain future. On the other hand, the minorities that have the political capacity to fight for their linguistic and cultural rights develop awareness of the association between their achievements in the linguistic-cultural field and achievements in political matters, thus encouraging peripheral nationalisms and their idea about full sovereignty being indispensable to ensure the survival of the ethnic and linguistic group.

## **Endnotes**

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<sup>1</sup> Castilian is the term used in Spain to refer to the Spanish language. Hereinafter, “Spanish” is used to refer to Castilian.

<sup>2</sup> It is advisable to avoid confusion between the definition of ethnic group and a

strictly cultural definition. Moulines points out, "the term 'ethnic group' and its subordinate 'nation', indicate autonomous political-cultural entities, which cannot be reduced, neither ontologically nor epistemologically, to other more basic entities, such as for example race, language, religion, etc." (Moulines 2001: 40).

<sup>3</sup> Moreno comes to describe Spain as a consociational system, which is, from the academic point of view, a clearly arbitrary and inaccurate statement, given that (as Moreno himself has admitted) Spain does not gather the characteristics defined by Lijphart to classify as consociational democracy (see: Moreno 2007: 16).

<sup>4</sup> The Spanish Senate (267 seats) is not a House of Representatives of the Autonomous Communities. Each Autonomous Community has one senator plus another one for every million residents, whereas the majority of the senators are elected in provincial districts where the electoral system is based on majority rule even more than the electoral system of the Congress of Deputies, a system that gives an a-priori majority result.

<sup>5</sup> The Spanish Judiciary is unitary, there is only one type of judicial decentralization via Supreme Courts of Justice of the Autonomous Communities, but they depend on the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ). Members of the CGPJ are elected by a three-fifths majority in the Congress of Deputies and the Senate.

<sup>6</sup> These are known as the Autonomous Communities of reinforced procedure. However, it seems that the most appropriate interpretation of the Spanish Constitution would be the one that in its essence states that the spirit of the Magna Carta is willing to equate or integrate the governmental system of the ACs in general to that of the State, and is therefore applicable to all of them. This would lead us to the extension of this Article to all ACs, regardless of the procedure followed to gain autonomy.

<sup>7</sup> In this autonomous community there is a small region, Carxe or Carxe (in Catalanian of Valencia) where Catalanian is spoken since the 19th century. However, since it only has a population of approx. 550, it cannot affect Murcia's classification as a linguistically homogeneous autonomous community.

<sup>8</sup> Surprisingly, within the boundaries of the Astur-Leonese domain, the only official linguistic modality is that of Miranda do Douro, in Portugal.

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## **PART 2. EUSKAL HERRIA AND BASQUE IDENTITY WITHIN SPAIN**

### **MINORITIES IN EARLY MEDIEVAL RIOJA\***

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The Rioja is a small region in northern-central Spain which was disputed by competing political systems for long periods during the early middle ages. Firstly, and for the best part of two centuries (750–923), between al-Andalus and the nascent Christian polities of the north, and then subsequently between those same entities, by then transformed into the kingdoms of León, Navarre, Aragón and Castile. To illustrate the complexity of the geopolitical history of the region, we will take the example of Nájera, its most important urban centre throughout the period, and which (and even here we are simplifying the process) was controlled successively by al-Andalus (712–923), Navarre (923–1076), Castile (1076–1111), Aragón (1111–1134) and, once again, Castile (1134 onwards). The impact upon society of this continual change makes this an interesting area in which to study the treatment dispensed to ethnic and religious minorities within the different Christian kingdoms. Moreover, despite the geopolitical upheaval, a vein of continuity in social policy is observed, which makes our analysis viable. Thus, for example, the 1076 municipal charter (*fuero*) of Nájera was granted by a Castilian monarch in confirmation of practice under his Navarrese predecessors. Finally, if we add into the equation the fact that the Rioja is also relatively well documented in the early medieval period, the region becomes a singularly promising one for this type of analysis. Accordingly, in this paper we will use this early documentation to study the treatment afforded to minority groups in the kingdoms of Castile and Navarre.

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For the almost two hundred years of Andalusian control of the region our information is very scant. However, it seems probable that a significant Christian community survived in place, subject to the twin processes of voluntary Islamisation and gradual Arabisation. After the Rioja passed into Christian hands sometime after 923<sup>1</sup>, our source material becomes much more abundant and detailed. However, almost all of it comes from the archives of different ecclesiastical institutions<sup>2</sup>, and in this sense such material poses some methodological challenges for the sort of analysis we propose since it is overwhelmingly concerned with those institutions' own interests. As such, it details the growth of monastic and cathedral estates, recording grants and purchases, a context in which it is possible that non-Christian groups are under-represented. A further distortion could stem from the eminently rural nature of such ecclesiastical estates as opposed to urban environments in which it is possible that minorities such as the Jews would have been more heavily concentrated.

Nonetheless, despite these methodological obstacles, both the place names and the personal names recorded in these documents bear witness to a culturally and religiously complex society: a Muslim population in all likelihood greatly reduced after the hostilities of the period 918–923, a significant Jewish minority, an at least partially Arabicised autochthonous Christian majority, and waves of Christian immigrants from the north, among them many Basques and Franks.

We will complement our onomastic analysis of the ecclesiastical sources with the perspective offered by municipal legal codes (known as *fueros*) granted by the different monarchs controlling the region at one time or another. More specifically, we will take into account three Riojan *fueros* –those of Nájera, Logroño and Ojacastro– and four more from nearby areas – Castrojeriz, Miranda, Tudela (where separate *fueros* for the Jewish and Muslim communities were granted after the capture of the city in 1119) and Jaca<sup>3</sup>. Above all, the *fueros* reflect the needs of a society in expansion; one which was demographically thirsty and willing to grant concessions in order to recruit colonists. In this context, we will be contrasting the social reality, as it is more or less faithfully reflected by the onomastics recorded in the ecclesiastical sources, with royal policy towards different minority groups, whether Christian (Franks and Basques), Jewish or Muslim.

References to these minorities are not common in the *fueros*, and on some occasions are merely formulaic<sup>4</sup>. In the *fuero* of Nájera (1076)<sup>5</sup>, however, we find a stark, brutal indeed, quantification of the precise value of each group. The *fuero* enumerates the fines (wergeld)

payable on the death of different members of the community and of the more valuable animals. According to this ranking (Table I), while the life of a Jew was valued at 250 *solidi*, the same rate as that of a noble or priest, and twice that of the Christian commoner, the life of a Muslim was worth one twentieth of said sum, the same value as that of an ass, and half of that of an ox.

**Table 1**

*Fines payable on the death of persons or beasts, according to the Fuero of Nájera (1076)*

	Amount (in <i>solidi</i> )
Christian noble	250
Priest / monk	250
Jew	250
Christian commoner	100
horse	100 / 50
ox	25
Muslim	12,5
ass	12,5

We will look in detail into the situation of the Muslim population subsequently, but as regards the Jewish community, I suggest that such a high valuation, rather than being a reflection of genuine social status, is explained by the desire of the Crown to protect a minority that was simultaneously valuable and vulnerable. Indeed, the Jews were considered royal property, *servi regis*, and unlike others were liable to direct taxation, a poll tax known as the *cabeza de pecho* (Valdeón 2004: 37). Similarly, they carried out a series of important functions – merchants, money-lenders, tax-collectors, physicians – which otherwise went unfulfilled and which consequently made them a highly valuable minority. Finally, it is possible that they had another function, since in our documentation they are repeatedly associated with the military strongholds of the few urban centres and possibly acted as *de facto* royal garrisons in times of conflict<sup>6</sup>. Such an arrangement would make a great deal of sense, simultaneously facilitating the protection of a valuable but vulnerable group and giving the Crown control of strategic strongholds through the loyalty of a minority which symbiotically depended on the Crown for protection. This, i.e. ‘chatelain’, is, I believe, the meaning of surnames such as *Alcastiel* and *Castellano* which we repeatedly encounter in Hebrew contexts<sup>7</sup>.

We have already commented how the ecclesiastical and rural focus of most of our sources might well tend to marginalize the Hebrew community, but even so it has a significant presence in said documentation, and all the more so if we avoid the surprisingly common methodological error of only regarding as Jewish those people explicitly described as such<sup>8</sup>. Employing a more proactive identification strategy based upon the characteristic and distinctive personal names used by the Jews<sup>9</sup>, some striking figures emerge in urban contexts. For example, in Nájera it seems reasonable to think in terms of the Jewish community accounting for as much as 25-30% of the total eleventh-century population<sup>10</sup>, a figure here reached through onomastic analysis but similar to those calculated from fourteenth-century fiscal data in other upper Ebro cities<sup>11</sup>.

As regards the vulnerability of the Jewish minority, this is clearly the case in later medieval Rioja, with pogroms taking place in Nájera, for example, in both 1360 and 1391 (*Cantera* 1987: 455–458), before the generalised expulsion of the Jews from Castile in 1492. For earlier periods we have anecdotal evidence in which Jews appear disproportionately as the victims of violence. For example, in a list of the homicides which had taken place over half a century in the village of Albelda (Albelda62)<sup>12</sup>, two of the five reported victims were anonymous Jews slain by a certain *Don Sona* in 1047. Around 1097 (BGD #314), the monastery of San Miguel de Pedroso acquired possessions in four villages near Belorado in return for paying a fine of two-hundred *solidi* owed by an unnamed third-party for the death of a similarly anonymous Jew, a sum which, incidentally, confirms the reality behind the high wergeld clause we saw in the *fuero* of Nájera. Finally, and also towards the end of the eleventh-century, the *aljama* of Nájera was collecting money to pay the ransom of a woman whose husband had been assassinated (*Cantera* 1987: 452–453). Such accounts are rare in our sources, which are generally only interested in property rights and municipal affairs, and indeed these anonymous victims are only recorded because of the implications of these cases for such rights, but when such events have been recorded the Jewish minority seems over-represented.

An even more striking example is recorded in the *fuero* of the town of Castrojeriz (Burgos). Inserted into the text is a list of events (*fazañas*) designed to demonstrate quite unashamedly that the townsfolk had repeatedly asserted their rights against all external threats, whether real or perceived. The *fazaña* that concerns us took place around 1035, i.e. shortly after the death of Sancho Garcés III, when

four royal officials and sixty Jews were slaughtered by the townsfolk, and the surviving members of the *aljama* were obliged to re-settle outside the town walls<sup>13</sup>. Several aspects of this terrible episode are of particular interest: the size of the Jewish community in a not particularly large town; that the violence was directed at the whole community rather than at individuals; the implicit association made between royal authority and the Jewish community; and the fact that the townsfolk seem quite unrepentant about the massacre. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the existence of such a large *aljama* at such an early date contradicts the traditional hypothesis that the Hebrew communities of the northern Christian realms had their origins in migrations that took place after the conquest of Toledo (1085) and the subsequent Almoravid onslaught. In fact the *aljama* of Castrojeriz dates back even further, expressly (though, as we have seen, futilely) receiving protection in the town's *fuero* of 974<sup>14</sup>.

There are a few generic references that suggest that Muslim population enjoyed some civic rights<sup>15</sup>, but we have seen the lowly position they occupied in the *fuero* of Nájera. In Jaca, similarly, they were regarded as chattels that their masters could use as surety and moreover were apparently treated little better than pack animals, hence the plea to those masters that "they are men and should not starve like beasts"<sup>16</sup>. Although our sources record an abundance of Arab personal names, generally, as far as we can tell, they were used by Jews or Christians<sup>17</sup>, and in fact we have no direct evidence of the existence of free Muslims in the Rioja of the eleventh-century. In other words, in contrast to the dozens of references to individualised Jewish land-owners and witnesses in the ecclesiastical documentation, free Muslim individuals, if there were any, make virtually no noise in the same register. We have but one specific reference to a Muslim, and significantly, the mention of the *mauro* Abdella Iben Mochaoar in 928 (Albelda5) is both very early and indicates the exodus of Muslim population after the Christian conquest, as the lands he had previously held were granted by queen Toda of Navarre to the monastery of San Martín de Albelda (Rioja). The fact that the previous owner is named suggests a relatively peaceful and legal transmission, rather than that the lands had been seized, and this could be an echo of the dynamic we observe two centuries later in Tudela (in 1119) when the defeated Muslims were granted a year to sell up their possessions within the city walls<sup>18</sup>.

We should probably then think in terms of the Muslim population as almost exclusively tied-peasants or slaves, the latter possibly

captured in warfare<sup>19</sup>. Such classes are barely mentioned on an individualised basis in our sources, but when we do have references that include the names of tied peasants, described as *collazos* and *casatos*, there doesn't seem to be a particularly high incidence of Arab names. An exceptional document from the monastery of Sobrado in Galicia titled *Genealogía sarracenorum* can perhaps help us understand the fate of the Muslim population of the Rioja (Sobrado 1976: doc. 108 [undated]). It details the progressive conversion (both onomastic and religious) of three generations of Muslim slaves captured in warfare. The predominantly Arab names of the first generation give way to the almost completely Christian names of their children and grandchildren, with specific cases of name-changing cited, such as a certain Fernando Nigro originally called *Mafumate*, i.e. Mohammed. Often the change of name is associated explicitly with baptism, referred to on a number of occasions, although poignantly one couple (Ali and Fatima) are recorded as having died as 'pagans'. In this context, we should bear in mind that the Rioja functioned as *de facto* frontier between the Christian and Muslim worlds for two centuries, and while it is true that we lack direct references to the phenomenon of Muslim slavery in the Rioja, it is implied in the *Nájera fuero*.

Overall, the extremely low profile of Muslims in our sources is probably the result of the confluence of two factors: demographic weakness and social marginalisation. The marginalisation is amply demonstrated in the *fueros* of Nájera and Jaca, while dynamics favouring emigration and thence demographic weakness can be seen echoed in later events such as the already mentioned settlement granted to the Muslim community after the fall of Tudela in 1119. Ironically, this last text is regarded as a positive landmark as far as Muslim rights within the Christian realms were concerned, as it was the first time any significant civic rights at all were granted to the community, and yet even so references to exodus to al-Andalus (*ire de Tudela ad terram de moros*) and expulsion from the city (*exeant ad illos barrios de foris*) are also present<sup>20</sup>. By contrast, a coetaneous settlement granted to the Jewish community, and which explicitly establishes parallels with their situation in Nájera, encourages Jews to the return to and settle in Tudela<sup>21</sup>.

Whereas the Muslims are occasionally mentioned in the legal texts but, with one exception, are nowhere to be seen in the ecclesiastical sources, the situation with the Basques is the opposite: the ecclesiastical sources are full of references indicating the presence of Basque-speaking immigrants while, with but one exception, there



is no mention of them in the *fueros*. Another distinguishing aspect is that, whereas Jewish and Frankish minorities are generally identifiable by their personal-names, Basque-speaking communities are more readily identifiable by the place-names they coined and which in many cases have survived until today in the border lands between the Rioja and Burgos, with important concentrations in the Oja, Tirón, Oca and Arlanzón river valleys<sup>22</sup>.

Traditionally, the early medieval Basque migration into the Rioja and neighbouring Burgos was regarded as a unitary phenomenon, but in fact two different phases are distinguishable both chronologically and spatially<sup>23</sup>. The second would take place from around 1025 onwards as the Navarrese monarchs Sancho Garcés III and his son García Sánchez III took control of both sides of what had previously served as the frontier between Navarre and Castile. In doing so they freed up fertile farmland in the lower Oja and Tirón valleys which had until then been relatively lightly colonised precisely because of its condition as frontier territory. In this area, alongside non-Basque settlement names which date from the pre-existing colonisation and all of which are documented before 1050<sup>24</sup>, there suddenly begin to emerge from 1025 onwards villages incorporating the *-uri* (= 'settlement') suffix characteristic of the western Basque dialect<sup>25</sup>.

The earlier phase, concentrated in the highlands, is more difficult to tie down chronologically, above all because the early documentation is notoriously problematical, some texts being forgeries while many others have been manipulated. Nonetheless, by the mid tenth-century Basque toponyms emerge profusely in the hill-country at the head of the Oja, Tirón, Oca and Arlanzón rivers in a range of sources<sup>26</sup>, a variety which in itself indicates the historicity of the phenomenon despite the undeniable problems surrounding many (though not all) individual texts. Indeed, such is the volume and concentration of these place-names in some areas, both in medieval records and surviving until the present day, particularly around Ezcaray in the upper Oca valley, that it seems reasonable to suppose that for a significant period Basque speakers constituted a majority of the population<sup>27</sup>.

Another type of evidence for Basque migration are the numerous villages with the element *vascones* in their name<sup>28</sup>. What is striking about the distribution of the *vascones* place names is that they do not coincide with either of the areas of highest concentration of Basque toponyms mentioned in the previous paragraphs, but appear to form an arc around them. What we seem to have here are relatively isolated Basque settle-

ments on the periphery of the areas with the densest Basque settlement. In this sense, these *vascones* place names are exonyms, bestowed on minority Basque groups by their non-Basque neighbours. The equivalent folk-names within the areas of highest Basque concentration refer not to the generic *vascones*, but to more specific and distinctive identifiers within the Basque-speaking community such as *Nafarruri* and *Gipuzare*, distinguishing settlers from the eastern vascophone regions of Navarre and Gipuzkoa amidst a majority from the western Basque regions of Araba and Bizkaia, as dialect evidence indicates.

By contrast, personal names are of relatively little use when it comes to distinguishing Basque speaking communities from their neighbours since the anthroponymic stock of both seems to have been largely the same<sup>29</sup>, and since our ecclesiastical documents rarely record the hypocoristic forms that give us a clearer idea of the actual language spoken within a community, the ecclesiastical scribes tending to record more formal versions of names<sup>30</sup>. The problem is exacerbated in earlier periods such as the tenth century when, generally, only a single name was used to identify non-noble individuals, without recourse to patronymics or more significantly the nicknames we encounter in later periods and which prove such a rich source for early Basque vocabulary<sup>31</sup>.

Nor, with but one exception, do the *fuegos* help much when it comes to recreating this Basque diaspora. These codes tend to be intentionally and explicitly inclusive, extending the conditions being offered to all Christians. The only distinctions that we see being made are in the so-called *fuegos de francos*, for example that of Logroño in 1095, where colonists from north of the Pyrenees, collectively referred to in such texts as *Franks*, were actively encouraged<sup>32</sup>. The exception mentioned, i.e. the only *fuego* which makes explicit and differentiated reference to Basque settlers, refers not to a single settlement but to the upper reaches of the river Oja in general, referred to as the valley of Ojacastro. According to the *fuego*, the men of the valley had the right to represent themselves in court of law in the Basque language (Merino 1978). Unfortunately, the text itself has not survived, and we only know of its existence from later references<sup>33</sup>. Nor do we know the precise date in which it was granted, though Merino Sánchez, seeing a number of parallels between Ojacastro and the village of Covacardiel (Burgos), has suggested that it could date from as early as 1052 (Merino 1988: 119–154). Given the geographical location of Ojacastro, at the epicentre of Basque place name distribution, this date sits very neatly with the observed chronology of the

second phase of Basque immigration, and it is intriguing to think that it might have been an instrument of a royal policy (by García Sánchez III) to promote Basque immigration, analogous to what we will later see with reference to Franks (*fuero* of Logroño, 1095) or Jews (*fuero* of Tudela, 1119), though this is all far from proven.

## Conclusions

All of the above makes most sense in the context of a society in expansion and in need of demographic reinforcement. Consequently, the habitual tone in the *fueros* is one of inclusiveness: almost any settlers were welcome. We see this made clear with settlers from north of the Pyrenees from 1095 onwards and possibly with Basques too, in earlier and less well documented periods. What is undeniable is the demographic weight of this latter group. It also seems to have been the case with the Jews, a valuable but vulnerable minority which the Crown sought to protect (not always successfully) throughout the period documented, even reaching back to the comital period in Castile in the 974 *fuero* of Castrojeriz. Finally though, despite the demographic needs of this society, it would not be until the early twelfth-century that the Muslim population began to receive any protection at all, and even then in terms less favourable than those of their Jewish neighbours.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Exactly how and when this transfer took place, and to what extent it was not so much the military triumph portrayed in the Christian chronicles as the ceding of the territory by Córdoba from one unreliable frontier dynasty (the Banu Qasi) to another (the house of Pamplona), are themes explored in (Peterson 2007: 155–76).

<sup>2</sup> Above all the archives of San Martín de Albelda, the Cathedral of Santo Domingo de la Calzada, San Millán de la Cogolla (particularly the *Becerro Galicano*), and the Riojan miscellany (much of it coming from the records of the Cathedral of Calahorra) edited by Rodríguez. In reference to these sources we will employ the following abbreviations: Albelda; Calzada; BGD; Rioja.

<sup>3</sup> For Nájera, see (Martínez 1979: 404–411); for Logroño (Martínez 1979: 411–17); for Ojacastró (Merino 1978); for Castrojeriz (Martínez 1982); for Tudela (Cantera 1998: 287–90); and for Jaca, see doc. Jaca8.

<sup>4</sup> *Fuero de Miranda: Et omnes populores qui modo sunt et de cetero erunt, generosi aut pedones, aut mauri, aut judei*. Note, however, the contrast between this formulaic inclusiveness and the anti-Hebrew rhetoric we find in the very same source: *et sit sicut judeus et hereticus a tota communione christianorum separatus*.

<sup>5</sup> The text is known to us only through later confirmations by Castilian monarchs in 1076 (Alfonso VI) and 1137 (Alfonso VII), but they make clear that they are confirmations of the *status quo* during the reigns of their Navarrese predecessors, Sancho Garcés III (1004–1035) and his son García Sánchez III (1035–1054).

<sup>6</sup> In the upper Ebro valley alone we encounter references to *castellum iudeorum* or equivalents in Arnedo and Nájera (Rioja: 323), Belorado (Blanco 1973: 57), Briviesca (Cadiñanos 2001: 128) and Haro (Bulario 51v).

<sup>7</sup> For example, in Navarre, *Jacob, Judas* and *Mosse Castellano*, and *Azac, Buena* and *Salomón Alcastiel* (Lacave, *Los judíos del reino de Navarra*, Pamplona, 1998); *Hayn Castellano*, father of *Salamon Halilla*, in Oña (Burgos) and thus in a Castilian context where the alternative geographical meaning of ‘Castilian’ would make little sense (Cadiñanos 2001: 137–138); and *Yaco Castellano*, *Castellano judío*, *Juan Estébanez de Castellanos* y *Almofacen ben Castellano* in León (Rodríguez 1976).

<sup>8</sup> For example, “los judíos o siervos moros, identificados como tales casi sistemáticamente en la documentación” (Sánchez Badiola 2001: 314).

<sup>9</sup> For example, the second element of the name *Scablevi* (BGD #307, 1028) is clearly Hebrew, but this wealthy landowner is nowhere explicitly described as being Jewish.

<sup>10</sup> The most valuable text for this exercise is Rioja14 (1052), a lengthy list of the possessions of the monastery of Santa María de Nájera in and around the city, and in which 11% those holding property next to Santa María’s own possessions are explicitly described as Jews while many others bear names repeatedly associated with said community. For a detailed breakdown of these figures and of the names involved, the names involved, see Peterson 2009: 384.

<sup>11</sup> For example, Huesca and Jaca (*Motis* 1990: 51) or Tudela (Carrasco 1993: 32).

<sup>12</sup> The reasoning behind this macabre list was to demonstrate that traditionally the men of Albelda had not been liable for fines for homicides by third persons that took place within their jurisdiction.

<sup>13</sup> *Fuero* of Castrojeriz: *Migravit a seculo Sanctius rex et surrexerunt homines de Castro et occiderunt IIII saiones in palacio de Rex in Mercatello et LX judeos; et illos alios prendamus totos et traximus illos de suas casas et de suas hereditates et fecerunt populare ad Castrello.*

<sup>14</sup> *Fuero* of Castrojeriz: *Et si homines de Castro matarent Iudeo tantum pectet pro illo quo modo pro christiano, et libres similiter hominem villarum.*

<sup>15</sup> *Totum concilium de Nagera et christiani et mauri et iudei testes*, BGD #645. See note 4 for a similar phrase in the *fuero* of Miranda.

<sup>16</sup> *Fuero* of Jaca (1077): *Et si aliquis homo pignoraverit sarracenus vel sarracenam vicini sui mitat eum in palatio meo; et domnus sarraceni vel sarracene det ei panem et aquam quia est homo et non debet ieunare sicuti bestia.* The fact that that it was felt necessary to set this in writing suggests it was a more or less common practice.

<sup>17</sup> For example, *Zuleman iudeo* (Rioja14.17, 1052) or *don Kiram*, abbot of the monastery of Santa María de Nájera (Leire65, 1062).

<sup>18</sup> Muslim *fuero* of Tudela (1119): *Et que stent illos moros in lure casas que abent de intro per unum annum; completo anno, quod exeant ad illos barrios de foris cum lures mobiles et cum lures mulieres et cum lures filios <...> Et qui voluerit exire vel ire de Tudela ad terram de moros vel ad aliam terram, quod sit solitus et uadat securamente cum mulieribus et cum filiis et cum toto suo auer.*

<sup>19</sup> For example, in 913, the sack of Évora (Portugal) by Ordoño II led to some four thousand captives (Reglero 2010: 101).

<sup>20</sup> See note 21 for the full text.

<sup>21</sup> Jewish *fuero* of Tudela (1119): *Et mandauit eis per sua mercede qui sunt inde*

*exitos quod se tornent popolare ad Tutela cum toto lure auere et lure causa <...> Et mandauit eis per sua mercede fuero de judios de Nagera in totas lures causas.*

<sup>22</sup> For example, *Ezcaray* in the upper Oja valley, and further downstream *Arteaga* in the village of Casalarreina; the river *Turrioza* < \**Iturrioza* (Fresneda de la Sierra) in the upper Tirón valley and *Ochanduri* downstream. Further west, the Basque toponyms are concentrated almost exclusively in the upper reaches of the rivers, for example *Galarde* in upper Oca valley and *Froncea* < *Faranluzea* in the valley of the river Arlanzón.

<sup>23</sup> The standard work for a long time was *J.J.B. Merino* *La Lengua Vasca en La Rioja y Burgos* (Merino 1978), though *L. Michelena* offered a more sophisticated analysis in “Onomástica y población en el antiguo reino de Navarra”, in *Palabras y Textos* (Michelena 1987: 59–72). For more on the differentiation between the two phases (see Peterson 2009b: 115–125).

<sup>24</sup> *Treviana*, 873 (BGD #396); *Grañón*, 936 (BGD #390); *Tormantos*, 951 (BGD #523); *Fonzaleche*, 959 (BGD #364); *Leiva*, 971 (BGD #342); *Redecilla del Campo*, 1025 (BGD #324); *Haro*, 1040 (Rioja3); *Bañares*, 1049 (BGD #188); *Castañares*, 1049 (BGD #188).

<sup>25</sup> *Belascuri*, now *Velasco*, 1028 (BGD #234); *Herramélluri*, 1067 (BGD #247); *Naharruri*, now *Casalarreina*, 1070 (BGD #176); *Ochánduri*, 1090 (BGD #395); *Ollauri*, 1182 (Calzada54). *Cihuri*, with a first appearance in theory in 947 (BGD #167) would seem to challenge this chronology, but that first appearance is actually in a twelfth-century forgery, and its real debut was in fact not until 1052 (BGD #169). The remaining – *uri* settlements in this area, some twenty in total are mentioned in the medieval documentation, have since been abandoned, but they all conform to the observed chronology of relatively late diplomatic debuts.

<sup>26</sup> 869, *Larrehederra* = ‘great pasture’ (BGD #361); 943, *Gipuzare* = ‘farm / settlement of the Guipuzcoan’ (BGD #382); 945, *Ocharanna* = ‘valley of the Oca’ (BGD #337); 945, *Lamiturri* = ‘spring of the water-nymphs’ (BGD #318); 947, *Faranluzea* = ‘long valley’ (BGD #378); 971, *Nafarruri* = ‘farm / settlement of the Navarrese’ (Ibeas2); 964, *Urrezti* = ‘hazel grove’ (Cardeñal113); 972, *Adefeterra* = ‘broad pass’ (Cardeñal156).

<sup>27</sup> As well as the name *Ezcaray* itself (= ‘high rock’), we encounter the following settlement names *Arviza*, *Ayabarrena*, *Azarrulla*, *Gilbarrena*, *Tondeluna* (< \**Iturri-iluna*? = ‘dark spring’), *Ulizarna*, *Urdanta*, *Uyarra*, *Zabarrula* and *Zaldierna*, all of clear Basque morphology and phonetic, even if the etymologies are not always transparent. Hundreds of Basque microtoponyms have been recorded by Merino (Merino 1978) and L.M. Mújika (Mújika 1991: 423–433).

<sup>28</sup> The following villages have survived: *Báscos del Agua*, *Báscos de Zamanzas*, *Bascuñana*, *Bascuñuelos*, *Villabáscos*, *Villabáscos de Bezana*, *Basconcillos de Muño*, *Basconcillos de Tozo* (all in Burgos), *Báscos de Ebro*, *Báscos de Valdivia* y *Báscos de Ojeda* (Palencia) and *Zayas de Báscos* (Soria). Microtoponyms containing this element are also observed in the medieval documentation: *Fonte Vascones* (1028, BGD #435), *ual de Uascones* (1063, Oña44), and *era de Vascones* en *Pancorbo* (1088, BGD #270) – all in Burgos.

<sup>29</sup> The most common names in both the western Basque-speaking area, i.e. *Araba* (*Muño*, *Tello*, *Beila*, *Oveco*, *Álvaro*, *Ulaquide*, *Diego*) and in the east, i.e. *Navarre* (*Sancho*, *Fortún*, *García*, *Aznar*, *Galindo*, *Enneco*, *Jimeno*) in the early medieval period are equally common in non-vascophone areas, cf. Antroponimia y sociedad (1995).

<sup>30</sup> By contrast, funerary epigraphs are much richer in hypocoristic forms (*Peterson* 2012).

<sup>31</sup> *Martin Arzania* ('shepherd'), *Garci Baltza* ('black'), *Lop Galvarra* ('bald'), *Enego Gorria* ('red'), *Sancius Zuria* ('blanco'), all examples from the thirteenth-century documentation of Santo Domingo de la Calzada cathedral.

<sup>32</sup> *Fuero* of Logroño: *tam francigenis quam etiam ispanis uel exquibus cumque gentibus uiuere debeant ad foro de francos se manteneant*.

<sup>33</sup> In the early thirteenth century we see a reference to the existence of a generalised valley *fuero* (Calzada96a), and then a generation later, around 1240, a second and much better known reference which mentions the right of the valley's inhabitants to defend themselves in court in the Basque language.

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## **THE FORMATION OF THE BASQUE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AT THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND ITS HISTORICAL LEGACY**

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From the reign of the Catholic Monarchs onwards (last quarter of the fifteenth century) the idea of a Spanish nation would start to take shape; the notion would gain ground during the period of the Bourbon Reforms (eighteenth century); and would only become fully consolidated after the Liberal Revolution (nineteenth century). Only after the end of the Carlist Wars and the beginning of the Restoration (1874) did Catalanist and Basque nationalist political movements emerge, seeking a territorial power-sharing model that reflected the institutional history of these regions. The frustrated Second Republic (1936–1939) then attempted to satisfy these demands through respective Statutes of Autonomy. However, the Franco dictatorship (1939–1975) put an end to this first experience of autonomous regional government. The principle would not be recovered until the return of democracy, in the so-called Transition (1975–1978), and the proclamation of the 1978 Constitution, which created the Spanish *State of Autonomies*, consisting of seventeen Autonomous Communities and the two Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla<sup>1</sup>.

Each of the seventeen Autonomies has its own single-chamber legislative assembly, which as well as legislative authority has other powers too, such as electing the president of the autonomous executive and government, its running, budgetary control, participation in the composition of the Spanish senate, etc.<sup>2</sup> However, only the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country / Euskadi, as well as a legislative assembly, or Basque Parliament as it is known in this case, has another layer of provincial assemblies. In other words, the three provinces [or *historical territories*] (Law 27/1983) of Araba, Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia each have their own single-chamber legislative assembly known as the *Juntas Generales* (Orella 1989; Monreal 1974; González



1990; Gómez Piñeiro 1992; SÁEZ 1996; Zabala 2006), which to a certain extent recreate at provincial level the responsibilities of the Basque Parliament.<sup>3</sup> The origins of the *Juntas Generales* are to be found in a medieval institution called the *Hermandad* (literally, ‘brotherhood’). The *hermandades*, which combined juridical and police functions, were in turn originally a response to the endemic warfare between the Basque feudal nobility that erupted as a result of falling incomes during the late-medieval crisis (14–16th C.).<sup>4</sup> I will now attempt to briefly and synthetically explain the historical process behind the formation of the *Juntas Generales* (provincial legislative assemblies), concentrating, by way of example, on the province of Araba.

## **1. The origins of the province of Araba and its institutional structure in the medieval *hermandades***

### **1.1. What is an *Hermandad*?**

As has already been intimated, the *Hermandad* was an institution with a dual purpose. On the one hand, the maintenance of public order, above all on the highways and in abandoned villages, and in pursuit of delinquents; and secondly, to ensure the correct application of penal justice. They were originally organised by local communities as a means of self-defence in response to the violence and other abuses of the rural nobility, in itself suffering from the drastic fall in traditional seigniorial rents which accompanied the late-medieval crisis [14–16th C] (VV. AA. 1986; Durana, Ramón 1986; Diputación 1986). According to one of the foundational texts of the *Hermandad* of Araba: “[the rural nobility and its acolytes] had committed and perpetrated a multitude of enormous and terrible crimes, by night as by day, robbing and stealing, demanding wine and provisions in villages and hamlets alike, defying all reason and murdering innocents” [06.02.1417] (*Esperanza* 1983). Such actions had even put at risk the commercial activity coming through Araba, which after Burgos was the next stage of the South-North commercial route that connected Castile with France, England, Flanders or the Hansa, via the Basque ports of the Cantabric coast.

In order to carry out these law and order functions, the *Hermandad* had its own officers, known as *alcaldes de hermandad*, to be elected at local level. They were essentially lay judges, bestowed with the authority to pursue and prosecute those responsible for theft, robbery, damage to property (arson, illegal logging), house-breaking, homicide and murder, sexual aggression, and those abetting declared outlaws (*encarta-*

*dos*). Together, these were termed *casos de hermandad*, that is to say crimes to be pursued by the *Hermandad*, rather than by the ordinary justice system.<sup>5</sup> As such, these matters were dealt with by an abbreviated procedure, with no appeal system, whereby the most straightforward of evidence was taken as full proof of guilt, in which case sentence was carried out by shooting (by arrows, *asaeteamiento*) or by drowning (*empozamiento*). If necessary, the *alcaldes de hermandad* could call on the help of the local populace, termed in such cases *cuadrilleros*, by means of a peal of church bells, a summons which would then lead to the persecution of the criminals. In this sense, the *alcaldes* assumed the judicial function and the *cuadrilleros* that of the police.

## **1.2. The different phases of the *Hermandad* movement in Araba**

A full account of the evolution in all its complexity of the *Hernandad* movement in Araba from its origins in 1282 until its definitive consolidation in 1463 goes beyond the scope of this paper.<sup>6</sup> Nonetheless, I will attempt to sketch the broad outlines of the process. In general terms, we can talk of the mid fourteenth-century as being a turning-point. Before then, we observe the emergence of *hermandades* associated, above all, with the problem of the weakening of royal authority in Castile (i.e., political instability) as a consequence of the revolt of the *infante* (prince) don Sancho (IV) against his father Alfonso X ‘the Wise’, and the minorities of Fernando IV (late 13th C.) and Alfonso XI (early 14th C). These were ad hoc *hermandades*, and as such, created with little intention lasting, and moreover it was an association at municipal level across the Castilian crown territories, rather than an exclusively Alavese phenomenon. The objective, in turbulent times, was the defence of local rights (*fueros*) and privileges, the maintenance of public order and the application of justice against the excesses of the feudal nobility.

From the second half of the fourteenth century onwards, Basque society, and Araba was no exception, was riven by the endemic warfare between two rival noble factions, the *Oñacinos* and the *Gamboínos*, that has become known as the *luchas de bandos* (Arocena 1959; Ángel 1995; Díaz, José 1998; Marín, José 2003, Dacosta 2003). The underlying causes, as mentioned above, are to be found in the late medieval crisis, which forced the nobility to search for alternative sources of revenue when faced with falling rents. Some of the solutions were peaceful, for example the entailed estate (*mayorazgo*), but others less

so, such as banditry and warfare between nobles, both of which ended up involving the rest of society. In response, and in alliance with the Crown, an efficient instrument to combat seigneurial violence was articulated: the *hermandades*. The first attempt at the creation of a provincial *Hermandad*, in 1417, when the localities of Vitoria, Treviño and Salvatierra grouped together, proved a failure. The next important step in the development of the institution was in 1458, although even after that a series of reforms were necessary before it began to function properly.

The reforms were implemented on the 11th and 12th of October, 1463, in the Alavese locality of Rivabellosa. Pedro Alonso de Valdivielso, commissioned by Enrique IV of Castile for this purpose, along with sixteen attorneys representing the *Hermandad*, drew up the definitive regulations of the Alavese *Hermandad* which went by the title Book of Laws and Ordinances Governing the Most Noble and Most Loyal Province of Araba (Cuaderno 1623). It was the end of a long process, culminating in the planting the seeds of what would become the province and the governing body of all Alaveses.

### **1.3. The territories that originally constituted the Province of Araba in 1463**

The *Hermandad* constituted in Rivabellosa was the basis of what was to become the modern Historical Territory of Araba. Within it there were five towns (Vitoria, Salvatierra, Miranda de Ebro, Pancorbo and Saja), twenty-six local *hermandades* in the rural areas known as the *tierras esparzas*<sup>7</sup> and two *juntas* (literally ‘assemblies’, in this case San Millán and Araya). Treviño and Lapuebla de Arganzón (which together constitute the County of Treviño, today an enclave belonging to Burgos province, surrounded by Araba) remained definitively outside from the start. Furthermore, between 1463 and 1481 Miranda de Ebro, Pancorbo, Villalba de Losa y Losas de Suso, all broke away from the Alavese *Hermandad* and today belong to Burgos province; while another town to abandon it, Saja, today belongs to the Rioja. On the other hand, between 1481 and 1502 the *Hermandad* welcomed Antoñana, Santa Cruz de Campezo, Lagrán, Peñacerada, Salinillas de Buradón, Berantevilla, Laguardia (all in 1486), the valley of Aramayona (1489), Bernedo (1490), the valley of Llodio (1491) and Labraza (1501). During this period the valley of Oroz-

co also briefly joined the Alavese provincial *Hermidad*, though it would later return to the jurisdiction of the Lordship of Bizkaia.

#### **1.4. Responsibilities of the *Hermidad* of Araba**

The primary responsibility of the *Hermidad* of Araba was to ensure public order, as has already been indicated, and the application of penal justice by the *alcaldes de hermandad*. As is to be expected, though, it also had administrative duties, generally linked to judicial practice and public order. Gradually, however, and above all from the mid-fifteenth century onwards, the limited role of the *Hermidad* countenanced in Rivabellosa ordinances came to be surpassed as it morphed into an intermediary institution between the Crown and the Alaveses. The monarchy's undertakings required money, men and supplies, and the *Hermidad* became responsible for providing all three, dividing the necessary amounts among the *hermandades locales*. Thus it came to acquire both fiscal responsibilities, which with time would result in the *Hacienda foral* (i.e. the provincial treasury), and military ones, in relation to the recruitment and provisioning of troops. Moreover, the institution, blessed with a great degree of autonomy, also came to acquire legislative and economic functions, proclaiming laws to be complied with at provincial level, or assuming the cost of building and maintaining the road network.

#### **1.5. The origins of the *Juntas Generales***

The *Juntas Generales* was the provincial governing body contemplated by the ordinances of Rivabellosa and consisted of the representatives (*procuradores*) chosen by and from among the different local communities (towns, villages, hamlets, valleys), generically referred to as *hermandades locales*. It convened twice a year, once in the Spring (May) and again in the Autumn (November), and one of the two meetings was necessarily held in Vitoria. Its mission, initially at least, was the naming of administrative personnel, the supervision of the actions of the *alcaldes de hermandad* (the lay judges, one for each local community) and to resolve any problems deriving from the provincial *Hermidad's* responsibilities for public order and justice. Nonetheless, it has already been commented how, over time, the *Hermidad* assumed further responsibilities (fiscal, military, legislative) beyond its original law and order remit.

## **1.6. The emergence of the *Diputación General***

The Rivabellosa ordinances also contemplated the creation of a restricted governing organ, the *Diputación*, in order to give continuity between meetings to the decisions and actions of the *Juntas Generales*. The *Diputación* consisted of two commissars and four deputies chose by the representatives at the *Junta General*, and in practice this was the organ responsible for the day to day running of the province, its meetings being called *Juntas Particulares*, to distinguish them from the *Juntas Generales*, i.e. the General Assembly of the representatives of the different local communities. From 1476 this body came to be presided over by a single magistrate, a development not contemplated by the Rivabellosa ordinances, the *Diputado General* (Rayón 1988, 1997). Various hypotheses have been proposed to explain the origins of this magistracy, but the one that seems most historically plausible is that which explains its origin in terms of the association between the *Hermandad* of Araba and the *Santa Hermandad* of Castile. The latter was established by the Catholic Monarchs with the dual objective of pacifying the realm during the unrest caused after their coronation by the scheming and rebellious nobility, and of conquering the Nazarí held Kingdom of Granada. The first *Diputado General* was Lope López de Ayala (1476–1505), followed by Diego Martínez de Álava (1505–1533, although he was de facto *diputado* from 1499). In principle it was a post to be held for life to be bestowed upon a neighbour of Vitoria.

## **1.7. The organization of the territory into *Cuadrillas***

The organization of the territory into *Cuadrillas* (literally ‘squares’, but commonly used in Spanish to mean any smallish grouping) was a result of the desire to organize the territory equitably between towns and rural (*esparsa*) areas for purpose of taxation and in order to assign different offices (commissars and scribes, above all) within the institutional organogram. The resulting territorial units, the *cuadrillas*, were definitively established in 1537 and remained unchanged until 1840, there being six in total: Vitoria, Salvatierra, Laguardia, Ayala, Zuya and Mendoza.

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By way of summary, the historical formation of the province of Araba, and the constitution of its governing bodies, the *Juntas Gener-*

ales and the *Diputación*, have their origins in the medieval institution of the *Hermandad*. The *Hermandades* first appeared in 1282 with the mission of protecting the constituent localities from the excesses of the feudal nobility in times of political upheaval. In other words, their primary concern was law and order. One of the numerous effects of the mid fourteenth-century crisis, was the fall in rents being recovered by the rural Basque nobility, who in reaction turned to violence leading to the endemic warfare that has become known as the *lucha de bandos* between the *Oñacino* and *Gamboino* factions. Once again, Alavese society turned to the instrument that had defended it in the past, the *hermandades*, this time in response to seigneurial violence. After two failed attempts, in 1417 and 1458, finally in 1463 a general *Hermandad* for the whole of Araba was constituted at Rivabellosa: the seed of the governing body of the Alaveses and the basis for the territorial entity that would become the *Territorio Histórico* of Araba. Between 1481 and 1502 Antoñana, Santa Cruz de Campezo, Lagrán, Peñacerrada, Salinillas de Buradón, Berantevilla, Laguardia, the valley of Aramayona, Bernedo, the valley of Llodio and Labraza all joined the *Hermandad*, which was in turn sub-divided into *cuadrillas* for fiscal and administrative purposes.

The *Hermandad* of Araba brought together a variety of different local entities (towns, villages, hamlets and valleys), and their respective representatives in assembly constituted the *Juntas Generales*, which met twice a year, in May and in November. The purpose of the *Juntas Generales* was initially the naming of administrative personnel, supervision of the *alcaldes de hermandad* (lay judges), and the resolution of any problems arising from the original law and order remit of the *Hermandad*, though later it would assume further responsibilities in legislative, fiscal and military matters.

The Rivabellosa ordinances also contemplated the creation of a limited governing body known as the *Diputación*, with the mission of providing continuity to the *Juntas Generales* actions and decisions between its biannual meetings. In practice, the *Diputación* was the body responsible for the running of the era province and its meetings were known as the *Juntas Particulares*. From 1476 onwards this body was presided over by a single magistrate in a role which had not been envisioned in the Rivabellosa ordinances: the *Diputado General*.<sup>8</sup>

## **2. The insertion of Basque foral institutions into the centralized state, from the Catholic Monarchs to the present day**

During the reign of the Catholic Monarchs (1474–1504), the affirmation and strengthening of the monarchy's power, a process started back in the thirteenth-century, began to consolidate, at the same time as the articulation and homogenisation of a territory until then consisting of different institutional regimes was achieved. The state administration was provided with institutions which favoured and facilitated this double process: the figure of the *corregidor*, a series of juridical ordinances (Pragmatics, the Montalvo ordinances, the Parliaments (Cortes) of Toledo and Toro, etc.), a re-organized judicial system based on audiences and the royal chancellery, the Inquisition, and government through a plurality of councils (known as the polysynodial system). However, despite this policy of homogenisation initiated by the Catholic Monarchs and continued by the Hapsburgs during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the conglomeration of kingdoms and territories that constituted the Crowns of Castile and Aragón maintained their institutional independence, and the Basque Country proved no exception in this sense (For more on this see: González 1974; Pérez 1976; Torres 1982; Bermejo 1982).

Things would only change at the beginning of the eighteenth century with the reforms that came in with the new Bourbon dynasty. Thus, in 1717, the so-called 'new-plan decrees' (*decretos de nueva planta*), put an end to the institutional diversity at the heart of the realm. In other words, the distinct territorial law-codes (*fueros*) were eliminated, as were economic, customs, military, judicial and institutional privileges and differences. In this way a single regime for the whole realm emerged although, for reasons we won't go into here, Navarre and the Basque Country came to be referred to as the 'exempted provinces' (See: Gómez 1982; Molas 1984; Portillo 1991; Angulo 1995).

A century later the Liberal Revolution would begin, its starting point being the 1812 *Cortes de Cádiz* (the Cadiz Parliament). The Liberal understanding of the State sat uneasily with the principle of exceptions, such as was the case with the Basque Country, to a common fiscal, military and institutional regime applicable to all citizens and territories alike. The process of homogenisation and centralization was completed in 1876 with the end of the Carlist Wars and the abolition of the *foral* (i.e. exceptional) Basque institutional system. In this way, the provinces of

Araba, Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia lost their special legal-institutional system that had emerged in the later Middle Ages with the *Hermindades*, and were fully incorporated into the common regime of the Spanish state (For more on this theme see: *Vázquez* 1984; *Urquijo* 1994; *Alonso* 1995).

A first attempt to recover the institutions of the Basque foral system was made during the Second Republic -in October 1936 during in the first months of the Civil War- with a Statute of Autonomy (For more on this, see: *FUSI* 1979; *Granja* 1990). However, the Francoist victory put an end to this first experience in autonomous government. The second attempt, which is indeed now the status quo, came with the Transition from the Franco dictatorship to Democracy and the proclamation of the constitution of 1978 (*Tamayo* 1994). Indeed, its first supplementary disposition states: "The Constitution protects and respects the historical rights of the foral territories. The general modernisation of said foral regime will take place within the framework of the Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy" (Constitución 2007).

Thus, with the Constitution of 1978 and the Statute of Autonomy of 1979 (Organic Law), the Basque foral system was restored at institutional level and with it the legislative assemblies of the different provinces called *Juntas Generales* and whose origins date back to the fifteenth century. In the case of the *Juntas Generales* de Araba, its nature is defined in its first three articles, according to the Royal Decree of 1979 regulating its organisation and running:

1°. *The Juntas Generales of Araba and its Diputación Foral are responsible for the governance and administration of the particular interests of the province.*

2°. *The Juntas Generales of Araba are, in accordance with historical tradition, the organ of participation of the people of Araba, through their municipalities which are in turn grouped together in Hermandades, in the administration and governance of the province.*

3°. *The municipalities of Araba, according to this Royal Decree, are grouped together in Hermandades in order to constitute the electoral units, which then designate their corresponding representatives<sup>9</sup>.*

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> On the historical rights and political claims, particularly with reference to the Basque Country, see, amongst others: *Castells* 1976; *Clavero* 1985; VV. AA. 1988; *Herrero* 1998; *Ezeizabarrena* 2003; *Laporta & Saiz* 2006.

<sup>2</sup> For the role of the regional Autonomies within the Spanish state, see, among others: *Barrachina* 1987; *Monreal, Trujillo* 1991; *Solozabal, Juan* 1998; *González-Trevijano, Núñez* 1998; *Aja* 2003.



<sup>3</sup> Among the functions and responsibilities of the *Juntas Generales* are the drawing up and approval of regulations governing the different questions devolved to provincial level (running of the different foral institutions, including the *Diputación* and the *Juntas*, the provincial budget, the provincial taxation system, administration of the province's own wealth, the municipal taxation system within the province, the municipalities' jurisdictional limits, etc.), the (provincial) road network, social welfare, provincial elections (to the *Juntas*), election of the *Diputado General* (the maximum authority of executive power within the province), control of the *Diputación Foral*, etc.

<sup>4</sup> On the origins and evolution of the *Hermandad* institution within the Crown of Castile, as well as on similar institutions in other parts of medieval Spain (see Bazán 2006).

<sup>5</sup> Bazán, Iñaki: "Sy fuere villano que le enforquen por ello e sy fuere fijoaligo que le enposen fasta que muera. La pena de muerte en la legislación vasca medieval" (*Mínguez, Bazán* 2006).

<sup>6</sup> On the historical evolution of the *Hermandad* movement in Araba between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries see: *Díez* 1974; *González* 1982; *González* 1994.

<sup>7</sup> "In an Alavese context, this concept initially (16th c.) refers to a group of «local brotherhoods» that fell outside the jurisdiction of the city of Vitoria and the twenty medieval towns of Araba. In time (i.e. by the 18th c.), the «tierras esparzas» would find themselves no longer in opposition to the old walled towns, but only towards the *Hermandad* y *Cuadrilla* de Vitoria" [our translation]; Pastor Díaz de Garayo, Ernesto, "Glosario", *González Mínguez, César, Juntas Generales de Álava. Pasado y presente*, Juntas Generales de Álava. Vitoria, 1990. Pp. 95.

<sup>8</sup> Much of the historical documentation referring to these questions is published in the (*Juntas* 1994). More specifically, volumes I, II & III, cover the day to day running of the institution. For syntheses of the *Juntas Generales de Álava* between the late 15th c and the Early-Modern period see: (*Durana, Ramón; Bombín* 1990). For an historicist account of the institution see *Landazuri* 1798a, 1798b, 1799.

<sup>9</sup> Royal Decree 122/1979 (26/01/1979) regulating the organization and working of the *Juntas Generales de Álava* (BOE, nº 24, 27/01/1979).

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## **BASQUE IDENTITY AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT DURING THE 18TH CENTURY\***

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The Enlightenment was a philosophical, cultural, economic and, at times, political movement that extended westwards from the Ural Mountains throughout Europe and as far as America during the 18th century. The key principle was the application of reason and science with a utilitarian and practical approach. New forms of socio-intellectual interaction sprang up (debating groups, academies, lodges, and cultural, economic and patriotic societies) spreading the new ideas through reports, essays, studies and observations on their experiments. Accordingly, in the Basque Country (Euskal Herria), new socio-intellectual groups emerged such as the *Sociedad Bascongada de Amigos del País* (1765) and *Real Sociedad Tudelana de los Amigos del Bien Público* (1775), alongside dynamic individuals such Dominique Garat, a member of *L'Amitié* and *L'Harmonie* lodges (*As-tigarraga* 1996; *Goyhenetche* 1992). The model here being followed was generally the French one of the local academies, as well as the various Economic Societies springing up around Europe.

Such academies tended to oscillate between complete independence and reliance on royal patronage. The participation of local elites in such initiatives often led to these academies identifying strongly with particular areas, leading in turn to a strengthening of local identity and political awareness as was clearly the case in France (*Roche* 1978: 308–313). A questioning of the political relationship between state, government and society saw the development of a latent consti-

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tutionalism across Europe, which would burst into life with the revolutionary events of 1789 (Díaz 1994: 113). This dynamic also seems applicable to the Basque Country, leading to the aforementioned foundation in 1765 of the *Sociedad Bascongada de Amigos del País*. Incidentally, there wasn't to be another equivalent initiative within the Kingdom of Spain until 1775 when the *Sociedad Matritense* was formed, so the Basque academy was the forerunner, if not the prototype, for the Spanish enlightenment (Negrin 1984: 43–59).

The *Sociedad Bascongada de Amigos del País* project spread from a prototype proposal in Gipuzkoa<sup>1</sup> across other institutionally similar Basque territories, in order to “cultivate the inclination and the taste of the Basque nation towards the sciences, *belles lettres*, and the Arts, and to further cement the unity of the three Basque provinces of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa”<sup>2</sup>. There was also a suggestion of incorporating Navarre, in accordance with the historiographical debate about the ancient boundaries of Cantabria<sup>3</sup>. However, Navarre was considered an historic kingdom within Spain and any comparison with other lesser political entities, such as the Lordship of Bizkaia or the provinces of Araba and Gipuzkoa, generated problems, as Navarrese institutions became suspicious of having their powers reduced. As regards the projected compilation of a dictionary of Euskara, as the Basque language is known, this drew on dialects from both sides of Pyrenees, i.e. from territories within both the French and Spanish kingdoms<sup>4</sup>.

This association between the Basque territories and the ancient limits of Cantabria was closely linked with traditional Basque historiographical thinking. The idea had two objectives: the creation of a version of the past that legitimized the singular Basque legal system, known as the Foral System<sup>5</sup>, and the adaptation of such a system to modern requirements. In other words, it was an attempt at the historical legitimization of a social body, the nobility presenting itself as a historic nation in opposition to the bourgeoisie (Goyhenetche 1993: 96–106).

The *Foral System* incorporated a range of legal, political, economic, social and cultural competencies enjoyed by both the Kingdom of Navarre and the three so-called ‘exempted provinces’ of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. Such policies meant limits on the powers of the Spanish monarchy within those territories, and the existence of an internal customs / tariff border situated on the Ebro river and together generated a situation virtual independence. Moreover, after the introduction of the *Decreto de Nueva Planta* (1707–1716), which attempted to introduce a centralising and unitary political system throughout the Spanish

monarchy, leading to the dismantling of the *Fueros* of the Kingdom of Aragón, these were the only autonomous political entities within the Spanish state that could boast their own representative institutions: the *Cortes* (i.e. Parliament) of Navarre, and the *Juntas Generales* (i.e. General Assemblies) of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa (Lluch 1999).

If we look at the *Sociedad Bascongada*'s symbolic elements of self-identification, we find as its motto the phrase "*Irurac Bat*" (which means in Basque, "Three made One"), a slogan that perfectly reflects the ideology underlying the movement. It was but one of a series of projects, which shared the idea, which we can term *bascongadismo*, of binding together in union the Basque territories and reinforcing existing ties between them stemming from a shared historical, legal, institutional, linguistic or political evolution, but now framed in reference to the new problems emerging in the late eighteenth-century. The challenge was to confront these problems without breaking with the foral tradition, but instead adapting it to the new circumstances, in a movement we can define as neoforalism.

This movement soon made an appearance in the different foral institutions. For example, in the petition made in 1766 to the General Assembly of Gipuzkoa requesting the creation of a political institute to enquire into the *fueros*, by-laws, good practice, customs and decrees of said territory<sup>6</sup>.

One of the lesser known initiatives of the *Sociedad Bascongada* was the attempt to create a unified history of the different Basque territories, which until then had each been the subject of different histories. In other parts of Europe, Economic Societies were created with similar objectives, for example the *Dublin Society for the Improvement of Husbandry, Agriculture, and other useful Arts* created in 1731 in Dublin (Ireland) [Foster 1988: 125–126], the *Société d'Agriculture, de Commerce, et des Arts, établie par les Etats de Bretagne*, founded in Rennes (Brittany) in 1757 [Meyer 1972: 206], or the *Ökonomische Gesellschaft* which came into being in 1759 in Berne (Switzerland) [Braun 1988: 68]. The *Sociedad Bascongada* coincided with many of the objectives and characteristics of these institutions, unifying the efforts of different territories in the face of common problems and introducing reform into traditional institutions.

The use of the economy, political arithmetic and statistics to promote economic growth gave an appearance of modernity to the reforms of the Basque enlightenment (Astigarraga 2003), and as a result sowed the seeds for the generation of a sense of national iden-



tity. In developing such a sense patriotism, the Basque reformist elite also succeeded in strengthening the mutual understanding between its members, many of whom were in fact already bound by close family ties. Among their main objectives was the construction, through economic and politic reforms, of the tightest possible union between the different foral territories, which had until then operated as if islands. In other words, the members of *Sociedad Bascongada*, without breaking with the traditions of the foral territories, attempted to create a modern sense of national identity.

The need to act together led to the attempt to promote an historical sense of patriotism, glorifying a common history and to this end promoting historical research, with the objective of designing and promoting a Basque National History that would group together the different foral territories. The concepts of 'patriotic love' and 'nationhood', the latter in a variety of senses, first emerged in a series of gentlemanly studies which predated the founding of the *Sociedad Bascongada* (Goyhenetche 1993: 96–106). The comfortable social adscription of the authors of such essays coincides with that of the reformist classes in general: the reforming nobility which was pushing for these changes.

Viewed from the outside, the *Sociedad Bascongada*'s projects emphasising Basque identity were not seen positively by the institutions of Spanish monarchy as they seemed to threaten the traditional balance between the monarchy and foral institutions. Suspicions that the Society was attempting to create a foral league of three Basque territories were first aired in 1772<sup>7</sup>, and led to the changing of the body's statutes in 1774 in an attempt to allay such fears, and ultimately would lead to a change of direction for the project.

Who supported this movement? In short, groups of friends in favour of reforming society. They generally had stable leadership that decided on the focus for their activities (agriculture, trade, industry ...) and were democratically organized though with a vertical internal hierarchy (director, secretary and treasurer). The majority were members of the reforming nobility, aware of the limits of traditional society and eager to overcome them. Such reformists were, however, a minority within the nobility, and were looked down upon by the traditionalists<sup>8</sup>. At first members of the bourgeoisie also took part in the reformist movement, however their liberal ideology did not fully develop until the 19th century, and the two ideological tendencies, initially united in the reformist societies, gradually grew apart leading to a rupture that left marginalized the bourgeois elements and their lib-

eral ideology. The earliest documents referring to the *Sociedad Bascongada* indeed reflect a broader outlook<sup>9,10</sup> in both sociological and ideological terms, than would be the case in later periods, indicating a change in the project's direction and the marginalization of some groups (the bourgeoisie) in benefit of others (the reforming nobility).

The *Sociedad Bascongada* established two categories of members. One representative of the different elites (political, economic, cultural ...), and which was composed of the lesser nobility and gentlemen who controlled both municipal and provincial institutions, and accordingly the *Sociedad Bascongada* too. In the other category were members with useful practical knowledge: townsfolk, merchants, craftsmen freehold farmers. The existence of a differentiated political system within Gipuzkoa, the foral system we referred to earlier and which conferred theoretical and legal equality to all its citizens, made possible the existence of a society that cut across class barriers, and the participation within it theoretically on equal terms of people from different economic and social backgrounds (Ibid: paragraph 50).

A division of labour was established between the two categories of members. On one side, the 'ordinary' members (the gentlemen and members of the nobility), and on other side, the practical members (artisans, artists, farmers and merchants). As regards the first group, the ideal was that of an enlightened gentleman willing to engage with other social classes and committed to the study of practical science and the economy, who believed in the use of empiricism as the basis for making sound decisions, and who should be intelligent, diligent and committed to his work. The idea was to make the best of both types of ability: the theoretical knowledge of the gentlemen complementing the practical skills of the others.

This is one of the most striking characteristics of this early period: the broad social spectrum of those taking active part in shaping the movement. Not only the gentlemen, but also other wealthy members of Basque society had the right to take part in the management of the different projects. This at least was the situation laid out in the Society's earliest documents, wherein, in reference to social participation in the running of the society, inter-classism was prioritized. Only later would the bourgeois elements and their ideology become marginalized. This was, initially at least, to be an association of scientists and technicians, with the objective of putting theoretical and practical knowledge at the service of ruling social groups (*Barret-Kriegel* 1988: 219–220, 293–294).

The subsequent marginalization of the bourgeois elements and their ideology seems to have been influenced by the foral institutions and their members, i.e. the superior social classes that also made up the oligarchies that similarly controlled the municipalities. Nor should we overlook the process of concentration of power in oligarchical hands that came with the introduction of the *millares* requirement. This meant that an individual was required to attain a minimum level of wealth before standing for public office, the principle being that such personal wealth then served as a guarantee against possible damages resulting from incompetence or malpractice. However, in reality it worked as a form discrimination against the less wealthy, and had the inevitable effect of consolidating control of such institutions amongst the wealthiest.

Going back to the founding principles, however, we can see how they promoted the idea of equality between different social strata, whether noble or bourgeois, although it didn't materialize into a corresponding political programme. This idea of equality was further related to the idea of patriotism, the idea of the union of all who wanted to be useful to society, and this was the essence behind the different Academies and Economic Societies that sprang up in this period (*Guiomar* 1974: 34, 102).

The identity of the Basque foral territories was institutionalized soon after (1800) with the creation of the Interprovincial Conferences (*Agirreazkuenaga* 1995), a consultative council of the Basque territories and their foral institutions. As such, it was an example of the evolution of Basque thinking about their identity during the Enlightened Age, as these Conferences assumed the *Sociedad Bascongada*'s motto of "Three made One" ("*Irurac Bat*"). Thus, the imposition of Spanish centralism by the Bourbon dynasty during 18th century had in turn led to the emergence of neoforalism and the birth of a sense of Basque nationhood in Euskal Herria.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Plan de una Sociedad Económica, o Academia de Agricultura, Ciencias y Artes utiles, y Comercio, adaptado a las circunstancias y comercio particular de la M.N. y M.L. Provincia de Guipuzcoa, 1763, facsimile edition: Donostia: Gipuzkoako Batzar Nagusiak, 1985.

<sup>2</sup> "Cultivar la inclinacion, y el gusto de la Nacion Bascongada ácia las Ciencias, bellas letras, y Artes... y estrechar mas la union de las tres Provincias Bascongadas de Alaba, Vizcaya, y Guipuzcoa" Estatutos de la Sociedad Bascongada de Amigos del País (1765), facsimile edition: Sociedad Guipuzcoana de Ediciones

y Publicaciones: Donostia, 1985. Article I. P. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya y Alava. Antigüedad, origen, Nobleza de sangre y virtud de fortaleza de los naturales oriundos de las Novilísimas Provincias. Cantabrias Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya y Alava, Araba Lurraldeko Agiritegia, Gasteiz, Fondo Prestamero, Comisión 4. Box 11. No. 1.3. P. 1.

<sup>4</sup> “Ynstruccion para la formacion de un Diccionario de la Lengua Bascongada, Reglas dispuestas por la Real Academia Española para la corrección y aumento del Diccionario”, articles 2nd and 5th. “3. De las particularidades de las voces”, Gipuzkoako Foru Aldundia, Donostia, Fondo Julio Urquijo, J.V. 9765 001 A-B.

<sup>5</sup> Foral System: the array of institutions and legal codes defining the political and economic self-governement of the Basque territories.

<sup>6</sup> *Registro de la Junta General ... de Guipuzcoa ... de 1766*. Bizkaiko Foru Aldundia. Bilbao, Sign. AJ00647/01. Pp. 46–48.

<sup>7</sup> “omitir las expresione que den á entender desea la Sociedad mezclarse en asuntos guvernativos: ó que las tres Provincias intentan formar una especie de unión, ó digamoslo liga defensiva separada de los restantes del Reyno”, letter from Eugenio Llaguno y Amirola to the Count of Peñaflorida, San Ildefonso, September 24th, 1772, Archivo Provincial de Alava, *Fondo Prestamero, Epistolario*.

<sup>8</sup> “Si se supiese que una Nobleza florida e instruida en el seno de la Sociedad [Bascongada] se halla tan distante de adoptar nuestras ideas, que giran entre pocos aislados reputados como si fueran infectos”, Letter from Pepe to Pedro Jacinto de Alava, Madrid, November 28 of 1771, Folder #11, *Letters from the Marqués de Montehermoso to Pedro Jacinto de Alava, 1766-1783*, Archivo del Parlamento Vasco, Gasteiz, *Fondo Bonillas-Alava*.

<sup>9</sup> “Plan de una sociedad Economica, o Academia de Agricultura, ciencias, y artes utiles; y comercio, adaptado a las circunstancias, y economia particular de la M.N. y M.L. Provincia de Guipuzcoa” (manuscrito), Archivo del Territorio Histórico de Alava, Gasteiz, *Fondo Prestamero*, Comisión 1, Caja 1, nº 19. 3C1/464-568. Dated to 1763 and generally attributed to the Count of Peñaflorida.

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## **BASQUE NATIONALISM: FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE PRESENT\***

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The beginnings of Basque nationalism can be dated back to 1895, when Sabino Arana founded the PNV (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, Basque Nationalist Party). This political movement, which would come to exercise an enormous influence on Basque history in the twentieth century and beyond, did not spring to life fully born. Instead, its formal founding represented the final flowering of the seeds of a particularism that had deep roots in Basque society: the conservation of the Basque language, especially in the countryside, and the ongoing existence of the *Fueros*, laws that governed each of the Basque territories. The *Fueros* represented legal and administrative arrangements that dated back many centuries, and were conceived in the nineteenth century as representing a regional distinctiveness that was at the same time compatible with the Spanish national identity.

The *Fueros* were lavishly praised in Basque romantic literature and historical works, and were not only embraced but also idealized by the majority of the Basque population in the nineteenth century, even though each political group saw them in a different light. The two Carlist Wars, in which Liberals and Carlists (i.e., traditionalists who supported the absolutist monarchy) clashed, constituted a turning point in this process, since the Second Carlist War, which concluded with the defeat of the Carlists in 1876, brought the *Fueros* to an end<sup>1</sup>.

### **1. Sabino Arana and the Founding of the Basque Nationalist Party**

It was in this context of the dissolution of the *Fueros* that Basque nationalism emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. In order to better understand the circumstances surrounding its emergence, it is

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important to consider not only the conservation among a large proportion of the Basque population of a differentiated identity, which grew more intense following the abolition of the *Fueros* in 1876, but also the relative fragility of the liberal Spanish state in comparison with stronger nation-states such as France. Another important factor to take into account in this connection is the rapid process of industrialization that, in the final third of the nineteenth century, radically transformed the economy and society of Bizkaia, the most important of the Basque Provinces. This industrialization attracted large numbers of workers to Bizkaia from other regions of Spain, and resulted in Bilbao and its industrial hinterland turning into a stronghold of Spanish Socialism.

Sabino Arana, the founder of Basque nationalism, was born in Bizkaia in 1865 to a Basque family of Carlist sympathies. At an early age, he began studying and reinterpreting Basque history and the Basque language before later embracing political nationalism in his 1892 book *Bizkaya por su independencia* (Bizkaia for its independence). On the basis of a legendary conceptualization of history, in this seminal work Arana contended that the Basque homeland was suffering under the yoke of Spanish domination. Taking this fundamental idea as his point of departure, Arana constructed a movement characterized by traditional Catholicism, antiliberalism, antisocialism, and an essentialist and racial conceptualization of a Basque nation. Arana, on the basis of his traditionalist perspective, held that the only way that Basques could gain eternal salvation was by isolating the Basque Country from liberal Spain (Corcuera 2006).

Once he had established these basic principles of his political program, Arana proceeded to refine and promote his ideology by launching a number of different periodicals and establishing centres that promoted his ideas, before founding the PNV in 1895. The contradictions that were to become a marked characteristic of the history of Basque nationalism were evident in the life of its founder. During the period 1893–1898, Arana's ideology can be described as radically nationalist, and as having the sole objective of attaining the independence of the Basque territories. During the years 1898–1903, Arana espoused a more moderate and pragmatic line, but without changing his basic ideological principles. He did this for two reasons: as an adaptation to the social reality he encountered and also in response to the repression he himself had been subjected to, including forced shutdowns of his centres and newspapers by the government and two separate periods of incarceration. This change in strategy led to elec-

toral success for the PNV in 1898–1899, when the party won its first seats in both the *Diputación* (provincial government) of Bizkaia and in several municipalities within this territory.

## **2. From the Death of Sabino Arana to the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1903–1930)**

The years following Arana's premature death in 1903 at the age of thirty-eight, were difficult times for the Basque nationalist cause. The need to reorganize the party and to provide it with a unified program would be made all the more difficult by the conflict within its ranks between moderate autonomists and those advocating complete independence. In order to reconcile these differences that arose in the years following Arana's death, it was necessary to find a kind of "magic formula." This is precisely what occurred in 1906, when the goal of the party was defined as that of restoring the *Fueros* (an action that was understood by the hard-liners as a return to the Basque independence that had supposedly existed prior to the abolition of the *Fueros* and by the moderates as a quest for autonomy within the Spanish state). Through this formula, the PNV was able to retain within its ranks both hard-liners and moderates. At the same time, the party was transformed into a legitimate political entity within the liberal (but not democratic) system of the Spanish monarchy ruled by Alfonso XIII. Thus, without explicitly renouncing its final goal, which the majority of its followers understood as independence, the PNV was integrated into the political life of Spain.

During the initial years of the twentieth century, the growth of Basque nationalism was slow, although it gradually laid the foundations for its future expansion. Apart from Bilbao, the PNV established centres and periodicals in the other three provincial capitals of San Sebastián (Gipuzkoa), Pamplona (Navarre), and Vitoria (Araba). The first National Council of the PNV was elected in 1911. In the same year, the Catholic and nationalist union, *Solidaridad de Obreros Vascos* (Basque Workers Solidarity), was also created. The nationalist daily *Euzkadi* was founded in Bilbao in 1913. Another landmark occurred in 1915, when the PNV gained representation in the *Diputación* of Gipuzkoa.

But along with this progress came internal problems within the PNV. The hard-line elements that sought independence continued to express their opposition to the moderates who controlled the party, which in 1916 was officially renamed the *Comunión Nacionalista Vasca* (Basque Nationalist Communion). Internal tensions led to



the expulsion of the founder's brother, Luis Arana, from the party in 1915–1916. A number of veteran nationalists who felt that the *Comunión* had betrayed his brother's ideal of striving for Basque independence accompanied him.

Once this crisis had passed, Basque nationalism entered its period of accelerated growth during World War I (an expansion that would only be surpassed in the pre-Civil War years of the 1930s). It became the most powerful political party in Bizkaia and also made important gains in the other Basque Provinces. During the years 1917–1919, it led the campaign for autonomy in the Basque Country. It was in 1917 that the *Comunión* achieved a majority in the *Diputación* of Bizkaia, with the moderate nationalist Ramón de la Sota serving as president of that body. In 1918, the first deputies and senators of the *Cortes* (the Spanish national Parliament) were elected for Gipuzkoa, Navarre, and Bizkaia (with overwhelming support everywhere in Bizkaia except in Bilbao). This strong showing in the elections, along with the fact that the party came under the control of moderate elements following the expulsion of Luis Arana, allowed the *Comunión* to use the *Diputación* of Bizkaia to promote the reinstitution of the *Fueros*, or a statute of autonomy for the Basque Country. On the international level, the general climate of sympathy for nationalism following the conclusion of World War I added certain legitimacy to the Basque aspiration for autonomy within the Spanish monarchy. As part of its program to achieve autonomy, the *Comunión* moderated its political rhetoric.

In the end, however, none of this moderation prevented the failure of this first concerted effort to attain autonomy. This failure was primarily due to the fact that Alfonso XIII's monarchical system, which was in the process of collapse, was incapable of resolving the problem of the different nationalisms within Spain, and of accepting a decentralized state structure. Beginning in 1919, the failed attempt to secure autonomy led to profound internal crises within the Basque nationalist movement. Thus, the electoral gains of 1917–1918 were followed by setbacks in two consecutive elections, the loss of the majority in the *Diputación* of Bizkaia, and the loss of most of the seats that the *Comunión* had held in the *Cortes*.

With the failure of the autonomist strategy, the radical elements of the party, which had kept a low profile in the face of the past success of the moderates, went back on the offensive. The radicalization of part of the nationalist movement led to a schism within Basque nationalism and the creation of a new radical nationalist party that

unambiguously advocated independence. The catalyst of this schism was the weekly newspaper *Aberri*. Its leader, Elías Gallastegui, founded in September 1921 a new party similarly known as *Aberri* (in reference to the group's newspaper). Luis Arana, expelled from the *Comunión* in 1916, also joined the new party. The *Aberri* schism did not result from any profound ideological differences regarding social or religious questions. Instead, it was the product of a difference between the two groups concerning the relationship between the Basque Country and Spain, with the *Comunión* favouring the continued quest for autonomy and the newly formed group explicitly advocating independence.

The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923–1930) brought the liberal system that had existed in Spain since 1875 to an end, and inaugurated a new stage in the history of Basque nationalism that had a distinct effect on each of the two nationalist organizations. On the one hand, the dictatorship persecuted the radical nationalists, closing the centres and newspapers of *Aberri* and forcing some of its leaders, such as Gallastegui himself, into exile. On the other hand, the *Comunión* was allowed to continue much of its activity, although it was required to cease all political action and instead focus on cultural regeneration and the promotion of Basque culture, language and sports. This flowering of Basque identity and culture during the years of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship was very important, since it set the stage for the nationalist political expansion that followed during the Republican democracy of 1931–1936. In contrast to the political hibernation of the *Comunión*, *Aberri*, in conjunction with the Catalan independence movement, carried out actions against the dictatorship, although with no real impact (*Pablo, Mees, Rodríguez Ranz* 1999–2001).

### **3. The Second Republic and the Spanish Civil War (1931–1939)**

Following Primo de Rivera's resignation in January 1930, the two branches of Basque nationalism that had formed in 1921 merged into a single organization in November of that same year, restoring the original party name of *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*. The reformed PNV adopted Sabino Arana's original doctrines as its political program and once again was able to attain a compromise solution to satisfy both hard-liners and moderates within its ranks. At about this

same time, a new secular, republican, and liberal Basque nationalist group arose called ANV (*Acción Nacionalista Vasca*, the Basque Nationalist Action), which remained very small and never seriously threatened PNV's dominant position during the 1930s.

The proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic on April 14, 1931, created a favourable climate for Basque nationalism. During this period (1931–1936), the PNV became a broad-based social movement and forged a nationalist culture that included its own press (with five dailies and a large number of weeklies that covered virtually every theme) as well as a plethora of political and cultural organizations directly or indirectly linked to the party. However, geographically speaking, the PNV was unequally represented throughout the Basque territories. For example, the party was weak in both Araba and Navarre, the two landlocked Basque Provinces. Nevertheless, by 1933 the PNV became the most voted party in the Basque Country for the first time in its history.

In accordance with the compromise solution that had been reached in 1930 for the purpose of satisfying both the hard-liners and moderates within its ranks, the PNV (now under the leadership of a new generation of young politicians like José Antonio Aguirre and Manuel Irujo), while not renouncing independence as the ultimate goal, was principally engaged in securing an autonomy statute for the Basque Country within Republican Spain. But this task proved to be elusive, because the republicans and socialists on the left of the Spanish political spectrum, which were strongly anticlerical, were suspicious of the Catholic PNV.

Although the Spanish republican government showed an active interest in resolving the problem of nationalities in Spain, the PNV was ambivalent toward it, and the party's attitude can best be expressed as a mixture of fear (aroused by republican anticlericalism) and hope (in response to the government's evident interest in resolving the Basque issue). The PNV's ambivalence toward the new regime did not stop it from immediately embarking upon a campaign to obtain autonomy. To this end, the PNV first allied itself with the Carlists and other elements of the right wing of the Spanish political spectrum, with which it formed a coalition in the 1931 constituent elections to advocate the Estella statute (which was approved by Carlist, PNV, and other Catholic city councils in the town of Estella, Navarre, in June 1931, but was rejected by leftist parties). This proposed statute, which called for an integration of the four Basque Provinces, had no

chance of being approved by the *Cortes Constituyentes*, which was controlled by leftist parties. In fact, it was never even discussed in the *Cortes*, since it was contrary to the constitution being debated in the fall of 1931. Because of its opposition to Republican anti-clericalism, the PNV (along with the Carlists and the rest of the Spanish right-wing parties) did not approve the 1931 Spanish constitution.

After the failure of the Estella statute on account of its unconstitutionality, the PNV accepted a pathway to autonomy in accordance with the Republican constitution and began to slowly distance itself from its right-wing allies. In March 1932 a new statute project was redacted, adapted to the Republican constitution. However, not all of the inhabitants of the four Basque Provinces agreed with the PNV's notion of a unified Basque nation. This was evident when, in June 1932, the majority of the Navarrese town councils decided to reject inclusion in the new Basque statute. The attempt to secure autonomy for the four provinces had thus failed once again. Furthermore, given the Navarrese rejection, future efforts to gain autonomy would be limited to the three provinces of Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa, although the door was left open for the possible future inclusion of Navarre. After breaking with the Spanish right-wing parties, the PNV repositioned itself in the centre of the Basque political spectrum. As part of this effort, it secured approval, through a referendum, of the proposed Basque statute by voter majority in Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, and (albeit with a high rate of abstention) Araba. However, a number of different factors (stemming from the fact that centre-right parties controlled the *Cortes* between 1933 and 1936) resulted in the proposed statute not being ratified by the Republican Parliament at that time. Then again, after the victory of the Popular Front in February 1936, approval by the *Cortes* appeared to be imminent at the time of the outbreak of the Civil War on July 18, 1936 (*Granja* 2008).

The initial stages of the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939 saw the Basque territories divided between those controlled by the Republic (Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa) and those in the hands of the nationalist rebels (Araba and Navarre). At the war's-outbreak, the PNV supported the Republican side for the purposes of securing approval of the Basque statute. Yet this initial support was at best lukewarm, due to the opposition of the deeply Catholic PNV to widespread religious persecution in the Republican-controlled areas of Spain. The PNV's participation in the Gipuzkoa campaign in the summer of 1936 (a campaign led by leftist forces) can best be characterized as lacklustre.

An alliance between the PNV and the Popular Front was formalized in October 1936, when the Basque autonomy statute was approved and the first Basque government in history, led by nationalist José Antonio Aguirre as *lehendakari* (president), was formed. It was also at that time that the leader of the PNV, Manuel Irujo, entered the Republican government, first as minister without portfolio and later as minister of justice. Following these events, the PNV became fully engaged in the struggle, which it saw as not only a fight against general Franco's forces but also as a defence of the newly won freedoms of the Basque Country, which it knew could not possibly survive the triumph of Franco's forces.

The PNV was the senior partner in the coalition between Basque nationalists and the Popular Front that ruled the Basque government (which only held jurisdiction in Bizkaia, the rest of the Basque Country already being controlled by the rebels by the time of the statute's approval). With Bizkaia, Cantabria, and Asturias isolated from the rest of Republican Spain by the rebels, the PNV strengthened Basque autonomy, enacting a fair amount of legislation involving areas not directly related to the military conflict, such as education and culture. During the so-called Basque oasis of 1936–1937, there was, in the territories under Basque government control, no social revolution or religious persecution comparable to what was seen in other parts of Republican-held Spain. The bombing of Guernica on April 26, 1937, by the Condor Legion of Hitler's Nazi regime, which was an ally of Franco, became a symbol of Basque defencelessness in the face of the nationalist rebels, and brought the case of the Basque Catholics to the attention of the world. The PNV's embrace of democracy won it the support of the progressive elements of the Catholic Church in Europe, including the prominent French philosopher Jacques Maritain (*Meer* 2007; *Granja* 2007).

In June 1937, Franco's armies triumphantly entered Bilbao, putting an end to the first Basque experience of self-government. Having lost its territory, the Basque government went into exile, while the PNV as a party chose to end its participation in the war, its troops separately surrendering to the Italian armies allied with Franco in the Santoña Agreement of August 1937. This surrender has often been the subject of controversy, but it is consistent with the stance of the PNV vis-à-vis the Civil War. In other words, once all of the Basque territory had been lost to Franco's forces, the PNV saw no point in continuing to fight for a Republican Spain that it did not fully support. However, it should be noted that there were important leaders

of the PNV (led by Aguirre and Irujo) who did continue supporting the Republicans, carrying on their efforts from bases in Catalonia and France until the definitive defeat of Republican forces in April 1939 formally ended the conflict.

#### **4. Exile and Clandestine Activity: Franco's Dictatorship and the Birth of ETA**

The Republican defeat signalled the beginning of a new era for Basque nationalism, one characterized by the varying reactions of silence, accommodation, exile, repression, and opposition to Franco's dictatorship. The guns of the opposing forces on the Peninsula had barely fallen silent when World War II began on September 1, 1939. The German occupation of France forced PNV leaders to either flee to Great Britain or the Americas, or to go into hiding. The PNV was well aware that its only hope lay in the defeat of the Nazis, which it was felt would inevitably lead to a change of regime in Spain, which would in turn bring about a higher degree of self-government for the Basque Country, whether within a Spanish federation or as an independent nation-state.

The support the PNV provided to the Allies took a number of different forms. Although it was discussed, the idea of direct Basque participation in Allied military units for the most part never really got off the ground, and the only concrete result in this respect was the formation of the Guernica Battalion, which fought against the Germans in France. Of perhaps greater impact was the creation by the PNV of a clandestine network within Spain that was dedicated to conducting espionage on behalf of the Allied forces and to aiding Basque prisoners of Franco's regime. After Paris fell to the Nazis, the Spanish police dismantled this network, and its primary operations coordinator was executed in 1943. This setback did not prevent the PNV from continuing information and propaganda activities within the Basque Country.

With the inevitable defeat of the Nazis becoming increasingly evident in the later stages of the war, the PNV, along with other elements of the Spanish opposition, reorganized itself in anticipation of the expected fall of Franco's dictatorship. In March 1945, Basque political parties and unions signed the Bayonne Agreement, which supported the Spanish Republic, the Basque government-in-exile, and the autonomy statute of 1936. During this same year, the Spanish Repub-

licans established a government-in-exile in which Irujo participated, representing the PNV. In 1946, Aguirre formed a new Basque government-in-exile, with the participation of the same political parties that had been represented in his cabinet in 1936. Within the Basque Country, the PNV carried out, from the time the war ended, a great deal of clandestine activity involving both the distribution of propaganda and acts of resistance. These activities culminated in the largely successful general strikes of 1947 and 1951. Through such actions, the PNV and the Basque government-in-exile sought to take advantage of the international climate following the end of World War II by placing themselves in the camp of Western democracies and drawing the attention of the victorious Allied powers (and especially the United States) to the “anomaly” of Franco’s dictatorship. Cooperation with the United States in assisting that nation attain certain foreign policy objectives, in which intelligence gathering played an important part, was an integral element of this pro-Western strategy of the Basque nationalists (Mees, *Santiago de Pablo, Rodríguez Ranz* 2014: 339–601).

However, in time it became clear to the Basque leaders that, because of priorities associated with the emerging Cold War, the Western powers were not going to invade Spain and expel Franco. This realization seemed to result in certain weariness on the part of the Basque nationalist opposition during the 1950s. The demoralization of PNV party members led to fewer clandestine activities, although the PNV did remain active through its participation in the Basque government-in-exile. In the face of the prevailing circumstances, Basque nationalists placed their hopes for the future in the European movement and in the Christian democracy. As early as 1947, the PNV had participated in the constitution of an organization that in 1965 would be renamed the International Union of Christian Democrats.

The death of the *lehendakari*, José Antonio Aguirre, in 1960 signalled the dawn of a new era in Basque nationalism. Jesús María Leizaola, who was also a member of the PNV, replaced Aguirre. In the Basque Country, improved living standards, together with the arrival of waves of immigrants during the 1960s, had an impact on the kinds of activities that the opponents of Franco’s regime were able to carry out, especially within the cultural and religious spheres. At a time when any activity that was not sanctioned by the officially approved culture could be considered an indirect form of opposition to Franco’s regime, initiatives were proposed that, once they overcame the obstacles imposed by the dictatorship, and at times with official

Church support, brought about an important Basque cultural revival. Results of this activity included the appearance of the first *ikastolas* (Basque-language schools), and a renaissance in Basque literature, music, and art. Within the religious sphere, the changes in Catholic practice that resulted from the Second Vatican Council had a special impact on the Basque Country, where certain elements of the Catholic Church became deeply involved in Basque political activities (and, *ipso facto*, the political opposition to Franco's regime).

Although the PNV, along with their socialist and republican allies, was the primary force that ensured the continuing existence of the Basque government-in-exile until the end of Franco's dictatorship, the leading role in Basque nationalism during the last fifteen years or so of Franco's rule passed from the PNV to a new organization, ETA (*Euska-di Ta Askatasuna*, Basque Homeland and Freedom). Founded in 1959, ETA was at first nothing more than the expression of the most radical and independence-minded wing of the Basque nationalism on the part of a younger generation of political activists who were frustrated with what they perceived as the inaction of the PNV against Franco. During the initial years following the schism, PNV and ETA maintained a fairly cordial relationship, mainly because the dictatorship's repression of the new nationalist organization aroused a sentiment of solidarity within the ranks of the PNV. However, from 1964 onwards, when ETA espoused social liberation in addition to calling for Basque political independence, a difficult period began in the relationship between this organization and the PNV, which accused ETA of being an outpost of Marxism, of jeopardizing the continued existence of the Basque government-in-exile, and of not being authentically nationalist.

From 1968 onwards, ETA stepped up the pace of its violent activities while formally embracing an ideology that blended radical Basque Nationalism and revolutionary and third-world Marxism. This ideology represented a definitive break with the Catholic democratic nationalism that characterized the PNV. In addition, beginning in 1968, ETA embarked upon a series of deadly terrorist actions, initiating an escalation of violence during which the terrorist organization murdered some forty-three persons until Franco's death in 1975. The dictatorship responded with repressive measures (which at times were indiscriminate) against ETA, but this only increased sympathy toward organization, not only among the local population in the Basque territories and the Spanish opposition to Franco's regime but among the international community as well. This is what happened in response to both the 1970



trial in Burgos in which six ETA members received death sentences (but who were later pardoned by Franco) and to the execution by firing squad of two ETA members in September 1975, just before Franco's death. The organization's highest profile attack during the Franco years occurred in 1973 when Luis Carrero Blanco, the president of Franco's government, was killed in a Madrid street bombing planned and executed by ETA operatives. The following year, ETA planted a bomb in a Madrid coffee shop, killing thirteen persons. This latter event triggered the most important schism in the history of ETA, which became divided into a military and political-military branch: [ETA-M and ETA-PM, respectively] (Gurutz 1985; Sullivan 1988).

## **5. Transition, Basque Self-government, and Violence**

Following the death of Franco in November 1975, the Political Reform Law of December 1976 paved the way for the dismantling of the dictatorial system of government and its replacement by a democratic regime. The democratic transition allowed for the public reappearance of the PNV. However, unlike during the period prior to the Civil War, during which the comparatively small and inconsequential ANV had never seriously threatened the PNV's political monopoly of Basque nationalism, such single-party hegemony no longer existed after the foundation of ETA in 1959. Following the democratic transition, ETA's influence could be seen in the creation of small leftist parties whose political programs reflected ETA's hard-line nationalism. These parties ended up aligning themselves in two coalitions that reflected the two wings of ETA that had formed in 1974: EE (*Euskadiko Ezkerra*, the Basque Left), supported by ETA P-M, and HB (*Herri Batasuna*, Unity of the People), which had ties to ETA-M.

In the general elections of June 1977, which were boycotted by citizens with ties to ETA-M, the PNV was the party that received the most votes. The PNV, led by Carlos Garaikoetxea, and with Xabier Arzalluz as its spokesperson in the *Cortes* of Madrid, participated in the debates about the new Spanish constitution but in the end, rejected the document that was finally drafted because it did not recognize the historic rights of the Basque Country. In a constitutional referendum held in 1978, the PNV counselled its supporters to abstain from voting, while the radical nationalist left came out in favour of a "no" vote.

The national, provincial, and municipal elections that were held throughout 1979 marked the beginning of nationalist political domi-

nation in the Basque Country, a domination which has continued with only brief interruptions in all elections that have been held until the present day. Within the nationalist camp, HB had clearly surpassed the more moderate EE by 1979, which marked the beginning of the latter party's steady decline, and which would lead to its dissolution in 1993. It was also in 1979 that the PNV, which continued to enjoy the strongest voter support, gained control of the *Diputaciones* of the three provinces, something that had never occurred before. In Navarre, however, support for nationalist parties was decidedly low (about 20 percent), reflecting the mainly non-nationalist political leanings of the people who resided in this territory. It should also be noted that terrorism did not end with the democratic transition, in spite of the unconditional amnesty that had been granted in 1977, which freed even those convicted and imprisoned for violent crimes. Instead, the death toll of ETA violence actually increased in comparison to the Franco years, with the organization responsible for 246 murders during the three-year period 1978–1980.

It was something of an historical irony that it was the very Spanish Constitution that the PNV had opposed that later made approval of the Basque autonomy statute possible. During the constitutional debate, the Basque members of Parliament began drafting the autonomy statute. After a number of discussions, Navarre was excluded from the statute's provisions, due to the opposition of the majority of that province's representatives. This represented a repeat of what had occurred during the Second Republic, when autonomy had also been limited to the provinces of Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa because of the minority status of Basque nationalism in Navarre. On October 25 1979, a referendum was held which (despite the boycott of HB) Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa definitively approved the Basque statute, as it currently exists. According to the text of that statute, Navarre could at any point in the future join the three Basque Provinces in adopting the provisions of the statute, if its inhabitants decided to do so in a referendum. However, ever since 1982, Navarre has constituted a different autonomous unit within the Spanish system of government – the Foral Community of Navarre – with only the Basque nationalist minority in favour of annexation to the Basque Country.

In 1980, the PNV emerged victorious in the first elections held in the newly established autonomous region and formed a government exclusively comprising PNV members, with Carlos Garaikoetxea serving as president or *lehendakari*. This new government thus for-

mally succeeded the Basque government-in-exile, whose *lehendakari*, Jesús María Leizaola, returned to the Basque Country. Although the main problem that plagued the Basque Country, that of ETA terrorist activity, continued unabated, the Basque Country had succeeded in acquiring a high degree of self-government, including an independent tax collection system, its own police force, internal control of education and health services, and a public television network.

Within the autonomous framework, the results of elections in the Basque Country have in recent decades reflected a varied tendency of the electorate, with between 45 percent and 65 percent of voters casting their vote for Basque nationalist parties, depending on the type of election being held (with the nationalist vote tending to be higher in elections to offices within the autonomous region and lower for offices within the Spanish national government). Within Basque nationalism, the moderate, democratic and non-violent element has always clearly been in the majority, with the PNV receiving the highest percentage of votes in nearly all of the elections held from the time of the transition until the present day, despite the fact that it endured a division in its ranks when Carlos Garaikoetxea, the first lehendakari of the newly established autonomy, founded EA (*Eusko Alkartasuna*, Basque Solidarity), a nationalist social-democratic party.

From the approval of the Basque statute until today, nearly everything possible was done to secure peace in the Basque Country. Thus, the negotiations conducted by EE with the Spanish central government in 1982 led to the dissolution of ETA-PM, with the political arm of what had been that organization, *Euskadiko Ezkerra*, folding in 1993. ETA-M, which continued to have the unconditional support of HB, thus remained the only active branch of the Basque terrorist organization. The PSOE (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) of Felipe González (who served as a prime minister of Spain between 1982 and 1996) attempted without success to directly negotiate with ETA-M at meetings in Algiers in 1989. However it was, paradoxically, the PSOE's Ministry of the Interior which was instrumental in the creation of the organization GAL (*Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación*, Antiterrorist Liberation Groups), which from 1983–1987 practiced state terrorism and was responsible for the murder of twenty-seven persons the majority of whom were either members of ETA or linked with the organization.

After Garaikoetxea left the PNV to form EA, the new president of the autonomous region of the Basque Country, José Antonio Ar-

danza (of the PNV) formed a coalition government with the PSOE in 1986, an alliance that would remain until 1999. In 1988 Lehendakari Ardanza spearheaded an effort that led to the signing by all of the Basque democratic parties of the Ajuria Enea Agreement “for the Normalization and Pacification of the Basque Country”, which represented the formation of a formal united front of nationalists and non-nationalists against ETA.

The fact that HB’s share of the popular vote, which had reached a high of 18 percent of the voters in elections to the Basque Parliament at the end of the 1980s, slowly and steadily declined in subsequent years did not seem to greatly concern ETA. Instead, the organization showed itself to be increasingly oblivious to the social reality within the Basque Country and continued to maintain its view of a historical conflict between Spain and the Basque Country that had existed from time immemorial, and that could only be resolved by the establishment of an independent and revolutionary Basque state (*Domínguez* 1998).

The phase of unity between nationalists and non-nationalists against ETA that had begun with the Ajuria Enea Agreement in 1988 reached its high point in 1997 with the kidnapping and murder of Miguel Ángel Blanco, a young member of the town council of Ermua who represented the PP (*Partido Popular*, Popular Party), the conservative party of José María Aznar, prime minister of Spain from 1996 to 2004. The particularly cruel way in which Blanco was murdered galvanized the united front against terrorism, leading to street demonstrations against ETA that reflected a revulsion that would have been unimaginable just a few years earlier.

However this pacifist solidarity did not last long; in the summer of 1998, the unity of all of the democratic parties against ETA, which had endured since the signing of the Ajuria Enea Agreement ten years previously, was irremediably ruptured. This break culminated with the Estella Agreement, in which PNV and EA joined forces with HB for the purpose of pressuring ETA to lay down its arms in order to join these two parties in a nationalist action front that would scrap the autonomy statute of 1979 and instead advocate total Basque sovereignty over the territories of the Basque nation. Secret conversations between the nationalist parties and ETA led to the terrorist organization’s September 1998 announcement of “a permanent ceasefire,” which ended up lasting only fourteen months. During this truce, HB recovered a lot of the popular electoral support that it had steadily lost over the past decades, and lent its support to the new PNV-EA

nationalist coalition government led by Juan José Ibarretxe of the PNV. After representatives of ETA and the Spanish government held a meeting that yielded no agreement, ETA declared its frustration with the failed effort and resumed terrorist activity in January 2000. One month later HB withdrew its support for the PNV-EA coalition, leaving the nationalist government with a minority of representatives in the autonomous Parliament.

While terrorist actions continued (albeit at a slower pace than previously, because of effective police action and eroding support for ETA), an increasingly bitter confrontation developed between the nationalist democratic parties (PNV and EA) on the one hand, and the two major Spanish “Constitutionalist” parties (PSOE and PP) on the other. Instead of attempting to form a new coalition with the PSOE after the suspension of the legislative pact with HB in February 2000, the PNV declared that the 1979 autonomy statute was no longer satisfactory and attempted to define a new political framework for the Basque Country. This framework, which called for a higher degree of self-government for the Basque Country while refraining from calling for complete independence, was eventually defined as the “Project of Free Association” with the Spanish state and was presented by *lehendakari* Ibarretxe in September 2003.

For its part, Aznar’s PP government initiated a new strategy (supported by the PSOE) that was designed to cripple the social and political institutions supporting ETA through political and judicial measures, such as the closure of newspapers that supported terrorist action and, most especially, the outlawing in 2003 of HB, the political arm of ETA that, despite having changed its name several times since then, was legally prevented from fielding candidates in the majority of elections held in the Basque Country since that time until 2011. At the same time, ETA terrorism, thanks to effective police action and international collaboration, was becoming increasingly debilitated (Mees 2003).

Within the political arena, the Project of Free Association, which was popularly known as the “Ibarretxe Plan”, was approved by the Basque Parliament in December 2004 but then overwhelmingly rejected by the Spanish *Cortes* in February 2005. One year earlier, the PP had lost its absolute majority in the *Cortes* and thus ceded power to the PSOE government headed José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Although Zapatero’s more moderate stance (in comparison to Aznar’s hostility toward Basque nationalism during his last years in power) did not lead him to embrace the Ibarretxe Plan, it did result in

a new truce with ETA, which held for nine months, until December 2006. After the breaking of the truce, Zapatero's government further strengthened measures against terrorist activity, while Ibarretxe was continuing his fruitless efforts to promote his Project.

In March 2009 elections to the Basque Parliament, it was once again the PNV that received the most votes, but the PP's support of Patxi López, the *lehendakari* candidate of the Basque Socialist Party (the Basque branch of the PSOE), marked a turning point in the Basque Country's political history. For the first time since 1980, the presence of a non-nationalist majority in the Basque Parliament resulted in López being sworn in on May 7, 2009. With a non-nationalist *lehendakari* in office, ETA's announcement in September 2010 of a new "permanent" cease-fire seemed to offer grounds for hope that the threat of terrorism in the Basque Country could be greatly reduced, if not altogether eliminated. Thanks to this truce, the radical nationalist left, which was finally able to field candidates in the May 2011 municipal elections under the name of *Bildu*, in alliance with EA, recovered some of its electoral strength, receiving the second-most votes (after the PNV).

In 2012 the PNV won the elections to the Basque Parliament and its candidate Iñigo Urkullu became the new *lehendakari*. The PNV, after three years of Socialist government, had returned to power. Two years earlier, in October 2011 ETA announced the "definitive cessation of its armed activity," although not its dissolution. It is of course true that, with a death toll of more than eight hundred persons from 1968 until the present, a great many wounds remain to be healed. However, the now very real possibility of a permanent dissolution of ETA seems to offer hope for a future Basque Country in which differences in political allegiance and conceptualizations of national identity can be discussed and resolved in a climate of peace and mutual respect, and in which violence can become a thing of the past.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> See *Granja, Pablo, Rubio* 2011: 13–110. Basque nationalism seeks also to exercise sovereignty over the Basque territories of France. However, its political activity has focused much more strongly on the Spanish Basque Country. For this reason, the focus of the present article is exclusively on the Basque nationalism within the Spanish state.

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# **RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE TERRITORIAL MODEL OF THE BASQUE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY (EUSKADI): FROM POLYNUCLEAR URBAN REGION TO CITY REGION**

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## **1. Introduction**

The term “territorial model” usually refers to the political and territorial system of organization of a state; in the case of the Kingdom of Spain, this model, as described in Title VIII of the Constitution of 1978, consists in the territorial division of the country into autonomous communities, provinces and municipalities.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, I will firstly specify the definition I have adopted for the term “territorial model” in this paper; namely, a meaning closer to “model of land planning”, which includes very specific elements characteristic of the policies of Land Planning.

More precisely, I will talk about the Model of Land Planning of the Basque Autonomous Community or *Euskadi*, an administrative entity smaller than the Basque Country (*Euskal Herria*), which itself refers to a broader geographical entity endowed with a specific cultural, ethnic and linguistic character. The Basque Studies Society *Eusko Ikaskuntza* (a private scientific-cultural institution, founded in 1918 by the Provincial Councils of Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and Navarre, as an instrument for the development of Basque culture) defines *Euskal Herria* as<sup>1</sup>:

“<...> a European cultural area or region, situated on both sides of the Pyrenees which is composed of territories from both the Spanish and French states.

<...> The northern part of the Pyrenees (commonly known as *Iparalde*) is composed of Lapurdi, Nafarroa Beherea and Zuberoa, territories which, in the French administrative organisation, are part of the Department of the Atlantic Pyrenees.



The southern area (known as *Hegoalde*) is composed of Navarre, Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa, where Navarre forms the Foral Community of Navarre and the last three make up the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country.”

Other definitions of the term Basque Country (*Euskal Herria*) have a more political sense; for example, the Autonomy Statute of Euskadi of 1979, known as the *Gernika* Statute, in its Preliminary Title, defines *Euskal Herria* as the Basque people, that is, as an expression of nationality. Paradoxically, the sphere of applicability of this statute, voted in a referendum in the region and approved afterwards as an Organic Law in the Spanish Parliament, is restricted to the Basque Autonomous Community or Euskadi. The Foral Community of Navarre has its own equivalent of this Statute, the so-called “Organic Law for the Reinstatement and Improvement of the Chartered Regime of Navarre” of 1982, also known as Improvement.

*Euskaltzaindia* (the Royal Academy of the Basque Language) stated the following in its 1979 *Report on the name Euskal Herria*, clearly referring to Article 1 of the Autonomy Statute<sup>2</sup>:

“<...> during the last centuries, the term *Euskal Herria* has been used to designate a region with well-defined cultural features, beyond administrative and political borders and beyond historical differences. This denomination has its origin in the Basque words *euskara* + *herri*, literally, ‘the country of Basque language’.”

“<...> Our academic institution, which is unaffiliated and unconnected to politics, religion or ideologies, giving answer to its purpose <...> of taking care of the Basque language, wants to support the adequacy of the denomination *Euskal Herria*; it belongs to all us, and cannot be taken in a biased sense in any way. <...> This, of course, does not dispense with the specific names of each of the regions and their administrative denominations.”

Leaving aside socio-political entities, or ethno-cultural realities, the territorial policy of the Basque Autonomous Community or Euskadi is restricted to the sphere of application defined by the Spanish legal system. In this regard, the Policy of Land Planning had to wait in this region almost two decades to be implemented at a scale larger than the municipality, and was finally approved in 1997 in the Land Planning Directive of Euskadi (so-called *Directrices de Ordenación Territorial* or DOT).

## **2. Transformations in the territorial model of the Basque Autonomous Community (Euskadi) in recent history**

### **2.1. The Industrial Age**

Basque industry developed early on from small-scale manufacturing and handicraft to more intensive productive systems. The founding of the Blast Furnace of Bizkaia in 1880 was a milestone in the development of heavy industry as a characteristic element of the economy of Euskadi. This gave rise to rapid industrial development, which in turn led to the active urban growth necessary to absorb a growing population. Thus, from the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, the population of Euskadi increased rapidly, and particularly intensely from the 1950's onwards.

The cities of Euskadi attracted population not only from the rural surroundings within their immediate areas of influence, but also from other Spanish regions with lower growth rates. The intense process of urbanization undergone by the Autonomous Community, especially in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, affected the capital cities and the industrial centres most of all. In Bizkaia, the concentration of heavy industries on the left bank of the river Nervión gave rise to the dramatic growth of the corresponding municipalities, not only due to migration from outside Euskadi, but also because of a sort of "suction effect" over the surrounding territories; this last process accentuating the ruralisation of large areas of Bizkaia. A similar process took place in Vitoria-Gasteiz, although it happened much later and less intensively. By contrast, the balanced structure of Gipuzkoa prevented such a concentration or suction process, giving rise to a more uniformly urbanized area.

The limits of this model of urban growth were made dramatically clear in the industrial crisis in the 1970's. The restructuring and dismantling of heavy industry, incompatible with the new economic framework which emerged on a global scale, gave rise to economic and demographic stagnation.

The decline of the productive basis highlighted other problems associated with the model of the "developmentalist" period. Urban and industrial growth had been achieved at the expense of serious environmental damage, pollution problems, and destruction of the

landscape and of natural resources. In built-up areas, large expanses were covered with the ruins of abandoned factories<sup>3</sup>.

The region as a whole, and especially those areas with high population concentrations, were perceived as a degraded urban space, with a very negative image. The lack of coherence in the urban growth process, together with insufficient infrastructure, gave rise to serious functional conflicts; a high percentage of residential areas displayed high densities of built-up space, with low quality constructions and few services. Industry, as the element driving urbanization, was to blame for the fact that, during the crisis, the territories that had grown most experienced the most important deterioration.

## **2.2. The First Transformation: emergence of the polynuclear urban region**

All these circumstances were an obstacle to the emergence of a new economic system, based on the growth of public services and high-level activities (such as innovation, design, finance, mass media). Urban renovation, as a way to modernize the economy, was the slogan of new policies, e.g. the one that led to the transformation of metropolitan Bilbao.

The development of the Metropolitan area of Bilbao and other Basque capital cities conveyed different territorial processes, often related to each other. On the one hand, the metropolitan central urban districts were renovated, in order to assume new functions and promote new developmental dynamics. Such renovation required the creation of new spaces able to host new growth opportunities, relieve the central districts, and diversify the territorial possibilities of the metropolitan area.

On the other hand, there was clearly a need for territorial balance and the improvement of conditions in the urban edge areas. The urban edge refers to those expanding areas which were being urbanized on the outer limits of the city or, in some cases, towards the inner city itself, invading spaces of urban and environmental interest. Together with this, a better distribution of the population and its economic activities was required.

In this context, we can say that the process reviewed here began in a space organised around big cities, industrial and rural centres, with well-defined, differentiated and hierarchized functions, very close to their economic structures. This system developed quickly into a

city region, where the boundaries of centres, functions, and activities spread towards wider and more diverse territories.

Nowadays, the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country has a population of 2,174,033 (according to the last census of December 2013), in an area of 7,234.36 km<sup>2</sup>, giving it a population density of approximately 300 people/km<sup>2</sup>, which makes it the densest non-metropolitan region in the European Union.

On the other hand, according to data from Udalplan, the urbanised surface in 2013 was 383 km<sup>2</sup> (excluding infrastructures and free spaces within urbanised / building land)<sup>4</sup>. Taking this last piece of information into account, the resulting population density is approximately 5,676 people/km<sup>2</sup> (cf. 9,600 people/km<sup>2</sup> in Moscow), which characterizes the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country as a territory with a density typical of central urban areas.

These figures reflect the most significant territorial transformation of the Basque Autonomous Community in the first decade of the 21st century, which, in turn, demonstrates the attainment of the critical mass necessary to reach the category of “Global city”. This new situation implies certain novelties, such as the loss of regional identity but, undoubtedly, taken separately, none of the individual Basque cities could play a relevant role in the new international scenario of global cities.

The territorial scale of the Basque Autonomous Community is similar to that of other city regions around the world. International city regions, which host the functions typical of economic global centres, such as Antwerp-Brussels, Frankfurt, Seattle or Minneapolis-Saint Paul, display demographic and geographic sizes similar to those of the Basque Autonomous Community; sometimes, they display even smaller densities and, consequently, are able to take advantage of their demographic and economic critical mass in a less effective way<sup>5</sup>.

### **2.3. The Second Transformation: transformations in the socio-economic network**

The process of transformation and growth of the last few years would not have been possible without the existence of a highly educated and trained population and of well-grounded territorial government structures.

Information, knowledge, and the ability to innovate have proved to be the basic components of any process of development in modern economies. These dynamics feed themselves back into society, in the

sense that innovation and knowledge generate more information and the ability to transform, as well as the wealth necessary to support this process. However, as the experience in Euskadi -and other territories that experienced precocious industrialization- show, this is a continuous process: regardless of the level achieved, it is necessary to keep generating knowledge and innovation, in order to make further development possible; otherwise, decline and loss of competitiveness can threaten the system.

In this regard, at the beginning of the 21th century, the educational level of the population kept increasing and today the number of people with university studies is higher than ever before. The ability to innovate is reflected in the transformations of the economic structure and in the increasing role of investment in Research and Development. However, such investment still lags behind the average for most developed countries.

Ten years is not a long period for a process of territorial evolution; however, it is long enough to provide some crucial data which demonstrate the intense changes that this Second Transformation brought to the Basque Autonomous Community.

The most significant change affected the productive structure: there was a change from an industrial economy to a service economy, in line with other developed economies. In parallel, the primary sector of the Basque economy was reduced, to the point that the fishing, forestry, and farming sectors combined now account for less than 2% of the GDP of the Community<sup>6</sup>.

The increase of the tertiary sector was much more intense in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, the territories more industrialized in the past, while Araba experienced the biggest growth of its industry, thanks to the unused lands available around Vitoria-Gasteiz -the Araba plain- and along the A1 motorway (Bilbao - Vitoria-Gasteiz).

In fact, the growth of the service sector did not imply a significant process of de-industrialization; quite the contrary, the value of the industrial product has not stopped growing in recent years. The transformation in industrial production consisted in the emergence of smaller but more productive units, with an increased technological component.

The building sector experienced the biggest relative growth until the real-estate crisis of 2008. The expansion of this sector, and its relevance within the economic structure, launched regional economies and led to crucial territorial transformations. Many of these territorial transformations led to undesirable results: (i) “out-of-control” residential ur-

banization –now unoccupied- on the edges of large and medium-sized cities; and (ii) a decrease in the borrowing capacity of many municipalities, whose funding depended in excess on urban exploitation, now in decline. In any case, it should be noted that such dynamics were much stronger and had more dramatic consequences in other regions of Spain; mainly, in the Levant, but also on the outskirts of some of the interior cities which had raised great expectations of growth, because of the improved accessibility (thanks to the TGV), and because of the growth in economic corridors, such as the European Diagonal.

The service sector experienced growth in the most productive branches, those with a bigger added value, and those implying a deeper structural transformation: financial services, business services, commercial centres, health services, leisure, culture, and incipient tourist activities. This structural change implied an increase in productivity, and the replacement of old activities with other, expanding ones.

The result of the favourable situation during a long expansive cycle was a decade of spectacular growth of the economy and wealth. Rather than economic stagnation during a period of industrial crisis, we experienced sustainable growth with higher rates than average in the European Union. The result was an increase in productive value and growth in *per capita* income, which is today higher than the average in Europe.

Growth in the first years of the 21st century suffered stagnation, and even recession after the first years of the crisis. In macroeconomic terms, this translated into a strong fall in GDP and public income and, over all, had dramatic consequences for employment, to the extent that unemployment quickly reached doubled the rate it had been at during the period of prosperity (faster than in the period of the industrial crisis of the 70-80's).

#### **2.4. The Second Transformation: demographic and territorial transformation**

As for the population, during the years of the industrial crisis, a series of economic and social factors gave rise to a slight, but significant, demographic decline. We can talk of a change in this tendency only during the last years of economic growth, when population levels almost recovered to reach the rates at the beginning of the 80's.

Demographic evolution, however, is not homogeneous across all three territories. Although, in the last decade, the population has increased in all three Basque Provinces, while Araba has experienced a

constant increase, Gipuzkoa has still not regained the population level of 1985, nor Bizkaia that of 1975.

This tendency towards a stable demographic situation displays peculiar features and is due, almost exclusively, to a change in the migratory flow. Previously, migratory patterns implied the loss of population, whereas now they generate a –quantitatively small- increase in the population.

In contrast, the natural growth of the population is insufficient to guarantee not only economic growth, but even demographic renewal. An ageing population is largely responsible for this lack of population renewal: in the last decade, the number of inhabitants over 65 has markedly increased, while the youth population has been reduced by half. This is a structural problem, which will tend to worsen in the following years, and will need several decades to be corrected.

The transformation processes experienced by the metropolitan centres, the decreasing relevance of big factories, and the new requirements associated with new life-styles and increasing mobility patterns, gave rise to the expansion of the urbanization process

The spreading and complexity of the new peripheries overrode the traditional limits of metropolitan spaces and created functional areas outside their direct influence, as well as in previously rural territories. This explains why the built-up area grew by almost 20%, even if the population did not significantly increase over the last fifteen years.

Before the economic crisis, the figures regarding housing were 126,732 new flats built between 1995 and 2004. It implied a significant increase of the housing stock, to the point that, e.g. in 2006, 12% of the whole housing stock in the Basque Autonomous Community had been built within those previous 10 years. This increase was mostly located on the outskirts of metropolitan areas, and displayed a lower building density than the average in traditional Basque urban areas.

The ban on house-building in green belts and land designated as not for building -except for buildings associated with farming exploitations- was one of the few binding resolutions of the Land Planning Directive of Euskadi of 1997. This resolution led to the reduction of the mentioned growth dynamics, most noticeably and intensively in certain rural regions, such as Gernikaldea (at the heart of the Biosphere Reserve of Urdaibai).

According to Udalplan 2013, the analysis of the land designated for economic activities shows that the larger extension of this typology is located on the periphery of metropolitan areas. More than 25% of the

land designated for economic activities belongs to Metropolitan Bilbao, another 25% to the area of Central Araba, and 10% is around Donostia-San Sebastian.

If we compare the amount of land designated for economic activities with the total area of each region, we see that the territories where economic activities have more significant weight correspond to the traditional centres of Basque industry, i.e. Beasain, Eibar, Mondragon, and Durango, as well as the less traditional areas of Zarautz-Azpeitia and Central Araba.

The data from Udalplan also shows a strong pressure exerted on land designated for economic activities, and the competing patterns of land use in those territories. Except for Laguardia, the occupation rate of these lands is around 84%, and sometimes, it borders on saturation, reaching 100% occupation, as in Igorre; in Bilbao, Durango and Mungia, the percentage of occupation exceeds 95%. Land destined for economic use experienced a significant growth in demand, and the best perspective for further growth is in Araba<sup>7</sup>.

The process of expansion of built-up spaces was much weaker than in other regions of Spain but, in any case, it was probably the least positive factor for the sustainability of the region in a period in which environmental quality has experienced a notable improvement. As regards protected Natural Spaces, the Community has moved from a situation in which only 5% of the territory was protected (in 1994), to the current situation, where 22,7% of the territory is defined as belonging to one or another of the existing protected areas. There are still unaccomplished objectives; for example, the improvement of the quality of river water, although here too significant progress has been made, and now 85% of the waste spillage is purified and coastal water is of excellent quality.

### **3. Final remarks**

By way of conclusion, the territorial model that is emerging in the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country points to a developmental pattern based on quality. The elements that are in increasing demand from citizens and businesses are the following: a high quality natural environment, attractive urban spaces, availability of sophisticated equipment and services, efficient transport and communication systems, etc. These are strategic factors to create and attract new economic activities, and sustain the competitiveness of the existing ones.

The improvement and spread of quality of life becomes goes be-



yond mere economic satisfaction, and crucially incorporates qualitative aspects. These aspects must be focussed on in the management of the development process which the Basque Autonomous Community is now implementing.

### **Endnotes**

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<sup>1</sup> [http://www.euskosare.org/euskal\\_herria/aurkezpena\\_eh/general\\_presentation\\_euskal\\_herria?set\\_language=en&cl=en](http://www.euskosare.org/euskal_herria/aurkezpena_eh/general_presentation_euskal_herria?set_language=en&cl=en). Last accessed: 10 September 2014.

<sup>2</sup> Euskera 24:1; 1979: 115–117.

<sup>3</sup> In this respect, the Basque Government activated in 1993 the “Program for the Demolition of Industrial Ruins”, which has recovered more than 229 hectares of the territory up to the present day, thanks to the investment of more than 18 million euros.

<sup>4</sup> Udalplan 2013. Internet resource: <http://www.geo.euskadi.net/udalplan/visor/viewer.htm>. Last accessed: 10 September 2014.

<sup>5</sup> Land Planning Directive of Euskadi (Directrices de Ordenación del Territorio). Internet resource: [http://www.ingurumena.ejgv.euskadi.net/r49-565/es/contenidos/informacion/dots\\_reestudio/es\\_1165/reestudioc.html](http://www.ingurumena.ejgv.euskadi.net/r49-565/es/contenidos/informacion/dots_reestudio/es_1165/reestudioc.html). Last accessed: 10 September 2014.

<sup>6</sup> Web Eustat. Internet resource: [http://www.eustat.es/bancopx/spanish/tipo\\_N/id\\_2208/indice.html#axzz1hrmhn1a3](http://www.eustat.es/bancopx/spanish/tipo_N/id_2208/indice.html#axzz1hrmhn1a3). Last accessed: 10 September 2014.

<sup>7</sup> Udalplan 2013: <http://www.geo.euskadi.net/udalplan/visor/viewer.htm> (last accessed: 10 September 2014).

## **BILINGUALISM AND THE BASQUE LANGUAGE\***

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### **1. Introduction: general information about the Basque language<sup>1</sup>**

The Basque language or *euskera* (also *euskara*) is the vernacular language of the westernmost part of the Pyrenees, along the Bay of Biscay, which occupies the corresponding border regions between Northern Spain and Southern France (cf. Figure 1 below)<sup>2</sup>.

No genetic relationship between the Basque language and any other language or group of languages has been established, as we will explain in Section 4. In fact, according to Trask (1998a, 1998b), the Basque language is the only pre-Indo-European language preserved in Western Europe today<sup>3</sup>.

From a linguistic perspective, the Basque Country is identified with the Basque-speaking territories, and is usually divided into three major regions. On the Spanish side, these regions are further divided into different administrative provinces, while on the French side, the subdivisions are merely geographical. These regions are depicted in Figure 2, together with their Basque names<sup>4</sup>:

- The Southern Basque Country is formed by two autonomous

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
*Figure 1. Geographical extension of the Basque-speaking regions.*

communities, part of the Spanish state of autonomies: (A) the Basque Autonomous Community or Euskadi, further divided into the provinces of Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and Araba; (B) and the Chartered Community of Navarre (Nafarroa).

- The Northern Basque Country is part of the Department of the Atlantic Pyrenees (Pyrénées Atlantiques) in France, is located within the Aquitania region, and is usually divided into the geographical entities of Labourd (Lapurdi), Soule (Zuberoa) and Lower Navarre (Nafarroa Beherea).

Traditionally, the speakers of Basque call themselves *euskaldunak*, and the Basque-speaking regions, *Euskadi* or *Euskal Herria*, literally, the ‘nation / people who speak Basque’. According to the last sociolinguistic survey, carried out in 2011, 714,000 inhabitants (putting together both the Spanish and the French Basque countries) speak Basque, another 388,000 people understand but cannot speak Basque, and finally, an indefinite number of Basque migrants and their descendants in both Americas are also speakers of Basque (Herria 2006).

The (non-)official status of the Basque language in these regions can be described as follows:



*Figure 2. Basque-speaking regions and their administrative or geographic subdivisions.*

- In the Basque Autonomous Community or Euskadi, Basque is an official language, with the same status as Spanish. This official status means that Basque is treated on a par with Spanish in the public environment and official documents. It also means that knowing Basque is a necessary condition to access certain public and administrative posts.
- In the Chartered Community of Navarre, Basque is an official language, together with Spanish, but only in the Northern areas, where it is used in an active way.
- In the French Basque Country, the Basque language is not official at all, only French is.
- The Basque language has a significant number of dialects, notably different from each other, to the point that several variants are mutually incomprehensible. Thus, starting from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, different initiatives worked toward unifying and normalizing Basque; these efforts finally converged in the establishment of the literary unified language called *Batua*, based on the Gipuzcoan dialect.

## **2. Some sociolinguistic data about Basque: its extension and use nowadays**

In this section, we will offer some general notions about the current situation of the Basque language, focusing on certain aspects, such as the number of “knowers” and users of Basque, as well as the characterization of Basque by its speakers as their mother tongue or as a second language. An important fact that we will highlight is the progressive recovery of the language in recent years in most regions. We will also review the percentage of Basque speakers with respect to some other relevant parameters, such as their age and place of residence, and where the official or non-official status of Basque is a determinant factor in its spread.


All the data in this section has been extracted from the Fourth Sociolinguistic Map and the Fourth and Fifth Sociolinguistic Surveys of the Basque language, carried out by the Basque Government in the years 2006 and 2011, respectively. The data was collected by interviewing 7,900 inhabitants over the age of 16 in all of the Basque-speaking regions.

Firstly, consider figure 3 below; it represents the knowledge of Basque among the inhabitants of the Basque Autonomous Community, the Chartered Community of Navarre, and the Basque-speaking region in Aquitania, according to the Fifth Sociolinguistic Survey, carried out by the Basque Government in 2011<sup>5</sup>. In that year, the total number of inhabitants aged 16 and over was 2,649,000, among which 27% consider themselves bilingual, 14.7% passive bilingual (they understand, but do not speak Basque), and 58.3% defined themselves as monolingual speakers of Spanish or French.



*Figure 3. Percentage of bilinguals, passive bilinguals, and non-Basque speakers in all Basque-speaking regions in 2011.*


By comparing the maps of the “greater” Basque Country in Figures 4 and 5, we can easily perceive a certain recovery of the Basque language in the last years only in the Basque Autonomous Community, probably due to the official status of the language and promotion of public free education in Basque in the region. By contrast, Basque has gone backwards in the territories where it lacks official status, and very clearly so in the French Basque Country. The map in Figure 4 illustrates the situation of Basque by the end of the Spanish dictatorship (according to data collected between the years 1971 and 1977)<sup>6</sup>, while Picture 5 offers the percentages of the Basque speakers in 2006<sup>7</sup>:




*Figure 4. Percentage of Basque speakers in 1971–1977.*

In the case of the Basque Autonomous Community, the recovery of Basque in the last 30 years is noticeable, as shown in Figure 6, which represents the percentages of Basque bilinguals in this specific region in the years 1981 and 2011<sup>8</sup>:

Considering all the Basque-speaking territories, the (non-)official status of Basque is also reflected in the contrast between the percentages of Basque speakers (full or passive bilinguals) vs. Spanish / French monolinguals in Figure 7<sup>9</sup>.




*Figure 5. Percentage of Basque speakers in 2006.*



*Figure 6. Percentage of Basque speakers in the Basque Autonomous Community in 1981 and 2011.*

Presumably, due to the official status of Basque, the Basque Autonomous Community displays a high number of full (32%) and passive bilinguals (17.4%), while in the Chartered Community of Navarre, where Basque is official only in the Northern part, and in the French Basque Country, where only French is official, the percentages are smaller: 11.7% (bilinguals) / 7.5% (passive bilinguals) and 21.4% (bilinguals) / 9.1% (passive bilinguals), respectively. Note that the French Basque Country, which historically used to have the highest number of Basque speakers, has dropped to only 21.4%.




*Figure 7. Percentage of full bilinguals, passive bilinguals, and non-Basque speakers in all Basque-speaking regions in 2011 (region by region).*

The data offered so far refers to the perception which speakers have about their own knowledge of Basque, according to the methodology employed by the Basque Government to carry out its sociolinguistic surveys. Focusing on the active use of the Basque language, the data varies with respect to those regarding just its knowledge, as shown in Figure 8 below (Fifth Sociolinguistic 2011).

Thus, in the Basque Autonomous Community, only 12.7% uses Basque more than Spanish, 7.3% uses both languages in the same proportion, and 65.2% speakers use Spanish more than Basque. The situation is even more extreme in Navarre, where only 3.9% and 1.9% use Basque more than Spanish or as much as Spanish,




respectively, while 87.4% speak only in Spanish. In the French Basque Country, 2.5% and 7.1% use Basque more or as much as French, while 77.1% speak only in French.



*Figure 8. Percentage of use of the Basque language in all Basque-speaking regions in 2011.*


Another important aspect about the extension of Basque from the sociolinguistic point of view is the characterization of the inhabitants as (non-)native speakers of Basque (or non-speakers of Basque). In the survey carried out by the Basque Government, a native speaker is considered to be one who was exposed to a language before the age of three, usually at home. Thus, it can be the case that Basque is the speaker's mother tongue, acquired before Spanish / French. It can also be the case that Basque is the speaker's mother tongue together with Spanish / French, when both languages are acquired at home at the same time (for example, one of the parents speaks Basque with her/his child, while the other speaks Spanish). Finally, Spanish / French can be the speaker's mother tongue; in this case, Basque can be a second language (acquired during childhood at school, or at an adult age), or not be acquired at all.

These situations are represented in Figure 9, where, as happened in the case of the real use of the language, we observe a prevalence of Spanish / French over Basque with respect to the graphics reflecting just the knowledge of Basque (Fifth Sociolinguistic 2011). Thus, while almost 41.7% inhabitants in all the Basque-speaking regions know Basque to a greater or lesser extent (cf. Figure 6), only 20.3% are native speakers of Basque, most of whom are also native Spanish / French speakers.



*Figure 9. Percentage of only Basque, bilingual or only Spanish / French native speakers in all Basque-speaking regions in 2011.*

An important factor to be able to interpret the percentages of Basque speakers illustrated in Figures 3 and 7, is the age of the speaker, represented in Figure 10 (Ibid).



*Figure 10. Percentage of full bilinguals, passive bilinguals, and non-Basque speakers, according to the age of the speaker in all the Basque-speaking regions in 2006 (region by region).*

In the Basque Autonomous Community, the number of speakers of Basque increases as we descend in the population pyramid. This high number of young and middle-aged speakers of Basque is usually interpreted as a consequence of the introduction of the official status of Basque in this territory after the dictatorship and, especially, the result of a successful educational model that allows every citizen to be taught fully in Basque, both in Primary and Secondary School, as well as at the University level.

In the French Basque Country, where Basque is not an official language, the process is just the reverse. Basque is becoming progressively lost, as reflected by the population pyramid in Figure 10. In Navarre, where the official status of Basque is restricted to the Northern territory, the number of young speakers is smaller than the number of older speakers, and is only slightly higher than the previous age group (middle-aged people), probably due to the availability of free Basque education in a few Northern schools (Fourth Sociolinguistic Survey 2006).

### **3. Hypotheses about the territorial extension of the Basque language in the past**

The hypotheses about the territorial extension of the Basque language during its history differ, and this issue has traditionally given rise to much discussion. Fortunately, a substantial and rigorous new synthesis of the problem will soon be published (*Gorrochategui, Igartua, Lakarra* 2015)<sup>4</sup>. A much criticized theory is the one by Núñez Astrain (2004), who estimated that the extension of Basque at the beginning of the Christian era was as represented in Figure 11<sup>11</sup>. On this map, the dashed line marks the alleged extension of Basque by the year 1 A.D., whereas the continuous line represents the current Basque-speaking provinces (cf. Figures 1 and 2 in Section 1), and the actual border between Spain and France:

It is a well-known fact that Basque has suffered a significant geographical contraction in the last 3,000 years, due to the pressure exerted by the surrounding Indo-European languages; however, Núñez Astrain's estimate is highly uncertain, especially, with regard to the Western boundaries proposed. There is evidence that Basque was once used in the regions of Aquitania, Navarre and part of Aragon (*Michele-  
na* 1954: 409–458), and there are a number of Basque toponyms in the easternmost regions proposed by Núñez Astrain. However, the westernmost estimate in Figure 11 is based on the mere assumption that all

pre-Roman tribes of the region, including those lacking any linguistic evidence (e.g. epigraphic documents), were Basque-speaking peoples.

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*Figure 11. Basque language by the beginning of the Christian era according to Núñez Astrain (2004).*

In this line of critique, Trask (2008: 7), in his posthumous work, observed that toponyms and anthroponyms of the Vardulian, Beronian, Caristian and Autrigonian peoples suggest that they spoke some Indo-European language, probably Celtic. In fact, we do not know whether Basque was spoken in the westernmost region before our era, or whether it was rather displaced there later from the East, after the collapse of the Roman domination in Western Europe (Trask 2008). Thus, Antonio Tovar (1968) proposes a different territorial extension of Basque in pre-historic times, illustrated in Figure 12, where the light green colour represents the historical extension of Basque, while the dark green colour marks its current extension<sup>12</sup>:

Another hypothesis about the spreading of Basque, regarding already its early historical period (therefore, much better documented), has been proposed by Arejita, Manterola and Oar-Arteta (2007: 36), represented in Figure 13 (Arejita, Manterola, Oar-Arteta 2007). Here,




Figure 12. Spreading of Basque and other languages in the Iberian Peninsula by the 5th century B.C.




Figure 13. Estimate about the regression of Basque in historical times, according to Arejita et alii (2007: 36).

the authors observe that Basque toponymy in the Roman period (the so-called “EUSKAL LEKUIZENAK” on the map in Figure 13) is restricted to Aquitania and the Eastern regions, as is often assumed in the literature. They consider that Aquitania, parts of Aragon and the Western regions started to be bilingual (“ESKUALDE ELEBIDUNA” on the map) not before the 7<sup>th</sup> century A.D., more or less the time when Basque could plausibly have been the leading language in Navarre and the Eastern region (“EUSKARA NAGUSI VII mend.” on the map). The majority use of Basque in the westernmost region would only start between the 9<sup>th</sup> and the 13<sup>th</sup> centuries (“EUSKARA NAGUSI IX–XIII mend.” on the map); the eventual retreat of the Basque language is pinpointed on the map according to significant dates: 1587, 1778, 1863 and 1935<sup>13</sup>:

#### **4. On the hypotheses about the potential kinships of Basque and the reasons for scepticism**

Up until now, we have focused on the sociolinguistic status of Basque and its extension at different periods, but, as we pointed out in the introduction, we think that it is also relevant to briefly overview the major hypotheses regarding potential Basque kinships and language families. Due to space restrictions, we will only provide a very brief overview of the main hypotheses relating Basque to other languages, and the interested reader will find supplementary information in the works of Trask (1995, 1999) and Lakarra (1998) and in the references cited therein<sup>14</sup>. Therefore, here we will overview three of the main hypotheses: (i) the hypothesis of a Basque-Amazhig (Berber) kinship, (ii) the hypothesis of a pan-European Basque substrate, and (iii) the hypothesis of a link between Basque and the languages of the Caucasus. However, the view that we will provide is one of deep scepticism –and we would like to emphasize that this is the shared opinion among Basque specialists –, in our view, there is no evidence to support the idea of any kinship relation between Basque and any other language, and on the contrary, there is a cornucopia of well-established evidence strongly suggesting, if not plainly denying, the plausibility of these hypotheses.

Before we start, we would like to offer a very brief sketch of the phonology of Basque, in order to set the ground for the comparison with other languages.

4.1. The phonological inventory of Basque

This is the phonological inventory of Basque consonants:

Table 1

Table of the consonantal phonemes of Basque

	Labials	Apicals	Laminals	Predorsals	Postdorsals	Laryngeals
Stops	p	t		c	k	
	b	d		ɟ	g	
Fricatives	f	s	ʃ	ʃ	χ	h
Affricates		ts	tʃ	tʃ		
Nasals	m	n		ɲ		
Laterals		l		ʎ		
Tap		r				
Trill		r				

Figure 14: table of the consonantal phonemes of Basque

To this, we would have to add a simple system of five vowels: /i, e, a, o, u/. Therefore, the phonological inventory of Basque is quite modest in comparison to those of other languages of the world (cf. the *World Atlas of Language Structures* edited by M.S. Dryer & M. Haspelmath<sup>15</sup>).

Notwithstanding, it has to be noted that the consonantal system of proto-Basque was even more meagre, with a division between *fortis* and *lenis* consonants. See the schema in figure 15<sup>16</sup>:

Table 2

Table of the consonantal phonemes of proto-Basque

fortis	(p)	t	k	ts	tʃ	N	L	R
lenis	b	d	g	s	ʃ	n	l	r

Figure 15: table of the consonantal phonemes of proto-Basque

On the other hand, the vowel system that is generally proposed for proto-Basque is taken to be the same as the current one: /i, e, a, o, u/.

We will not elaborate on the phonological inventory of Basque

(and its dialects), but it is essential to have an overview of the language when evaluating possible kinships.

Regarding phoneme distribution, Basque has quite strict phonotactic restrictions. For instance, it allows for simple onsets (C(onsonant)-V(owel)), but complex onsets are virtually inexistent in the indigenous lexicon, and they are generally avoided in borrowings (*via* epenthesis or simplification of the consonant cluster). In a nutshell, there are in Basque no onsets like ZL-, MN-, SK-, etc. In fact, the only complex onsets allowed by Basque have been of the sort of *muta cum liquida* (KR-, TR-, TL-, etc.), but only in modern times, given that historically even these complex onsets have also been avoided (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Lat. *christianus* > Bsq. *girstino*, Lat. *librum* > Bsq. *liburu*, Lat. (< Gr.) *ecclesiam* > Bsq. *eleiza*). It has to also be noted that up until very recently there has been a restriction regarding the presence of stops word-initially to the effect that only voiced stops were possible in this position. This restriction can be observed in Latin borrowings, where original voiceless stops get voiced when borrowed into Basque: Lat. *torrem* > Bsq. *dorre*, Lat. *corpus* > Bsq. *gorputz*, Lat. *pacem* > Bsq. *bake*. The last phonotactic characteristic that we would like to mention is the restriction with respect to word-initial rhotics: historically the presence of these segments has been avoided in this position with the introduction of vocalic protheses; thus, Lat. *Roma* > Bsq. *Erroma*, Lat. *rosam* > Bsq. *Arrosa*, etc.

One has to take all these restrictions into account when looking for kinship relationships between Basque and any other language since these restrictions clearly constrain the plausibility of cognates and possible reconstructions.

We leave here this brief overview of the main properties of the Basque phonological system, and go on to commenting on the different hypotheses of kinships with Basque.

## **4.2. The different hypotheses**

### **4.2.1. The Basque-African hypothesis**

In principle, the Basque-African hypothesis has to its advantage a certain geographical plausibility since the historical Basque-speaking area is not very far away from the Maghreb, the area where purported Basque kins like the Amazhig languages are spoken.

Among the defendants of the Basque-Amazhig hypothesis we find



Georg von der Gabelentz, Hugo Schuchardt and Hans G. Mukarovsky<sup>17</sup>. However, according to the specialists the efforts to relate Basque and Amazhig failed to render any significant results. The evidence that has been employed is very poor, and it does not stand up to any comparative rigor. For instance, when looking for cognates, Romance borrowings have often been employed (*lili* ‘flower’, *matel* ‘cheek’, *tirria* ‘repudiation’, *barraiatu* ‘to disperse’, *papo* ‘chest’, etc.). Observe, furthermore, that forms like *papo* and *tirria*, apart from their Latin origin, are impossible in ancient Basque, given the aforementioned restriction on word-initial voiceless stops. Besides, as argued by Trask (1996), some of the forms employed for cognates are simply inexistent or impossible in ancient Basque (this is the case of forms like *\*aba* (created by S. Arana in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century), or the causative suffix *\*-zi* (which, simply, does not exist in Basque)). Likewise, other cognates are built upon forms that are visibly new, and that could not exist (at least in that form) in proto-Basque. This is the case of *mama* (drinkable liquid in child-directed speech), *tu* (‘saliva’, onomatopoeic form), *ukabil* (‘fist’, which is assumed as a lexical root, but which probably comes from the compounding of ‘*uko* + *-bil*’), *emazte* (‘woman/wife’, also taken as a root, but probably derived from *eme* ‘female’ + *gazte* ‘young’), etc. Besides, it is plainly incorrect to take as the basis of a comparison the form *nik* (which is the first person singular pronoun, but in the ergative case) in order to get a cognate with Amazhig *nik(ki)*.

In some other cases, the methodological failure is not due to a lack of morphological similarity but to a lack of semantic similarity (say, when the Basque form *oskol* ‘shell’ is translated as ‘nail’ for purposes of comparison). Even if nails and shells could be considered as pertaining to the same semantic field, we cannot say that they are the same thing.

Lastly, a lack of systematicity is also blatant in the languages under comparison: for instance, instead of comparing a Basque form with a form which is present in all Amazhig varieties, sometimes forms existing only in a local variety (such as Tuareg) are taken. And at other times forms pertaining to other linguistic families like Arabic (Semitic) or Mande (Niger-Congo) are used.

#### **4.2.2. The hypothesis of the pan-European Basque substrate**

Another of the main hypotheses about potential Basque kinship is the idea of a pan-European Basque substrate. In a nutshell, the idea is that modern Basque is the only survivor of such a pre-Indo-European sub-

strate<sup>18</sup>. Among the defendants of such a hypothesis are Johannes Hubschmid and Theo Venneman (*Hubschmid* 1963, 1965; *Venneman* 1994: 215–284; *Venneman* 2003). Hubschmid (1965), for instance, proposes a range of cognates that, in his view, would support the possibility of a Basque substrate in all Europe. These are forms that appear in Basque and in Romance too, but that would find no Indo-European explanation. The amount of cases proposed is quite small (about thirty), which in and of itself would constitute quite a weak body of evidence. However, among the cases analysed there are some that are plainly impossible in proto-Basque, and therefore, that are completely invalid for reconstruction. Among them we find forms like *tutur*; *kukur* ‘crest’, ‘beak’, *kosko* ‘acorn cupule’ or *pentoka* ‘steep slope’, that violate the constraint against word-initial voiceless stops that we mentioned earlier. Likewise, he also mentions forms like *muga* ‘limit/boundary’, with an /m/ that is impossible in proto-Basque (see the inventory in the chart in figure 15).

More recently, the German linguist Theo Venneman has made a similar proposal based on the idea that modern day Basque is the only survivor of a family which was spread across all Europe. However, instead of focusing on common nouns, Venneman’s hypothesis is mainly based on the comparison of hydronyms. Thus, Venneman proposes that the abundance of similar hydronyms across Europe (*Ava*, *Aula*, *Auma*, *Avantia*, *Ara*, *Arla*, *Arma*, *Arantia*, *Ara*, *Alara*, *Alma*, *Alalantia*, *Sala*, *Salara*, *Salma*, *Salantia*, etc.) is due to a pan-European Basque substrate. In fact, Venneman’s idea is based upon some properties of these hydronyms that would match the features that we see in Basque:

1. The language of origin of these hydronyms is supposed to be an agglutinative language, which makes almost exclusive use of suffixation.
2. It has a humble phonological inventory composed of the segments /i, e, a, o, u, p, t, k, b, d, g, s, m, n, l, r/.
3. The final *-a* observed in these hydronyms could, in principle, be associated to the final *-a* of the article in modern Basque.

Nevertheless, these arguments are wrong, as has been pointed out by Trask and others. To begin with, even if modern Basque is an agglutinative language, syntactic reconstructions propose quite a different picture for previous phases (*cf. Gómez, Sainz* 1995: 235–274). What is more, there is ample evidence (and agreement among specialists) that the word-final *-a* of the article in Basque derives, and in quite recent

times, from the demonstrative *har-* (cf. Manterola (in progress) [*Manterola*]). Furthermore, among the names employed by Venneman for his proposal there is an important number of forms that are just impossible in proto-Basque (*Drava-*, *Kara-*, *Pala-*...). Last, it has to be said that the phonological system derived by Venneman for these hydronyms corresponds to a system of unmarked segments which are existent in the majority of languages in the world (among them, Basque).

### **4.2.3. The Basque-Caucasian hypothesis**

Finally, one of the major hypotheses has been the potential Basque-Caucasian link, which has been studied by a range of linguists, including R. Lafon [1951, 1952] (*Lafon* 1951: 227–224; *Lafon* 1952: 80–94.), or, more recently Chirikba [1985] (*Chirikba* 1985: 95–105) and Bengtson [2003] (*Bengtson* 2003: 33–54).

The first thing that should be noted is that the term ‘Caucasian language’ is simply a geographic term, not a linguistic one; that is, the term ‘Caucasian language’ refers to the languages spoken in that area (around 40), but not to any particular linguistic family. In fact, it is generally assumed that there are four main linguistic groups in the Caucasus (Northeast, Northcentral, Northwest and Southern [or Kartvelian]), but no reliable proto-Caucasian has been reconstructed. Thus, when searching for cognate pairs, very often a link is established between Basque and several Caucasian languages without previously establishing a link between the Caucasian languages themselves, and this is a major problem when trying to establish any kind of Basque-Caucasian comparison.

In any case, the kinship proposals have not been fruitful, and we could even say that they have clearly failed. One can always find potential cognates between any two given languages, even more so if instead of two languages we compare one language against forty. However, the specialists agree that there is no reliable evidence for a Basque-Caucasian link (see, for instance, the works of Mitxelena [*Mitxelena* 1968, 1988] and Lakarra [*Lakarra* 1999: 15–84]). The fact is that even if some typological similarities can be found between Basque and some of the Caucasian languages (like the ergative-marking or a rich inflectional morphology), these are features that are not that uncommon among the languages of the world. But what is more, regarding phonology, there are extreme divergences between the languages in comparison. In fact among the Caucasian languages we can

find some of the most complex consonantal inventories in the world. For instance, Kabardian has 49 consonantal phonemes (*cf. Kuipers* 1960), while Ubykh, an extinct Northwest Caucasian language<sup>9</sup>, had one of the most complex consonant inventories in a language without clicks (up to 83 consonants) and the most disproportional ratio of phonemic consonants to vowels (according to most scholars, it only had 2 vowels /ə/ and /a/) [*Dumézil* 1965]. Likewise Catford (*Catford* 1991), in his reconstruction of proto-Lezguian, proposes a phonological inventory with 101 consonants and 13 vowels. All this bears testimony to the fact that any link between Basque and Caucasian languages is very unlikely: such rich phonological systems plainly clash against the modest system of modern Basque, and even more so with that of proto-Basque (*cf.* The table in Figure 15).

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> A good English introduction to the basics of the Basque sociolinguistics is found (Barreña, Ortega, Amorrortu 2013).

<sup>2</sup> Creative Commons licence. Internet resource: [http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archivo:Mapa\\_provincias\\_Euskal\\_Herria.svg](http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archivo:Mapa_provincias_Euskal_Herria.svg). Last access: 28.08.2014.

<sup>3</sup> Trask 1998a: Euskararen etorki eta ahaideak: datuen analisisa. *Uztaro* 26: 81–108; Trask 1998b: the Basque Language: then and now. *Language Sciences* 20: 313–324.

<sup>4</sup> Creative Commons licence. Internet resource: [http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archivo:Greater\\_Basque\\_Country.svg](http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archivo:Greater_Basque_Country.svg). Last access: 28.08.2014.

<sup>5</sup> Fifth Sociolinguistic Survey 2011, 2013 Euskal Herria. Hizkuntza politikarako sailburuordetza. Servicio de Publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco. Available on line (English version). Internet resource: [http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/contenidos/informacion/sociolinguistic\\_research2011/en\\_2011/adjuntos/FifthSociolinguisticSurvey.pdf](http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/contenidos/informacion/sociolinguistic_research2011/en_2011/adjuntos/FifthSociolinguisticSurvey.pdf). Last access: 28.08.2014.

<sup>6</sup> Euskaltzaindia - SIADECO 1979: Estudio socio-lingüístico del euskara (1971–1977) Hizkuntz borroka Euskal Herrian. Donostia: Ediciones Vascas.

<sup>7</sup> Fourth Sociolinguistic Survey 2006 / 2009 Euskal Herria. Hizkuntza politikarako sailburuordetza. Servicio de Publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco. Available on line (English version). Internet resource: [http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/r59-738/en/contenidos/informacion/sociolinguistic\\_research2006/en\\_2011/2011.html](http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/r59-738/en/contenidos/informacion/sociolinguistic_research2006/en_2011/2011.html). Last access: 28.08.2014.

<sup>8</sup> IV. mapa sociolingüístico del euskera (2006). Hizkuntza politikarako sailburuordetza 2009. Servicio de Publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco. Available on line (in Spanish). Internet resource: [http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/r59-738/es/contenidos/informacion/argitalpenak/es\\_6092/adjuntos/MAPAcast.pdf](http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/r59-738/es/contenidos/informacion/argitalpenak/es_6092/adjuntos/MAPAcast.pdf). Last access: 28.08.2014.

<sup>9</sup> Fifth Sociolinguistic 2011. Note that the size of the circles is proportional to the number of inhabitants in each region.

<sup>10</sup> For a survey on the hypotheses about the historical relation of the Basque language and its possible speakers with surrounding languages and peoples (see

Igartua, Zabalza 2012).

<sup>11</sup> Luis Núñez Astrain. 2004: El euskera arcaico. Extensión y parentescos. Tafalla: Txalaparta. Picture available on line. Internet resource: [http://www.erabili.com/zer\\_berri/galdezka/1077895960/1077896788](http://www.erabili.com/zer_berri/galdezka/1077895960/1077896788). Last access: 28.08.2014.

<sup>12</sup> Antonio Tovar 1968: Lo que sabemos de la lucha de lenguas en la Península Ibérica, Madrid. Picture available on line (license by Wikimedia Commons): [http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archivo:Retroceso\\_del\\_euskera\\_\(2\).svg](http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archivo:Retroceso_del_euskera_(2).svg) (last access: 02-08-2014)

<sup>13</sup> These dates correspond to different landmarks in the history of the extension of Basque, according to Fernando Mikelarena (Mikelarena 2003: 184ff): (i) Manuel de Lecuona found a document from 1587, which listed the villages under the jurisdiction of the Episcopate of Pamplona, describing most of them as Basque-speaking; (ii) Irigaray found another document dated from 1778, which reflected the result of a litigation determining which Navarre villages were Basque-speaking; (iii) in 1863, Luis Luciano Bonaparte elaborated his map of the Basque dialects, and (iv) in 1935, Irigaray conducted the first large study about the number of Basque-speaking people.

<sup>14</sup> This overview will be mainly based on (Trask 1996; Trask 1995; Andoni Lakarra 1998: 47–110).

<sup>15</sup> URL. Internet resource: <http://wals.info>. Last access: 20.02.2011.

<sup>16</sup> Adapted from L. Trask (Trask 1998: 313–324). See also A. Martinet (Martinet 1955; Hualde 1999: 77–104).

<sup>17</sup> See, in particular Mukarovsky 1964: 177–184; Mukarovsky 1972: 5–48.

<sup>18</sup> It has to be noted that all European languages pertain to the Indo-European family except Basque (which is pre-Indo-European), and some languages pertaining to families arrived later like the Finno-Ugric languages (Finnish, Hungarian, Estonian, Sami...), or Maltese (Semitic).

<sup>19</sup> Its last speaker, Tefvik esenç, died in 1992.

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## IMMIGRANTS AND EUSKERA: STRATEGIES OF ACCULTURATION IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY

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There has always been migration, whether in search of natural resources or as a result of political pressures, human movement is as old as human history. In more recent centuries, Europe was a net exporter of population, as the colonial history and current ethnic make-up of large swathes of the planet testify, and only in the second half of the twentieth century has it reverted to the role it had previously held (in Late Antiquity, for example) as a net importer of population. In the case of Spain, the inversion of the process has been even more recent, being particularly noteworthy only in the 21st century, and this has been the case too for the Basque Country. Previously there had, of course, been important migratory dynamics within Spain, with the Basque Country a net exporter during the medieval and early modern periods and only with industrialisation, from the late 19th century onwards, becoming a net importer. However the fascinating implications (social, political and cultural) of this are beyond the scope of this paper. It is only within the last decade that the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (henceforth CAPV - *Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco*) has had to respond to a new social reality and the concomitant challenges posed by the presence of a significant immigration population of extra-peninsular origin, and it is the integration of these overseas immigrants in the CAPV, with particular reference to the linguistic and educational aspects of said process, that we will be examining here.

According to the National Institute for Statistics (henceforth INE – *Instituto Nacional de Estadística*), there were 801.329 immigrants resident in Spain in December 1999, i.e. 2% of the total population of 40 million. Now on the other hand, the picture has altered significantly, although the figures peaked a few years ago. Using INE data from 2012–13, of the 46.8 million then residents of Spain, approximately 5.3 million, i.e. 11%, were of foreign origin (*Valle, Baelo*



2013), while, as a result of the economic crisis, this figure had fallen slightly to 4.5 million, i.e. just under 10%, by 2014<sup>1</sup>.

Of the seventeen different autonomous regions within Spain, the CAPV has the fifth lowest proportion of immigrant population, with 7.2% of residents, i.e. 156,716 individuals having been born outside Spain. In general the Mediterranean coast has the highest proportions, as a result of both tourism and intensive agriculture, alongside Madrid, while the northern coast and impoverished interior regions have the lowest figures.

**Table 1**

*Proportion of immigrants within the different CAPV territories*

	<b>Total population</b>	<b>immigrants</b>	<b>% immigrants</b>
<b>Spain</b>	46,464,053	4,538,503	9.8
<b>CAPV</b>	2,172,877	156,716	7.2
<b>Álava</b>	320,032	30,418	9.5
<b>Bizkaia</b>	1,144,214	75,943	6.6
<b>Gipuzkoa</b>	708,631	50,355	7.1

Within the Basque Country itself (Table 1), the most populous territory of Bizkaia naturally has the most immigrants in absolute terms (75,943), but not in relative terms (6.6%) since, repeating the pattern seen elsewhere, the more agricultural Álava (9.5%) comes first, with Gipuzkoa lying between the two extremes at 7.1%<sup>2</sup>.

### **1. Basque exceptionalism: bilingualism and educational models**

The educational system within the CAPV has a number of distinctive characteristics that it is necessary to take into account when analysing the immigrant reaction to said system. These mostly stem from the bilingual nature of the region, and more specifically the non-Indoeuropean origins of the Basque language (known as *Euskera*). Being non-Indoeuropean, and moreover a language isolate, Euskera is quite unlike any other language in the Iberian Peninsula or beyond, and thus necessarily also quite unlike any other language to which any immigrant will have been exposed. This makes Basque society and Basque bilingualism rather different to the situation in other bilingual regions such as Catalonia or Galicia where the regional languages (Catalan and

Gallego, respectively) are relatively similar to Castilian and other Romance languages (Portuguese and Gallego are particularly closely related), and thus are relatively easier for the immigrant to acquire.

The first law governing the effective integration of Euskera into the education system in the CAPV only came into place in 1979 with the *Decreto de Bilingüismo*. In order to revitalise what was an ailing and marginalised language after years of neglect and indeed of official hostility from the central government, the Basque Government adopted a policy of normalisation, formalised in the *Ley de Normalización* of 1982, promoting the effective penetration of the language into all aspects of society, and very significantly into the educational system, through a standardised form of the different dialects known as *Euskera Batua*. One of the most significant principles established was that all students had the right to choose whether to study in Euskera or in Castilian. As a result, some 30 years after the policy was adopted, the percentage of the population that self-identifies as knowing Euskera has almost doubled, rising from 22% to 37.5%.

In purely educational terms, this translates into the co-existence of three different educational models within the CAPV from which, in theory at least, all students from the ages of three to eighteen are free to choose, though in reality on occasions budgetary, geographical and staffing practicalities can limit such choices (as conceivably could politics, too). The theoretically symmetrical options on offer to all are:

- Model A – all subjects are taught in Castilian, with the Basque language itself being the only exception;
- Model B – a hybrid model, with some subjects taught in Euskera and others in Castilian, in theory the split being 50:50;
- Model D – Basque as the vehicular language for all subjects, except for Castilian, taught as a separate subject.

[Note there is no ‘Model C’ as the Basque alphabet lacks the letter ‘C’]

Over the years, Model D, the Basque language model, has steadily gained ground on the others, and as a result in all three territories the proportion of Euskera-Castilian bilinguals has grown across all educational levels, amongst natives, but also amongst immigrants too. If we concentrate on the latter, faced with a free choice of model – though, we repeat, on occasions such a choice might in practice be qualified by the realities on offer – immigrants have consistently been more likely than natives to choose Model A, presumably for obvious linguistic reasons. [After all, to all South American immigrants and to many from other regions too, Castilian is seemingly an easier

option leading in theory to quicker initial integration.] Accordingly, ten years ago (2005–2006), 50% of all immigrants were receiving a Model A (Castilian only) education, while only 23% were registered in model D (*Basabe et al* 2004: 18). Seven years later, Model A has maintained its hegemony among the immigrant population, but Model D has eaten significantly into its lead and is now on 32% (Table 2). Within this overall picture, moreover, there are significant territorial differences, with the advance of Model D much more pronounced in Gipuzkoa, a contrast we will come back to subsequently. To a certain extent the change is perhaps a result of choice not being entirely free, since, as the native population has turned massively toward model D (it now accounts for over 78% of all enrolments in Gipuzkoa), fewer resources are dedicated to Model A, however, perhaps there is also an awareness amongst some immigrant groups that, whatever the initial cost, full integration into Basque society is favoured by the attainment of bilingualism and thus an education in Model D.

**Table 2**

*Percentage enrolled in the different educational models (2012–2013)*

	Immigrants			Natives		
	Model A	Model B	Model D	Model A	Model B	Model D
<b>CAPV</b>	51	17	32	16	21	63
<b>Álava</b>	56	22	22	23	32	45
<b>Bizkaia</b>	55	15	30	19	22	58
<b>Gipuzkoa</b>	42	15	43	9	13	78

## **2. Strategies of acculturation**

The question which interests us is how does the immigrant family react to this situation and to the choice regarding the education of their children and collaterally their relationship with Euskera. It should be borne in mind that, although in theory the relationship between the different models might appear symmetrical, in reality functionally bilingual high-school graduates only tend to emerge from Models B and D, and even more pronouncedly so amongst the immigrant population where the pass rate of EGA (the Basque Proficiency exam) for immigrants schooled in Model A was last year 0%.

The other side of the integration coin, and though this is not our topic it too is important to bear in mind, is the authorities' desire for an intelligent policy of acculturation avoiding where possible situations of ghettoization or diatopical segregation, and the resultant tendency towards discrimination all too readily directed against immigrant groups.

In sociological terms, language skills are regarded as one of the strongest binding factors between an endogroup and an exogroup, allowing for the practical integration of the latter, and conversely, the language choice of the allochthonous group has an effect on the autochthonous population. Every immigrant is necessarily subject to a process of acculturation, regardless of the effective level of ensuing integration, and is exposed to the psychological stress of being in an unfamiliar environment, and all the more so when not knowing all of the languages spoken in the host society. Such linguistic stress is particularly problematical among young people, and for example one third of all immigrant children in the CAPV share no vehicular or communicational language with their teacher, leading to frustration (and stress) for both pupil and teacher. If to such linguistic stress we add the insecurity caused by being uprooted from their homeland and perhaps also from their family, the psychosocial perception of personal failure associated with migration, poor academic results exacerbated by incomprehension, possible xenophobic discrimination both inside and outside the classroom, and frequent social and economic marginalisation, the psychological situation of the immigrant child is often extremely delicate and can lead to poor academic performance.

As well as language acquisition *per se*, the possession of a 'non-standard' accent is regarded as a further stigmatising characteristic, that could furthermore subsequently impact on the academic or professional future of the student. Alongside the psychosocial marginalisation mentioned above, the tendency for people with similar life experiences to socially bond together, further contributes to the feeling of otherness compared to their autochthonous peers, unconsciously paving the way for possible discrimination.

In this context, Euskera, relatively difficult to acquire, can be perceived as yet another factor contributing to stress. Ironically, amongst Romance speaking immigrants, a large sub-set of the immigrant community with many advantages as regards linguistic integration, this 'relative' difficulty is transformed into 'exponentially more difficult'. Before breaking down immigrant responses by region of origin though, in general terms, as we have suggested earlier, the evidence suggests

that immigrant students enrolled in Model A fail to attain basic linguistic competence in the Basque language, as indeed do many of those enrolled in Model B. The option of Model A for the immigrant child, which might initially seem less difficult for the recent arrivals as it avoids the need to acquire (yet) another language, and indeed a relatively difficult one at that, might in reality be storing up problems for the future, and making the long-term full integration of the immigrant child and his/her ability to compete on equal terms in the labour market all the more unlikely.

Nonetheless, the data shows us that the majority of immigrant children are enrolled in Model A (51% across the CAPV), with Model D accounting for only 22% of students in Álava, for example. It is of course impossible to know what were the factors that influenced the decision in each case, and situations vary from one area to another and from one family to another. Nor we should we forget that the immigrant, initially at least, can be disorientated and willing to accept whatever type of schooling is proposed by the authorities, unaware of or reluctant to exercise their right to choose. Moreover, the authorities' suggestion will often be conditioned by geography, availability of places and other such factors. Once a model has initially been assigned, there is then an understandable reluctance to further subject the child to stress by subsequently changing model and consequently of peer group and often of centre, too. Some parents opt for Model D in order to facilitate the long-term full social and linguistic integration of the child, on the other hand those enrolled in Model A might experience an easier short-term integration but in the longer term are exposed to higher-levels of psychosocial stress as a language barrier between themselves and their peers and neighbours is added to the pre-existing tendencies towards margination and discrimination.

Finally, another level on which language and the social integration of immigrants come into contact and when the acculturational strategies of the latter become manifest, is the choice of given name when children are born to immigrant families already installed in the CAPV. It is interesting to see how many immigrant families choose Basque names. In this context, *Nora* and *Unai* are popular amongst immigrants, and we note that, compared to other Basque names (*Garikoitz*, *Aitziber*, etc.), they are relatively short (mono- or bi-syllabic), and both orthographically and phonetically straightforward, avoiding consonantal combinations unique to Basque, or silent 'h's between vowels. Following these same principles, the most common

names of all, amongst both natives and immigrants, are the Basque forms of standard Christian names, such as *Ane*, *Sara* or *Markel*, *Jon*, *Mikel*. The opposite tendency, of reaffirmation of non-Basque identity can also be observed in appearance in 2010 of *Mohamed* on the list of 100 most popular given names in the CAPV. Perhaps in an attempt to reconcile the two desires, interesting hybrids are names that also first appeared in 2010 such as *Aisha* or *Saray*, phonetically close to Basque but also redolent of Arabic culture<sup>3</sup>.

### **3. Diatopical realities: the geography of origin and of residence**

The almost 157,000 immigrants in the CAPV in 2014 can be further broken down by region of origin (Table 3). Across the hole CAPV almost a third of all immigrants hail from South America, another 10% principally from the Caribbean, a quarter each from Africa (mainly the Maghreb) and from Europe (mainly the East) respectively. As regards the individual countries of origin, in 2012, the largest single group resident in the CAPV were Moroccans (11.7%), followed by immigrants from Romania (11.6%), Bolivia (7.7%), Colombia (7.3%), Portugal (5.5%), Algeria (3.9%), Brazil (3.7%), Ecuador (3.7%), Paraguay (3.7%), China (3.4%), together accounting for 61% of the total immigrant population. The figures for school age immigrants vary slightly, though with Morocco again leading the way with 15.2%, followed by Romania (9.9%) and Colombia (9.2%)<sup>4</sup>.

To put these figures into historical context, and to see how the proportions ebb and flow over time and according to the state of the economy, if we go back to 1998, 50% of the immigrant population was of European origin, but particularly of Western European origin, Portugal being the single largest contributor, as the construction industry boomed. By contrast, only 23% was from Latin America (now 40%+), with the Maghreb contributing 12% as opposed to the current 17% (*Moreno Márquez* 2013: 21). By 2005, at the height of the economic and construction boom the Latin American presence had peaked at 48%, before falling back to its current figure of ca. 40%. The opening up of the western European labour market to eastern European members of the European Union from 2007 onwards (above all Romanians in the case of the CAPV and of Spain in general) has had an important effect, as has the collapse of the construction industry and a shift towards the service industry, and especially domestic service (*Moreno Márquez* 2013: 122).

Breaking this down by territories within the CAPV, perhaps the most interesting contrast is between the higher proportion of Africans, and most significantly of Maghrebis in agricultural Álava, and the number of South American immigrants in Bizkaia, particularly highly concentrated in the Bilbao conurbation where they constitute over 50% of the immigrant population. Among the stand-out traits for Gipuzkoa are the much higher proportion of west Europeans, presumably a reflection of its border with France. Nor should we ignore, when observing this data, the phenomenon of immigrant groups gathering together.

**Table 3**

*Immigration in the CAPV broken down by region of origin\**

	CAPV		Álava		Bizkaia		Gipuzkoa	
	Nº	%	Nº	%	Nº	%	Nº	%
Europe East	23,970	15,3	3,519	11,6	12,282	16,2	8,169	16,2
Europe Other	16,523	10,5	2,698	8,9	6,217	8,2	7,608	15,1
Africa Maghreb <sup>5</sup>	26,439	16,9	8,598	28,3	9,829	12,9	8,012	15,9
Africa Other	12,809	8,2	3,073	10,1	7,545	9,9	2,191	4,4
America South	49,835	31,8	8,353	27,5	29,705	39,1	11,777	23,4
America Other	14,531	9,3	1,600	5,3	4,919	6,5	8,012	15,9
Asia & Australasia	12,609	8,0	2,577	8,5	5,446	7,2	4,586	9,1
Total Immigrants	156,716		30,418		75,943		50,355	

What determines the immigrant's choice of educational model? What seems to be more significant in the choice of model is not the geography of origin, but the geography of residence. To illustrate this we will take a diachronic look at the two extreme territories, Gipuzkoa where Model D is dominant among natives, and Álava where Model A is still chosen by most immigrants. We will employ data published by the Basque Government for 2004–2005 (Zapata Solano 2006: 37) and the more recent study by Moreno for 2012–2013 (Table 4).

\* Source: Eustat, 2014.

**Table 4***Changes in the popularity of different educational models\**

Model & year	Natives		immigrants	
	Alava	Gipuzkoa	Alava	Gipuzkoa
A 2004–05	39	12	78	19
A 2012–13	23	9	56	42
B 2004–05	30	22	18	45
B 2012–13	32	13	22	15
D 2004–05	29	66	4	37
D 2012–13	45	78	22	43

The picture that emerges is of the steady advance of Model D in all territories and for all groups. Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly also the case that in all areas immigrants are less likely to enrol in Model D. The corollary of Model D's expansion is necessarily an overall decline in the other models. However, what is striking is that this is not uniform across the two territories. While Model A has suffered most in Alava, Model B has held its own, or even seen a small increase in enrolments amongst both natives and immigrants. On the other hand, in Gipuzkoa Model B has collapsed while Model A has actually seen a substantial increase among immigrants.

This rather uneven development suggests two things. On the one hand the risk of educational ghettoization in Gipuzkoa in Model A. The second conclusion to be drawn from this contrasting response in the two territories is that immigrant decisions have as much to do with the realities on offer than with genuine choice. Otherwise it is hard to reconcile the move away from Model A among immigrants in Álava with the move back towards it in Gipuzkoa. Surely the decisive and distinguishing factor here is not a hypothetical greater degree of integration of the Alavese immigrants; after all, they have generally been slower to embrace Euskera (cf. enrolment in Model D) and have a higher proportion of otherwise linguistically disadvantaged Africans (when compared to South Americans, Romanians or Portuguese) many of them inserted in agricultural contexts and all of them living in an in itself less Vascophone society (i.e. Álava itself). Rather, it would appear that the decisive factor in the contrast between the for-

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\* Sources: Zapata 2004–2005; Moreno 2012–2013



tunes of Models A and B in Álava and Gipuzkoa is simply the collapse of Model B in the latter. As the natives move steadily towards Model D, an increasing number of immigrants follow them, but the collapse of the 'third way' seems to enhance the risk of the ghettoization of others, those in a sense 'left behind' on the path towards bilingualism.

#### **4. Linguistic competence and age: bilingual generations & generating bilinguals**

The concept of linguistic competence refers to the possession of a series of basic linguistic skills which here we are going to apply to the knowledge of Euskera amongst immigrants. Accordingly we can divide the immigrant population into three broad linguistic groups (though this taxonomy is equally applicable to the native population), and in all cases we are assuming competence in Castilian has already been achieved:

- Full Bilinguals, i.e. those who can speak Basque well;
- Passive Bilinguals, i.e. those who can speak Basque with difficulty, but understand it reasonable well; and
- Castilian Monolinguals, i.e. those who speak (virtually) no Basque.

Several different factors determine the level of linguistic competence achieved by an individual. Geography we have already touched upon above, but it is worth reiterating the differences between Gipuzkoa with over 50% of the population fully bilingual, Bizkaia with 25%, and Álava with the lowest proportion of full bilinguals (16%). Obviously this conditions the exposure (both social and educational) of the immigrant to the Basque language.

The dynamics of immigration, and the age at which the individual is first exposed to Euskera is also of great importance, and allow us to enrich our analysis of bilingualism by introducing several different patterns and routes towards bilingualism (with the associated socio-linguistic jargon).

The phenomenon of mixed marriages has not yet been touched upon, but is a social reality which in many occasions sees the offspring of a mixed native-immigrant marriage being brought up as bilinguals, though of course such children would not normally figure as immigrants.

Similar is the case of children born in the CAPV to immigrant couples (again, statistically not classed as immigrants), or those brought

to the region at a very early age and schooled almost exclusively in the Basque Country. Their early introduction to the Basque educational system, particularly if resident in areas with a high incidence of native bilingualism, tend to result in the achievement of full bilingualism, even when Basque is not spoken in the domestic environment. This model is sometimes referred to as *Balanced Bilingualism*. Nor should we forget that in many cases this will effectively be trilingualism.

*Coordinated Bilinguals* are those who pick up their second language slightly later, coming to the CAPV between the ages of 4 and 10, but still nevertheless acquiring a functional level of bilingualism, if of course schooled in Models B or D. Typically this group will have seen one of their parents migrate before the rest of the family follow a few years later when a degree of economic stability has been achieved.

Finally the *Dominant Bilinguals* are those who while competent in both languages, are significantly stronger in one, generally the language spoken in the domestic environment.

Adolescent (11–18 years) immigrants, on the other hand, faced with a number of other psychological problems, tend to struggle much more with the acquisition of the language, and in such cases the attainment of full bilingualism is much less frequent. A lack of conversational skill in Basque enhances any tendency towards a lack of self-confidence only serving to compound their linguistic isolation from Basque-speaking peers.

Finally, among adult immigrants knowledge of anything more than a smattering of Basque is clearly limited. With little access to formal education and little exposure to Euskera in domestic and labour contexts, allied with the cognitive limitations of the adult brain, cases of full bilingualism among adult immigrants are extremely rare, but the extra motivation of some adults, especially if regularly exposed to Basque in the workplace, does lead to some cases of functional (passive) and even occasionally full bilingualism.

## Conclusion

The integration of immigrant students into the Basque educational system is generally regarded as a success, as generations of immigrant bilinguals are now emerging from the system and for the most part the spectre of ghettoization with its concomitant social problems has been evaded in the CAPV. Similarly, the decades long policy of recuperation and promotion of the Basque language is regarded as a qualified

success, though it is a battle far from won as no minority language in a globalised world can afford to rest on its laurels. It is worth adding that the interface between language and education is a singularly complex, fiercely ideological and often highly emotive one. Moreover, we should note that the challenges posed by the exceptional bilingual nature of the CAPV pit not just extra-peninsular immigrants against the 'natives' that we have tended to lump together for convenience, but that amongst these so-called 'natives' are both immigrants from other parts of Spain and long-term residents of the CAPV who are Castilian monolinguals. Finally, the continued economic crisis and the consequent exclusion from the job market of most young people – even more pronounced amongst immigrants- means that enrolment in higher educational levels and professional modules is expanding too, putting further strain on the educational system. Lurking behind these two qualified success stories there is however a risk that the very success of Model D among most of the native population and many immigrants too ends up creating precisely the form of educational ghettoization and social marginalisation among those who reject it that all participants have been keen to avoid.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> INE Cifras de Población a 1 de julio de 2014 [http://www.ine.es/inebmenu/mnu\\_cifraspob.htm](http://www.ine.es/inebmenu/mnu_cifraspob.htm).

<sup>2</sup> All these figures from Eustat for 2014, which vary slightly from the INE data [http://www.eustat.es/estadisticas/tema\\_159/opt\\_0/temas.html#axzz3WnbsZbyE](http://www.eustat.es/estadisticas/tema_159/opt_0/temas.html#axzz3WnbsZbyE).

<sup>3</sup> Source. Internet resource: [http://www.eustat.es/estadisticas/tema\\_3/opt\\_0/temas.html#axzz3WnbsZbyE](http://www.eustat.es/estadisticas/tema_3/opt_0/temas.html#axzz3WnbsZbyE).

<sup>4</sup> Data from INE quoted by *Moreno Márquez* 2013: 122.

<sup>5</sup> Algeria, Lybia, Mauritania, Morroco and Tunisia.

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## **PART 3. THE CHALLENGES FACING MULTI-ETHNIC RUSSIA**

### **ON RUSSIAN IDENTITY IN HISTORY AND MODERNITY**

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In this article I would like to briefly touch on some essential points in the development of Russian identity.

After the baptism of the Rus in 988, the bulk of the population gradually embraced Orthodoxy and became homogeneous in religious terms. With the formation of a Russian centralized state from the late 15th to early 16th centuries the ethnic and national interests of its inhabitants were perceived to lie in unity. The very concept of the motherland coinciding with the political boundaries of the Russian state underlined this and in this period the ethnonym *Russian* pointed to the ethnicity of the bulk of the population: a united people of the same faith within a single state.

Perhaps dating back to this period four main components constantly interacted in Russian consciousness – religion, nationality, ethnicity and society. Throughout Russian history, the term *Russian* traditionally had not so much an ethnic, but a religious character, and was virtually synonymous with Orthodoxy. This was indeed reflected in the Russian language itself. For example, in Vladimir Dahl's 1860s Dictionary of the Russian language which collated a mass of material descriptive of Russian usage, this equivalence was made clear: Russian as a synonym for Orthodox Russian people; the Orthodox emperor was similarly the Russian Tsar; the Orthodox faith was the Russian faith; and even God was necessarily a Russian God. Consequently Russian people self-identified as a Christian nation (*krestyane*), but moreover distinctive ethnic environments also contributed to the interchangeability of the concepts of Russianness and Orthodoxy – the Lezghins, Georgians, Tatars all referring to the «Russian faith», the «Russian God», etc. Finally, we might add that the identification of

the notions *Russian* and *Orthodox* took such firm root, because the number of representatives of non-Orthodox denominations within the Russian ethnic group was minimal.

It should be noted that Church Slavonic was for many centuries virtually a second language within Russia. Many linguists have even considered it the most important, given its early influence in the formation of literary styles, and its subsequent contributions to Russian common language and its many dialects. Conversely, when quantifying literacy, those who read only Church Slavonic were often included amongst the illiterates, lacking any education in civil literacy. On expeditions as recent as ten to fifteen years ago, one encountered this situation with, for example, a grandmother, who was considered illiterate, replying confidently to the question of whether she knew Church Slavonic: «Oh yes, that's what I read».

This clear awareness of belonging to the Orthodox faith manifested itself both in peacetime (the audience at village meetings was habitually referred to as *Orthodox*), and – even more so – during periods of war and military conflict. During the latter (and in the history of Russia it is difficult to identify peaceful periods lasting more than 10 years), it was not so much ethnic identity, but rather the sense of belonging to the Orthodox world that gave people a strong common historical destiny.

Thus, within the Russian psyche until the early 20th it was not national but religious affinity that stood in the foreground. Russians have seen in both Greeks and Vlachs close and trustworthy peoples, and similarly with Serbs and Bulgarians, while “Papist” (i.e. Catholic) Poles were regarded as utterly alien, little significance being given to their belonging to the Slavic world.

Russian religious consciousness has always been closely connected with state and national consciousness. Moreover, this state consciousness did not belong exclusively to the ruling class, but almost every Russian perceived himself as belonging «from time immemorial» to a strong state. And not just a strong one, but an Orthodox one too, with the state intended to protect the true faith and be its mainstay. Consequently, Russian enemies in different wars were in the eyes of the people regarded as infidels, *basurmane*, even when belonging to the Christian world, such as the French in 1812. Furthermore, the consciousness of personal involvement in the state represents an important component of Russian national identity, hence the highly developed sense of patriotic duty in most of the Russian

military, the principle of educating children accordingly and the ideal of military heroism, all combining to develop a strong Russian state consciousness, above all with regards to the key questions of the army and the defence of the homeland.

Drawing on historical folklore, early woodcut literature and other sources up until the mid – 19th century, being Russian meant being faithful to the Orthodox Church and the Tsar. By the end of the century society had become somewhat more secular, and the main characteristics of Russia were regarded as its size, wealth and military strength, though still alongside the Orthodox character of the state. Russia's strength lay (and lies) in the people who inhabit it. To illustrate this we will now quote some direct statements extracted from a late 19th century survey of ordinary people's life in southern Russia: a typical Russian was characterised as «brave» and «smarter, knows how to fight, get around [and is] more agile». Other significant comments include «[there is] no faith stronger than ours», «the Russian people would die for each other, but still would not surrender to the enemy».

Thus, this quest for Russian identity repeatedly leads us to the fields of Orthodoxy, of belonging to a rich and powerful country, and of a people who, though perhaps not highly educated (until much later), nonetheless showed themselves to be selfless, generous, brave and united.

Naturally, this is a reflection of folk consciousness and tends towards generalisation and only the most salient features, however, it is nonetheless valid on that very level. With regard to the genuine qualities of Russia, here we are missing in my opinion, some of the more authentic qualities of the Russian people and particularly the polarized nature of Russian character, capable of harbouring completely opposite traits: kindness with cruelty, emotional subtlety with crudeness, generosity with pettiness, and self-effacement with national pride.

Pre-revolutionary Russia was, of course, an empire incorporating more than a hundred and fifty different nations and nationalities. The Pan-Russian census of 1897 recorded 146 different nationalities, most of which had experienced centuries of interaction, adaptation and interethnic integration. Binding all this together was *Rossiyskaya* identity, a less overtly ethnic and more political and imperial Russian identity, although also pronouncedly Orthodox in character. This *Rossiyskiy* patriotism played a decisive role in people's lives and is the context of the well-known formula coined by Sergei Semenovitch Uvarov, tsar Nicholas I's Minister of Education: «Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality». A vast and complex array of historical

and ethnographic sources consolidates the idea of a Russian ethnic group within Russian society underpinning national consciousness. Conscription, is a good example of the interaction between the main components, promoted as it was under the formula «For the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland».

Monarchism was another essential manifestation of the centuries-old Russian consciousness. It was based, above all, on the perception of the Tsar as having been anointed by God, indeed, he appeared before his subjects, themselves God's chosen people, as the incarnation of Orthodox Russianness. And until the beginning of the 20th century, when traditional views of the social structures became heavily eroded, the state united the peasants' belief in the monarchy.

In everyday life at local level, on the other hand, peasants considered their own communities and the Cossack circles as the most equitable social organisms; notions of democratic self-government at local level thus coexisting with the acceptance of the monarchical form of government. The concept of civic nationalism had first materialised under Peter I, who justified the existence of *the people of Russia*, and for the first time coined the category *Rossiyanе* (i.e., "all citizens of the Russia"). The concept further evolved in the subsequent history of *Rossiyskaya* nationalism, and the essentially synonymous relationship between *Russian*, *Rossiyskaya* and *Orthodox* persisted until the beginning of the 20th century, and indeed for many Russians still exists today.

Russian national consciousness was closely connected with historical memory: in virtually every region, local history intertwined in people's minds with national, personal and group memory, fitting into the context of the history of the country, the so-called *Big History*. Despite some local and religious specificity, throughout the area of Russian settlement the same basic range of historical events and facts remained in the memory. Their interpretation, if it varies at all, is very limited. Centuries old common historical representations have contributed to the ethnic and cultural consolidation of the Russian people, and to the strengthening and development of their identity.

In the 20th century – a century of social disasters, which saw the destruction of the secular order and attempts to create a «new historical community, the Soviet people» – people's views on society changed, particularly regarding the power, role and character of the state. The implementation of various reforms (in this case, it is not so important whether we term it revolution or reform) intentionally



created misconceptions about preceding history. A new culture was needed, so the old one was declared unsuitable on all fronts. Accordingly, the construction of a «new society» was painted in shades of rampant social optimism. In the Soviet period, the idea of Russianness was deformed because a unified national consciousness posed a danger to the communist authorities and it was consequently expelled from all spheres of public life.

The Bolshevik model cut artificial boundaries across national administrative units. Initially presented as a symbol of national equality and justice, national and state units soon became a tool in the artificial politicization of ethnicity and the short-lived dream of exporting this model abroad. The communist policy of the Sovietization of the «multinational people» almost led to the destruction of Russian history (except for its most heroic aspects) and culture (with the exception of some cornerstone achievements, for the most part secular). The Russian language was employed by the state as an instrument of Sovietization and accordingly all Soviet people were referred to as *Russians*, although, in fact, they should have been referred to as *Soviets*. What was then termed and is still perceived by many as «Russification» was actually «Sovietization», and simultaneously undermined Russian ethnicity and (traditional) ways of life. Over the entire period of existence of the USSR, Russian numerical superiority within the leadership of the USSR did not lead to the promotion of Russian ethnicity, because the guiding principle was instead Soviet identity, not any ethnicity as such. Despite the seemingly natural Russian dominance in most areas of life in the Soviet Union, in fact, Russian identity *per se* was actually excluded from the national perspective. The notorious concept of «big brother» was in fact inverted in the sense that Russianness became merely an «agglutinating element» for the multinational «Soviet people», their own national identities being diluted as a result.

However, progress was made in terms of the patriotic and civic (again, in the Soviet sense) consolidation of society. The Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 revealed new depths to this consolidation, which subsequently became one of the key factors in the eventual victory. Since 1945, rhetoric referring to the «Soviet people» has placed the emphasis not only on the brotherhood of nations, but also on their civic unity, and it played an important role in the integration of the concept of the «multinational Soviet state» and the corresponding «friendship of peoples». The concept of the «Soviet people», in use since 1930, was enshrined in the Programme of the CPSU in 1961,

thus stating the existence of a new historical community of people of different nationalities but with common features. It was used to characterize the citizens of the USSR as a political whole, the idea of Soviet patriotism related to national loyalty.

In the second half of the 1970s there was a return to the strengthening of Russian language and culture. However, once again, this does not mean that *russkost* (ethnic Russianness) stood out among other ethnoidentities. For the authorities it was still important to avoid the identification of Russians as colonizers, and as a result, the opportunity for Russian self-expression was again confined to supraethnic institutions – social-class, international or soviet.

By the end of the Soviet period, between 60 and 80% of the population of the various republics called the USSR their birthplace, showing themselves committed to a supra-ethnic Russian community. According to the 1989 census, 30% Russians in the RSFSR self-defined as Soviets, and in Moscow and Leningrad the figure was 38%. In December 1990, according to polls, between 70 and 80% of the population in Russia itself and other Russian union republics perceived themselves primarily as citizens of the USSR, while the representatives of the titular ethnic groups in the union republics put their republic or country in first place.

The results of the referendum on the fate of the Soviet Union in March 1991, despite criticisms of the wording of the questions, afford us clear evidence of the Soviet people's thinking. For the majority, the principle feeling was a belief in the unified common destiny of the Fatherland, an idea no doubt held very dearly by most citizens. It is no accident that to many Russians, regardless of political affiliation, the collapse of the Soviet Union was perceived as a personal defeat. The explosion of ethnic separatism, the so-called parade of sovereignties, on the break-up of the USSR's largely determined the fate of a single state. The «national question» was the single most important factor behind the phenomenon that has already been designated as the «greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century».

With the collapse of the USSR, many people have lost their habitual sense of themselves as citizens of a great empire, and ethnic tensions have been exacerbated. The identity crisis of the until now Soviet system spawned a vacuum in the spiritual realm, and has led to the search for a new identity, which I think is impossible to adequately fulfil without access to traditional and provenly historical forms of people's previous lives. In the public sphere, there is an acute need for integrative ideas. As such, increasingly people are turning to eth-

no-national and religious traditions, and to the historical heritage.

Currently, ethnic Russians constitute 81% of the population of the Russian Federation (111 out of 143 million people, according to the 2010 census). In the post-Soviet period, the Russian population increased as a result of ethnic Russian refugees and immigrants from the former Soviet republics, in which some 26 million Russians had been cut off. Furthermore, among the ethnically non-Russians, another 15.8 million consider Russian their native language.

Given the undoubted importance for the proper functioning of society of understanding the population's sense of self-identification, we posed the question in a survey of the inhabitants of the Ryazan region (though the results were confirmed in other regions). Conducted at the beginning of the 21st century by scientists of the Department of the Russian People of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, to the question «What do you consider yourself?» we offered a series of options: Russian, *Rossiyanе*, Orthodox, a Ryazan resident, or an inhabitant of a certain village, city. Mindful of the fact that the consciousness of the people is, as a rule, multi-level, and that different kinds of consciousness can coexist, respondents were asked to rank their responses in order of importance.

According to the responses given in first position, the main category of self-awareness was given as Russian (56%), followed by Orthodox (24%), *Rossiyanе* (10.7%), Ryazan residents (8%), and finally as inhabitants of a particular village or town (1.3%).

As their second option people voted for: 38.8% Orthodox, 26.5% Russian, 16.3% Ryazan residents, 14.3% *Rossiyanе*, and 4% of a particular village, town etc. Thus most of the respondents at the beginning of the new millennium put forward first their ethnicity and then their religious affiliation. As shown by other, more recent polls, against the background of perceived stabilization in the country, an increasing proportion of people, particularly young people, are calling themselves *Rossiyanе*.

Before the revolution of 1917, the term *Rossiyanе* was restricted mainly to formal occasions, and was virtually synonymous with Russian, embracing Great Russians (Velikorossy), Ukrainians (Malorossy) and Belarusians (Belorusy). Therefore, the term *Rossiyanе* had primarily an ethnic sense. After 1917, both *Rossiyanе* and the phrase *Rossiyskiy narod* ("the people of Russia") disappeared from the political lexicon, for the same reason that the word *Rossiyskaya* (*Empire*) was removed from the name of the state. Nowadays, the

term *Rossiyanе* has primarily (and indeed only) a territorial value. The recontextualization of the term, of course, can be regarded as a statement of civic identity. Nevertheless, the problem persists of finding the optimal mechanism of interaction between *russkost* (Russianness in an ethnic sense) and *rossiyskost* (Russianness in a non-ethnic sense), in which they can complement and support each other.

With the predominantly secular character of modern Russian culture, only gradually has the Orthodox church and the confessional term *Orthodox* regained their former importance. Since the early 1990s, Orthodoxy has, however, been of particular importance as a core cultural symbol of national identity. This change in the institutional and socio-cultural role of the Russian Orthodox Church was on the one hand partially determined by state policy, but was also a result of the civil and ethnic identity of the Russians, as the majority began to identify with the Orthodox Church and Russian cultural and historical traditions.

According to the results of a large-scale nationwide survey conducted by the Institute of Public Planning in 2006 (N = 15,000 people), 61,9% of *Rossiyanе* call themselves Orthodox. In another series of nationwide surveys carried out in Russia by the Sociology of Religion (2004, N = 1476 people) and Socio-Political Research (2006, N = 1497 people) institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Orthodox population was calculated at respectively 72% and 73% of all Russians. With so many polls and quantitative indicators, it is undeniable that Orthodoxy acts as one of the bases for the formation of the collective identities of modern Russians.

Illustrative in this respect is the opinion of one of our informants, an 83-year-old man from a small Russian town: «We must abide by custom. Being Russian, means to be Orthodox. My parents were believers. Whether there is a God or not, we do not know, but we are given destiny – we must believe. It was not invented by us, we did not start afresh! I do not believe, but I am Orthodox because I was baptized (*krescheny*)» (recorded in 2002). The official position of the Russian Orthodox Church echoes this interpretation: a baptised person is by definition Orthodox, indeed ‘baptised’ means Orthodox. This is why we see such high (and probably surprisingly high to many people) indicators of the Orthodox population in our quantitative surveys.

It is much harder to grasp the qualitative changes. Religious sentiment is inherently secretive. Most believers are not inclined to publicly display it, even if it does not entail any negative consequences

for them, while believers living in an otherwise confessional environment do not, as a rule, want to stand out either. Decades of militant atheism in the USSR have left people fearing persecution for religious affiliation. Several generations of our countrymen were deprived of the opportunity to participate fully in religious life (in the scientific use of the firmly established concept of «unconfessed Orthodoxy» in relation to the faithful of the Soviet era), and today Orthodoxy continues to be a «new faith» for many Russian citizens.

Within Russian Orthodoxy the concept of «churched» (*vozerkovlennyye*) applies to people who regularly visit their parish church, confess to the priest, follow religious precepts and thus are believers in the full sense of the word. According to various estimates, they account for about 3-4% (according to the most optimistic calculations as much as 10%) of the population. As for the rest, who call themselves Orthodox, it is usually ordinary people who identify themselves as culturally Orthodox through the maintenance of the external attributes of Orthodoxy: displaying icons at home, wearing crosses, lighting candles on their rare visits to a temple etc. All this gives them a sense of belonging to their own people, belonging to the Russian world.

Probably, we can say that the fact that the majority of modern Russians (including both those lacking faith and even some atheists) identify themselves with Orthodoxy is not a matter of faith (for now, at least), nor even of ideology, but primarily one of identity, an ethno-national marker. In Russia people approve of the sentiment that the Orthodox faith remains a national symbol and a factor of consolidation for Russians, both within Russia and beyond its borders. The Russian Orthodox Church, in turn, emphasizing the supranational character of the Church, at the same time emphasises that «the Christian is called on to preserve and promote national culture and national identity».

Recent research confirms that Russians have retained many traditional features in their consciousness and mentality. In everyday life *russkost* (ethnic Russianness) in pre-revolutionary Russia was elusive, practically invisible. Such amorphous national peculiarities somehow tended to disappear in moments of adversity and situations of national crisis. These days, Russians can be characterized as having an underdeveloped sense of nationalism, in the sense of persistently and consistently desiring the cohesion and unity of the nation. Hence, the mobilization of national identity is necessary, if only because it excludes marginalisation and loss of ethnic consciousness.

Unfortunately, in today's mass consciousness the phenomenon of

nationalism is viewed only from one perspective and almost always receives a negative assessment. In fact, nationalism is equated with chauvinism, which is based on the preaching of national exclusiveness. All the more urgent then is the current need for the adoption of a healthy nationalism, based on the sense of belonging to the nation, love for its people and veneration of the national traditions.

The formation of self-consciousness is an ongoing, lengthy and complex process. Just as many aspects of Soviet identity have survived, so before them were preserved many characteristics of Russianness. Orthodoxy has returned to the forefront of people's consciousness, and patriotism alongside it. The concept of the «new Russia» is a shell after all, a play on words. Hence the appeal to historical heritage, characteristic of the public sphere in recent years, is absolutely natural. More and more Russian people are aware that the consciousness of the people cannot be inferred by the laboratory, it is forged over centuries and is based on traditional values and historical memory. What is it that, despite all of today's disunity, really binds together Russians? In many ways – a sense of pride in past heroic and cultural achievements, and in the names and figures of great Russians. A good example was the 2008 television project «Name of Russia» which enjoyed wide public resonance as 4.5 million viewers voted on the most important figures from Russian history, bipolar forces were reconciled in their interest in the project, if not in the specifics of their highly politicised choices. The strengthening of the traditional components of Russian *Rossiyskaya* identity will undoubtedly contribute to the consolidation of a positive identity, which Russians need so much. In this respect, as a rule, the positions of the elite and of ordinary citizens coincide: an attractive image of the country is important for all the inhabitants of the metropolis and for their compatriots abroad.

## THE CHALLENGES OF SELF-DETERMINATION

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The majority of the existing states of the modern World are heterogenic in ethnic, cultural, linguistic and confessional terms and, above all, with regard to the racial composition of their population. That is why the elaboration of effective methods of managing such heterogenic societies is an important and relevant theme. During the last few years, rather panicky declarations about the collapse of the strategy of multiculturalism in Europe have been heard. In my opinion, they are something of an exaggeration, correct perhaps with regard to specific unsuccessful policies, rather than in reference to the idea of multiculturalism itself.

While wishing to distance myself from any Russian-nationalist chauvinism, I would recommend the study of the history of Russia, which formed and developed for more than one thousand years as a multicultural community. Sovietologist and, now, «Russiologist» critical literature is full of philippics about the nationalities policy in the Russian Empire and in the USSR. This critique may seem valid in the light of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, but I would disagree with such an interpretation. The main causes of this epochal and dramatic collision lay in the field of politics, enforced by genuine ethno-political problems<sup>1</sup>. However, I would disagree that either the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union were the «prisons of peoples». Ethnic tolerance, cooperation and trust were important keystones of Russian statehood (though certainly there were exceptions in some periods).

«Self-determination» seems to be one of the most contradictory and even mysterious categories of international law and political practice. On one hand, it symbolizes the ideals of justice, freedom and democracy, on the other hand, the realization of this principle often leads to conflicts and wars. The paradigm of self-determination, being highly politicized, is actively used in various political situations, and therefore it becomes extremely difficult to convince interested parties of the need for finding a balanced and substantiated approach as to its clear categorization.

Another obstacle for the conceptualization of the principle of

self-determination is the complexity of the problem from the point of view of both the contradictions within the principle itself and the possibility of its practical realization. When we pass from the declaration of the right to the self-determination to the scrupulous analysis of the reality, numerous difficult questions emerge. What is the essence of the right to self-determination? Who can be acknowledged as its possessor, and by whom? How can it be considered within the context of the relationship of individual and collective rights? Are there adequate mechanisms for the realization of the right to self-determination? Is there any limitation on this right, and, if so, by whom can it be limited? Should it be a priority of national laws or international juridical norms to act in the implementation of the principle of self-determination? Without the answer to these and other associated questions, it is not possible to transfer the principle of the self-determination from the sphere of beautiful ideas into the sphere of practical jurisprudence and policy.

Before undertaking the analysis of some of these problems, I wish to emphasize that I mean mainly the territorial-political forms of self-determination (formation of independent states or self-governing autonomies), and also the institutionalization of ethnic communities as minorities, indigenous peoples, etc. and the assignment to them of lawful privileges. I do not consider them the basic or even sufficient forms of self-determination – quite the opposite. Nowadays it is more common to make the satisfying of ethno-cultural demands the priority and, simultaneously, to decrease the level of politicizing of ethnic extraterritorial forms of self-determination, such as «national-cultural autonomy» and other ways of providing for the self-organization of people promoting their own cultural, linguistic, and religious initiatives. However, in reality, that same political self-determination often remains at the heart of political conflict over ethnicity.

### **The origin and evolution of the Paradigm of Self-determination**

There is a strong temptation to connect the idea of self-determination with people's inherent belief in the “fundamental” rights of the individual. In fact, some of international legal documents declare that self-determination relates to a number of such unquestionable rights. Thus, in the «International Covenant about the economic, social and cultural rights» and in the «International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights», approved by the General Assembly of the UN



on the same day, on December 16, 1966, it is said: «All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development»<sup>2</sup>.

However, one should bear in mind the vagueness and discrepancy of the declarations of United Nations about self-determination, and also that that these declarations were elaborated after the formation of this organization, though the UN Charter does contains a mention of this principle. Among other aims of this organization, the Charter declares: «...To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples...» (UN Charter).

The essential aspect of the problem is that, in terms of self-determination, the individual's rights are usually excluded as a central point from international legal documents and post-War political rhetoric. Though the right of individuals to self-determination is specified in some such documents, its relationship with group rights to the self-determination is not explained (Abashidze 1995: 152).

I believe that it is precisely in individual rights and individual choice that the best chance of group self-determination lies. The priority of the individual's rights is caused not only by the recognition of an individual as the main value in a democratic society, but also by the assumption that only this approach leads to the realization of collective rights. Here my position comes into contradiction with, for instance, an early UN Resolution of 1952, which declares «...the right of peoples and nations to self-determination is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights» (UN General 1952).

Of course, no principle can be raised to the absolute, that leads only to absurdity. For instance, probably the most radical and, simultaneously, unrealistic principle in the approach to the problem of individual rights was formulated by the outstanding ideologist of anarchism prince P.A. Kropotkin at the end of 19th century. He wrote: «... Другими словами – никакого *навязывания* отдельному лицу каких бы то ни было действий под угрозой общественного наказания или же сверхъестественного мистического возмездия: общество ничего не требует от отдельного лица, чего это лицо само не согласно добровольно в данное время исполнять»<sup>3</sup>. [см. концевую сноску]. An opposite approach is rather characteristic of radical ethno-nationalistic movements and in general of «ethnic romanticism». It consists in admitting the priority of the «holy interests

of a nation» over individual rights.

Therefore, it seems rather an attractive approach, consisting of a call to search for the optimum combination of individual and group rights (См., например: *Tishkov* 1997: 162), though it seems that until now nobody has found the best way of realizing this approach.

Concerning the history of the paradigm of self-determination, it transpires that rather than being connected with certain allegedly original and eternal values of human rights, it was in fact the result of specific political circumstances.

The origin of the category of self-determination dates back to no later than the end of the 18th century. Historians trace its first appearance to 1792, when a plebiscite legalized the inclusion of the Vatican territories (Avignon and the County of Venaissin) into the jurisdiction of France (Право на самоопределение 2015). However, the real outbreak of self-determination ideas came with the nationalistic movements in Europe of the second half of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries, primarily in the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. These ideas were incorporated by socialists into their programs, though L. Walker argues that it was K. Marx who invented the principle of self-determination (*Walker* 1991). However, in 1896 the right of national minorities to self-determination was adopted by the Congress of the Second International (The Nationalities 1990). Two years later, this norm was included into the Program of the Russia Social-Democratic Party (RSDRP) at its First Congress and enshrined at the Second Congress in 1903. For decades, it became the basic paradigm of the Party and her successors (Russia Communist Party, All-union Communist Party, and Communist Party of the USSR).

It is necessary to stress Lenin's famous formula of the self-determination of oppressed peoples as a right until separation from the «mother» state and the formation of their own states. Lenin explained his position quite unambiguously: for him the «national-liberation movements» of colonial and subordinate peoples could be compatible with the aims of World Revolution (*Lenin* 1918). It is important for understanding Lenin's point of view that he regarded a right to self-determination (in his «extremist» interpretation) as a purely tactical measure. In fact, Lenin considered the right to secession as an «expedient right».

Another political leader who argued for the right of self-determination was the American president T.W. Wilson. His motive in this regard was the political and economic desire of the American estab-

lishment to restructure Europe after the First World War. This idea was limited mainly to the territories of the Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires and some other parts of Europe, but also made reference to overseas colonies, though this part of his famous «Fourteen Points» was rather vague (Speech to the Congress 1918).

The next large wave of «self-determination» arrived in the 1940–1960s, when colonies and dependent countries achieved independent statehood. During this period, the basic documents of the United Nations concerning the principle of self-determination were drawn up. As in all previous cases, it was not the different peoples themselves, for the most part, who decided whether they should achieve self-determination, but the leading world powers. As a result, many potential areas for interethnic and interstate conflict emerged in Asia and Africa.

Finally, it is possible to speak about the last wave of «self-determination», connected with the collapse of the USSR. Here I have put this term in quotes because the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a result of the separate arrangement between the political elites of three republics within the USSR – Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia [*Belaja Vezha Agreements* of the 8 December, 1991 (Belaja Vezha Agreements 1991: 228)].

The liquidation of the Soviet Union was not assured by any democratic procedures. Indeed, the presidents of the three republics who signed the *Agreements* absolutely ignored the will of the vast majority of Soviet citizens who voted for the preservation of the USSR in the referendum of 17 March, 1991 [89.9% of those who took part in it] (About the results of a referendum 1991). Thus, most of the Soviet republics were actually forced to «self-determinate». There were, however, several exceptions – Georgia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (and, to a degree, Moldova), – where in previous years mass movements for secession had formed. The circumstances of the collapse of the USSR and the appearance of post-Soviet states serve as another and in this case particularly convincing example of how, under the slogan of people's self-determination, ethnic elites achieved their own political and economic goals<sup>4</sup>.

Of course, we should also mention the movements for independence or, at least, wide-ranging autonomy among ethnic entities, which are often regarded as «internal colonies», such as the North American Indians, the Scots of the Great Britain, the Basques and Catalans of Spain, the Francophone population of Canada, the Kurds of Turkey and Iraq, the Tamils of Sri Lanka, and many others.

## Competitors of the right to self-determination

There is a conglomeration of slogans, emotions and myths surrounding the idea of self-determination. It is important to verify this idea from the point of view of the reality, and the instrumentalisation of the assumed mechanisms of implementation of the principle.

One of the essential, maybe the most essential, question in the context of the problems being discussed is who are the potential applicants for the right to self-determination? If we generalize from existing approaches, it is possible to talk in terms of certain groups which differ from the general population of a state according to their ethno-cultural characteristics. Different international and national legal documents, specialists in the realm of jurisprudence and political science, politicians, the ideologists of national movements, and pamphleteers refer to peoples, nations, ethnic, national, racial or confessional groups and minorities. The core of the problem lies in the absence in any international legal documents of clear definitions (or even attempts to make such definitions) of the notions of «peoples», «nations», «ethnic entities» and others that are used in such documents.

The least clear and most discussed notions are those of «peoples» and «nations». The term «peoples» could be correlated with any community, real or «imagined» (according to the terminology of B. Anderson). «Nation» is an even vaguer notion. The problem stems from the terminology and ideology of the early socialists of the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries. From their point of view, the term *nations* (or more precisely, «nationalities», «national movements», «national-liberation movements», etc.) was regarded, primarily, in the context of the right of ethnic minorities within the Great Powers to sustain or achieve their cultural and linguistic demands up to the point of secession. The ethnic interpretation of nationhood was common in the scientific and political discourse of Soviet and the earliest Post-Soviet times. This tradition is now being erased under the influence of Western publications and the works of some Russian scholars who argue for the «de-ethnisation» of all communities which are associated with the notion of *nation*.

Concluding the debate about the concept of *nation* in the context of the problem of self-determination, it is necessary to draw the conclusion that the *nation* must not be considered identical to the *ethnos* (though in their theoretical constructions scientists are, of course, free to do anything which is warranted). These two different social entities

cannot in principle -because of their typology, origin and functions – be identified with each other. The cases of full coincidence between nation and ethnos are exceptions and, most likely, rather hypothetical, since in contemporary times there are no purely monoethnic states, indeed, there have been no such political bodies at any time. Even the primitive and archaic societies known to ethnologists were not mono-ethnic, because they often included foreigners, for instance, prisoners of war adopted into the community. As regards contemporary views, based on democratic values (if they are in fact democratic), the presence in a population of even a single citizen ethnically different from the majority necessarily excludes such a state from qualification as an ethno-nation state. All these considerations lead to the conclusion that nations cannot be regarded as the unquestioned subject of the right of self-determination.

This version of the attribution of the right to the self-determination of peoples is to be found in the documents of different international organizations. The linking of the right to self-determination with nations and peoples proves unsuccessful, not only because there are different conceptual approaches to this category, but also because the corresponding fundamental notions, determining the subjects of this right, prove illegible or at least ambiguous in their content. Within a legal framework, there is no room for half-words or for variability in the interpretation of basic terms, and the right to self-determination must have the status of a juridical right, and not some other more abstract sense. Thus, neither nations nor peoples can be acknowledged as the unconditional carriers of the right to self-determination.

### **Ethnic Self-determination**

Let us now lay aside terminological nuances and pay attention to the dominant tendency within the context of the discourse around self-determination: usually it is ethnic entities that are placed at the centre of the problem. Among such entities are *ethnoses*, *ethnic communities*, *ethnic groups*, *ethnic minorities* etc. – all kinds of real or «statistical» human collectives, to which in one way or another it is possible to apply the definition «ethnic». However, it is a very pertinent question, why precisely ethnic groups are acknowledged as the natural aspirants to self-determination and, more generally, to special rights?

This question was actively discussed in the Soviet/Russian scientific literature of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Even today frequent-

ly, one hears that specific ethnic rights follow on from certain eternal humanitarian values, which are to be preserved, by any possible means, as if they were museum exhibits or rare animals included on the endangered list, rather than ever-mutating human communities.

Let us, however, make one additional assumption, after recognizing ethnic rights, including ethnic self-determination, as fitting into the category of hypothetical «natural rights». Then a question arises: what particular groups of people can be considered as «ethnic» ones? None of the existing and competing concepts located in the range of the Soviet «theory of ethnos» – «primordialism» – «constructivism» can provide satisfactory and indisputable answers to questions which deal with of the category of *ethnicity*.

If scientists are engaged in theorizing for its own sake, then the implications for society are limited. However, if they aspire to publicise their conclusions as absolute truths and to impose them on society as instrumental methods for the solution of its problems, then the weaknesses inherent in any theory become clear. The reality is that today we lack indisputable scientific criteria for the identification of *ethnic* communities.

If we consider our own society, then the classical signs of *ethnos* (as well as of a *nation*), as defined by the apologists of the above named «theory of ethnos», can be found, for example, in associations of punks, bikers, football fans, or even in the virtual association of Internet users. They all demonstrate the intergenerational transfer of tradition, special (sub-)cultures, special languages (jargon), their own self-consciousness and identity. It gets even worse if we try to make similar comparisons from the point of view of radical constructivism which regarded ethnicity as a purely artificial phenomenon marked by self-identification. I intentionally provide such exotic examples in order to show fundamental deficiencies in contemporary anthropological theory.

### **Illusions and defects of the idea of self-determination**

One additional series of problems is connected with the criteria and the procedures of self-determination. When and under what conditions is it possible to be confident that *self*-determination occurs?

Some foreign countries accumulated specific experience in working out approaches to designated problems, however, such experiences tend to confirm the complexity of such problems rather than provide convincing and abundant examples of their successful solution.

It is necessary to emphasize that in this case the discussion deals not with the «classical» period of self-determination of the post-war period of decolonization, but with the 1970–1990s. During this period, the political map of the World stabilized, and questions of self-determination passed from the plane of relations between colonies and mother countries into the sphere of relations within states.

True, those aspiring to ethnic self-determination today often substantiate their requirements with the argument that they are in exactly the same position as colonies – «internal colonies». Thus, for example, during the period preceding the break-up of the USSR, ideologists of practically all ethno-national movements, who argued for one or another form of political self-determination, declared that their republics were under the colonial rule of Moscow. It is obvious that similar assertions are no more than the ideological posturing of separatism and have nothing in common with the well-known United Nations reports about decolonization.

Thus, today the problem of self-determination concerns primarily the status, rights and living conditions of ethnic groups in independent states. If the decolonization criteria are sufficiently clear, then under contemporary conditions one of the main problems consists in elaborating special mechanisms to identify the will of the population.

Almost never does an ethnic group speak as a conscious, active and monolithic champion in favour of anything, including political independence. As a rule, this role is played by the so-called «ethnic elites» which claim to express the interests of the whole group. Actually they themselves formulate these interests and attempt to inject them into the consciousness of their «tribesmen», although it is obvious that an ethnic community cannot have absolutely common interests in all spheres of social life because of the social and, often, cultural heterogeneity of modern societies, no matter how small. The requirement of self-determination usually proves not to be a reflection of the general interests or the concentrated will of the ethnos, but rather a falsification coming from an ethnic elite.

As soon as ethnic groups are internally differentiated, then a question arises: if its members disagree on the expediency of self-determination or on its desirable forms, then how can the different voices be reconciled as an expression of the tendency of the ethnos towards political independence. In such cases, it is necessary to contemplate appropriate democratic procedures, such as referendums. Similar procedures make sense when dealing with the most important questions

in the life of a society and it is important to discover the personal choice of citizens. However, the self-determination of an ethnos indicates something different: firstly, the development, or more precisely, the construction of a certain unanimous opinion, and secondly, the secession of the ethnos or the territorial-political detachment within the framework of the state. But this creates many problems.

One of the deficiencies in the idea of ethnic self-determination in the form of secession consists, no matter how paradoxically it sounds, in the unattainability of this idea. History provides no examples of the construction of (mono)ethnic states through self-determination. In any state, there is the population which differs by ethnic origin from the majority, and which does not want to separate from the mother country. Characteristic examples during the so called «parade of sovereignties» before the dissolution of the Soviet Union<sup>5</sup> include Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Gagauziya, Transnistria. In such cases the sequential building of an ethnic state unavoidably leads to the suppression of ethnic minorities, as also occurred in the post-Soviet Baltic states.

The idea of self-determination is weak because it is impossible to realize it in practice without damaging someone (other ethnic groups, states), and often part of one's own ethnos. In other words, most frequently the principle of self-determination enters into insoluble contradiction with the basic principles of the world commonwealth: the acknowledgement of the sovereignty and integrity of existing states.

### **Is there a solution?**

The analysis undertaken shows the presence of a number of fundamental problems related to conceptualization, lawful guarantees and mechanisms for implementation of the principle of ethnic (political) self-determination.

Firstly, there is no proof that this principle can be attributed to the list of basic human rights and, most importantly, that it is in man's own interests.

Secondly, there are no unequivocal international legal standards suitable for the interpretation and realization of this right.

Thirdly, there are no clear criteria for determining who can aspire to the right to ethno-political self-determination.

Fourthly, there is no indisputable position from the point of view of democratic principles of the procedures for the realization of this



right which would make it possible to guarantee the self-determination of ethnic groups as integral formations.

Fifthly, there are no methods to combine ethnic self-determination with other legal standards intended to ensure the maintenance of the world political order and the interests of all ethnoses.

Instead of undertaking new titanic and pointless attempts to make the principle of self-determination work in practice, it makes more sense to question whether the principle itself is wrong. It seems to me more sensible to concentrate intellectual efforts on ending speculation around this question, and instead explaining that only the sequential development of the democratic standards of social mechanisms can lead to the solution of ethnic problems.

### **Corrections**

What has been said before might seem a radical rejection of self-determination as an effective instrument for regulating inter-ethnic relations and removing ethnic conflicts, and currently, from a theoretical viewpoint, my position on this question is indeed close to such an approach. Nonetheless, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the idea of self-determination maintains its popularity. It is estimated that between 1944 and 2014 in Europe over thirty referendums on independence took place, including more than twenty since the 1990s (*Guboglo* 2014a: 8–9). Here we have a good example of how social and political realities compel scholars to correct their scientific studies.

Some of aforementioned plebiscites reveal novel features in comparison with the «classic» movements for ethnic self-determination. It was the case in the 2014 referendums in the Crimea, in the South-East of Ukraine and in Catalonia which were not ethnic, but rather regional, or cultural-regional in nature.

I will set aside the Catalonia case (the referendum for independence of 2014) since I am not myself a specialist in Spanish matters. I will instead try to illustrate my overview of the regional character of the most recent cases of movements in favour of self-determination with reference to the territories of the former Soviet Union.

**Crimea.** On March 16th, 2014, a referendum took place in Crimea (one of the administrative regions of Ukraine) on possible incorporation into Russia. The turn-out was 89.5% of which 95.6% of citizens who took part in the referendum voted in favour of joining Russia (Wikipedia 2015).

According to the All-Ukrainian Census of population of 2001, there were registered in Crimea about 125 nationalities within a total population of slightly more than two million citizens. The most numerous were the Russians – 58.5%, followed by Ukrainians – 24.2 %, and then Crimean Tatars – 12.1% (The size and composition of the population 2001a). The additional information about the ethnic identity of Crimeans provides data on their linguistic orientations.

**Table 1**

*Number and the composition of the population of Autonomous Republic the Crimea on the sums of the all-Ukrainian population census of 2001<sup>6</sup>*

	What they considered their native language (%)			
	The language of their own nationality	Ukrainian	Russian	Another language
<b>Russian</b>	99,7	0,2	x	0,1
<b>Crimean Tatars</b>	93,0	0,5	5,9	0,6
<b>Tatars</b>	67,8	0,1	25,0	7,1
<b>Azerbaijanians</b>	55,8	0,7	37,9	5,6
<b>Armenians</b>	52,9	0,3	46,1	0,7
<b>Ukrainians</b>	40,4	x	59, 5	0,1
<b>Moldavians</b>	31,0	1,9	66,0	1,1
<b>Greeks</b>	23,8	1,1	71,8	3,3
<b>Koreans</b>	20,1	0,1	78,8	1,1
<b>Bulgarians</b>	18,4	3,1	77,6	0,9
<b>Belorussians</b>	17,1	0,9	81,8	0,2
<b>Poles</b>	4,1	20,4	74,6	0,9
<b>Jews</b>	1,9			

In total, the majority of the Crimeans showed that they accepted Russian as their «mother tongue» with only one exception – the Crimean Tatars. The population of Crimea traditionally, since its conquest by Russia in 18th century, was primarily Russian speaking and despite the attempts at Ukrainization after Ukraine became independent in 1991, the majority of Crimean inhabitants maintained their orientation to the Russian language and culture and to Russia herself.

We have no accurate data on the voting by ethnic group. However, a series of sociological surveys carried out by specialists of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology in 2013–2014, if we can summarize their findings, showed a prevailing degree of pro-Russia feelings regardless of ethnicity, while a good part of Crimean Tatars demonstrated some wariness of Russia. M. Guboglo, when analysing this data, comes to the conclusion that the regional and citizen identity of the majority local population prevails over ethnic identity (Guboglo 2014a: 191–192). I would add that one of the main factors which determined the results of the referendum was the irredentism of Crimeans in their wish to reunite with Russia.

**South-Eastern Ukraine.** On May 11th, 2014, two rebellious provinces of Ukraine – the Donetsk and Luhansk regions – held a referendum on independence. The outcome is rather similar to in the Crimean case.

Firstly, it should be noted that all other regions of Ukraine which are included in the South-East (Kherson, Odessa, Kharkov, Zaporozhye, Nikolaev) are characterized by the dominance of the Russian language and cultural tradition. The reasons why these regions have not followed Donetsk and Luhansk need special study, though we can speculate that among such causes were a much lower capacity for social mobilization and the successful efforts of the Ukrainian leadership to control the situation. Besides, it is worth bearing in mind that the Donbass is a region with a very high concentration of miners and other industrial workers (plus their families). The solidarity amidst such professional groups is normally especially high, much higher than in more heterogenic communities.

The reasons for the «rebellion» and subsequent referendums are explained by the forced Ukrainization which was carried out by the Ukrainian powers during the post-Soviet decades and significantly increased after the state coup in Kiev in February, 2014. This campaign was accompanied by aggressive and offensive propaganda against Russians, the Russian language and culture and by the rehabilitation of those who had fought in the Ukrainian nationalistic military units and the German Waffen SS during World War II. Moreover, the inhabitants of the Donbass demanded a greater share in the profits of their industries, a demand that the new regime in Kiev resolutely ignored.

In the Donetsk region, 89% of those who took part in the referendum voted for the establishment of an independent Donetsk People's Republic [with a turnout of almost 75%] (Wikipedia 2015). It is remarkable

that according to the all-Ukrainian census of 2001, 56.8% of the population identified themselves as Ukrainians and 38.2% as Russians. At the same time 74.9% called Russian their mother tongue (Ibid).

In the Luhansk region, according to the same all-Ukrainian census of 2001, 56.9% of the population identified themselves as Ukrainians and 38.2% – as Russians. 68.8% called Russian their mother tongue (Ibid). With a turnout for the referendum of approximately 75%, 96.2% voted for a sovereign Luhansk People's Republic (Ibid).

Both the Donetsk and Luhansk cases, as well as the Crimean one, demonstrate impressive examples of a social movement within multi-ethnic regional communities with a definite orientation to Russian cultural and historical traditions.

**Trans-Istria.** This is one more example of what has been said above. During the final crisis of the USSR the inhabitants of this part of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist republic did not show the desire to break away from the Soviet Union and instead proclaimed the Transnistrian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (September, 1990). After the disappearance of the USSR, it was renamed the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic (November, 1991). In the referendum of 2006, 97.2% voted for membership of Russia. Among some 15 different nationalities present in Transnistria, the first place, according to the census of 2004, belonged to Moldavians (31.9%), followed by Russians (30.4%) and Ukrainians (28.8%).

The choice of the inhabitants of the region was caused to a large degree by their unwillingness to be Romanized<sup>7</sup>, understanding the inevitable troubles connected with the destruction of the Soviet economic infrastructure, and loyalty to the historical and cultural traditions of the Russian/Soviet nation.

**Gagauziya.** On February 2nd, 2014, in the Gagauz autonomous region of Moldova a «consultative referendum» was held (*Guboglo* 2014b). 98.5% of the participants voted for economic integration within the Russian Federation, while 97.4% voted against integration into the European Union. 98.8% voted for the so-called «differed sovereignty», a formula meaning that the people of Gagauziya have a right to independence if Moldova joins Romania.

It is particular impressive the ethnic composition of the region. The absolute majority are Gagauzes (Turks by language and Orthodox Christians by confession) – 82.2%. The second place belongs to Bulgarians (5.1%), then Moldavians (4.8%), Russians (3.8%) and Ukrainians (3.2%).

The voting motives of the population of Gagauziya are very similar to those that applied in Trans-Istria.

## **Conclusion**

One of my articles is titled « The Crisis of the Self-determination Doctrine » (Cheshko 2001: 3–16). Now, after the series of referendums that took place in 2014 I feel the need to refine my arguments. Seemingly, it is more correct to talk in terms of the crisis of the international legal system relating to this paradigm. Largely this crisis is caused by attempts to manipulate the idea of self-determination in order to achieve geopolitical objectives in the context of the ‘great game’ in the international arena. In this sense, we can speak about the crisis of the entire UN system.

As to the idea of self-determination itself, it seems to have received a new impulse in the context of the most recent political cataclysms in Europe. It would seem that the subjects of self-determination are more complex entities than simply ethnic ones. They are communities based on territorial and economic relations as well as historical, cultural, linguistic, religious traditions.

## **Endnotes**

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<sup>1</sup> For my views on the circumstances of the disintegration of the USSR see: *Cheshko 2000*.

<sup>2</sup> International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights / Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27 // Internet resource: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx>.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights / Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49 // Internet resource: <http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>.

<sup>3</sup> «... In other words - no attachment to individual any actions under the threat of public punishment or the supernatural mystical retribution: society nothing requires from the individual, what this person at a time does not accept for voluntarily fulfill» (*Kropotkin 1990: 287–288*).

<sup>4</sup> For my views on the circumstances surrounding the disintegration of the USSR, see: *Cheshko 2000*.

<sup>5</sup> During 1990-91 all fifteen Soviet Union republics declared sovereignty, still within the USSR.

<sup>6</sup> See: The size and composition of the population 2001b. In October 2014 in Crimea there was conducted the first after the inclusion of the peninsula into

Russian Federation census, but the data about the ethnic composition of the Crimean population have not yet published.

<sup>7</sup> Moldavian radical «patriots» had demonstrated a very rare and paradoxical case. Their idea of independence from the USSR initially took the form of integration into Romania and abandoning their Moldavian identity.

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## **INDIGENOUS IDENTITY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDIGENEITY IN RUSSIAN POLITICAL PRACTICE AND LAW\***

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What city, town or village would you claim to be a native of? Would you simultaneously claim to be indigenous to the place? Who are indigenous peoples and what are the grounds on which some groups of people might claim this status? By asking such questions of various audiences and circumstances we will inevitably discover that the concepts of nativity and indigeneity overlap only partially and that they have subtle gradations and different rationales. The reflection on the construction of indigeneity in Russia merits a short digression into the recent history of the administrative and political classifications employed in the management of the ethnic diversity of the country's population.

Back in Soviet times some of the governmental agencies such as State Statistical Committee (Goskomstat, later Rosstat) used elaborate classifications of ethnic groups, partly officially acknowledged, and partly governed by the ideology and its pragmatic outcomes, implicit in both administrative and academic constructions of what might be called a separate people or ethnic group. It is instructive in this respect to look closer at the principles that guided the construction of the list of nationalities in the last Soviet population census of 1989. Its *Perechen' natsional'nostei* (the official list, enumerating all recognized ethnic categories, that were coded and counted as separate identities) was not arranged alphabetically, but organized according to the elaborate hierarchy which mirrored the administrative and political structure of the state. Several general groupings, both official and implicit, reflected the complex ethno-political organization of the country and the idea of the population that in some sense belonged to it or could be considered 'native'. Hence, the two largest official groupings in this census divided the entire population of the country into "nationalities of the USSR" and "nationalities, residing predominantly outside the borders

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of the USSR”<sup>1</sup>, known colloquially as “foreigners”. “Russians” as the largest group opened the list and fourteen so-called “title nations” of the former Soviet republics followed, also not in alphabetical order, but in the order in which they were listed in the Soviet constitution. I should, perhaps, add that the arrangement principles within this small subgroup changed several times. Initially, the so-called “nations” were listed in the order in which they had joined the Soviet Union; at a later stage, the criterion of a nation’s numerical size had been introduced. During the preparation of the 1989 census, it was pointed out that Uzbeks had become more numerous than Byelorussians, and a new principle of listing, in the same order as in the relevant article of the Constitution of 1977, was used to solve the problem of rearrangement in the case of other possible changes in the numerical order<sup>2</sup>.

The “title nations” subgroup was followed by another subgroup of the main or titular nationalities of the autonomous republics, which had a lower administrative status than the Soviet republics. The ethnic group terms within this subgroup were listed alphabetically but, again, with some inconsistencies, as there were more “titular groups” than republics (several autonomous republics were named after two peoples, such as Kabardino-Balkaria). Others, such as Dagestan, had more peoples who were considered “titular” or indigenous, and twice as many who were indigenous to the region but counted as parts of larger groups<sup>3</sup>. Out of more than 30 ethnic groups from Dagestan, only ten, the most numerous ethnic categories were chosen to be named in the subgroup of “autonomous republics” peoples<sup>4</sup>.

With “title autonomous peoples” from other autonomies this subgroup contained 28 categories.

Another smaller subgroup was formed from the ‘title’ peoples of autonomous regions (oblasts and okrugs). It contained only seven ethnic categories<sup>5</sup>, since most of the indigenous peoples of the northern autonomous territories (okrugs) were listed within the next subgroup, called “nationalities of the North”. This well-known category was composed of 26 peoples of the North (*Slezkine* 1994; *Sokolovski* 2001). The group was subdivided into two parts. The first contained “northerners” who had their own autonomous districts<sup>6</sup>.

The second comprised all the other small groups scattered over the vast territory of Siberia and the Far East. A residual subgroup of “peoples without their own ethnic territories” with sixteen ethnic categories followed. The list was concluded by the category colloquially known as the “foreigners” and two residual categories: “Oth-

ers,” and “Nationality not listed.”

In post-Soviet censuses of 2002 and 2010 the construction of the country’s population in terms of ‘belonging to the population of Russia’ was based on the following tacit principles:

1. A group belongs to the country’s population (and thus constitutes ‘a proper population category’) if it is considered to have a homeland within the territory of Russia. This is clearly a remnant of primordialist thinking, the evident case of the so-called *territorialized ethnicity*, based on the presumptive linkage of an ethnic group to the region of its ‘*ethnogenesis*’ or historic origin.
2. A group belongs to the country’s population and is included in the census list of identity categories as a separate entry if it has a homeland in one of the former Soviet states and if it is expected that it has a significant number of its members in the territory of Russia.
3. Finally, the group belongs to the country’s population if it is expected that it has a significant number of its members in the territory of Russia (its number in RSFSR as reflected in the last Soviet the census of 1989 was fairly large; there was no significant emigration). As a result of this dubious procedure more than 30 groups were excluded as ‘foreign’ (read ‘*atypical*’ for the population of Russia) and relegated to the residual category of ‘others’<sup>7</sup>.

The existence of the nested hierarchy just described that stood behind the concept of the ‘peoples of the USSR’ retains its influence on the practice of various state agencies to this day and lies at the core of the construction of indigeneity in Russia. The notion of ethnic territorialisation is covertly operative in many administrative state practices. The population census remains an efficient tool for re-inscribing and re-instating the state. It is also an efficient instrument for dealing with otherness, and for sorting various ‘others’ into more and less ‘domestic’, for domesticating the first and discarding the latter. The implicit classification into ‘us’ and ‘others’ bears a direct relevance to the topic of indigeneity construction, to which I now turn. I will first outline the international background on which the specifics of the Russian case could be seen in sharper contrast.

While indigenous peoples have for a long time been acknowledged by various international organizations and have obtained an official legal status in international law, we still have a plethora of

definitions of the concept, none of them universally accepted, as well as a series of unresolved issues with the interpretation of indigeneity. Ambiguity and fuzziness in legal concepts make them hard to apply and to implement the legal norms in which these concepts are used, hence the need to disentangle semantic and pragmatic issues that lead to *ad hoc* decisions in disputes, involving indigenous groups or groups that are striving to attain this status.

What are the grounds on which a group of persons might claim the indigenous status? One might say that in a way we are all indigenous to this planet (I will come to the issue of aliens shortly). Most of us are indigenous to the continent we inhabit or spend the best part of our lives in. Many of us as citizens of some nation-state might claim to be indigenous to this state, whereas at the same time (and here comes a paradox, one of many that are so characteristic of indigeneity) some citizens of, say, Britain, only half a century ago have been considered indigenous not by virtue of their own or of their ancestors' birth within its territory, but precisely because they had arrived from the colonial elsewhere. In close analogy to this case, the so-called 'peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East' claim to be 'indigenous' irrespective of their place of residence, be it Moscow, Sochi, or Geneva. Finally, some of us who have not changed our place of residence since birth are in a certain sense indigenous, or at least native to the place, but, again, might be challenged in this respect by other claimants, who use different justifications for the status and appear both in the eyes of the public and of the state as "more indigenous". The concept of indigeneity seems to be dependent on historically changing ideas of territorial borders and boundaries that are deemed essential for its construction. Territorial identities, even for nomadic groups and recent settlers, who change or have changed places of residence, become reified and influential in political and legal terms.

A brief terminological digression, perhaps, is needed, although the preoccupation with words and concept definitions often seems pedantic or preposterous. Yet, without understanding a word's meaning and its conceptual boundaries we can hardly construct efficient legal norms and adopt effective political decisions. In English-language literature there are at least four terms that are currently used to designate this category. They are: '*native*', '*aboriginal*', '*indigenous*' and, less often, '*autochthonous*'. Although treated as synonyms, they have differences in meaning with far-reaching legal and political implications. In Russian we have similar differences between the terms '*tuzemtsy*', '*korennyye*', '*aborigeny*', and '*avtokhtony*', again with subtle seman-

tic differences that do not fully coincide with their English equivalents. Roughly 70-80 years back there was another system of designations at work, and even professional anthropologists used such terms as 'primitive' and 'tribal' to denote the groups under this category<sup>8</sup>, and a century back words like 'savage', 'backward', 'early'<sup>9</sup> peoples (close to German '*Naturvölker*') were often used to designate the same groups that were later to be called 'indigenous'.

As was mentioned above, all these terms are variously defined in the practice of a number of national and international bodies, but most if not all of these definitions could be roughly reduced to two basic approaches with some additional principles serving as *conditio sine qua non*.

The first approach emphasizes the specificity of indigenous peoples in their legally substantiated ***claims to territory*** and the history of its occupation by various claimant groups (the so called principle of ***prior occupancy***). The second approach advocates an economic and environmentalist view, embedding indigeneity in ***subsistence economy*** and ***sustainable use of natural resources***. For the sake of brevity, I will henceforth call the first type of definitions '*territorial*', and the second '*economic*'. They could also be labelled as the Old World and New World approaches to indigeneity, for the reason that definitions underlying special links to land or prior occupancy are more characteristic of the settler societies in Canada, US, Australia and New Zealand, whereas economic specificity is usually highlighted in the definitions of indigeneity as used in European and some Asian countries. Africa stands apart since in most of its post-colonial states the category is contested, and there is no legal status acknowledging special rights of such groups in national legislative systems either in territorial (prior occupancy) or in economic (subsistence economy) terms. I should also mention that in practice mixed definitions, combining the traits of both territorial and economic approaches, are not rare, especially in international law, as well as in the practice of such global organizations as the World Bank.


Both dominant approaches have a common rationale for the creation of a special legal status for the so-called Fourth World peoples, on account of their refusal to integrate into the global market economy and urban ways of life, and out of respect for the right to choose one's way of life. Thus many former attempts at integration of indigenous groups are often perceived as colonial domination, forced assimilation, or cultural genocide. The principle of non-integration, however, as we shall shortly see, is often abandoned in the legal construction of indigeneity.

The dynamics of the constant struggle over definitional issues will be clearer if we take into consideration that current notions of indigeneity are influenced by and are constantly reconfigured in three large discursive fields, that of 1) *international and national legal discourse*, that of 2) *government-level and international political discourse* which includes both the language of state policies and the grass-root vocabulary of local indigenous politics; and, finally, there are notable contributions to indigeneity's conceptual richness from social sciences with its ongoing dialogues and discussions, that is, from that of 3) *academic or scientific discourse*. Needless to say, all three of these large discursive fields (legal, political and academic) interrelate, mingle, overlap, and produce a vast variety of views and positions of their own actors in respect of indigeneity.

In order to understand the specifics of the Russian case we need to compare it with other cases. Let us now turn to the brief outline of current approaches towards indigeneity in legal definitions and operational procedures used by influential international organizations, such as the International Labour Organization (further ILO), the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (existed from 1982 to 2007; henceforth, WGrIP), the UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues, and the World Bank. Neither WGrIP, nor the Permanent Forum could agree on a formal definition of indigenous peoples. In their approaches they have used neither longevity of residence (or priority of territorial occupation) and attachment to land, nor commitment to a non-urban and non-industrial lifestyle and subsistence economy as the leading criteria for inclusion in the category. Instead, unable to account for widely different situations and criteria by which local indigenous groups are singled out and acknowledged as groups meriting special legal status in different states, they opted for self-identification as indigenous peoples, with legally unsatisfactory outcomes such as that some claimants complying with the self-designation criterion (notably Frisians, Faroese, the inhabitants of the Orkney and Shetland islands and similar groups from Northern Europe, as well as some Boers or Afrikaners groups from South Africa) were rejected as members on legally indeterminate grounds.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the issues of indigenous peoples rights J. Martinez Cobo in his study of discrimination against indigenous peoples suggested the following working definition:

Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems. (*Martinez Cobo: 28–29*).



*Fig. 1. Definitional elements of the indigenous peoples concept according to UN Special Rapporteur J. Martinez Cobo*

The World Bank has, since 1982, in practice used a series of operational definitions of tribal or indigenous peoples. Although more limited in scope than the ILO approach, the term “tribal” peoples in the Bank’s policy directive referred to those ethnic groups that have “stable, low-energy, sustained-yield economic systems,” and exhibit in varying degrees the following characteristics:

1. Geographically isolated or semi-isolated.
2. Unacculturated or only partially acculturated into the societal norms of the dominant society.
3. Non-monetized, or only partially monetized production largely for subsistence, and independent of the national economic system.
4. Ethnically distinct from the national society.

5. Non-literate and without a written language.
6. Linguistically distinct from the wider society.
7. Identifying closely with one particular territory.
8. Having an economic lifestyle largely dependent on the specific natural environment.
9. Possessing indigenous leadership, but little or no national representation, and few, if any, political rights as individuals or collectively, partly because they do not participate in the political process. And,
10. Having loose tenure over their traditional lands, which for the most part is not accepted by the dominant society nor accommodated by its courts; and, having weak enforcement capabilities against encroachers, even when tribal areas have been delineated (World Bank Operational Manual Statement 2.34, para. 2. Feb. 1982).

At a later period according to the World Bank Operational Directive of Sept. 1991 a shorter list of traits or characteristics of indigenous peoples has been used as a guideline for locating and defining indigenous groups among the rest of the population. According to said Directive:

“Indigenous peoples can be identified in particular geographical areas by the presence in varying degrees of the following characteristics:

(a) a close attachment to ancestral territories and to the natural resources in these areas;

(b) self-identification and identification by others as members of a distinct cultural group;

(c) an indigenous language, often different from the national language;

(d) presence of customary social and political institutions; and

(e) primarily subsistence-oriented production.”

(OD 4.20 – Indigenous Peoples, para. 4)

Finally, in July 2005, the latest World Bank Operational Manual was adopted, which contained a revised definition of indigenous peoples:

“For purposes of this policy, the term “Indigenous Peoples” is used in a generic sense to refer to a distinct, vulnerable, social and cultural group, possessing the following characteristics in varying degrees:

(a) self-identification as members of a distinct indigenous cultural group and recognition of this identity by others;

(b) ***collective attachment to geographically distinct habitats or ancestral territories*** in the project area and to the natural resources in these habitats and territories;

(c) customary cultural, economic, social, or political institutions that are separate from those of the dominant society and culture; and

(d) an indigenous language, often different from the official language of the country or region.”

(OP 4.10 – Indigenous Peoples, para. 4)

Basing on these and other sources I have singled out four groups of traits that are more or less systematically used in indigenous peoples’ definitions both at international and national levels. The 1982 World Bank’s Operational Manual Statement 2.34 contains a good example of this set. Among its ten characteristics of “tribal peoples” there were those that underline taxonomic separateness and autonomy as well as geographical isolation (1), ethnic and linguistic distinction (4, 6) and (only) partial inculturation into the mainstream culture (2). A strong sense of ethnic identity and cultural separateness have been further underlined in later operational directives of the Bank.

*Economic* characteristics (such as a non-monetized economic system and dependence on specific natural environment), and *prior settlement* components of the definitions, although mentioned in pragmatically oriented policy documents, have been more often used in legal contexts, serving as arguments for special treatment. In the absence of specific economic or earlier settlement traits the protection of indigenous groups loses its rationale as they become indistinguishable from other types of minorities, thus meriting only minority rights protection. Hence the four groups of traits that are more or less systematically used in IP definitions both at the international and national levels are the following:

1) a *proof of distinctness* or general *proof of existence* as a separate people;

2) *minority traits* which are also met in many minority group definitions stressing non-dominance.

These two groups of traits are not specific to IP, whereas the last two groups characterize the two basic approaches to defining IP *per se*. They are not so often combined in the one and same definition. Provisionally, they may be called

3) *territorial* and

4) *economic* approaches that are used to construct the specific category of IP.

Russia has a plethora of indigenous groups with different legal and political statuses and varying degrees of recognition. There is a number of nativized groups of old-settlers, not unlike the New Zea-



land *pakeha*, as well as some groups of mixed origin, that is, Metis, some of which (such as the Kamchadal and Chulym) have attained the official status of indigenous peoples. There is a legal definition of indigenous status in Russia, which combines both territorial and economic traits, but in political discourse and administrative practice the economic aspect has clear predominance. Northern indigenous peoples are perceived by most scholars and legislators as predominantly foragers and reindeer herders, whose way of life serves as the basis both for their preferential treatment and special legal status, as well as the foundation of their existence as separate societies. Such perception has its roots in imperial and communist periods of Russian history. Various groups of hunters, herders and gatherers of the Russian Sub-Arctic and the Far East were the target groups of the government's affirmative action, providing legal guarantees for their privileged legal status throughout various stages of Soviet and post-Soviet nationalities policy.

**Table 1**

*The Comparison of Definitional Criteria in Russian and International Law*

<b>Source of the definition</b>	<b>Self-identification</b>	<b>Distinctive way-of-life based on subsistence economy</b>	<b>Ethnic distinctions from other groups</b>	<b>Links to ancestral territories</b>	<b>Non-dominant position</b>
ILO Convention No. 107 (1957)	–	–	√	√	√
ILO Convention No. 169 (1989)	√	√	√	√	–
UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (J. Martinez Cobo)	√	–	√	√	√
World Bank Operational Statement 1982 (OMS 2.34)	–	√	√	√	–
World Bank Operational Directive 1991 (OD 4.20)	√	√	√	√	√

*Table 1 (continue)*

Definitional criteria					
Source of the definition	Self-identification	Distinctive way-of-life based on subsistence economy	Ethnic distinctions from other groups	Links to ancestral territories	Non-dominant position
World Bank Operational Directive 2005 (OD 4.10)	√	√	√	√	√
Russian legislation	√	√	√	√	√

Among different groups claiming to be indigenous to the region that they consider their homeland there was a category that was viewed as indisputably autochthonous. This category formed the core of the indigeneity concept in Russian discourse. The reasons for such preferential treatment were both historical and ideological, as Marxists employed the framework of social evolution theory with its idea of economic formations as stages in social development, wherein ‘natives’ were treated as ‘primordial communists’. The relatively small size of native groups, the harsh environments they inhabit and drinking habits brought by settlers often put such groups on the brink of extinction. All these circumstances contributed to the prevalent treatment of native peoples as ‘dying out’ (*vymeraiuschie*) or almost extinct. The threat of extinction together with the communist version of the noble savage ideal, implying presumably unselfconscious, unselfish and naïve economic behaviour, formed the main rationale for the government’s targeting of the northern native groups for positive discrimination and served as a rationale for the government’s support. As the preservation of the subsistence economy (the ‘traditional way of life’) and links to the territory of inhabitancy were perceived as the key characteristics of indigeneity, indigenous peoples status was strongly linked to the concept of traditional territory (*‘territoria traditsionnogo prozhivania’*).

The strategy of linking peoples to territories and via territories to rights is worth noting as an effective strategy of emplacement, or

what Arjun Appadurai termed *incarceration* of indigenous people to the territories they inhabit. The explicit linkage of peoples to territories is found in Russian law 'On the State Guarantees and Compensations for the Persons Who Work and Reside in the Districts of the Far North and Equivalent Areas' of February 19, 1993<sup>10</sup>. The law however did not enumerate either ethnic categories or territories of residence. It stipulated in Art. 27 the general norm, according to which preferences in retirement go to 'citizens, belonging to the small-numbered peoples of the North', as well as 'reindeer herders, fishermen and hunters permanently resident in the districts of the Far North and equivalent areas' (Art. 26). It was the official regulation of the Ministry of Social Services on retirement allowances for the persons residing in the districts of the Far North of August 4, 1994, that provided the enumeration of those peoples that receive special treatment. It stipulated that "the designated peoples include *Nenets, Evenk, Khant, Even, Chukchi, Nanai, Koryak, Mansi, Dolgan, Nivkh, Sel'qup, Ulcha, Itelmen, Udege, Saami, Eskimo, Chuvan, Nganasan, Yukagir, Ket, Oroch, Tofa, Aleut, Neghidal, Enets, Orok, Shor, Teleut, Kumanda*."<sup>11</sup> This official commentary mentions for the first time three new members of this group: *Shor, Teleut, and Kumanda*, who were added to the previous standard Soviet list of 26 peoples.

All three new groups were highly urbanised (at a level of 50-70%). The data of the recent Russian population census demonstrates that approximately half of the peoples classified as 'indigenous minorities' have over one third of urban dwellers among their respective populations, and for ten peoples the level of urbanization is near or higher than 50%. Moreover, only among six groups (Dolgan, Nenets, Oroch, Chukchi, Enets, and Nganasan) the share of those who practice traditional subsistence economy reaches 20% (in the case of Dolgan, almost 30%). Out of approximately 125,000 persons of working age (among those who reside in the North, Siberia and the Far East and classified as 'small-numbered indigenous peoples of the North') only 17,000 (or 13%) are employed in some form of agricultural economy, or indicate as their source of subsistence hunting, fishing, forestry, or processing industries. Effectively it means that out of the group of more than 140,000 people with IP status, only a few families, scattered over vast territories of the North, engage in subsistence economy and need special protection not as cultural or linguistic minorities but as indigenous peoples maintaining their unique economies and lifestyles (for details see *Table 2* below).

**Table 2**

*Indigenous groups sources of income in areas of principal residence  
(North, Siberia, and the Far East) for ages 15-64,  
Russian population census 2002*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	Total no. in area	Urban	Urban, %	No. in working ages	Working ages, %	No. in traditional subsistence economy	Subsistence economy, %	Medicine and education, %	Administration and finances, %	Transport, communication, construction building, %
Aleut	446	96	21.5	291	65.2	16	05.5	09.6	7.2	6.2
Dolgan	7077	1194	16.9	3998	56.5	1176	29.4	19.5	2.3	2.9
Itelmen	2939	1012	34.4	1859	63.3	94	05.1	10.7	4.2	2.0
Ket	1189	199	16.7	715	60.1	27	03.8	08.1	4.1	1.1
Koryak	8271	2368	28.6	5070	61.3	498	09.8	17.3	5.0	2.3
Kumanda	2888	1522	52.7	1867	64.6	84	04.5	04.0	0.5	0.6
Mansi	10820	5487	50.7	6273	58.0	384	06.1	11.6	3.5	3.5
Nanai	11569	3278	28.3	7411	64.1	553	07.5	11.1	2.5	2.2
Nganasan	811	147	18.1	458	56.5	85	18.6	16.6	2.4	1.5
Neghidal	505	115	22.8	308	61.0	35	11.4	13.0	3.2	0.3

**Table 2 (continue)**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	Total no. in area	Urban	Urban, %	No. in working ages	Working ages, %	No. in traditional subsistence economy	Subsistence economy, %	Medicine and education, %	Administration and finances, %	Transport, communication, construction building, %
Nenets	39813	6781	17.0	21188	53.2	5449	25.7	11.9	3.0	1.7
Nivkh	4902	2291	46.7	3082	62.9	301	09.8	09.4	2.8	2.3
Oroch	426	150	35.2	268	62.9	63	23.5	07.5	2.6	3.0
Saami	1769	680	38.4	1090	61.6	151	13.9	07.3	6.0	2.4
Selqup	4056	645	15.9	2512	61.9	306	12.2	10.6	5.2	3.6
Teleut	2534	1044	41.2	1597	63.0	77	04.8	05.6	2.6	7.3
Tofa	723	42	05.8	457	63.2	17	03.7	09.2	2.8	0.7
Tuba	1533	120	07.8	894	58.3	99	11.1	07.2	1.9	1.7
Todja	4435	3	00.0	2495	56.3	102	04.1	15.5	2.1	0.7
Udege	1531	337	22.0	968	63.2	119	12.3	11.5	3.4	1.7
Uilta (Orok)	298	169	56.7	196	65.8	24	12.2	08.7	9.7	1.5
Ulcha	2718	413	15.2	1666	61.3	142	08.5	11.7	4.7	1.9
Khant	27655	9190	33.2	16128	58.3	1793	11.1	13.8	4.3	3.2
Chelkan	830	113	13.6	502	60.5	31	06.2	12.7	4.2	2.2
Chuvan	990	295	29.8	581	58.7	74	12.7	20.0	7.9	4.5
Chukchi	14034	2320	16.5	8377	59.7	1598	19.1	18.6	3.3	2.2

*Table 2 (continue)*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
	Total no. in area	Urban	Urban, %	No. in working ages	Working ages, %	No. in traditional subsistence economy	Subsistence economy, %	Medicine and education, %	Administration and finances, %	Transport, communication, construction building, %
Shor	12773	9094	71.2	1831	62.7	199	10.7	05.2	2.5	3.1
Evenk	34610	7901	22.8	20269	58.6	2271	11.2	13.4	5.6	1.9
Even	18642	5831	31.3	10877	58.3	1405	12.9	13.4	5.1	1.5
Enets	197	24	12.2	122	61.9	23	18.9	18.0	6.6	1.6
Eskimo	1534	394	25.7	951	62.0	86	09.0	16.4	7.7	3.2
Yukagir	1176	494	42.0	671	57.1	84	12.5	12.1	8.2	3.9
Total	223694	63749	28.7	124972	55.4	17366	13.1	13.0	4.0	2.3

As in the published results of the Russian population census of 2012 there was no data on indigenous persons' occupations the Table's entries are counted on the basis of the Census 2002 results (Vol. 13, tables 11 and 12). Column 8 was counted as the sum share of those employed (ages 15-64) in agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, and processing sectors. Column 10 is the sum share of finance, real estate business, social services, administration and security. Some indigenous groups (such as Kerek, Soyot, Kamchadal, Taz, Telengit and Chulym) are absent from the table, due to the absence of the relevant data in the census publications. 16,280 indigenous persons of working age, residing in the regions of Siberia, North, and the Far East work in education and health facilities; 5,010 in finance, administration, social services, real estate business, and security. 2,843 persons are employed in the construction, transport and communication sectors.

Local nativistic ideologies and indigenist discourse in respect of territorial claims has many startling analogies with anti-migrant sentiments and the discourse of such notoriously infamous movements as the Russian anti-migrant movement (ДПНИ). In both discourses the newcomers, migrants, or recent settlers, often designated as aliens are represented as aggressive, deleterious, omnipresent, tenacious, prolific and ineradicable, acting and proliferating covertly etc. (It is worth noting that this type of discourse is reproduced also in respect of alien species in ecology; details are provided in Sokolovskiy 2010). Jeremy Waldron, an eminent New Zealand scholar, specializing in the philosophy of law, advocates “the principle of proximity.” The principle holds that people have a paramount duty to come to terms with, and to deal justly with, those with whom they are, in Kant’s phrase, “unavoidably side by side” in a given territory, irrespective of cultural or national affinity, irrespective of issues about whose ancestors were here first, irrespective of any history of injustice that may have become attached to the process by which these people came to be side by side in that territory. Thus, the principle holds that lip service to the principle of soil (ethnicity territorialisation) or attempts to correct historical injustices, instead of paying close attention to presently existing inequality and discrimination might in fact be the source of new injustices. Instead of further essentialisation of the links between groups and territories we should try, as I suggested elsewhere (Sokolovski 2004), to work out new specialized protective programs by targeting different groups within the Russian legal category of the ‘small-numbered indigenous peoples’ via special and differentiated legislation (standard minority protective measures for well integrated autochthonous minorities; economic development programs for groups of indigenous peoples, residing in urban settlements of the European and Siberian North; and special protective measures designed for those who practice a traditional subsistence economy, in this latter case, irrespective of the person’s ethnic identity).

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### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Slovari natsional’nostei i yazykov dlia kodirovaniia otvetov na 8 i 9 voprosy perepisnykh listov (o natsional’nosti, rodnom yazyke i drugom yazyke narodov SSSR) Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 g. [Dictionaries of Nationalities and Languages for the Coding of Answers to Questions 8 and 9 of the Questionnaires (on Nationality, Native Language and Other Language of the Peoples of the USSR) of the All-Union Census of 1989]. Moscow, 1988.

<sup>2</sup> Author’s interview with Pavel Puchkov (March 3, 2001), who had taken part in the drafting of census directories for the 1970 population census.

<sup>3</sup> These were twelve minority peoples of the so-called “Andi-Dido peoples” of counted previously as Avars, and two additional minorities counted in 1989 and prior censuses as Dargins.

<sup>4</sup> In alphabetical order: Agul, Avars (Maarulal), Dargins (Dargwa), Kumyk (Qumuq), Lak (Laq), Nogai (Noghai), Lezgin, Rutul, Tabasaran, and Tsakhur (Tsakhigali) [Slovari natsional’nostei 1989].

<sup>5</sup> Adygei (Adyge), Altai, Circassian (Cherkess, Adyge), Jews, Karachai (Qarachaili), Khakass (Khaas), and Komi-Permiak.

<sup>6</sup> Chukchi, Dolgan, Evenk, Khant, Koriak, Mansi, and Nenets.

<sup>7</sup> It has been claimed that 1) many of the categories from this group are essentially country-of-origin designations and do not refer to ethnic identity (such designations as Americans, French, Italians, Spaniards, and Cubans); 2) many have left the country since 1989 (among them Albanians, Cubans, Croats, Serbs, Czechs and Slovaks); 3) some categories were expected to be so numerically small, that could be relegated without much concern to the residual category ‘other nationalities’ (Austrians, Albanians, Amhara, Baluch, Czechs, Croats, Dutch, Italians, Japanese, Montenegrins, Portuguese, Punjabi, Serbs, Slovaks, and Swedes)

<sup>8</sup> Cf.: Dozier E.P. The Concepts of “Primitive” and “Native” in Anthropology // Yearbook of Anthropology. 1955. P. 187-202.

<sup>9</sup> Herskovits M. Economic Anthropology. N.Y.: A. Knopf, 1952. P. V-VI.

<sup>10</sup> “O gosudarstvennykh garantiakh i kompensatsiiakh dlia lits, rabotaiushchikh i prozhivaiushchikh v raionakh Krainego Severa i priravnennykh k nim mestnostiam” of February 19, 1993.

<sup>11</sup> Art. 4 of the Decree “O naznachanii pensii litsam, rabotaiushchim i prozhivaiushchim v raionakh Krainego Severa” [On retirement payments for the persons, who work and reside in the regions of the Far North]: Ministry for Social Protection Decree No. 657, Aug. 04, 1994; registered at the Ministry of Justice by No. 651 on the same date.

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**«RUSSIA NEEDS EVERYONE»: OBSERVATIONS ON  
THE 2010 POPULATION CENSUS IN THE RUSSIAN  
FEDERATION\***

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The 2010 population census was the second in the history of post-Soviet Russia. The first census (conducted in 2002, three years behind the usual ten-year cycle and later than in most other post-Soviet states) generated much controversy that was centred primarily on the legitimate question of self-identification of the population in a changing country. The collapse of the previous social structure and ideology caused a surge in interest in “primordial ties” which many saw as ties to “their own” ethnos. The ethnic conflicts that accompanied the USSR’s disintegration convincingly demonstrated the potential of these ties to mobilize the population. The 2002 census has seen large-scale propaganda campaigns run by various ethnic groups (often led by their “ethnic entrepreneurs”) that were seeking to increase the count of their ethnic communities by encouraging people to self-identify as members (putting forward slogans such as “be counted as a Tatar” – a classic but far from unusual advertisement from that time). The circumstances surrounding the preparation and conduct of the first post-Soviet census in the Russian Federation were the subject of an international research project “Nationality and language in population census”. Its results had been presented in New York at ASN 7<sup>th</sup> Convention in April 2003 and were reflected in a series of publications in Russian, French, and English<sup>1</sup> to which we refer the interested reader.

The new census was originally planned for 2010 (in order to return to the normal schedule) but that timetable has unexpectedly come under threat again, this time due to the international economic crisis, which did not leave Russia unaffected. In the beginning of August 2009 the media started reporting that there were plans to postpone the census until October 2012 and then even until 2013 due to the large cost of the undertaking (estimated at 10 billion roubles by a repre-

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sentative of the Russian statistics agency Rosstat). This has caused all preparatory work to stop as its financing was frozen. Although by the end of 2009 the government decided to proceed with the census as originally planned for the time window of October 14-25, 2010, crucial time had been lost and any significant changes or amendments to the existing questionnaire were no longer possible.

Yet, the 2010 census was very different from the previous one.

### **The legal framework for the census**

First, we need to mention a serious legal hurdle that the census had to overcome, namely the 2006 federal law covering personal data collection. Title 10 of that law defines the types of data that cannot be collected without the consent of the individual: these are racial and national origin, political views, religious or philosophical beliefs, health issues, and sexual life. Accordingly, lawyers pointed out to the statisticians that the planned population census had the potential to conflict with this law, since the collection of data about nationality or ethnic identity constitutes an invasion of privacy. Rather than abandon the collection of such information, the census officials sought ways to stay within the letter of the law. As a result, the questionnaire acquired a “no nationality” option, and it was further suggested that the corresponding sections of the questionnaire were to be filled in by the respondent rather than the census taker (the respondents had to write their passport data in the margins and confirm it by signing). This latter procedure obviously contradicted the principle of census anonymity and led to well-grounded fears that the whole census effort could collapse. Furthermore, it was not clear what to do if the respondent was illiterate, had bad eyesight, or for whatever other reasons was unable to fill in the information on his or her national identity. Because of this controversy, two months before the data collection was due to start the Census law was amended to allow census takers to fill in such information based on respondents’ answers. Interestingly, despite that change, the census taker that visited my house suggested that I fill in the corresponding section myself but did not request either my passport data or a signature.

Another census item that falls into the personal data category is religious affiliation. This question had been included in the first Russian census of 1897 but was absent in all Soviet censuses (with the exception of the 1937 census that was later annulled). It was also excluded from the 2002 census questionnaire, although some of the

post-Soviet states (Georgia, Estonia, and Lithuania) did include religious affiliation in their census forms. However, during the run-up to the 2010 census the problem of religious affiliation reporting was actively discussed in religious as well as civic circles.

In 2007, the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation came out in support of inclusion of the religious affiliation question in the upcoming census. The main champion of this approach has been V. Tishkov, the director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IEA), who also at the time served as the chair of the Chamber's commission on tolerance and freedom. The representatives of traditional Russian religious groups that participated in a roundtable organized by the State Statistical Agency in August 2010 did not voice any objections to that idea. Note however that this roundtable was held only two months before the start of the census and was thus merely ceremonial in nature – the religious representatives were invited not so much to share their views on the necessity of collecting religious affiliation data but rather to secure their help in convincing their followers that it was both necessary and safe to participate in the census. Traditionally, governmental attempts at “inventorying” the population cause panic and protest among some believers. However, some of the religious leaders that participated in the roundtable used the forum to speak up, albeit cautiously, in favour of counting religious affiliation. In particular, that was the position taken by the Russian Orthodox Church representatives. Although patriarch Kirill has repeated almost verbatim the position of his predecessor Alexi the Second who stated before the 2002 census that it was the business of the government and therefore the government should decide which questions to include in the census, the press-secretary of the Patriarchy V. Vyglynsky referred to the absence of the question on religious affiliation as “discrimination”.

The public relations representative of the Chief Rabbi of Russia has also expressed interest in counting the number of religious Jews. The paradox here is that in Russia the Jews are considered an ethnic rather than a religious group, and are counted as such in all Soviet and post-Soviet censuses. However, not all of them practice Judaism: there are in fact not only many atheists among them but also many Orthodox Christians. This is why the number of Jews in contemporary Russia according to the governmental statistics is quite different from the estimates of religious authorities.

This situation is in fact typical for many other confessional groups whose numbers today are often estimated on the basis of the count of

ethnic groups that traditionally practice a particular religion. The two largest confessions – Russian Orthodox and Islam – are particularly prone to using this approach, which, according to many experts, allows them to overestimate the true number of their adherents many times over. It is perhaps worth remembering that in the first Russian census of 1897 the situation was reversed: the social scientists had to extrapolate information on the ethnic composition of the population based on the data actually collected on native language, religion, and place of birth since the nationality question was not asked directly.

Therefore, the main argument in favour of collection of data on religious affiliation, which can only be done properly during a census, is the necessity to have reliable and accurate data that can be used to refute speculation and to build a rational policy regarding the relationship of the state with various confessional groups. The main arguments against it include the privacy concerns as reflected in the law on personal data, the impossibility of truly judging someone's religiosity based on a single answer to a simplified question, as well as the suspicion that many true believers will avoid giving a truthful answer for fear of state persecution. However, this argument plays out this time, considering the way this problem was discussed prior to the census just completed, one can confidently predict that it will still be relevant when the next census comes along, and that the representatives of confessional groups and especially ROC will be much more assertive then.

Another problem of a legal nature concerns the obligatory nature of census participation. In 2003, a legislative proposal was introduced in the State Duma to make the census obligatory and to introduce sanctions for evading the census, but it did not attract support. However, in November 2009, several related amendments to the existing Census law were successfully adopted. This made it legal, for example, to have the respondents fill out the questionnaires by themselves at the census precincts or even by phone (which was intended to boost participation rate by including some of those who refused to let the census takers into their homes), as well as making it possible to use administrative records to collect data on the sex and age of people that were absent or that were evading the census (as long as their total number did not exceed 3% of the population, according to the instructions from Rosstat). This practice was tacitly used during the previous census and this time it was legalized. However, these measures did not produce the desired results – according to the just published VSI-OM results, 11% of the population did not take part in the 2010 cen-

sus, whereas in 2002 that number was only 6%. According to a joint study by the Institute of Ethnology and the Civic Chamber, in the cities with a population of over one million the non-participation rate for the census ranges from one quarter to one third of the inhabitants.

### **Organizational issues**

From the organizational perspective, a substantial innovation is constituted by the Rosstat administrative order of June 23, 2009 that mandated translating the census questionnaire into 17 languages: Bashkir, Tatar, Chuvash, Mari, Udmurt, Mordvin, Buryat, Tuva and Yakut, as well as English, French, German, Spanish, Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean and Turkish. In December 2009, the order was amended and the list was shortened to 14 languages (Mari, Mordvin and Udmurt were dropped), apparently in an attempt to save time and money.

The approved list of languages looks somewhat strange. The list traditionally used two categories: “languages of the peoples of Russia” and “foreign languages”. Apparently, the German and Korean languages made it onto the list as foreign languages. However, relatively numerous groups counted by census as “Germans” and “Koreans” are mainly formed not by recent migrants but rather constitute well-established populations of so-called “Russian-Germans” and “Russian-Koreans”, with a correspondingly tiny proportion of people who do not know the Russian language. The presence of Chinese, Turkish and Vietnamese languages in the list appears to be more justified by targeting recent immigrants. At the same time, the list is completely devoid of languages of the countries that are the source of the largest numbers of migrants to Russia – Armenian, Azeri, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Tajik. In the 20 years since the dissolution of the USSR, the spread of the Russian language in those countries has greatly diminished, as evidenced, for example, by the difficulties in educating the children of these migrants in Russian schools. If the census organizers really wanted to count these groups (which, according to some estimates, were significantly undercounted in 2002), it would have made sense to translate the questionnaires into the corresponding languages. The reasoning behind translating the questionnaires into Western languages such as English, French, and Spanish is completely unclear, considering that the potential population of the speakers of such languages (especially those that do not speak Russian) cannot possibly exceed a few thousand people in all of Russia. Perhaps this was driven by desire to make

the questionnaire more accessible to the international statistical community. We were unable to obtain any clarifications from Rosstat concerning the target audience of these translations.

As to the “languages of the peoples of Russia”, it is stunning that no languages from the North Caucasus region have made the list despite the findings of 2002 that already revealed a significant proportion of those who do not know Russian among the larger linguistic communities in this region. Note in particular that among the Chechens – a group that is among the five largest “peoples of Russia” – the absolute number of people not speaking Russian was significantly larger than in all other language groups that were defined as target population for non-Russian language questionnaires. On the contrary, Buriats (as well as Mordvins, Mari and Udmurts who were excluded at the last moment) are almost entirely Russian speaking but still remained on the list (see table).

The task of translating the questionnaires was assigned to the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. This effort was hampered by the fact that many of the languages lack adequate terms for the concepts used in the census. Among such problematic concepts is the “household” (first introduced in 2010 as the main counting unit, replacing “family” used in earlier censuses), and “private plots” – a concept that cannot be directly translated into foreign languages (including English) due to the absence of the corresponding social practices in most countries. However, in the context of this Conference it is important to point out the difficulties of translating the Russian term “национальность” (“national’nost’”). Rosstat insisted on rendering this simplistically as “nationality”, but many experts pointed out that this was bound to create confusion with the concept of citizenship. Some experts maintain, however, that the use of the term “ethnicity” is not quite justified here either, because the Russian word “национальность” allows a broader meaning of both civic and ethnic identity. In the officially approved “List of nationalities (national categories) to be published with the results of All-Russia 2010 census” (see table), Altai, Bashkyr, Tatars and Lezgins are placed side-by-side with Americans, Spaniards, Afghans and Nigerians as if these identity levels were comparable.

Another peculiarity of the 2010 census was that due to funding constraints it was decided to abandon preliminary visits to dwellings before the census, as well as the use of a more detailed “long” form of the questionnaire that was originally intended for 25% of the pop-

ulation. All permanent residents of the Russian Federation only had to answer 13 questions (just 7 for temporary visitors). The same lack of funding led to the weakening of the media support for the census. Many observers noted a lack of public awareness of the census, absence of advertising, and insufficient coverage of the census in print and online sources. However, as in the previous census, some associations and ideologues claiming to represent certain ethnic communities did conduct visible advertising and propaganda campaigns.

### **Conflicting identities**

IEA RAS has produced a list of territories where, based on the continuous monitoring of the pre-census situation, one could expect varying degrees of social tension due to the collection of ethnic affiliation data on census forms. More than one thousand administrative units – towns and regions – were on the list. Let me discuss just some of the problems that could lead to social polarization. Some of these are familiar from the 2002 census, while others were new.

Among the former we can mention, for example, the counting of small ethnic groups in Dagestan or the relative numbers of Tatars and Bashkyr in the Bashkortostan Republic and, in particular, the matter of the ethnic composition of north-western Bashkiriya. Also, the concerns that the numbers of the Altai people were being reduced by counting some of the population of that republic into small indigenous ethnic groups. In general, the expectations that the numbers in such small groups were set to rise, and finally the problem of undercounting migrants.

Among the more recent concerns, we can cite the calls for the “restoration of Circassian unity”. Throughout 2010, several Circassian web sites used the slogan “One people – one name” to convince everyone who calls themselves “Adyge” in their native language to sign up as Circassian during the census (using the name that Russians use for the Adyge). This is more than just a symbolic change – from “one people – one name” some of the Adyge activists want to move on to the principle of “one people – one land” and use the unified ethnic name to justify the formation of a single administrative unit: unified Circassia.

The activists of the “Congress of the Ersa people” that claim to represent the Mordvin-Ersa people, first identified as a separate ethnic group by the 2002 census, in the summer of 2010 petitioned the



president of the Russian Federation with a proposal to create a separate Ersania-Mastor republic. This initiative aimed at increasing the incentive to self-identify as Ersia. In 2002, only 84,000 out of more than 840,000 people that called themselves Mordvin have added Ersia to that self-identification.

In Kalmykia, the “Oyrat” self-identification is enjoying a growth in popularity, especially among the creative and technical intelligentsia and civil activists. That was the name of nomadic tribes, some of which migrated from Asia to the Volga region and now call themselves Kalmyk. Several civic organizations promoting Oyrat culture have been registered in the run-up to the census. In 2002, Oyrat self-identification has been noted among the Altai people who are also supposed to be the descendants of those nomads.

### **Expert community role in the census**

As before the previous census, Rosstat has formed a body of experts from the ranks of scientists and specialists. The Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the RAS has become the leading scientific institution responsible for the information section related to national identity and the language of respondents. In particular, it was responsible for updating the List of Nationalities (national categories) that was to be published when the results of the census were made public.

We must point out here that the question of “nationality” in the Soviet and post-Soviet censuses is asked in the open format (i.e. the respondent can give any answer), and the list is only used during the tabulation of responses so it is not shown to respondents. There are, in fact, two such lists – the long list that in 1989 and 2002 contained about 800 possible answers to the nationality question, and the short list that grouped those responses into larger categories (which had 128 and 182 items respectively in these two censuses). It is this grouping that became the subject of controversy and negotiations, because traditionally the presence of a line in the final tables is a sign of the recognition of the corresponding group. In an attempt to depoliticize the publication of this list some experts suggested calling it the “List of possible responses to the nationality question” rather than the “List of the peoples of Russia” (similar to the “List of the Soviet peoples” of the Soviet censuses). However, the temptation to think in group terms and to separate peoples into “us” and “them” groupings is too strong.

Some of the proponents of keeping the nationality question in censuses argue that in Russia legal and political tradition takes into account the ethnic characteristics of population, and that the Constitution of the Russian Federation allows everyone to state his or her ethnic affiliation (although that same Constitution also gives the right not to declare it). Others justify their position with reference to the needs of social science, in particular the study of identity issues. However, upon closer inspection one often finds that the anthropologists that provide such expertise are less interested in tracking and comprehending the changing self-identification mechanisms and focus more on squeezing the vast variety of responses into pre-existing schemas. Ignoring the emerging tendencies of self-identification with the largest possible categories such as Latinos or Africans, as well as civic identification as Russian citizen, these experts take the route of fragmenting and subdividing the counting categories and evoke ethnic and even racial arguments (the depth of history of a particular group within Russian territory, its “demographic weight” and so on). Thus, territorial and confessional identities are viewed as ethnic. Siberians, Cossacks and Pomors are subsumed into Russians, those that call themselves “Azeri”, “Turks”, “resident of Baku” all become “Azerbaijani”; and it is unclear what to make of “Muscovites” and “Petersbourgeois”. A particularly striking case is the fate of the response “rossiyanin” (Russian citizen): it is inexplicably lumped together with “others”, which is difficult to reconcile with the stated aim of building a civic nation. Either the census officials are not interested in finding out how widespread this form of identification really is, or they fear that the negligible frequency of such responses will put into question the often stated premise that the existence of a civic nation in Russia is an accomplished fact.

Various Roma groups had difficulties with self-identification during the census. Russians traditionally refer to these groups as “Tzigani”, however they identify themselves as “Roma” in order to distinguish themselves from other ethnic groups. Within this community, other terms are being used to differentiate subgroups of Roma population. Therefore, it was noted during the census that Moldovan Roma preferred to call themselves Moldovan or Bessarabians to avoid confusion with “Russian” Roma who, for their part, accepted the “Tzigani” label after many decades of having that term written in their Soviet passports.

As in 2002, ethnologists failed to convince the bureaucrats of the legitimacy of multiple ethnic identities. Russian citizens still cannot give more than one answer to the nationality question. That, according to observers on the ground, leads to the imposition of identity. In particular, descendants of mixed marriages that in 2002 attempted to declare double ethnic identity were generally classified as “others”, and in some cases, the census takers simply refused to record unusual responses and pushed the respondents to provide the “real” nationality.

In conclusion, we summarize the main changes in 2010 census compared to the previous one regarding the counting of ethnic affiliation:

- The list of possible responses to the “nationality” question (the long list) was extended from 800 to 1450 items by incorporating some responses that were previously counted as “others”
- The list of “nationalities” (the short list) has grown from 182 to 196 items. This increase is mostly due to adding “foreigners” – Afghans, Montenegrins, Croats, Indians, British, Bangladeshi, Pakistani, etc. Alongside the Tajiks, the Pamir people are now counted separately. Jews are now split into “highland Jews”, “Georgian Jews” and “Central Asian Jews”. Mennonites are added to the list alongside Germans. The Misharis are now counted separately but within the Tatars (although in 2002 the Institute of Ethnology concluded that they did not qualify as a separate ethnic group).
- In accordance with the Constitution, each respondent now has three choices with regard to the nationality question: to self-identify their ethnic affiliation, refuse to answer, or declare that they have no ethnic affiliation at all. Experts insist that this latter response should be included in the final census results as a separate entry and not be lumped together with “other nationalities”. The Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology has provided an opinion recommending this latter approach.

In the language section, the question about native language has returned after an absence in 2002.

**Table 1**

*Census Questionnaire Form Л (side Л2)*

<i>№ вопроса</i>	<i>Формулировка вопроса и подсказов</i>	<i>Questions and instructions</i>
<b>10</b>	<b>ИСТОЧНИКИ СРЕДСТВ К СУЩЕСТВОВАНИЮ</b>	<b>SOURCES OF SUBSISTENCE (INCOME)</b>
10.1	Укажите все имеющиеся у Вас источники средств к существованию	Declare all available sources of subsistence
	Покажите опрашиваемому карточку Число ответов не ограничено	Show the card to the respondent (the number of answers is not limited)
	1 – трудовая деятельность, включая работу по совместительству	1 – work, including the second job
	2 – личное подсобное хозяйство	2 – work at one's own/private plot
	3 – стипендия	3 – scholarship (stipend)
	4 – пенсия (кроме пенсии по инвалидности)	4 – pension (except disability pension)
	5 – пенсия по инвалидности	5 – disability pension
	6 – пособие (кроме пособия по безработице)	6 – welfare benefits (except un- employment)
	7 – пособие по безработице	7 – unemployment benefits
	8 – другой вид государственного обеспечения	8 – other type of state social wel- fare (state assistance or care)
	9 – сбережения; дивиденды; проценты	9 – savings, dividends, banking interest
	10 – сдача внаем или в аренду имущества; доход от патентов, авторских прав	10 – income from ownership, rent, patents or copyrights
	11 – иждивение; помощь других лиц; алименты	11 – support by parents or other persons, alimony
	12 – иной источник →	12 – other sources →
	<i>Запишите какой</i>	<i>Specify</i>

*Table 1 (continue)*

<i>№ вопроса</i>	<i>Формулировка вопроса и подсказов</i>	<i>Questions and instructions</i>
<b>10.2</b>	<b>Если Вы имеете несколько источников, укажите, какой считаете для себя основным</b>	<b>If You have several sources of income, please, specify the main source</b>
	Запишите номер этого источника из вопроса 10.1	Indicate the number of the main source from the list provided in question 10.1
	Вопросы 11.1-11.5 для лиц в возрасте 15-72 лет Для остальных – переход к вопросу 12.1	Questions 11.1-11.5 are for the persons aged 15 to 72. <b>Others go to Question 12.1</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>ЗАНЯТОСТЬ И БЕЗРАБОТИЦА</b>	<b>EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT</b>
<b>11.1</b>	Имели ли Вы какую-либо работу, приносящую заработок или доход с 7 по 13 октября 2010 года?	Have You had any work that provided income, wage or salary during the period October 7-13, 2010?
	да	Yes
	нет →	no →
	Переход к вопросу 11.5	Go to Question 11.5
	Вопросы 11.2-11.4 для лиц, имевших работу с 7 по 13 октября 2010 года (ответивших «да» на вопрос 11.1)	Questions 11.2-11.4 are for the respondents, who had work during the period of October 7-13, 2010
<b>11.2</b>	<b>Кем Вы являлись на основной работе?</b>	<b>What is your status at the place of your main occupation?</b>
	работающим по найму (по договору, контракту или устной договоренности)	employee (by agreement, on a contract, on an oral arrangement)
	работающим не по найму (на собственном предприятии или в организации, в собственном деле) →	employer (on one's own enterprise or organization, in one's own business) →

Table 1 (continue)

<i>№ вопроса</i>	<i>Формулировка вопроса и подсказов</i>	<i>Questions and instructions</i>
	с привлечение наемных работников	with permanent use of employees' labour
	без привлечения наемных работников	without permanent use of employees' labour
	иное	Other
<b>11.3</b>	<b>Ваша работа находилась на территории того же населенного пункта, где Вы проживаете?</b>	<b>Is your working place located in the territory of the same settlement (locality) where you live?</b>
	да	yes
	нет →	no →
	На территории Вашего субъекта Российской Федерации?	In the territory of the same subject of the Russian Federation?
	да	yes
	нет →	no →
	<b>Укажите наименование субъекта Российской Федерации (республика, край, область, авт. область, авт. округ, г. Москва, г. Санкт-Петербург) или наименование иностранного государства, где Вы работали</b>	<b>Specify the name of the territory of the Russian Federation (republic, region, autonomous region or area, Moscow, St. Petersburg) or the name of the foreign state where you worked</b>
<b>11.4</b>	<b>Имели ли Вы в этот период вторую работу?</b>	<b>Have you had during this period another work?</b>
	да	yes
	нет	no
	<i>Вопрос 11.5 для лиц, ответивших «нет» на вопрос 11.1</i>	<i>Question 11.5 for persons, who answered the Question 11.1 in the negative</i>

*Table 1 (continue)*

<i>№ вопроса</i>	<i>Формулировка вопроса и подсказов</i>	<i>Questions and instructions</i>
11.5	Искали ли Вы работу в течение последнего месяца	Have you been looking for work during the last month?
	да →	yes →
	Если бы Вам предложили подходящую работу, то смогли бы Вы приступить к ней в ближайшие 2 недели?	If You were offered a suitable work, could you start working within the next 2 weeks?
	да	yes
	нет	no
	нет →	no →
	Укажите одну главную причину:	Specify one main reason
	получил(а) работу и приступаю к ней в ближайшие 2 недели	I found work and will start working within the next two weeks
	нашел(ла) работу и ожидаю ответа	I applied for work and am waiting for an answer
	ожидаю начала сезона	I am waiting for the start of seasonal work
	занимаюсь ведением домашнего хозяйства	I am engaged in housekeeping
	иная причина →	other reason
	Запишите какая	Specify
12	МИГРАЦИЯ	MIGRATION
12.1	С какого года Вы непрерывно проживаете в этом населенном пункте?	Since what year have you permanently resided at this settlement (locality)?
	с рождения →	From birth
	Для женщин – переход к вопросу 13	For women – please, go to Question 13

Table 1 (continue)

<b>№ вопроса</b>	<b>Формулировка вопроса и подсказов</b>	<b>Questions and instructions</b>
	Для мужчин – конец опроса по форме Л	For men – the end of interview on the Form Л
	год →	year →
	<i>Для переехавших с ноября 2009 по октябрь 2010 года, задайте вопрос 12.2</i>	<i>For those who have changed their place of residence between November 2009 and October 2010, ask Question 12.2</i>
<b>12.2</b>	<b>Где Вы проживали в октябре 2009 года?</b>	<b>Where did you reside in October 2009?</b>
	Укажите наименование субъекта Российской Федерации или наименование иностранного государства	Specify the name of the territory of the Russian Federation or the name of the foreign state
	В каком населенном пункте Вы проживали?	In what type of the settlement (locality) did you reside?
	городском	urban
	сельском	rural
<b>13</b>	<i>Для женщин в возрасте 15 лет и более</i>	<i>For women aged 15 and over</i>
<b>13.1</b>	<b>Сколько детей Вы родили?</b>	<b>How many children have You given birth to?</b>
	<i>Записать общее число рожденных детей, не считая мертворожденных</i>	Write down the total number of children, excluding the stillborn
<b>13.2</b>	<b>Дата рождения первого ребенка</b>	<b>Date of birth of the first child</b>
	месяц	month
	год	year



Table 2

*Вопросы Перечисного листа формы В*  
*Census Questionnaire Form B*

<b>№ вопроса</b>	<b>Формулировка вопроса и подсказов</b>	<b>Questions and instructions</b>
	<b>№ п.п.</b>	<b>No. of the resident on the list in the household</b>
1	Ваш пол	Your sex
	Мужской	Male
	Женский	Female
2	<b>Год Вашего рождения</b>	<b>Year of your birth</b>
3	<b>Страна Вашего постоянного проживания</b>	<b>Country of your Permanent Residence</b>
4	Цель Вашего приезда в Россию	What is the purpose of your arrival to Russia?
	работа	work
	учеба	study
	служебная или деловая поездка	official or business trip
	лечение	medical treatment
	туризм, отдых	tourism, recreation
	транзитная миграция	transit migration
	другая цель →	other purpose
	Запишите какая	Specify
	<i>Для приехавших с целью работы, учебы</i>	<i>For those who came to work or to study</i>
5	<b>Продолжительность Вашего проживания на территории России</b>	What is the duration of your residence in the territory of Russia?
	месяцев	months
6	<b>Страна Вашего рождения</b>	<b>What is the country of your birth?</b>
7	Ваше гражданство	Citizenship
	без гражданства	without citizenship

**Table 3**

*Вопросы Перечисного листа формы П (сторона П1)*

*Census Questionnaire Form П (side П1)*

<b>№ вопроса</b>	<b>Формулировка вопроса и подсказов</b>	<b>Questions and instructions</b>
	<b>Раздел I – заполняется на жилище</b>	<b>Section I. DWELLING (residence)</b>
	<i>Для многоквартирных домов раздел I заполняется только в первом жилом помещении в доме (в каждом счетном участке)</i>	<i>For apartment houses Section I is filled in only at the first apartment of the house (for each census unit)</i>
<b>1</b>	<b>Тип жилища</b>	<b>Type of dwelling</b>
	Укажите один из вариантов ответа	Choose one of the options provided below
	индивидуальный (одноквартирный) дом:	the individual (one-apartment, detached) house:
	частного жилищного фонда	private housing
	государственного/ муниципального жилищного фонда	state/municipal housing
	многоквартирный дом	apartment building
	общежитие	hostel (dormitory)
	гостиница	hotel
	<b>другое жилище →</b>	<b>other types of residence →</b>
	Укажите какое (например, юрта, вагончик, бытовка, баржа и др.)	Specify (e.g. yurt, trailer, cabin, barge etc.)
	Конец опроса по форме П	The end of interview on Form P
	Бездомный(ые)	Homeless
	<i>Конец опроса по форме П</i>	<i>End of interview on Form P</i>

*Table 3 (continue)*

<b>№ вопроса</b>	<b>Формулировка вопроса и подсказов</b>	<b>Questions and instructions</b>
	<b>Раздел I – заполняется на жилище</b>	<b>Section I. DWELLING (residence)</b>
	<i>Для многоквартирных домов раздел I заполняется только в первом жилом помещении в доме (в каждом счетном участке)</i>	<i>For apartment houses Section I is filled in only at the first apartment of the house (for each census unit)</i>
<b>2</b>	<b>Время постройки дома</b>	<b>Time of the house construction (when was the house built?)</b>
	При перестройках, надстройках, расширении дома годом ввода в эксплуатацию считается год первоначальной постройки	In cases of alteration, renovation, extension (expansion) of the house, the year of construction is considered to be the year when the house was initially built
	Укажите один из вариантов ответа	Choose one of the options indicated below
	ранее 1957	before 1957
	1957–1970	1957–1970
	1971–1995	1971–1995
	1996–2002	1996–2002
	после 2002	after 2002
<b>3</b>	<b>Материал наружных стен дома</b>	<b>Material of the outside walls</b>
	Укажите один из вариантов ответа	Choose one of the options indicated below
	кирпич, камень	brick, stone
	панель, блок	concrete (reinforced concrete), panels (blocks)
	дерево	wood
	монолит	cast concrete
	другой смешанный материал	other mixed material
	иное →	other →

Table 3 (continue)

№ вопроса	Формулировка вопроса и подсказов	Questions and instructions
	<b>Раздел I – заполняется на жилище</b>	<b>Section I. DWELLING (residence)</b>
	<i>Для многоквартирных домов раздел I заполняется только в первом жилом помещении в доме (в каждом счетном участке)</i>	<i>For apartment houses Section I is filled in only at the first apartment of the house (for each census unit)</i>
	Запишите, из какого материала стены	<i>Specify the wall material</i>
4	<b>Виды благоустройства жилого помещения и санитарно-гигиенические условия проживания</b>	<b>Essential facilities and amenities</b>
	электричество	electricity
	электроплита напольная	floor electric stove
	газ:	gas:
	сетевой	gas network service
	сжиженный (баллоны)	liquefied (bottled) gas
	отопление:	heating:
	центральное	central
	от индивидуальных установок, котлов	individual heating installation
	печное	stove heating
	водоснабжение:	water supply:
	водопровод из коммунальной системы	piped water from the municipal system
	водопровод из индивидуальной системы	piped water from an individual installation
	водопровод вне жилища, колонка	water pump outside the residence

*Table 3 (continue)*

<b>№ вопроса</b>	<b>Формулировка вопроса и подсказов</b>	<b>Questions and instructions</b>
	<b>Раздел I – заполняется на жилище</b>	<b>Section I. DWELLING (residence)</b>
	<i>Для многоквартирных домов раздел I заполняется только в первом жилом помещении в доме (в каждом счетном участке)</i>	<i>For apartment houses Section I is filled in only at the first apartment of the house (for each census unit)</i>
	колодезь, скважина или другой источник водоснабжения	water well or other source of water supply
	горячее водоснабжение:	hot water supply:
	центральное	central
	от индивидуальных водонагревателей	individual heaters
	горячее водоснабжение отсутствует	no hot water supply
	водоотведение (канализация):	drainage (sewerage):
	через коммунальную канализационную систему	municipal sewage system
	через индивидуальную канализационную систему (включая септик)	individual unit for sewage system (including a septic tank)
	через систему труб в выгребные ямы и т.п.	cesspool drainage
	система канализации отсутствует	no drainage (sewerage)
	туалет:	toilet:
	туалет (со смывом) в жилище	flush toilet in the dwelling (residence)
	туалет другого типа в жилище (включая биотуалет)	other type toilet (including bio-toilet) in the residence
	туалет вне жилища	toilet outside the residence

Table 3 (continue)

№ вопроса	Формулировка вопроса и подсказов	Questions and instructions
	<b>Раздел I – заполняется на жилище</b>	<b>Section I. DWELLING (residence)</b>
	<i>Для многоквартирных домов раздел I заполняется только в первом жилом помещении в доме (в каждом счетном участке)</i>	<i>For apartment houses Section I is filled in only at the first apartment of the house (for each census unit)</i>
	туалет отсутствует	no toilet
	ванна и (или) душ:	bathtub and (or) shower:
	ванна и (или) душ в жилище	bathtub and (or) shower in the residence
	ванна и (или) душ вне жилища	bathtub and (or) shower outside the residence
	баня, сауна	bathhouse, sauna
	ванна, душ, баня, сауна отсутствуют	no bathtub, shower, sauna or bathhouse
	удаление бытовых отходов:	household waste (garbage) removal:
	мусоропровод	trash chute (refuse duct)
	мусоросборники вне дома	waste containers outside
	сбор мусора спецмашиной	garbage truck (refuse tipper)
	выброс мусора в ямы, на кучи и т.п.	trash dump (garbage pit)
	кухня:	kitchen:
	кухня или кухонный угол в доме	kitchen or kitchenette in the house
	кухня или кухонный угол в отдельном строении	kitchen or kitchenette in a separate building
	кухня и кухонный угол отсутствуют	no kitchen or kitchenette

Table 4

*Вопросы Перечисного листа формы II (сторона II2)*  
*Census Questionnaire Form II (side II2)*

№ вопроса	Формулировка вопроса и подсказок	Questions and instructions
	Раздел II – заполняется на каждую квартиру или многоквартирный дом	Section II is completed for each separate apartment or one-apartment house
	<i>Для индивидуальных (одноквартирных) домов в частном жилищном фонде вопрос 1 не заполняется</i>	<i>For individual (one-apartment) houses in private ownership Question 1 is omitted</i>
<b>1</b>	<b>Тип жилого помещения</b>	<b>Type of dwelling (residence)</b>
	отдельная квартира	a separate apartment
	Отмечается для дома или квартиры с одним личным счетом	To be filled out for a house or an apartment with a single personal account
	коммунальная квартира	communal (shared) apartment
	<i>Отмечается для дома или квартиры с двумя и более личными счетами</i>	<i>To be filled out for a house or an apartment with two or more personal accounts</i>
<b>2</b>	<b>Размер общей площади квартиры или многоквартирного дома (в целых кв.м)</b>	Floor space in a individual house or apartment (in integer square meters)
	В общую площадь жилого помещения не включается площадь:	Total living space excludes:
	– общедомовых лестничных клеток, лифтовых холлов, тамбуров, коридоров (кроме внутриквартирных), вестибюлей, сеней;	– communal staircases, escalator (elevator) halls, lobbies, hallways (excluding those inside apartment), antechambers, inner porches;
	– занятая выступающими конструктивными элементами и отопительными печами;	– area under protruding (extending) elements of the building and heating ovens

Table 4 (continue)

№ вопроса	Формулировка вопроса и подсказов	Questions and instructions
	Раздел II – заполняется на каждую квартиру или одноквартирный дом	Section II is completed for each separate apartment or one-apartment house
	<i>Для индивидуальных (одноквартирных) домов в частном жилищном фонде вопрос 1 не заполняется</i>	<i>For individual (one-apartment) houses in private ownership Question 1 is omitted</i>
	– веранд, балконов, лоджий, террас;	– verandahs, balconies, loggias, terraces
	– гаражей;	– garages
	<i>– отдельно стоящих кухонь, бань, бассейнов, саун, сараев, беседок и др.</i>	<i>– detached kitchens, bathhouses, saunas, barns (sheds), pavilions etc.</i>
3	Число жилых комнат квартиры или одноквартирного дома	Number of occupied rooms in the apartment or one-apartment house
	В число жилых комнат не включаются: кухни, холлы, коридоры, ванные и душевые комнаты, бассейны, сауны, кладовые и другие вспомогательные помещения.	The number of occupied rooms excludes: kitchens, halls, hallways, bathrooms, shower rooms, swimming pools, saunas, storerooms and other subsidiary rooms
	<i>Совмещенная кухня-столовая считается жилой комнатой.</i>	<i>A kitchenette is counted as an occupied room.</i>
	<i>Виды благоустройства жилого помещения</i>	<i>Types of dwelling amenities</i>
4	<b>Наличие телекоммуникаций</b>	<i>Availability of telecommunications</i>
	стационарная телефонная связь	stationary telephone line
	телевизионная антенна	TV antenna (TV aerial, satellite dish)



*Table 4 (continue)*

<b>№ вопроса</b>	<b>Формулировка вопроса и подсказок</b>	<b>Questions and instructions</b>
	Раздел II – заполняется на каждую квартиру или многоквартирный дом	Section II is completed for each separate apartment or one-apartment house
	<i>Для индивидуальных (одноквартирных) домов в частном жилищном фонде вопрос 1 не заполняется</i>	<i>For individual (one-apartment) houses in private ownership Question 1 is omitted</i>
	проводное радио (радиоточка)	radio line
	Раздел III – заполняется на каждое домохозяйство в квартире или многоквартирном доме	Section III is completed for every separate apartment or one-apartment house
	<i>Если в помещении проживает одно домохозяйство – заполняется только одна строка таблицы, если два и более – заполняется по одной строке на каждое домохозяйство.</i>	<i>If there is only one household in the dwelling, only one table line is filled out, if two or more, a separate line is assigned for each household</i>
<b>1</b>	<b>№ п.п. домохозяйства</b>	<b>No. on the list of households</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Число лиц в домохозяйстве</b>	<b>Number of persons in the household</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Число занимаемых жилых комнат</b>	<b>Number of occupied rooms</b>
	часть комнаты	part of a room
<b>4</b>	<i>Вид благоустройства жилого помещения</i>	<i>Types of dwelling amenities</i>
	Доступ в сеть Интернет (включая мобильный)	Internet access availability (including mobile Internet)

**Table 5**

*Вопросы Списка лиц формы С*  
*Persons List, Questionnaire Form C*

<b>№ вопроса</b>	<b>Формулировка вопроса и подсказов</b>	<b>Questions and instructions</b>
	Адрес помещения	Dwelling's address
	Район	District
	Город, внутригородской район, пгт	City (town), urban district, urban settlement ( <i>posiolok</i> )
	Сельский населенный пункт, сельская администрация	Rural settlement, rural administrative district
	Название улицы, проспекта, площади, переулка, проезда и т.д.	Name of the street, avenue ( <i>prospect</i> ), square, lane (alley), passage (thoroughfare)
	№ дома ( <i>и № корпуса, если он есть</i> ) или ФИО домовладельца ( <i>если нет номера дома</i> )	No. of the house (No. of building, if there are several) or full name of the house owner
	№ квартиры	Apartment (flat) number
	Наименование институциональной организации, учреждения	Name of the institution, organization
	Список лиц, подлежащих Всероссийской переписи населения 2010 года	List of persons, eligible for the 2010 Russian population census
	Таблица 1. Список лиц, постоянно (обычно) проживающих в этом помещении	<b>Table 1. List of persons, permanently (normally) residing in the dwelling</b>
<b>А</b>	№ п.п. домохозяйства в пределах помещения	No. on the list of households in the dwelling
<b>Б</b>	№ п.п. лица в пределах домохозяйства	No. of the person on the list in the household
<b>1</b>	Фамилия, имя, отчество (полностью)	Surname (family name), first name, second name (middle name, patronymic) (full names)

*Table 5 (continue)*

№ вопроса	Формулировка вопроса и подсказов	Questions and instructions
2	Примечание	Note
	<b>Таблица 2. Список лиц, временно находившихся в этом помещении на дату переписи населения и постоянно проживающих в другом месте</b>	<b>Table 2. The list of persons, temporarily residing in the dwelling at the date of the census and permanently residing somewhere else</b>
1	№ лица	No. of the person
2	Фамилия, имя, отчество (полностью)	Surname (family name), first name, second name (middle name, patronymic) (full names)
3	Место постоянного (обычного) жительства, срок пребывания в этом помещении	The place of permanent (normal) residence; length of residence at this dwelling
4	Проживает за рубежом	Resides abroad

DEAR LADIES AND GENTLEMEN!

We invite you to take part in the All-Russia population census of 2010!

**The All-Russia population census of 2010** is taken **14–25 October** in accordance with the Federal Law «On the All-Russia population census» from 1/25/2002 No. 8 and the governmental order of the Russian Federation from December, 23, 2009 № 1074.

The All-Russia population census is a collection of information on the persons who are found at the moment of the population count (**0 hours, October, 14th, 2010**) in all the territory of Russia, organised on a unified state methodology in order to obtain generalized demographic data.

Please, be assured that the data provided by you are protected from disclosure according to Federal Laws «On the All-Russia population census» (from Jan. 25, 2002 № 8) and «On personal data» (from July 27, 2006 № 152). The Federal Agency of the State Statistics guarantees confidentiality.

All documents are compiled on households. A **household** is treated as a family, but it can include non-relatives too. To one household are applied persons, live at one living quarters or in part of its, who completely or partly consolidate and spend their means. You may define yourself who enter into composition of your household. Tenants are not included into your household – they establish a separate household.

A person, living independently and providing himself by food and all necessities for life, is also considered a household, consisting of one person.

If in your living quarters live persons, who have more than one place of living, then they should to determine for themselves where (in what place) they will take part in the population census. In case of difficulty in the choice of a place, the preference is given to that place, where (her) his spouse resides.

The collection of population data is conducted by specially trained employees – enumerators, who during the visits to the living quarters to interview respondents and to fill in the questionnaire forms JI, II, and B (confirmed by the Government of the Russian Federation order of December 16, 2009 № 1990-р, as well as the form C) with their answers.

**The Form JI «Census Questionnaire»** (designed for one person) contains the list of 25 questions on a two-sided page with forms JI1 and JI2, and is filled in on every person who permanently resides in Russia.

**Form II «Census Questionnaire»** contains the questions characterising building (section I, page side II1), living conditions in each apartment or the one-apartment house (section II, page side II2), and also the living conditions in each household in the apartment or the one-apartment house (section III); one form is filled for each dwelling in which there are permanent residents of Russia.

Under the reduced programme, which **Form B «Census Questionnaire»** contains, those who temporarily reside in the territory of Russia at 0 o'clock on October 14, 2010 but permanently live abroad are counted (the form is designed for 8 persons, 4 persons on each page side).

**Table 6**

What Form is used for the census-taking:	
<p>Form JI:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– All persons (irrespective of citizenship), <b>permanently residing</b> in the Russian Federation;</li> <li>– Persons (irrespective of their citizenship), who arrived to the Russian Federation <b>for work</b> under contracts of the Russian and foreign organisations (except the foreign citizens working in embassies of the foreign states and international organisations offices) or <b>study for the term of one year or more</b>;</li> <li>– Persons (irrespective of their citizenship), who arrived <b>from foreign countries</b> to the Russian Federation (including the member–states of the CIS) for a <b>permanent residence or in search of a refuge</b> (irrespective of whether they have received the residence permit or not).</li> </ul>	<p>Form B:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Persons (irrespective of their citizenship), who <b>arrived</b> to the Russian Federation for work or study for <b>the term of 1 year or more</b>;</li> <li>– Persons (irrespective of their citizenship), who <b>arrived</b> to the Russian Federation for the purposes of <b>recreation, medical treatment, to visit relatives or acquaintances, for religious pilgrimage</b>;</li> <li>– <b>Transit migrants</b> (the persons who are in Russia on a way to other country).</li> </ul>

WE THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE  
ALL-RUSSIA POPULATION CENSUS OF 2010!

**Table 7**

*Estimated number of people who need non-Russian language questionnaires according to 2002 census data*

	Population by nationalities	Not Russian-speakers
Population, in total	145166731	2593446
Translation performed into appropriate language		
Tatars	5554601	219 349
Bashkirs	1673389	92 571
Yakuts	443852	55 952

*Table 7 (continue)*

	<b>Population by nationalities</b>	<b>Not Russian-speakers</b>
Chuvashs	1637094	52 303
Tuvans	243442	27 909
Burials	445175	16 330
Chinese	34577	11 178
Turks	92415	9 736
Vietnamese	26206	5 949
Korean	148556	2 901
Germans	597212	1497
<b>Total</b>		495 675
Translations planned but not performed		
Mari people	604298	16 846
Udmurts	636906	11 608
Mordvins	843350	5 816
<b>Total</b>		34 270
Translations not planned		
Chechen people	1360253	233 216
Caucasian Avars	814473	114 768
Dargwa people	510156	60 062
Ingoush people	413016	50789
Lezgian people	411535	40109
Kumyks	422409	38265
Kabarday	519958	36687
Azerbaidjani	621840	34325
Armenians	1130491	17276
<b>Total</b>		625 497

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> See: *Arel* 2002: 801–828; *Tishkov & Stepanov* 2003; *Filippova, Arel, Goussef* 2003; *Tishkov & Stepanov* 2007.

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**THE LANGUAGE OF SCHOOL EDUCATION IN  
THE CONTEXT OF IDENTITY.  
THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE\***

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*IEA RAS*

There are many tools one can use to both construct and downplay differences in society. One of the most effective tools for the social construction of identity is, in my opinion, educational policy. The fact that people belong to different cultural traditions stems from, first of all, education and socialization in general. To the fullest extent this pertains to school education. It is in childhood when people develop an understanding of ethnically coded differences. Both personal experience and well-directed teachers' efforts help to shape these ideas. A school program, to a great extent, foregrounds differences making them a subject worth studying. Educational politics implies the selection of certain cultural values in order to promote them among young people. However, some distinct characteristics can be seen in the educational policies of different states. Their focus can be on the maximum satisfaction of cultural needs of as many subcultures as possible; they can seek either modernization, or, in contrast, the conservation of tradition. In practice most social systems combine these approaches.

I would like to elaborate on the aspect of school education as related to linguistic policy in Russia. The strategic importance of language is evidenced by the fact that linguistic policy has always appeared to be an arena for political debate. During the history of my country attitudes towards linguistic pluralism have not been the same, and this was initially reflected in education.

**The linguistic tapestry of Russia**

The scale of linguistic diversity in Russia is unique. According to the Russian census of 2010, there are 174 minority languages which is 3.5 times more than in Europe, which has only around 50 minor-

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ity languages. At the same time, 99.4% of those who indicated their command of language speak Russian, which has the status of the state language throughout the whole territory of Russia. By comparison, according to the same census, Russians constitute 80.9% of the country's population, while the Russian language is native for 92% of them, or in other words, 130 million Russian citizens<sup>11</sup>. 23% of Russian citizens can speak one or more of another 38 languages; while only 1% of the population speak the other 114 languages. Thus, on the one hand we note the linguistic unity of Russia and the domination of the Russian language, while simultaneously there is broad linguistic and cultural variety.

Among all these languages, there are those that are spoken by millions of people, alongside those which are spoken by only thousands, hundreds or even tens of people. Seemingly, the most widespread languages are those used by the country's most numerous nationalities. Besides Russian, the most popular language is Tatar, used by 4.28 million people, or 3.1% of the citizens of the country who indicated their command of languages. Native speakers of another four languages surpass 1 million people, while their separate share in the linguistic landscape of Russia is less than 1% each. These are Chechen (1.35 million or 0.98%), Bashkir (1.15 million or 0.83%), Ukrainian (1.12 million or 0.82%) and Chuvash (1.04 million or 0.75%). Compared to the Russian census of 2002, only the share of Chechen language has increased in the population's make-up, while the shares of the other languages have decreased<sup>22</sup>.

The most widely spoken languages have the official status of state languages within different constituent territories of the Russian Federation. Twenty out of the twenty-one republics of Russia (the monolingual exception is Karelia), as well as the Nenets Autonomous Okrug have their own state languages besides Russian. All in all, these account for 22 languages plus the 13 languages of Dagestan. Apart from that, a series of languages are officially used by local government authorities (including Kazakh in the Altai Republic) in areas densely inhabited by their native speakers, a fact reflected in local legislation. Thus in all, some 49 different languages have official status in one part or another of Russia.

Fifteen republics have more than one state language in addition to Russian. This, besides Russian, there are another thirteen languages in Dagestan, four in Karachay-Cherkessia and two in Kabardino-Balkaria, Mari El and Moldova. On the whole, 35 languages of constituent

territories of the Russian Federation have official status, and another fourteen have official status in areas densely inhabited by their native speakers, where local government authorities have a right to officially use them (as in the case mentioned above of the Kazakh language in the Altai Republic).

### **Language and “national” schools<sup>3</sup> in historic and regional contexts**

The question of what language(s) to choose for school education is crucial in Russia. The language of school education is a possibility guaranteed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Along with the article 43 of the Constitution, the article 6 “Education language (languages)” of the Law №3266-1 “On education” of July 10, 1992 stipulates that “citizens of the Russian Federation have the right to receive general education in their native language, as well as to choose a teaching language within options provided by the educational system”. Meanwhile, studying Russian is obligatory and is regulated by the state educational standards<sup>4</sup>.

How best to combine the idea of integration of a multiethnic society with the strategy of cultural equality in the field of education? This challenge is most clearly seen in the choice of language for school education. Throughout the history of our country the issue of language diversity has been addressed differently. As a multiethnic and multi-cultural country Russia has long-standing traditions of providing education in the languages of its native peoples. As early as in the 1760s, Russian society recognized that the school system in a multiethnic country, as well as being an educational institute, should also function as a tool for the linguistic and spiritual integration of peoples.

During Soviet times, the state financed ethnic identities via legal norms and state institutes, as well as promoting the idea of “bringing peoples together” and equating their economic and cultural development. All of this was reflected in educational politics as well. Education in the native languages of the USSR reached its fullest extent in 1934, when education was provided in 104 languages. At the end of 1930s the state adopted a policy of Russification (Russian language support), and accordingly, in 1938, the USSR Council of People’s Commissars passed a decree “On the compulsory education of Russian language in the schools of national republics and territories”, whose aim was to establish bilingual education. Russian became an

obligatory subject for all schools in the country, and gradually the idea of “schools in native languages” was rejected, most schools starting to provide education in Russian. After the 1940s lower grades of “national schools” used native languages for education, while middle schools used both Russian and native languages, and upper schools provided education only in Russian.

In 1952, new educational programs were introduced with a significant increase in time devoted to the study of Russian. The law “On education” (1959) marked a real turn towards the potential loss of bilingualism, as it stipulated that parents could voluntarily choose the language of education for their children, and as a result, the Russian language became the dominant language of school education. In the 1960s, the type of school where Russian was used as a vehicular language, while the native language and its literature were taught as *school subjects*, became the standard type of “national school” in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. By the end of 1970s, only 14 languages of the USSR peoples were used in school education, while the number of languages taught in schools decreased by 44 (*Martynova* 2004).

According to the Center of National Educational Problems of the Federal Institute of Development of Education (Russian Ministry of Education and Science), the number of languages taught and used as school languages numbered 55 in 1989. The extent to which native languages were used for teaching at schools was not identical across the different regions. For example, in 1988, the Republic of Bashkiria and the Republic of Tatarstan used their native languages for teaching from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 10<sup>th</sup> grades (from lower to upper school), the Republic of Yakutia and the Republic of Tuva from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 7-8<sup>th</sup> grades (from lower to middle school), while Chuvashia, Mordovia, Mari El, Udmurtia, Altai, Khakassia, Komi and Dagestan used their native languages as teaching ones only from the 1<sup>st</sup> to 3-4<sup>th</sup> grades (lower school). Some native languages were taught as school subjects starting from the 1<sup>st</sup> grade, i.e. Adygei, Buryat, Kabardian, Balkarian, Ossetian, Circassian, Ingush, Kalmyk and the languages of some indigenous minority peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East (*Artemenko* 2011).

By the mid-80s, “national schools” were almost completely absorbed into the Russian-based school education. The results of this are well illustrated by the following figures. In 1989, among Ukrainians and Belarusians living in the USSR Russian was used as the native language by 20.6% of people (in the Russian Soviet Federative

Socialist Republic the figure was 59.9%), and as a second language by 55.9% (37.5%), making a total of 76.5% (96.4%). Among the non-Slavic population of the USSR, Russian was used as the native language by 8.8% of people (in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic the figure was 19.5%), as a second language by 44.5% (66.5%), and in total by some 53.3% (86.0%) (*Kuzmin*2001).

However, despite the state's large-scale and focused efforts to create an integrated linguistic environment via school education between the 1960s and the 1980s, we also observe the end of the spread of Russian language and culture influence in some Soviet republics in the 1980s. The reasons for this were rooted in real ethno-social, ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural processes which determined identity shaping and development.

At the beginning of 1990s, native languages started to regain the function of vehicular languages in all the territories of the Russian Federation, and the need for a system of ethno-cultural education became quite pronounced. Today there are around 9,000 "national" schools and 89 languages taught in the public education system<sup>5</sup>. 39 of them are used for teaching at schools. These include the languages of ethnic minorities such as Azerbaijanian, Armenian, Georgian, Kazakh and others. In upper grades schools teaching is done in the following languages: Altaian, Bashkir, Buryat, Mari, Tatar, Udmurt, Chuvash, Evenki, Yukaghir, Yakut and others. Furthermore, some 50 languages are taught as school subjects, generally being taught at all stages of school education (from 1<sup>st</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup> grades).

The following languages are taught in the general education system as the state languages of various republics: Bashkir, Tartar, Komi, Chuvash, Sakha. In mono-ethnic republics, such as Ingushetia, Chechnya, Tuva, native languages are studied as the official state languages. The level of bilingualism in the republics, without any doubt, determines to what extent the environment is bi-cultural.

It should be noted that the number of "national schools" tends to increase in the areas densely inhabited by ethnic minorities, where native languages are used for school education or taught as school subjects. In this way, in Russia there are 47 Armenian schools, 85 Kazakh schools, 66 Azerbaijanian schools, 19 Turkmenian schools, etc. For instance, in the Republic of Tatarstan there are 56 Chuvash, 18 Udmurt and 9 Mari pre-school institutions, as well as 140 Chuvash, Chuvash-Russian and Chuvash-Tartarian schools where more than 83,000 Chuvash children study their native language<sup>6</sup>.

However, the languages of the people of our country still differ in the degree to which they are socially demanded. The most advantageous positions are occupied by the Russian, Tatar, Bashkir and Yakut languages. These are languages used throughout all the cycles of school education. Accordingly, the regions where we have most schools teaching in native languages are Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia and Tuva. The number of schools that teach in native languages is continually increasing, mostly due to the growth of such schools in cities. Thus, at the beginning of 1990s there were about 13% of such schools in Russia, whereas now they constitute 45%<sup>7</sup>.

Some regions of Russia are particularly notable for the degree to which the network of schools teaching in native languages has grown. For example, more than 40% of all schools in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) provide education in native languages, 45% in the Republic of Bashkortostan, 60% in the Republic of Tatarstan, and 80% in the Republic of Tuva. Correspondingly, the number of children studying their native language grows. For example, in the Republic of Tatarstan the number of children taught in their native language has increased from 12% in 1991 to 50% in 2006, and in the Republic of Bashkortostan to 40%<sup>8</sup>.

To give one final example. There are 32 different languages in Dagestan, and one distinctive feature of the region is that, outside the big cities, representatives of the different ethnic groups live in separate areas. Thus, no single school has children from all 32 linguistic minorities. School education is provided in 14 of these languages: children being taught in their native languages in the lower grades, while in the middle and senior grades they study in Russian. To further complicate matters, a few Dagestani languages lack a written system, for example the Andi language, and students speaking this language go to schools where education is provided in the Avar language. The teachers usually know both languages and employ comparative methodologies<sup>9</sup>.

The schools which provide education in languages other than Russian are traditionally called “national schools”. The Russian Federation Law of 1992 “On education” changed this concept. In the bylaws of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation such schools are denoted as schools with native (non-Russian) and Russian (non-native) languages of education. Usually, schools of this type are targeted at children from many different backgrounds and are located in areas most densely populated by them.

## **Ethno-cultural education in a multiethnic city**

In the 1990s the rebirth of ethnic self-awareness was observed throughout the post-communist world, and led to the formation of organizations and movements engaged in ethno-cultural development and the preservation of minority languages and cultures. The law passed in 1996 "On national-cultural autonomy" encouraged the creation of non-governmental pre-schools, schools and post-secondary institutions teaching in native languages. In the 1990s, ethnic policy was conceptualized as the policy of multiculturalism, according to laws passed at the time ("On ethnic-cultural autonomy", "On indigenous minorities", the Concept of the State National Policy, etc.). Despite the ambiguity of the term, multiculturalism implies the pathos of seeking cultural equality, as well as a model of egalitarian coexistence of various cultures as opposed to a hegemonic model of one-culture dominance. The idea of a multicultural and multireligious social environment became one of the basic tenets of educational policy in this period. Not only in the areas densely inhabited by ethnic groups, but also in the areas populated by other ethnicities, public organizations started to build schools where education was provided in different languages and included subjects on the history and culture of this or that people. For instance, in Orenburg Oblast native languages are taught in 146 schools. Taking into consideration optional courses and non-curricular activities we can regard an ethno-cultural educational component as being used by more than 200 schools, including those using Tatar (more than 90), Kazakh (55), Bashkir (47), Mordovian (17) and Chuvash (6).

The development of so-called ethno-cultural education in the context of a multi-ethnic city was first initiated in Moscow, where the first schools of this sort were created for child-migrants. After the earthquake of late 1988, groups of young people from Armenia came to Moscow for rehabilitation, and with the help of the Moscow Government a weekend-school was created for them in the rehab centre of the Republican Children's Clinical Hospital. Subsequently a kindergarten for Georgian children was also set up, and in 1989 it was reorganized into school № 1680 with a Georgian educational component. The weekend-school was transformed that same year into a school with a multi-cultural educational component (№1650). This school gave birth to other educational institutions that later became independent: schools with Georgian, Armenian, Korean or Tatar facilities, as well as Dagestan, Polish, Ukrainian and Romany cultural

& educational centres. Therefore, starting from late 1980s in Moscow a distinctive ethno-cultural system of education started to take shape in the conditions of a multi-ethnic city. During this time the growth rate of such schools was very high, and by 1998 they numbered 47 (Goryachev 2008: 21).

The Moscow authorities and teachers envisaged the main aim of ethno-cultural education at that time as the need “to build such an educational sub-system that would start to satisfy to the fullest possible extent all essential ethno-cultural and ethno-educational needs of residents of the capital city” (Концепция 1995: 5–16). A series of methodological documents devoted to ethno-cultural education were drafted in the 1990s. According to the program “Education in the Capital-1” approved in 1994, the “*Concept of the Contents of Moscow School Education with an Ethno-Cultural Component of Education*”, as well as the “*Program of Development of Ethno-Cultural Education*” for 1994-98 were worked out. In 1997 a policy statement on the General School with an Ethno-Cultural (National) Component of Education and a Policy Statement on the Pre-School with an Ethno-Cultural (National) Component of Education were approved. A program of development of ethno-cultural education in Moscow for 1998–2000 became an integral part of the program “Education in the Capital-2”. In accordance with this program, 15 more institutions of ethno-cultural education were set up, including several schools and kindergartens with a Russian ethno-component.

The Law “On general education in Moscow” passed in 2004 approved the principles of creation and functioning of state educational institutions with an ethno-cultural educational component. According to this law, such schools became a type of “state educational institutions implementing general educational programs”<sup>10</sup>.

More than 70 educational structures today use the *Programs of an Ethno-Cultural Component* in Moscow, and teach more than 20,000 children implementing these programs. Should we regard the experience of such schools as positive or negative? Does the city need them? There is no simple answer to these questions. Almost 20 years of their existence in Moscow have demonstrated both pros and contras of ethno-cultural education, an experience that provides an opportunity for further developing their functional model based on this accumulated experience.

The success of the work of educational institutions with an ethno-cultural component is largely thanks to the highly skilled and en-

thusiastic professionals working there, and indeed that is why educational standards in schools with an ethno-cultural component are often higher than in other schools. Moreover, children get into such schools after a competitive selection process, and the number of children in each class is fewer than usual, which gives the teacher a chance to pay more attention to each child than in is the case in a normal school. Educational programs of schools with an ethno-cultural component are aimed at introducing ethno-cultural and ethical values to the students, and such schools have a pronounced humanitarian commitment. Both children and teachers of ethno-schools have turned out to be a useful resource for carrying out various urban, federal and international projects dedicated to implementation of innovative educational methods, international upbringing and the organization of folklore festivals and holidays. This means that at least some of the schools with an ethno-component can be regarded as outstanding and highly prestigious educational centres.

At one point schools with an ethno-component appeared to be in great demand, and were much sought after by the citizens of big cities. This form of ethno-cultural education is rooted in the earlier phenomenon of the “national schools” which laid the foundations for a totally new educational sub-system. If earlier “national schools” tended to exist in areas densely inhabited by one or other ethnic groups, nowadays their goal is to satisfy the ethno-cultural needs of a multi-ethnic city.

Among those interested in developing such schools, as well as preserving certain ethnic traditions and their native languages, are a number of long established ethnic minorities. A few languages taught in these schools (for example, Korean) are not spoken inside the students’ families and are studied almost as foreign languages. Alongside this, Russian schools experience the important and relatively new problem of migrants’ social adaptation: their isolation in the context of separate education can further influence socialization of the child. A series of schools undertake serious work to help recently arrived children overcome such adaptation barriers, and the time has come to take measures to prevent the formation of potential ethno-cultural and ethno-religious enclaves.

Children of natives of Moscow and residents of other cities of various nationalities are also voluntarily enrolled in schools with an ethno-component. Along with this, extremely relevant have become the efforts to introduce Russian as a foreign language into schools’



syllabuses, as well as additional programs on adaptation and integration, including efforts to create a friendly environment for preserving the migrants' native languages and studying their history, traditions and culture.

It is often the case with immigrants that they do not know Russian, which leads to their inability to keep up with the school syllabus. According to the survey conducted among head teachers in 2002, it was revealed that at that time such students attended 68% of all schools.

Integration, migratory and social processes in Moscow in the late 1990s and early 2000s have significantly changed the scene. According to the *Concept of the Further Development of Ethno-Cultural Education*, Moscow witnesses the growth of discrepancies between the Moscovites of different nationalities and new groups of immigrants, including diasporas and communities not fully integrated into Moscovite society, which produces noticeable socio-cultural barriers between the long-standing Moscovites and recent immigrants. The motivations and goals of immigrants coming to Moscow have changed, as educational and cultural motivations have given place to economic motivations stimulating new flows of labour migrants. Some of the new migrants' communities tend to form closed groups based on ethnic traits as a reaction against ethnic discrimination, as the level of tolerance of cultural and religious differences has decreased, leading to a spread of xenophobia which is now approaching extremism (Martynova 2007).

The authors of the *Concept* assume that these new trends decrease traditionally high levels of intercultural integration in big cities, destroying the traditional image of Moscovite identity and the values of the unified Moscovite socio-normative culture. For instance, Moscovite identity is set against the identities of ethnical minorities. Based on accumulated experience, a decision was made that in the context of massive arrival in big cities of unadapted migrants, ethno-cultural education should not be limited to the reproduction of ethno-cultural variety. Besides, such programs are implemented in only a few Moscow schools, while the overall needs of general schools remain unfulfilled. As a result, ethno-cultural education in all general schools (in particular in Moscow) has been transformed to include the multi-cultural training of all the participants of the educational process, i.e. students, teachers and parents (Martynova 2007).

According to the recently drafted *Concept of the Further Ethno-Cultural (Multi-Cultural) Education in Moscow*, "the purpose of ethno-cultural education under current conditions is the creation

of Russian and Moscovite identity, civil consciousness and patriotism regardless of students' ethnic background. The ethno-cultural component of the educational process should aim at the formation of positive ethnicity, intercultural competence and student tolerance, shaping individual values of peace culture, international dialogue and harmony" (Ethnodiologi 2007: 17–40).

### **School programs for the education of migrants' children**

The majority of "new wave" migrants have a poor knowledge of Russian, while a lot of recently arrived children do not speak Russian at all. Young people migrating to Russia lack a sufficient knowledge of the basics of Russian legislation, culture, history, traditions, and standards of everyday behaviour, which means they are not integrated into Russian society.

Starting from 2000, Moscow schools began to teach "Russian as a foreign language". That same year one of the Moscow schools organized a pre-school class for non-Russian-speaking children from 6.5 to 8 years. The first students in the class were the children of refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq and various African countries. The methodology was developed by the *Department of International Education of Moscow Institute of Open Education* (opened in 1999 as part of the *Center of Interethnic Education*), and included study guides and learning packages. A teachers' course on teaching Russian as a foreign language was also introduced. In 2000 a memorandum was signed declaring cooperation between the Moscow Government and the Russian delegation of the United Nations Office of the High Commission for Refugees. It was also supported by UNESCO (Goryachev 2008: 50–51).

As a part of a special international project, for the next 5-6 years new approaches were worked out to provide consistent education for migrants' children in a Russian-language school. In March 2006 the Department of Education approved the "Program of integration of foreign migrants' children into the Moscow educational environment and their socio-cultural adaptation to the conditions of the Moscow metropolis". Its recommendation was the creation of a network of Schools of the Russian Language which would develop methodological foundations for teaching Russian to students of different levels, as well as becoming integrative centres for teaching the basics of Russian legislation, culture and history, helping to shape Russian identity

among recently arrived children, providing psychological support, and giving information to parents. In 2006-07 ten full-day experimental schools of this type were set up in different districts of Moscow. Children need to study there for one year; afterwards they continue their education in normal schools at their place of residence (*Martynova* 2013a). All such classes are affiliated with normal schools. For one year children study mainly just Russian and to a lesser extent other subjects (for instance, students of upper grades), and then return to general classes. Today in Moscow there are twelve such schools of the Russian Language for non-Russian-speaking children, while in another 68 Moscow schools additional classes of Russian are provided. The experience of Moscow Schools of the Russian Language was adopted by schools in Saint-Petersburg and other Russian cities.

A quarter of the students of these schools are the children of migrants from countries outside the former Soviet Union; the other 75% come from the Commonwealth of Independent States and other regions of Russia. The most common countries of origin are Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Kirghizia and Uzbekistan. 22% of students studied at the equivalent to the first grade of a general school, another 28% of students studied in other lower grades, and the remaining 50% finished preparatory programs for students of fifth to ninth general school grades (*Goryachov* 2008: 57).

To sum up, the use of this kind of adaptation programs is in line with international standards. At some point in the future we will be able to evaluate their influence on the ethno-cultural environment of Moscow, however, even today one can state that the most effective ways of adaptation and integration of immigrants into the cultural map of a city can be found in the system of education of children and teenagers who are much more sensitive to the traditions and rules of Moscovite social life. Therefore, after developing programs of education with an ethno-cultural component, Moscow teachers created a network of institutions encouraging complex linguistic and socio-cultural adaptation of migrants' children.

### **Perspectives of Russian identity and education**

According to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 19, 2012, the Strategy of the State National Politics of the Russian Federation until 2025 was approved. On August 25, 2013 the Government of the Russian Federation stipulated the fed-

eral purpose-oriented program “Enhancing the unity of the Russian nation and ethno-cultural development of the peoples of Russia” for 2014–2020. These documents put forward the following goals:

- a) enhancing pan-Russian civil consciousness and the spiritual unity of the multi-ethnic society of the Russian Federation (the Russian nation);
- b) the preservation and development of the ethno-cultural diversity of the peoples of Russia;
- c) the harmonization of national and international (interethnic) relationships;
- d) the maintenance of equal human and citizen’s rights regardless of race, nationality, language, religion and other circumstances;
- e) the effective social and cultural adaptation and integration of immigrants (*Martynova 2013b*).

How can these goals be effectively combined? New challenges and trends have stirred up new pedagogical activities (*Materialyi 2007*). In recent years Russian teachers have been paying ever greater attention to methods of shaping the identity of young people, their civic stance and patriotism. For instance, the Federal Institute of Education Development led by of A.G. Asmolov prepared “Teaching aids on shaping the civic identity of students for teachers at various levels of general education system in the framework of social partnership between families and schools”, as well as the “Program of psychological and pedagogical support for parents in relation to shaping the civic identity of students in the framework of social partnership between families and schools”. The book by V.A. Tishkov, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, could be helpful to the teachers of social disciplines. The topic of civic identity formation among young people has been widely discussed in dissertations and scientific papers, as well as in methodological seminars and scientific conferences. In October 2012, the Public Chamber held hearings devoted to “Forms and methods of work with identities: language, education, culture”.

To sum up, it should be noted that the latest research carried out by Russian sociologists shows that Russian self-awareness among young people appears to be dominant today (*Gorshkov 2011b; Drobizheva*

2009). Around 80-95% of young people who took part in the survey stated that they consider themselves Russians and feel a connection to Russia; up to 70% replied that they feel bound by close ties to other citizens of Russia. This figure is quite high considering the fact that, according to the survey conducted by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, in 1992 only a quarter of Moscow population identified themselves as Russians (*Drobizheva* 2009: 19).

The sociologists' research also demonstrates that Russian citizens can easily have multiple identities (interpretations of themselves). State, civic and ethnic identities can co-exist for the majority of citizens. The poll conducted in 2011 revealed an almost complete overlapping of state-civic and ethnic identities (95% and 90%) (*Gorshkov* 2001a; *Drobizheva* 2013). Although in reality these identities are differently interpreted and understood by the respondents, it is obvious that shaping the concept of national and civic identities has become an important social factor for Russian citizens. At the same time ethnic identity has not lost its significance, it dominates to some extent national-civil identity. How effectively civic 'Russianness' will go together with ethnic 'Russianness', 'Bashkirness', 'Yakutness' etc. in the future? We would agree with the opinion that "State policy devoted to the support and development of ethno-cultural diversity must be aimed not only at strengthening citizens' ethnic self-awareness, but also at enhancing the Russian peoples' sense of inter-ethnic solidarity, at the integration of citizens of different nationalities into a unique co-citizenship, and at the formation of a unique civic identity" (*Tishkov* 2010: 635).

All the above is equally valid for the education system, which plays a crucial role in promoting national self-awareness and citizens' upbringing. Contemporary educational standards provide for the spiritual and moral development of a young person who recognizes that he belongs to the Russian nation, as well as knowing the traditions of the peoples of Russia and, above all, the traditions of his own people and region.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Returns of the Russian census of 2010. Appendix 6. Command of languages among the population of Russian Federation. [http://www.gks.ru/free\\_doc/new\\_site/population/demo/per-itog/tab6.xls](http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/per-itog/tab6.xls)

<sup>2</sup> Returns of the Russian census of 2010. Appendix 6. Command of languages among the population of Russian Federation. [http://www.gks.ru/free\\_doc/new\\_site/population/demo/per-itog/tab6.xls](http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/per-itog/tab6.xls)

<sup>3</sup> Since Soviet times “national schools” is the traditional term used to denote schools with non-Russian vehicular languages (i.e. languages used for teaching other material).

<sup>4</sup> <http://mon.gov.ru/dok/fz/obr/3986/>

<sup>5</sup> The current archives of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, 2010.

<sup>6</sup> The current archives of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, 2010.

<sup>7</sup> The data of Artemenko O.I.

<sup>8</sup> The current archives of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, 2010.

<sup>9</sup> The data of Artemenko O.I.

<sup>10</sup> See Article 5 of this law. URL: [www.mos.ru](http://www.mos.ru), accessed on February 3, 2015.

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## **‘PERESTROIKA’ IN THE RUSSIAN PROVINCES\***

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Due to the efforts of Western historians studying the Soviet period, over the course of the last decade the concept of ‘Soviet subjectivity’ has established itself firmly in the lexicon of scholars<sup>1</sup>. Through their analysis of ‘sources of personal origin’ such as diaries and autobiographies, Jochen Hellbeck, Igal Halfin and other historians have shown that Soviet ideology was a constituent factor in establishing the historical subject and its perception of self and the world (*Halfin, Hellbeck* 2002; *Hellbeck* 2006). Thanks to works of this kind, it has become clear how deeply Soviet ideological language was internalised by wide swathes of the population. Similarly, applying the ideas of Michel Foucault to Russian material, Oleg Kharkhordin describes the Party and educational practices in the USSR in terms of techniques for the production of the self (*Kharkhordin* 1999).

Yet, whereas the case for the interaction or even the harmonious unity of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘Sovietness’ looks quite convincing with regard to the 1920s and 1930s, with regard to more recent times, the picture is rather more complex. It would seem that the ‘Thaw’ and the Brezhnev years can be better understood as a process of gradual differentiation within the former conditional unity and an increasing autonomy of the historical subject from Soviet discourse. This process is described in greater detail by Aleksey Yurchak. According to his research, ‘the last Soviet generation’ seemed to be separate from the ossifying public rituals and ideology, but not in opposition to them (*Yurchak* 2006).

The swift end to the Soviet era seems to have an intrinsic logic, to be a set point in a defined trajectory. Numerous investigations into ‘post-socialism’ have dealt with quite different kinds of subjectivity. Yet certain sociologists have claimed that a kind of ‘ideally typical’ Soviet person possessing a set array of (rather unattractive) characteristics has continued to ‘be reproduced’ even after the fall of the Soviet Union (*Gudkov* 2009). Could Soviet discourse really

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have disappeared so rapidly? How did this turning point affect the mass everyday level of social life that is traditionally at the centre of anthropologists' attention?

As an avenue of approach for finding answers to these questions, this article proposes the experience of local history from the 1980s to the 2000s in the 'urban settlement'<sup>2</sup> of Sosnovka and the surrounding Sosnovska district in Tambov province. From 2006 to 2009, I carried out field research primarily in Viryatino, a settlement near Sosnovka that was described by Soviet ethnographers in a famous monograph of 1958 (*Kushner et al.* 1958; see also *Alymov* 2011). Over the course of 2010, interviews with 37 inhabitants of Sosnovka itself were recorded. With a few exceptions, those interviewed were people born between the mid-1940s and mid-1950s, so that they belonged to the generation that reached a conscious age during the epoch of 'Mature Socialism' and the ensuing transformations.

Having received the status of 'urban settlement' only in 1966, Sosnovka was at the centre of an agrarian area, and so the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants were peasants and the children of peasants. At the same time, the Sosnovka inhabitants whom I surveyed mainly belonged to a more or less privileged stratum of people engaged in intellectual work – managers, journalists, teachers, doctors and entrepreneurs. The form of the interviews was at once biographical and judgement-based: I asked my interlocutors to describe and evaluate the changes that had taken place from post-Soviet times to the present day in various areas of life: in everyday life, interpersonal relations, social mood, values, ideology and relations with authority.

The second source for my research was the newspaper of the Sosnovska district, which was renamed three times during this time: from its original title *Leninskaya pravda* (Lenin's Truth) it changed to *Slovo* (The Word) in 1991, later becoming *Sosnovskoe slovo* (The Sosnovka Word) in 1997.

The district press is a valuable source that can be somewhat undervalued by ethnographers. Like every district newspaper, the *Sosnovskoe slovo* reflects everyday life in the region, but from the late 1980s and through the 1990s it was a far from typical local newspaper. At that time, journalists who had received a professional education in central higher education establishments were the backbone of the collective. The creative potential of these authors provided the newspaper with a high level of reflective writing, meaning that it did not simply act as a chronicle or transmitter of official informa-

tion, but also as a real tool for the community to make sense of the events taking place. The opportunity to write without censorship, which emerged in the late 1980s and coincided with the arrival of a young and progressive main editor, made it possible for the talent of a whole series of journalists to be revealed, and they were to play an important role in the history of not just the newspaper but also in the region as a whole. The high standard of the newspaper is attested to by the fact that more than once it has been named the best publication in Tambov province, and in 1997 it took first place in a nationwide competition, becoming the best district newspaper in Russia.

The creative work and social activity of three journalists from the *Sosnovskoe slovo* are of particular importance for this research project. All three authors, Lyudmila Sergeevna Kudinova, Vera Alekseevna Rozhkova and Larissa Ivanovna Uvarova, belong to the post-War generation. Lyudmila Kudinova and Vera Rozhkova are natives of Sosnovska district, professional journalists who worked for the district newspaper from the 1970s. During perestroika their paths diverged. Following a series of publications about the privileges of the local Party and economic elite that made a big splash, in 1990 Lyudmila Kudinova became a deputy at the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), and joined the 'Democratic Russia' faction. In the first half of the 1990s she was deputy governor of Tambov Oblast, and in the mid-1990s she returned to Sosnovka, where she worked as a teacher and was a deputy at the village council.

To this day Vera Rozhkova continues her work at the *Sosnovskoe slovo*. Her articles might be called an 'encyclopaedia of Sosnovka life'. In the words of Vera herself, she writes mainly about 'everyday issues', primarily about cultural life, everyday existence and the social realm. The leitmotif of her publications might be called 'women's issues', focussing on family problems and young people. Her articles (generally written under the pseudonym Popova) stand out in their particular ethnographical attention to detail and simultaneous search for a sociological understanding of events, morals and the 'spirit of the epoch'. She adopts an independent critical position, and has always remained at some distance from politics, although of course she welcomed (at least in the beginning) the reforms and liberalisation in social life that came at the end of the 1980s.

Larissa Uvarova is an ambiguous character and is somewhat mysterious. She moved to Sosnovka at the end of the 1980s, and worked at the newspaper from 1989 to 1996. Her articles had a clear journalistic

flavour, and even when describing events on a local scale she drew far-reaching social and political conclusions. Towards the middle of the 1990s Uvarova became a social leader, able to bring people together for demonstrations. In 1999, for reasons described below, she was forced to leave the district, and in 2010 she passed away. The people who knew her remember her as a striking orator and leader, an eccentric and sharp-witted person, partial, however, to rather random behaviour. For example, in one of her articles from 1991 Uvarova describes an 'experiment' she carried out to illustrate how serious the problem of theft was: at night she walked past some warehouses and through the whole village with a huge bedtick stuffed full of rags over her shoulder, so that she could see if she would be stopped by the police or any inhabitants. At 1am she made it home safely (Uvarova 1991b: 4).

Alessandro Portelli pointed out that in a certain sense, information from oral sources can never be regarded as false. Even if the facts it contains are subject to distortion, this very distortion reflects the values and views of the informants: '(W)hat is different about oral history is that "false" assertions are nevertheless psychologically "reliable", and this reliability can be just as important as a factually reliable testimony.' (Portelli 1991: 51). Taking this position, I tried to expose these two strata in both written and oral sources – factual information and values from whose perspective various facts are interpreted. From this point of view, the publications of the local district newspaper, with its many letters to the editor from ordinary inhabitants and articles written by professional journalists describing everyday life in Sosnovka, are thematically closely linked to, and have something in common with, my recorded interviews. They mention the same key events in life in the district; evaluations and opinions given in the interviews often coincide with the general 'ideological line' of the district newspaper. At the same time, the articles allow us to delineate a more factually reliable picture of the past than oral sources, since even when referring to events in the comparatively recent past, the latter are characterised by being chronologically approximate.

In this way, any attempt to compile a 'local history' of Sosnovka over the last thirty years must simultaneously be a narrative that outlines the specific sequence of events, as well as a reflection on how historical memory functions, inevitably interpreting the past rather than becoming its duplicate. Moreover, publications in the *Sosnovskoe slovo* show that reminiscence and reflection on what was then the very recent Soviet past was an important part of the history

of the post-Soviet epoch, while my interviews, as though of their own accord, concentrate on comparisons of the two epochs in life of the 'penultimate Soviet generation' [I would like to remind readers that Yurchak's 'last generation' referred to people born between the mid-1950s and early 1970s] (Yurchak 2006: 31–32).

Finally, it is worth clarifying the inverted commas containing the word 'perestroika' in the title. In the course of my field work, I became convinced that the majority of informants understand this concept not in the narrow sense of a specific stage in Gorbachev's politics (Barsenkov 2002: 81), but more literally – as a cardinal change of the whole social order that took place throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. It is this experience and the way it is understood by the inhabitants of Sosnovka, and by the many Russian places like it, which form the subject of this study.

### **Perestroika**

Despite the ambiguous – to put it mildly – attitude towards the events at the end of the 20th century, one can say that the majority of my interlocutors acknowledged that the resounding speeches about perestroika and overcoming 'stagnation' were linked to concrete hopes. To the reasons indicated can be added the fact that an urge for change was dictated by a sense of tedium, an understanding of how ineffective the agricultural system was, and impressions of life abroad, which, odd though it may seem, many inhabitants living 'out in the sticks' did have, thanks to a scheme that issued tourist vouchers permitting travel to socialist countries, and which was widespread by the end of the Soviet era. The new general secretary Gorbachev made a positive impression on many. However, the most important process of the early perestroika period was changing the framework and boundaries of public discourse, which gradually came to include previously unthinkable issues and modes of discussion. This process can be traced most effectively through publications in the *Leninskaya pravda* newspaper.

It would be incorrect to suppose that before perestroika newspaper publications had no critical element. From the very beginning the Soviet authorities used the district press not only to praise the regime, but also as a means of criticising negligent managers, and to educate the population about the positive and negative examples of mismanagement, uncultured behaviour and parasitism. It is possible to identify two interconnected vectors of changes in public discourse that were manifested in various newspaper publications: a gradual

increase in critical tension in publications and, in the articles of more progressive journalists, the resonant issue of the battle against bureaucracy and the vacuous officious forms of public life.

In 1987–1988 reviews of letters to the newspaper repeatedly remarked upon the abrupt change in the tenor of readers' correspondence:

Reports about ordinary labour successes, sycophantic letters of gratitude and resounding reviews of concerts on special public holidays and other gala events gradually pass into legend. Increasingly there are letters reflecting upon the course of perestroika and democratization in public life, about the flaws in areas such as trade and health, and 'painful' problems in social and cultural life are raised (Post 1988a).

In the following review of letters the author also indicated the growing number of letters about the growing 'lack of culture in our lives' (the impudence of shop assistants and doctors, the neglect of street care and so on): 'The habit of dullness and routine has eaten so profoundly into the fabric of our lives and being that any attempt to disturb it evokes perplexity' (Post 1988b).

A kind of breakthrough was achieved by an article by Lyudmila Kudinova that began with the problems of trade, but later progressed to the theme of the distribution of welfare and social justice that was central to the public consciousness. In this article, which created a tremendous stir, 'Shortage. Who Creates It and Why?', Kudinova 'declares for all to hear what everyone had previously whispered on street corners', specifically the practice of manipulating the distribution of goods in short supply (from furniture to trimming materials and books), as a result of which many of them ended up with the trade workers themselves, and their relatives and 'clients':

'So I'm not to take anything for myself?' This phrase was heard many times. It sounded certain, tranquil, with a sense that it had formed and been confirmed over many years.

Well, would *you* work in retail without having better clothes and shoes, without eating a bit better, let's say, having tinned salmon and silver carp, or marshmallows and biscuits, drinking Indian tea and instant coffee?! (*Kudinova* 1988a).

The increased shortages provoked ever greater numbers of questions among the population, and the newspaper did not merely respond with vivid everyday sketches, but also gave a precise answer to the question 'who is guilty?':

That day very early there was a big crowd in the department store at the district centre. The doors to the shop had been propped open in expectation of the shop assistants by those eager to get some good, reliable boots. The whole forbidding look of the crowd said: strangers keep out!

‘Wonder what they’re like?’ someone said.

‘Some don’t need to wonder. They was walking to work in them boots today already,’ someone in the queue said.

‘What?!’

‘That’s my point. You need to know how to fix things, not stand in a queue.’

This vivid description of the incredible crush, when the shop assistants carry several boxes of imported shoes onto the shop floor, is followed by an indication of the ‘other side’ of trade:

They (the shop assistants – S.A.) didn’t hang back, and then, to the sounds of grumbling from the queue, shop assistants from other departments and their friends, and friends of friends all went into the storeroom, and, as they say, out they came tired but satisfied – each one with a new purchase.



Владимир Жабский, уже больше года сотрудничающий с нами, решил выразить свою позицию этим рисунком. Тема, как всегда у автора, весьма актуальна. Действительно, с чем мы идем к рынку, что принесет он рядовым людям?

Illus. 1. ‘Contract Prices’. ‘Yes, but who made the contract?’ Artist V. Zhabsky.

*Slovo*, 7 December 1991. No. 5.

‘So that’s the crux of the matter,’ says the quick-witted reader. Absolutely right – the other side of trading. That one like a cat in a bag, which came through the ‘back door’. What’s that, you don’t like it? It belittles your sense of human worth? Offends your feelings? Big deal! Don’t have it then – we’ll find other people who want it (Korneeva Kudinova 1988: 4).

A critical event not only in the social but also the political life of the district was the publication of an article by Lyudmila Kudi-

nova entitled 'Mansions: Why So Many Are Being Built in Sosnovka Now' (Kudinova 1988b: 2). This was a reference to the dozens of high quality brick houses that were built at that time in a part of central Sosnovka that locals called 'Rude Town'<sup>3</sup>. As it turned out, the 'mansions' had been erected without going through the proper channels and violated large numbers of building regulations, but most importantly, they were built at the expense of State departments and organisations, which is to say 'public funds'. Their future owners were the managers of these organisations: from the head of the District Agro-Industrial Association, the district agricultural system, and the services department, to the chief physician of the hospital and the chair of the committee for district control. 'Mansionism', as Kudinova wrote, 'was quite a phenomenon in Sosnovka', mansions 'continue to grow like mushrooms before our very eyes', and it was during this time, when 'hundreds of families are huddling in poky little rooms in hostels and tumbledown houses, and are creeping into debt, when, having lost all hope of getting a flat, they decide to build one themselves or buy a house.' The author called for 're-establishing social justice on every level'.

When remembering 'Rude Town', people always note that by modern standards, these houses were nothing special – they were no more than good quality, but quite modest 'cottages', nothing in comparison to the real 'mansions' of the 1990s. However, at the time the repercussions were huge. The newspaper received 28 responses, whose authors 'were guided by a heightened sense of social justice awakened by the glasnost years'. The fact that managers 'received preferential social benefits', as the newspaper's review of letters summarised, was a 'social evil' that had become endemic during the years of stagnation (Pochta 1989: 1). The letters published from enraged readers contained demands to 'root out rudeness', a proposal to give away 'detached houses' to be used as kindergartens, to pass them on to 'simple workers' or families with many children, as well as political demands: 'Isn't it time that the District Committee of the Communist Party and the district executive committee took up a principled and honest position in relation to these shameless people and turned their attention to the needs of the people, and represented their interests?' (Gladilina *et al.* 1989: 3).

The wave of mass dissatisfaction with the local leadership that arose marked the beginning of Lyudmila Kudinova's political career. In 1989 she published articles on related issues, such as 'The Virus of Exclusivity', which was about the sale by the district consumer union of motor cars to district bosses out of turn. Judging by



letters written to the newspaper, the results of the spot-checks and commissions created to examine these cases did not satisfy the population. Kudinova wrote:

We are just waking up from a long slumber, but how painful is this awakening! How we wish to not see trampled ideals, outraged honour and decency all around us, a lack of conscience in those who manage and rule us as we go about fulfilling the five-year plan for milk or meat (*Kudinova 1990a: 2*).

In 1989 a gathering of citizens in the town of Sosnovka put forward Lyudmila Kudinova as a candidate for the people's deputy of the USSR to counterbalance the candidate traditionally proposed by the Party's district committee 'under orders'. The initiative belonged to a teacher working at the vocational school, N. D. Varchev. Up to this point, Lyudmila Kudinova had not only enjoyed widespread popularity with local people generally, but had also been the newspaper's Party organiser, a member of the district committee. She had the support of some of the 'progressive' Party and agricultural managers in the district. In this way, the district committee, like the Communist Party as a whole, found themselves in quite a contradictory situation. On the one hand, its official policy was, naturally, not to allow Kudinova to be selected. All primary organisations were instructed to let anyone go through but her. In total, nine candidates took part in the campaign, many of whom were obviously put forward 'as an alternative' to the obstinate journalist. Activists recall the enthusiasm with which people helped to organise Kudinova's pre-election campaign (money for placards, petrol for trips, costs for time off work etc.), and the obstacles they encountered (meeting disruption, rumours and counter-campaigns).

On the other hand, one of the instructors of the ideological department organised a meeting between Kudinova and some work collectives which, of course, could not have taken place without the permission of the authorities, and helped compile the programme. The population's sympathy was unanimously on the side of the journalist. The civic assembly that had launched her candidacy was an extraordinary event. Taking place in the packed hall of the cinema, as a current member of the district committee recalls, this meeting 'was simply overflowing with joy! People were talking so much, and they were so critical of us politicians that everyone in the hall was on their feet applauding'. Kudinova was duly victorious at the elections, beating the 'district committee' candidate by almost 10,000 votes.

The main ideological message which the author of 'Mansions' recommended to the people was, of course, the demand for 'social justice'. Besides this fundamental issue, Lyudmila Kudinova spoke out for the democratic election of Party and government leadership, higher prices for agricultural producers, and the independent choice by peasants of the form of economic management they were supposed to live by. She refused to have anything to do with 'Memorial', the national front or the Inter-Regional Group (*Kudinova* 1990b). In an interview carried out when I was doing my fieldwork, Lyudmila Kudinova recalled: 'My ideology was to improve the Party, to shake it up so that it would finally face change and perestroika today'. Only later, under the influence of metropolitan luminaries – Yeltsin, Sakharov and other members of the Inter-Regional Group of People's Deputies – did she come to realise the 'naivety' of her reformist ideas of that time.

The atmosphere made possible by such events is difficult to understand without taking into consideration the second change mentioned above: the gradual rejection of public rituals and other established forms of public life. From 1985, one of the most problematic issues, evoking the widest outcry, was leisure facilities for young people: 'The culture club is empty, public events are pompous and boring, and youth work is totally bland' (*Pochta* 1987). Vera Rozhkova wrote repeatedly about the 'window dressing' approach and 'conventionalism' of work with schools, cultural institutions and the district cinema, which was the reason why youth leisure was reduced to 'rackety' dance evenings, when there was 'nothing to do sober' (*Popova* 1987). The sense of emptiness and being at a loose end felt by some young men led to vandalism, hooliganism, and mindless theft. Kudinova viewed the solution in freeing the individual's actions from excessive ritualisation. When describing the 1987 competition among local village soviets for the best civil ceremony (naming, engagement, marriage)<sup>4</sup>, Kudinova criticised those who were so full of grandeur and pomposity that 'you completely lost sight of the people who were supposed to be at the centre of the celebration' (*Kudinova* 1987). In an article about Pioneers' Day, in 1989 Rozhkova compared it to the formerly strictly regulated public holidays, when, after marches, reports and speeches arranged at the square, children would begin to faint. Having rejected this kind of rigid organisation and formalism, the Pioneers organisation had to become a place where the 'rudiments of the future of personality and individuality' were established. At a public holiday in 1989, there was evidence of the new develop-

ments, when children talked in their own words about the activities and achievements of their section (*Popova* 1989).

Another example of this kind of rejection of ritual forms of behaviour was shown to Sosnovka residents by Alexander Lyubimov, the presenter of the then massively popular TV show *View*, who had stood for election as a People's Deputy of the USSR for Tambov province<sup>5</sup>. When going to meet voters he arrived in jeans and a black T-shirt decorated with the emblem of the USSR and the words 'All power to the soviets!'. In an article about this meeting, Uvarova wrote about his uniqueness and even described him as an 'extraterrestrial', striking in his relaxed nature, honesty and refusal to accept the ideals of the past (*Uvarova* 1990a: 2).

However, the rapidly worsening material conditions soon changed people's mood. Here, I shall describe the subsequent events of the 1990s – 2000s from two viewpoints: 1) changes at the domestic and everyday level as seen through the prism of a discourse about changing character and interpersonal relations, and 2) ideological and socio-political processes as they emerged in the discussion of ideas about the past and in the 'use' of history to define the values of the present.

### **'Money ruined the Russian and his soul'**

The relationships between people in everyday life and the related rules and micro-rituals are a complicated issue, and any statements made regarding them always give cause for doubt, and can be considered 'subjective' and not necessarily typical. In my decision to include this issue in my conversations with Sosnovka residents I was influenced by one of the first interviews I conducted, in which this issue was raised by a member of the local intelligentsia: 'Everyone closed up, you could say. Everyone kind of dug themselves into a hole, had less trust in one another, less sense of obligation and less willingness to help. <...> At one point, borrowing money was quite common, but nowadays borrowing money from anyone except a close relative is quite out of fashion' (male, b. 1949). The structure of this kind of reasoning is also based on a comparison between this situation and past Soviet times. In 2000, the *Sosnovskoe slovo* published an article by a tenth-grader in which she wrote about the reasons why there was nostalgia for the past. In her words, native Sosnovka residents 'sigh about the days when there were parades with banners on the first of May' and celebrations were organised in the park. Trips to the cinema and even to the shops were talking points, whereas now in their free

time Sosnovka residents 'watch their televisions, sit around at home, and play cards'. The author of the letter noted the current lack of communication which forces people to think of the past with nostalgia: 'Long ago were the days when you might see a small group of people happily chatting and smiling on the street. <...> People are beginning to be afraid of one another, because they have completely stopped communicating' (*Skopintseva* 2000: 4).

Many informants formulated their own observations in terms of the changing character of people and their personal relationships in modern times using such strong expressions as malice, envy and greed in contrast to kindness and openness in the past. As a rule, these changes are linked by informants to the stratification of ownership and the abrupt increase in the importance of money.

It's more or less the same people as always (in the group), but the relations are different. People became different, do you see? So say I remember how I got married here, I moved here when I was eighteen. I came to our street. People would always gather near our house, my father-in-law was an accordion player. Say it's a holiday, they'd have some kind of celebration. They'll be just a little bit drunk, nobody was completely drunk, just a little! And they're singing songs, and socialising and so on<sup>6</sup>. I don't want to say that my neighbours now are bad. They're good neighbours, God bless them! But it's just the house, that's all! And the fence. There's no socialising, do you see? There's all the division of income, and this is what it causes – dissatisfaction with life and dissatisfaction with one another. Maybe it even causes envy (female, b. 1961).

Observations relating to the role of envy and stratification of ownership and the destructiveness of these for neighbourly and friendly relations are one of the leitmotifs in the reflections of Sosnovka residents about the transformations in recent decades.

There's almost no socialising. Everyone's ground down with their own problems and aren't about to rush over to a neighbour's house for tea. That's one reason. Because everything is expensive, even relatives have stopped going to visit each other. And the third thing is that people have begun to be resentful, probably because they see one person enjoying success without working, while someone else is working hard for peanuts. <...> As soon as our system started changing, can you imagine what questions all those mansions raised in our minds? (female, b. 1945).

The same problems are also experienced by inhabitants living several kilometres away from Sosnovka in the large town of Tretyi Levye Lamki. A young woman, chair of the town council, remarked upon the characteristic trait of the past: 'Somehow it was simpler. We always had someone staying in our family. Families got together for every celebration. <...> Now it's not like that. Now each family is more isolated'. She named several factors that brought people closer together in the past. First of all, there was no stark stratification, and an approximately uniform level of comfort. Then, gathering the plants from one's vegetable garden at harvest time generally united the forces of several families, who jointly collected the produce from their plots. Nowadays, vegetable gardens are much less frequently cultivated – instead people mainly cultivate seasonal work in Moscow. This leads to a disparity of income as well as a lack of time to spend maintaining interpersonal links, visiting friends or family and celebrating special occasions together with others. The cinema, which was the centre of collective leisure activity even up until the 1990s, squandered this function, eventually becoming a small bar. Television and the spread of Internet access also took their toll. 'Isolation' is said to affect relations between neighbours and attitudes towards children:

Now you try not to let other people in the house, to conceal what you've got there. Suppose you suddenly have too much and others envy you. Or then again, less than someone else. But before, we would skip along without trouble, I don't even know how, five people at a time would come round and there was enough rolls and buns for everyone.

I was the baby of the whole street. My mum, never shy, could send me to one neighbour, or a second neighbour, or a third. And people didn't refuse. <...> Now no one would babysit someone else's child. Basically, they'd say, why should I have that burden? So something in people's minds has definitely changed (female, b. 1977).

Many of my interlocutors pointed out the negative changes in the relationships between people in work collectives, linking this to factors such as the intensification of competition for a shrinking number of jobs, the growing disparity in wages, the poor protection of workers from the authority of the 'bosses' and employers, the disappearance of traditions such as the 'apprenticeship' – novices being mentored by older workers. To comprehend the current situation, however, it is necessary to turn back to the 1990s, a time when, generally speaking,

the sources of these problems arose. As early as 1991 the regular author of a local district newspaper wrote:

In seventy years of life under the Soviet regime we have become people of a particular sort. Alongside the good nature of the Soviet person, increasingly negative qualities such as malice, envy and mistrust can also be seen. This has been particularly obvious in recent years. Will this not spill out everywhere during privatisation, when the rich will become richer and the poor, poorer? Will farmers' estates, private shops and enterprises not burst into flames and will blood not pour forth? (*Yurin* 1991).

The beginning of the 1990s was, for Sosnovka and for the whole country alike, primarily a time of extreme shortage, unpaid salaries, and an abrupt worsening of the material situation. The planned liberalisation of prices at the beginning of 1992, in the words of Vera Rozhkova, 'completely stirred up our human anthill', and forced people to stock-pile any goods they could get hold of. The newspaper was swamped with complaints at violations of trading rules: 'But our people, simple country people, brought up on the most absurd Soviet idealism, they are all calling for some kind of justice. Even though of course they don't believe in anything themselves' (*Popova* 1991).

At the same time as the liberalisation of prices at the beginning of 1992, district public opinion got worked up over an 'ugly story', described by Rozhkova in an article of the same name. It was about the New Year presents for the children of workers at the district cinema network. Chocolates and sweet food were given out as gifts through the district consumer association, which only informed the cinema management on 28 December that an 'order' for caramel, biscuits and fondant would soon be arriving. By this point the children of the rural projectionists had already been given gifts in the form of half a kilo of 'greenish little mandarins', therefore the manager and the employees of the accounts department of the cinema network bought up an entire eleven boxes of the allocated sweets and divided these between themselves. However, the manager of the local cinema decided to blow the whistle. As she wrote in the newspaper: 'Dear children of the local cinema staff! I'm sorry to tell you that the sweeties, biscuits and chocolate bars meant for you as part of your New Year presents have all been eaten by grown-up men and women from the management team. Maybe now they'll be ashamed of what they've done!' (*Popova* 1992a). Employees of the accounts department, however, refused to acknowl-

edge their guilt, claiming that they bought the sweets with their own money, and that the manager of the cinema (which was already closed) was simply settling a score with the other management departments because various people had lost their jobs (*Ustinova et al.* 1992). In reaction to this story a number of readers' letters were published, and Larissa Uvarova responded in her article. She lamented the 'abrupt fall in moral standards' that allowed so many improper acts to be publicly defended and permitted life according to the formula 'I live how I want, I do what I want' (*Uvarova* 1992b). The more moderate Rozhko-va pointed out, by way of mitigating circumstances, the general setting of the 'pre-market witches' sabbath', in which 'something happened to the conscience' of many people (*Popova* 1992b).

The reigning mood of the 1990s in the collective farms and enterprises of the district is often described, in conversations and articles, using the eloquent word *rastashchilovka*, meaning 'pilfering at work':

It is a secret to no one that today on kolkhozes and sovkhoses very real *rastashchilovka* goes on. People steal anything lying around that they happen to spot. And they fight hard to get it.

So, for example, there's a dairymaid coming home from work clutching a jar of milk and some flour in her bag. Is she thieving? Maybe she's taking her due, as the head of one kolkhoz told me. If someone isn't paid for six months, does he then have the right to drink a glass of milk? If a mechanic uses a kolkhoz lorry to fetch firewood, should he be punished? He too is sitting there with no money, and he has a family to look after (*Uvarova* 1994d).

As early as 1992 Uvarova characterised the situation that had arisen on the district's farms as intolerable:

Firstly, there is a lack of discipline among the livestock breeders. The dairymaid might have a drinking bout, go on the town, and be late for work. The farmyard worker might not turn up at all. The feed carriers may be late, indifferent to their work as animal specialists. Secondly, the livestock breeders may transfer their resentment and their feeling of being tired of this life onto the animals. Gone are the times when the cows were treated tenderly: daughter, mother, provider. Today on the farms, you hear curses and swearing, the animals are beaten and kicked. They, the poor creatures, withdraw into themselves, they don't give milk, they don't put on weight. Truly, cattle have a bestial life (*Uvarova* 1992a).



*Illus. 2. Barter. (The woman is offering the cow a ration coupon that says 'Milk', while the cow offers her one that says 'Hay'.)*

*Artist V. Zhabsky. Slovo, 10 December 1991.*

Kolkhoz farmers, whose salaries were mainly paid 'in kind' (with young animals, formula feed etc.), staked everything on their personal allotments. Larger agricultural concerns in Sosnovka encountered cuts and unemployment. By 1994 many businesses were on the brink of bankruptcy, and jobs were cut (mainly for women and young people), or employees could continue without pay, earning money on the side with other work such as clearing the fields of the surrounding kolkhozes. As a shrewd observer of everyday life in Sosnovka, Rozhkova described the circumstances in labour collectives:

Yes, once upon a time there were mentors. But today a nurse approaching retirement age or already receiving her pension convulsively hangs on to her job, with the strength of a death grip. When a newly-fledged young workmate is brought to her, she looks at this new woman not as the successor to her work, but as a superfluous mouth, a threat to the harmonious work collective.

The situation was aggravated by refugees from countries of the former USSR:



So they come to Sosnovka, not knowing that now you have to pull strings even to be a care worker in a nursing home, that you have to watch out for your job as a stoker in case one of the wretched workers goes on a drinking spree or lets the frost into the boiler room. This doesn't encourage people to become closer to one another, nor does it encourage their moral standards (Popova 1994).

The limitation and violation of labour rights were 'hotspots' of the mid-1990s. The managers of unprofitable businesses avoided 'bal-last', and in the words of Rozhkova, work collectives were dominated by 'lawlessness and petty tyranny' (Popova 1996b). One such story reached court and was made public thanks to the newspaper. Nina Mikhailovna, a painter and plasterer with an eight-year-old child whose husband was unemployed, was dismissed from the municipal housing and utilities department, which she said was the result of a conflict with the head bookkeeper. The conflict had deep 'roots': the head bookkeeper had hindered her from obtaining a place to live, as a result of which Nina Mikhailovna had occupied one of the mansions in the infamous 'Rude Town' without permission. She succeeded in obtaining authorisation and asserted her right to inhabit the house in court. However, she was right in the hair of the daughter of the head bookkeeper, who lived in the next-door 'mansion' and also worked at the housing and utilities department. When the neighbours' children fell out, things rapidly escalated, and Nina Mikhailovna was told 'she needn't hold her breath' over keeping her job, a threat that soon turned into reality (Popova 1996c: 3).

Larger-scale clashes between ordinary workers and managers also crept into the heated general meetings where the fate of businesses was decided. For example, by 1996 the meat processing factory, formerly a very desirable place to work, was on the brink of bankruptcy: it was struggling against the competition of other producers, and kolkhozes and sovkhoses were stopping delivering cattle. In order to avoid complete collapse, the manager decided to sell the business to a large factory in Tambov. At the general meeting, it became clear that the management, engineers and technicians were in favour of the sale of the business, while the workers were against it. The ensuing debates on the issue provided an opportunity for the workers' accumulated complaints about the management to pour forth. The workers managed to assert the right of the business to be independent, although a year later the factory finally ground to a halt all the same

(Uvarova 1996a; 1996b). At a bread factory meeting at the beginning of 1997, the chair of the district consumer cooperative was openly accused of making enhancements to the construction of a mansion at the company's expense (Popova 1997).

The true stars of *rastashchilovka*, however, were the managers of *kolkhozes* and businesses that had the opportunity to control and direct this process. Uvarova described the deliberate collapse of one Sosnovka company in her article 'I'd Start Working as a Boss Myself...' (Uvarova 1995a). The company got a new manager in the early 1990s, when 'the managers of many organisations, companies and enterprises completely threw aside all restraint. It was as if someone had instructed them "grab everything that you can lay your hands on." Which they did.' It soon emerged that 'you could have shot a war film' on the site that had once housed the company's health club, canteen, and bathhouse. The employees of the accounts department had bought its computers and televisions at rock-bottom prices, and drivers had made off with the company cars. In 1998, some drivers at the now bankrupt transport company were able to purchase their Kamaz vehicles, but many were 'dumped on the roadside', while the collective of 'shareholders', in Rozhkova's words, 'just fell on their backs and waved their legs in the air' (Popova 1999a). Unsurprisingly, at meetings following the bankruptcy and the 'voluntary redundancy' of the former manager, the collective 'became enraged' and demanded an investigation and for the manager to be tried in court.

The behaviour of the authorities and managers throughout this period remains to this day a factor noted by my interlocutors when analysing the reasons for the protests and particular mood of the population:

The authorities behaved wrongly. <...> Then the factory was closed and the machinery was sold when it changed from a *kolkhoz* to Agricultural Production Cooperatives. Now people see the murky water, and as they say, when the water's murky, there's plenty of fish to be caught. And there was a lot of bad feeling. "They grab what they can, like we all always said, while we..." <...> So all the bad feeling, it came from that, and now it's here to stay. Seeing that some people have shops and somewhere to live, <...> but we, the simple people, just have our wages, and we've stayed stuck at the bottom. Though when it comes to brains and professionalism, many people remained at the bottom because of the structure of their mind and their attitude and their political views, they thought people should stick together,

that life wasn't for individuals, but for everyone together. So they made their own beds to lie in (female, b. 1953).



*Illus. 3. Wolf and Sheep. (The wolf is saying to the sheep, 'We've got democracy now, so by all means voice your opinion' – i.e., before I eat you.) Artist V. Zhabsky. Slovo, 6 November 1993.*

Protests by ordinary Sosnovka residents in the 1990s were widespread, and particularly striking in comparison to the absence of comparable social activism in the following decade. The first protest took place in Sosnovka on 19 August 1989. Drivers from the dairy factory, unable to resolve their own problems at the company (they had demanded that the old schedule of work and holidays, overtime pay and so on should continue being honoured) drove their milk tankers out on to the central square in front of the district committee building – where all the official rallies and festivities were held – and the First Secretary himself came out to meet them (*Uvarova* 1989c: 1). Subsequently, however, the acknowledged leader and organiser of the protest activity was the trade union of education workers. As early as 1991 its chief warned the district authorities that the teachers' cup of patience was flowing over (*Morozova* 1991: 1).

Besides the problems that many different residents had in common, teachers had other specific issues: frequently they could not redeem their ration coupons in shops, because the agreed hours for this were

mainly in the mornings, during school lessons; rural schools were not provided with fuel; repairs were not carried out; money had stopped being paid for textbooks and pedagogical literature and so on. Rural teachers were gradually shifting to subsistence farming, forced to get up at five o'clock in the morning to set the cows in order and, in Uvarova's words, even during lessons they were thinking about the fact that 'the cow's gone down with something, and the piglet's not eating well'. 'Teachers began to live embittered lives, withdrawing into themselves, losing the feeling of collectivism and simply losing the inner strength to fight for survival' (Uvarova 1995c). Teachers themselves recall that during those years it was necessary to rely a great deal on help from your parents living in the countryside in terms of foodstuffs and handouts from their pension money, and that you had to borrow a lot of money from your friends as well. In an interview with Rozhkova on the eve of 1 September 1998, a teacher aged with 30 years' experience expressed gratitude to the 'former underachievers who today work at the market place: they treat us with understanding, and come to our aid – by loaning us money' (Popova 1998e: 1).

Evidence of the situation in schools can be seen in the form of a letter published in the *Sosnovkoe slovo* and written by pupils studying at the Tretyevolamskaya Middle School of the Sosnovka district to President Yeltsin:

*Dear Boris Nikolaevich!*

We are writing to you as pupils of the Tretyevolamskaya Middle School with a request that you look carefully at education.

The majority of our parents work at the kolkhoz, they have not received their salary for three years, and we have no possibility of buying textbooks or the equipment we need to study. The textbooks which were given to us for free are now unfit for purpose. There are no visual aids, and we cannot do any laboratory or practical work.

The school has not been repaired for ten years – there is no money – and it is cold because there is not enough fuel.

Money is not assigned to feed the children in the canteen, and parents cannot pay. It is very difficult to learn a new curriculum on empty stomachs and enter institutes of higher education.

Dear Boris Nikolaevich! We implore you to make higher education free because our parents are unable to pay for the fees and we are supplementing the army with the unemployed and criminals (Lukina et al. 1998: 3).

The tipping point in the strike movement was, most likely, the decision made by the district authorities in 1996 to do away with the discount for teachers on utilities bills. From this time onwards, there was a whole succession of pickets and strikes: on 4 October 1996 the administration building was picketed, in March 1997 there was a one-day strike in 29 schools across the district, in April and October 1998 there were protests in support of the nationwide trade union demonstrations and a strike, in November there was an open-ended strike in four schools and in February 1999 the administration was again picketed and there were strikes in 22 schools (*Popova* 1999b).

All these demonstrations took place under the management of Valentina Ivanovna Morozova, the chair of the district trade union of education workers from 1987–2000. Influenced by the non-payment of salaries and other difficulties, during the 1990s the trade union gradually moved away from its official function, during Soviet times, as an organisation engaging in ‘cultural work’ and distributing vouchers for holiday trips, and moved towards a position of increasingly tough confrontation with the authorities. Administrative workers tried various means to displace the leader, but thanks to the support of the district’s teachers, Valentina Morozova emerged victorious from these conflicts. Despite this, her main aspiration was to ‘make contact with government bodies’, to make sure that ‘the sheep are safe, and the wolves have plenty to eat’<sup>7</sup>. The complication in the trade union chief’s position was shown in some rather curious cases, when, alongside the head of the district administration and at his request, she had to visit and ‘calm down’ the teachers during the strike that she had organised.

Summarising her trade union activity in an interview with me in 2010, Morozova said:

On the whole I am glad to have worked at the trade union organisation. <...> When I wasn’t working at the trade union, I thought that if a manager told me to do something, I should follow orders without demur, because that’s how I was brought up. Whether he was right or not... But at the trade union I learned how to see what I hadn’t been able to before. I learned how to see, to hear people, not just to listen but to hear an ordinary person – a teacher, a cleaner, a logistics manager – and I learned how to understand people at the trade union.

In the 2000s the situation changed. There was a mass exodus of teachers from the trade union. After Morozova left her position as chair, another equally active leader could not be found. However, it

would seem that the change in labour relations within education was a more crucial reason for the decline of trade unionism. The former deputy head of the district gave a characteristic example in an interview. In the 1990s teachers and other workers in the social sector were involved in a large amount of protest activity, and the authorities could not ignore them: 'They shook me and the deputy up about social issues in every collective, and they wouldn't let me go until they'd thrashed the life out of me and I left the auditorium looking as white as a sheet'. In the 2000s teachers 'suddenly shut up'. 'Now they won't say boo to a goose, especially people working in the social sector'. The management teams also 'suddenly shut up' after a wave of dismissals of head-teachers (according to the new Labour Code, a manager can be dismissed without explanation). As a result, there was no-one to oppose the current policy of conversion of rural schools into 'branches', or indeed their complete closure.

A shortage of leaders also influenced the situation. Many of my interlocutors noted that today's Sosnovka residents 'don't trust anyone'. This attitude towards politics was in many respects established by the experience of the 1990s, and similar opinions were heard at that time too: 'We placed our hopes in Lyudmila Sergeevna Kudinova and we were mistaken. We're surprised that people don't go out and vote, but they don't trust anyone or anything. And with good reason' (*Yurin* 1995). In December 1990 Lyudmila Kudinova published an article in Tambov about the abuses in the Sosnovka district consumer association. This article, however, caused a backlash: the district newspaper issued a disclaimer on behalf of the trade workers and accusing Kudinova of seeking 'momentary popularity' and 'fixing deliveries of building materials when she needed them, jumping the queue for a colour TV, and getting hold of a bath for her parents through the chair (of the district soviet)' and so on (*Ternovskaya* 1991). The court forced the newspaper to make an apology, but soon afterwards relations between the editors and the former journalist were ruptured once and for all during the confused story of the newspaper's coverage of the events of 19-21 August 1991.

Kudinova's memories of these events, when she was actively involved with the democrats, include the following episode: "We arrived home, in Sosnovka, around midnight. Little Svetlana, my daughter, couldn't sleep. She didn't look herself. In the queue for bread she'd overheard: 'Thank goodness they're getting things in order. Now they'll put Kudinova away'" (*Kudinova* 1991).

In 1993 the conflict between the newspaper and the people's deputy flared up again. The cause was Lyudmila Kudinova's refusal to offer financial aid to one of the head journalists at *Poisk* who had reconstructed the fates of the Tambov soldiers who had disappeared without trace during the Great Patriotic War (WWII). Various aspects of the deputy's activity underwent an impartial discussion in the newspaper, although the leitmotif of all the publications was disappointment in the 'democrats'. They stood accused, and Lyudmila Kudinova in particular, of obtaining more 'privileges' than those with whom they were competing at the beginning of their political careers. The newspaper printed further publications accusing the politician of obtaining various favours and of failing to offer any kind of help for Sosnovka residents (up until this point Kudinova was the deputy governor of Tambov Oblast). Disappointed voters began to explain her whole 'journey to power' from an ordinary Sosnovka resident as being the pursuit of selfish ends: 'We were promised a capitalist heaven by the President's representative V. Davituliani. "We will put an end to all privileges," came the assurance from L. S. Kudinova. But they were already dreaming of big plots of land seized from collective farms, chic flats in town, visits abroad using the people's money, personal limousines and so on' (Yurin 1993). The



*Illus. 4. Deputy. (The deputy is protesting to the devil, 'But I've got parliamentary privilege!')*  
Artist V. Zhabsky. *Slovo*, 9 September 1993.

democrats lost a great deal of authority. The Sosnovka district and the whole of Tambov province became part of the so-called 'Red Belt', the main area of electoral support for the Communists, and in 2000, 'if Russia had voted like our district, the President would be Gennady Zyuganov, if it had voted like our region, we'd have new elections, but Russia voted like Russia' (Esli by Rossiya 2000).

By 1998 the social tension had reached a critical level. The gen-

eral crisis was worsened in Sosnovka by the government's unexpected New Year 'surprise', which eliminated the community from the list of population centres whose inhabitants had a right to 'Chernobyl' benefits, what the locals called 'the coffin dole'. Commenting on this event, which stirred up the whole of Sosnovka, Rozhkova reminded readers that 'nowadays you cannot forget the sad, proven truth: each successive year is worse than the previous one' (Popova 1998b). Demonstrations in front of the administration building for the first time now mounted political slogans speaking out against the reforms, the President, and the 'regime' as a whole.

It was against this background that Uvarova gained in popularity. Having taken a harshly critical position in relation to the reforms as early as the beginning of the 1990s, she now became *Slovo's* leading writer of political essays. In 1996 Uvarova resigned from the newspaper and became involved in various public activities: 'As an energetic, active person, she could not be satisfied with the life of a "pensioner". She surrounded herself with people who were discontented – and there were many of them: pensioners, the unemployed – "and raised them up to fight for their disregarded rights". In short, she occupied herself, if one may put it this way, with human rights activities: she organised meetings and protests, she wrote official objections and complaints, she even, so they say, went personally around the towns with petitions' (Kolebanov 1999).

One of these protests organised by Uvarova took place in July 1998, after rumours had spread around the community about the administration cutting pensions to a minimum. The report about the protest published in the newspaper accused the former journalist of having a 'flippant' attitude and trying to stir things up. The deputy head of the local administration had come to meet with protesters to discuss the social issues, but 'the information given by the public official manifestly did not satisfy Lyudmila Uvarova personally and her tactless replies only served to enrage the pensioners. As a result, the "protest" turned into sordid buffoonery, ending in accusations and insults aimed at the authorities' (Nagaitseva 1998).

Soon after this, a strange story unfolded that put an end to the 'human rights' activity of Lyudmila Uvarova and, so it would seem, forced her to leave Sosnovka. 'For a long time a rumour has been circulating around Sosnovka saying that a brothel is being built,' the newspaper noted in January 1999. The rumour related to a four-storey detached house that was being erected by a local entrepreneur on the outskirts of the town. The owner of the building imperturbably ex-



plained to the journalist that he was in fact planning a restaurant and a 'hotel with comfortable rooms', and the local 'old dears' need not worry: the establishment was designed for businessmen from large cities who wanted to 'have a good time with their mistresses' far from prying eyes (*Simonova* 1999). Two months later, the editor-in-chief of the *Sosnovskoe slovo* informed readers that Lyudmila Uvarova had extorted money from the entrepreneur, blackmailing him with threats of exposing him to the Tambov press. The author claimed that the former journalist was caught red-handed, and called upon Sosnovka residents to be vigilant 'when choosing their idols' (*Kolebanov* 1999). Evidently, this story gave inhabitants of the district further proof that any 'journey to power', indeed any form of public activity, can only be driven by self-interest and an unscrupulous attitude to money.

Similar motifs resounded in Rozhkova's reporting of the conflicts that came to the forefront in the late 1990s – early 2000s and were linked to the community being supplied with gas. Gas was only provided to homes in the community in the 1990s, which put an additional burden on the meagre budget of Sosnovka residents. They were not all able to pay, and the poorest section of the population were only willing to 'join up' to the gas mains toward the end of the decade. However, those who joined up early became acquisitive monopolists of sorts, and sought to control the conditions on which others joined up later. In several streets, connection was done for nothing, or at very low cost. The price differentials – and particularly the efforts by those already on the mains to charge high prices – caused all kinds of conflicts. Symptomatically, at the centre of one such dispute were the inhabitants of houses in 'Rude Town', who had demanded an excessively high connection charge for latecomers. When reporting on this conflict, the journalist pondered the 'communist capitalists' of the post-Soviet present: 'Today we have one leg "here" and the other "there". We're Communist capitalists. "Everything had got mixed up in the Oblonsky household."<sup>8</sup> <...> How quickly the slogan "man is a friend to his fellow man" defected to "man is a wolf to his fellow man"' (*Popova* 1998c: 2). 'We reap what we sow: spite, greed, and aggression... there's almost civil war in Sosnovka' (*Popova* 1998d: 4).

When reporting the gas wars in Sosnovka and the unseemly role played by former Communists, Rozhkova wrote: 'From what we learned in books, Communists are people who would give the shirt from their back to the common people. Whereas capitalists, again as we were taught, are people who seek to gain from their own capital' (*Pop-*

ova 1998c: 4). The difference in the system of values and upbringing is of course felt by many. Lyudmila Kudinova confirmed this observation:

It was always instilled in us that you should think of others before yourself. This was instilled in us at home, and by our teachers and instructors. I myself know that they would always say to me: you should think about others! When I went to Moscow, my father said to me: don't you dare rent a flat like the other deputies have done. You'll disgrace me. I got the keys, and went to see it, but I turned it down because I was ashamed. I promised people that I would return to Sosnovka. I promised my father... But from somewhere around the mid-nineties there was a different idea. You should think about how to get on in life, you should show initiative. That's good. My opinion is that unfortunately collectivism and initiative have little in common with one another. So if nature had ordained that it were possible to consider the interests of the community and oneself without upsetting anyone, getting on in life would be very difficult<sup>9</sup>.

This ideological and psychological turning point led to a re-thinking of the Soviet experience, as was reflected in numerous publications written by authors and correspondents in the *Sosnovskoe slovo*. The publications and interviews show how these ideas can become an argument for certain values and a certain way of life. For example, the opposition between the newspaper and the people's deputy Lyudmila Kudinova was expressed in an argument surrounding the terms of address 'comrade' and 'mr/mrs/miss'<sup>10</sup>. In response to Kudinova's accusation that the *Sosnovskoe slovo* was organising a 'propagandistic brouhaha' against her and 'forming an image of the people's enemy', the editor-in-chief wrote:

*Dear Miss Kudinova...*

That's how it sounds: Miss!!! Tears are brimming in people's eyes, they want to fall to their knees with their arms in the air reaching up to the Lord, to the Ladies. We thank our native, home-grown democracy, we are finally no longer comrades, because this word, they say, comes from the word 'commodity', we're Lords. <...>

Hell! How nice it is to feel oneself a mister! How one wants to pull up one's trousers and run after the democrats, like Yesenin and the Komsomol<sup>11</sup>. Let it roll on your tongue: 'Miss, a coffee

in the office, please!’ ‘Sir! Your Mercedes is at the entrance!’ – even if the editorial staff only have one car that ‘won’t make it to the next stop’ (Kolebanov 1993: 2).

Later the author admits that he feels himself to be a ‘comrade’, since he does not have a flat in Tambov, nor an automobile, nor a dacha.



*Illus. 5. Problems. (One street drinker is saying to another, ‘Gawd, Vas, you know that tax declaration, it’s just a nightmare...’) Artist V. Zhab-sky. Slovo, 6 November 1993.*

Another article was entitled ‘What Are You Called Now?’. The journalist and head of the club *Poisk* V. Medinsky was puzzled as to ‘why Lyudmila Sergeevna calls me and my fellow writers “misters” with such a smirk, is that really now accepted among the latter-day authorities? Dear Lyudmila Sergeevna, you should probably be called Miss’ (Medinsky 1993). In an article with the characteristic title ‘I don’t trust anyone’ another author explained his disapproval of the new terms of address in a similar way:

The editorial staff have now begun to receive letters in which

the terms of address 'miss', 'mrs', and 'mister' are being used. 'Comrade' has been completely forgotten. <...> Mister is linked in my mind either to someone very noble or very far from our existence. What kind of mister can you have working a wooden plough, or being a cleaner, for example? Mister drunk, good evening to you, sir! (*Larina* 1993).

## **Conclusion**

The material examined here suggests several theoretical points. Evidently this period in the history of Sosnovka, and for the whole country, was a period of rapid change in all areas of life and culture. Owing to the epistemological traditions of anthropology and its preference for synchronic approaches, anthropologists feel much more comfortable about describing 'timeless' structures or, at the very least, relatively stable historical periods. This helps to explain the dissatisfaction of a number of contemporary anthropologists with Geertz's strategy of 'thick description' and the interpretation of culture as a text. In the opinion of these recent critics, culture (to use the term in general) should be understood not as a 'coherent system of ordered symbols with its own logic abstracted from people's actions, statements and beliefs', but as a 'changing, fragmentary and contested knowledge immersed in human practice', manifestations of which 'are inevitably aspects of domination, authority and resistance' (*Kalb, Tak* 2005: 6). As Foucault wrote, 'the history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning' (*Foucault* 1984: 56).

On the other hand, it is worth remembering the useful observation made by Jochen Hellbeck relating to the history of everyday life. Criticising the tendency of historians of this research area to divorce ordinary life from 'ideology', he points out the danger of 'ignoring the conceptual fundamentals of life that are characteristic of different historical periods' (*Halfin, Hellbeck* 2002: 246). In this way, the oral historian/ethnographer/anthropologist looking at the last few decades of Russian history is faced with the difficult task of reading the cultural codes and ideological ideas of people while simultaneously analysing the practices and social relations that have shaped these ideas.

Aleksey Yurchak formulated the category of the 'non-visibility' of 'the last Soviet generation' with reference to the attitude towards Soviet ideology shown in material discovered while he was inter-

viewing city inhabitants (Yurchak 2006; see also the discussion in Platt, Natans 2010). Similar evidence can be found in material on the Sosnovka 'provinces'. For example, in response to an 'express interview'<sup>12</sup> in *Slovo* in 1992 regarding attitudes towards the November 7<sup>th</sup> celebrations, Elena, a 20-year-old student, wrote:

We, the 'stagnant' youth, have long since lost our political dimension. We didn't gather at Sosnovka Square when it was filled with red flags for ardent speeches praising the October Revolution. The atmosphere at 'our' 7<sup>th</sup> of November celebration was human and joyful: 'And my balloon flies up to the heavens!'. Now that joy cannot return (Express Interview 1992: 1).

However, publications in the 1990s and my interviews definitively show that Sosnovka's parting with the Soviet past was by no means a painless process, and that the realities that came to replace it often caused hurt feelings and nostalgia. Attempts to explain this with the help of categories such as 'traditionalism' and especially the 'cultural backwardness' of the provinces are less than productive. After all, the prevalence of traditional attitudes and the relative regularity in the way of life of the typical 'urban settlement' or village during the late Soviet era did not hinder a surge in social activity at the end of the 1980s and protest demonstrations in the 1990s.

From my materials, it is obvious that perestroika was perceived and supported by the inhabitants of Sosnovka primarily as a movement against the privileges of the elite, and its main slogan became the battle for 'social justice'. This later flowed over into the campaign against 'Rude Town'. This movement in Sosnovka in turn acts as a typical example of how the Soviet regime tended to be criticised from the perspective of the ruling ideology itself. In this case, one should not concern oneself with questions about the 'sincerity' of the district's inhabitants and their commitment to the ideals of egalitarian socialism, but rather, analyse how the existing ideology and cultural codes were deployed in this social battle.

'Rude Town', as became clear, was only the first swallow heralding the coming changes. In the stormy debates during the early 1990s that were reflected in the press, seemingly forgotten concepts from early Soviet propaganda sprang back into unexpected life, and there was talk of 'lords', 'farm-hands', 'masters', and even 'slaves'. Yet, in my interviews, these terms and the interpretation of events from this kind of 'vulgar Marxist' perspective were, as a rule, not present. It is obvious that

the actualisation of these concepts was not so much a spontaneous 'remembrance' of Marxist rhetoric and pre-Soviet experience as they were a response to the bourgeois values now being imposed by the media. The cultural situation in the 1980s-2000s was indeed more similar to a battle for 'changing, fragmentary and contested knowledge immersed in human practice', than to a 'coherent system of ordered symbols'. Therefore the 'historical' technique of structuring material 'chronologically' is, in my opinion, not only the most convenient compositionally, but also the most useful heuristically, allowing this battle to be described as a contradictory process unfolding in time. Coming back to 'Soviet subjectivity', it is worth emphasising that from an anthropologist's perspective, the issue is not about the construction of some kind of 'ideal type' with a specific range of consistent characteristics, but rather about the analysis of the situational, intricately dependent, and plastic cultural practices of various groups of the population that have assimilated and used certain features of the (changing and fragmentary) Soviet culture.

The reassessment of historical values in the 1990s by no means signified an unambiguous idealisation of the Soviet setup, though the values of 'social justice' could be identified both in my interviews and in the publications that I have examined here, and though they were always linked to nostalgia or a positive attitude towards the Soviet authorities. It was, in fact, their commitment to these values that led the population of Sosnovka to a sharp clash with the regime of Party nomenclature during perestroika. Nowadays, there are few opportunities for the open display of such moods. The sense of 'weariness' and disappointment in politics and any form of social activism has been accompanied by a growing atomisation of the population, by the 'departure' into narrow family circles, and a focus on material striving and practical problems. Debates about forms of address have now settled on the neutral 'man/woman', while social events and celebrations in recent years have tended towards de-ideologization on the one hand, and on the other to the search for universals, with the result that they are dedicated to the most basic human characteristics (Family Day, Youth Day, Elderly People Day etc.). Should the values of social justice that are shared by the majority of Sosnovka inhabitants be considered a feature of 'Soviet subjectivity'? Will this idea disappear or transform in the minds of subsequent, post-Soviet generations? These are open questions.

The link between interpretations of the past and fundamental social problems is demonstrated by Vera Rozhkova's highly original analysis of the project 'Old Songs about Important Things', the suc-

cesses and failures of which she traces to the nature of the epoch being 'sung about'. The first series, with songs from the 1940s-50s that had become favourites in Sosnovka, was a resounding success. The songs from the 1960s also met with a positive reception: 'Despite the fact that during those years we were far from being a monolithic mass, again these songs fit perfectly into the general story about life back then and into our hearts'. However, by the 1970s the 'Soviet monolith' had already collapsed: '(W)e were no longer a single monolithic socialist mass, but were only held together at the corners by our interests' (Popova 1998a). As a result, 'Old Songs about Important Things', Series 3, completely bombed.

It follows that views of this kind relative to the past are linked to a widespread discourse about envy, conditionality and a lack of communication in the present, the relevance of which is to this day attested to in interviews. The selectivity of historical memory is demonstrated in the fact that my interlocutors almost never mentioned the existence of 'envy' during Soviet times. One could posit the hypothesis that this elision of 'envy' may be linked to a change in its object: whereas previously the objects were, evidently, mainly bosses and shop assistants, subsequently the assumption of a relationship of inequality spread to embrace the entirety of the population.

At the same time, the critical assessments of present time contained within the interviews make clear the importance for my interlocutors of the values of communication and the support of harmonious social links. One might ask: is this a sign of the collectivism of people brought up in Soviet times, and if so, how has this need transformed in younger generations?

My interlocutors described the changes in human relations in terms of the changing characters of the people themselves. When analysing these comments, we should avoid the naivety that accepts an affirmation of the type 'people have become nastier' as an empirically established fact, as well as the cynicism that discounts people's reflections on their life situation and operates with ready 'truths' suggesting that people are always dissatisfied with the present, idealising the past and suggesting that in the past 'the grass was always greener'. Richard Sennett analysed various aspects of labour relations and values in the conditions of 'late capitalism' in his book with the characteristic title *The Corrosion of Character*. However, Sennett understands 'character' not in the everyday sense, but as the type of person and worker that existed during the era of 'harsh' bureaucratic structures (compa-

nies, trade unions and so on) of capitalism in the period from the late nineteenth to the mid twentieth century. Employing the framework of Weber's labour ethics, Sennett traces the changes brought in by the regime of 'new' capitalism (established from the beginning of the neo-liberal reforms of the 1970s – 1980s) not only in labour relations but also in the existential principles of human existence, such as the ability to establish long-term relationships with colleagues and other people, to 'draw up' the history of one's life and career as a coherent narrative, and to express an attitude towards work as 'the business of life' (or, on the other hand, a range of interchangeable and 'superficial' skills) (Sennett 1998; Sennett 2005). Drastic changes in the life of the individual caused, in his opinion, a shift away from 'paternalistic' capitalism towards a system of the 'flexible' social structures of today. The processes examined by Sennett, despite the sociologist's 'ameri-cocentric' stance, and the methodology that he uses, can be useful for analysing a situation even in places as far removed from the centre of global capitalism as Sosnovka. Furthermore, the insights that come from a comparative approach can help prevent us from trusting excessively ideologically-charged categories such as 'our' collectivism/communitarianism and 'their' individualism, and lead us to pay more attention to the specific determinants of people's social behaviour.

The basic social process that was conditional for the events and tendencies traced in this article can also be defined as a shift from the 'harsh' structures of Soviet times (with stable employment, often expressed in the form of the 'job for life' and other well-known social institutions of that kind) towards the 'flexible' realities of today: the collapse of major labour collectives and unemployment, the emergence of a pattern of commuting to Moscow or 'self-employment' as basic forms of material survival, the lack of a distinctive system of values and common ideology. This relates to the devaluation of the values of professionalism and 'craftmanship', which lose their weight in a situation of purely monetarist assessment (according to Sennett, the lever of economic success becomes the ability to shift quickly from one task to another and to keep up appearances in the right way). It also relates to the absence of a real, albeit authoritarian, source of power that is capable of solving the problems of the population (the district committee in Sosnovka or Sennett's 'boss cracking the whip'). An issue that is separate, but possibly also vital to explaining the communication problems that Sosnovka inhabitants encounter, is the practice of commuting to Moscow for 'shift work', which became widespread in the 2000s. This



is not only an important factor in property stratification, but is also turning Sosnovka, like many similar villages and towns within a radius of more than 500km around the megalopolis, into something like ‘dormitory suburbs’ that are, as is well known, unlikely to be characterised by a full social life. Having transformed into an ‘open society’ and ceased to be a more or less autonomous social body, Sosnovka is therefore taking part, in its small way, in the process of globalisation.

In conclusion, it is my pleasure to sincerely thank all of my interlocutors from the urban settlement of Sosnovka who found the time and desire to share their thoughts with me, as well as the administrative staff of the Sosnovka district, Tambov province, who were so helpful in my field work.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> The earlier version of this article appeared in “Forum for Anthropology and Culture № 8. The Russian version of this article first appeared in *Antropologicheskii forum* No. 15 online.

<sup>2</sup> ‘Urban settlement’ (*posyolok gorodskogo tipa*) is a hard-to-translate Soviet term for a large village or small town (replacing the pre-1917 designation *sloboda*). Some are monotowns, centred on one particular plant; in the 1960s, the policy of closing down ‘futureless villages’ meant that settlements of this kind became new centres for a displaced rural population. (Editor).

<sup>3</sup> *Khamskii*, from *kham*, refers to aggressive and self-promoting rudeness – cf. the dialect use of the English word ‘rude’, as in the Jamaican term ‘rude boys’ (gangsters) etc. (Editor).

<sup>4</sup> The late Soviet era witnessed a proliferation of ceremonies such as baby-naming rituals and ‘Komsomol marriages’, organised to a standard format that included the singing of patriotic anthems, speeches by local dignitaries, Komsomol and Pioneer delegations, etc. (Editor).

<sup>5</sup> Alexander Lyubimov (b. 1962) was a leading TV journalist of the perestroika period. *View*, which started being broadcast in 1987, began life as a music magazine programme but then evolved into a current affairs talk show. Briefly banned in 1991, the programme was revived and continued appearing until 2001, when Lyubimov’s appointment as deputy director of ORT put an end to his presenting career. (Editor).

<sup>6</sup> The slippage between past and present tense follows the original. (Editor).

<sup>7</sup> Interview with SA, 2010. (The expression ‘the sheep are safe, and the wolves have plenty to eat’ refers to the solution to a difficult problem that satisfies all concerned, where everyone ‘has his cake and eats it’. Editor).

<sup>8</sup> The famous first sentence of Tolstoy’s *Anna Karenina*. (Editor).

<sup>9</sup> Interview with SA, 2010.

<sup>10</sup> ‘Mr’ (*Gospodin*), Mrs, Miss (*Gospozha*) were avoided during the Soviet period, since the literal meaning is ‘Lord’ and ‘Lady’ (cf. Herr in German, Monsieur in French, Signore in Italian, etc.) Indeed, even before 1917, and in the Russian emigration, *Gospozha* was considered old-fashioned and often replaced by *Mad-*

ame. (Editor).

<sup>11</sup> A reference to Esenin's famous poem, 'Vanishing Russia' (Rus ukhodyashchaya, 1924), in which the phrase 'pull up my trousers/and run after the Komсомol' echoes as an ironic refrain. (Editor).

<sup>12</sup> I.e. a vox-pop. (Editor).

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***Translated by Rosie Tweddle***



## **ETHNIC AND CONFESSIONAL ASPECTS OF THE “MAIAK” ACCIDENT\***

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Every radiation accident has entailed severe consequences that affected the population's ecological, medical, social, and psychological situation in the contaminated zone. The tragic uniqueness of the area under consideration below (14 villages along the Techa River, the largest of them being Musliumovo), with its high level of radioactive pollution, consists in the fact that three generations have already lived on lands contaminated by long-lived radionuclides, using the water from the Techa and food products produced right there in the zone of high radiation.

Not only are the people living in a polluted area where they are exposed to the chronic influence of radiation, but also they are descendants of persons who were exposed to radiation. This population is affected by other techno-genetic burdens as well as by the social problems of the current transitional period in Russia.

The internal irradiation of the human body by radionuclides is caused by food products derived from plants and animals (94%), by water (5%), and by the air breathed (1%) (*Margulis* 1988).

In contrast to an acute one-time exposure to radiation as a result of a nuclear explosion, when people live in a zone of radiation contamination the dose any particular individual may receive is dependent not only upon the objective factors of the situation (distance from the source of radiation, the presence of barriers, etc.) but also on the person's behaviour. In other words, as was established in the course of the present study, there is a direct connection between the level of a person's dose of radiation and his or her behavioural pattern (at least, if the person is an adult).

Until recently, the problem of survival under conditions of radiation contamination was not discussed in Russia. There has been little research, even abroad, on the social, cultural, ethnic, and confessional aspects of the behaviour of the populations in areas where radiation disasters occurred. Moreover, the problem of the Techa River region

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has no analogy anywhere in the world in practically every respect.

The study presented below of the life of the people of the floodplain of the Techa River has several aims:

- Describing the life support systems of the different ethnic groups, their occupations, the way they conduct private farming, their nutrition systems, the elements of their personal hygiene, the preventive health measures they take and the means of self-treatment they use for illnesses caused by the elevated level of radiation.
- Examining the dynamics of ethnic self-identification of the Russians, Bashkirs, and Tatars during recent decades.
- Clarifying the level of religious consciousness of those presently living in the zone and determining the influence of this factor on their conduct.

Attention is given to the traditions connected with Russian Orthodox Christianity and to the problems of devout Muslims in observing the demands of Sharia (Muslim common law). Examples demonstrate how strict observance of the canonical demands of Islam tends to exacerbate the situation of people living in this elevated radiation zone (Komarova 2002).

Studies of the populations in question were carried out from 1993 to 1998. The studies all used the same approach, with the aim of obtaining comparable data and revealing the dynamics of the processes taking place in several villages in the floodplain of the Techa River.

## **Introduction**

In contrast to the famous Chernobyl nuclear accident, the scale and consequences of the Urals radiation disaster remained unknown for over forty years, not only to the Russian public and the world at large, but even to the population of the southern Urals itself. There, at the headwaters of the Techa River, at the end of the 1940s, the Maiak Nuclear Complex – the first and most powerful complex for the production of weapons-grade plutonium in the USSR – was constructed. In the course of half a century, over thirty serious radiation incidents occurred there.

Since 1948 about 500,000 people have been adversely affected by the polluting activity of Maiak. At present about 12,000 people live in the zone of elevated radiation. Women constitute 59 percent and children less than 18 years of age about 30 percent of the population.

Medical studies have indicated a very close connection between

the radioactive contamination of the Techa River and the local residents' state of health. This connection is confirmed by both official medical statistics and respondents' self-evaluations of their state of health (Komarova 2002). The vast majority of those questioned (about 95 percent) recognized the danger of radiation to their own health and to those close to them. Almost all of them thought that the cause of their illnesses was the contaminated Techa River.

Less than five percent of the survey respondents considered themselves to be relatively healthy. Official medical estimates more or less agree. They indicate that the proportion of healthy persons in the Techa floodplain is only seven percent of the population (Shilko *et al.* 1994).

From the beginning of the 1990s, Russian and foreign specialists of all kinds jointly conducted a broad and complex medical study of the Techa River floodplain population that revealed the long-term consequences of the irradiation of the population. The general conclusion was that there had been a severe delay in starting to rehabilitate the population (Rezonans 1991). The studies revealed a heightened level of impaired mental abilities among children in the zone. Thus, in the Kunashak region, among all those born in the period 1963–1967, 6.5 percent suffered from mental retardation, and during the period 1968–1978, the figure rose to 9.9 percent. The highest frequency of Down syndrome in the district as a whole was also found in this area – 1.28 percent (Shalaginov 1993). Special research indicated that the physical and mental work capacity of Techa adolescents was significantly lower than that of the control group (who lived in uncontaminated areas).

Observations of local physicians (Rusanova *et al.* 1994) indicate that Techa area children are suffering from diseases that in the past were encountered only among adults. Techa children and adolescents are officially recognized as a high risk group, first of all because “depending on their age, the build-up factor of radionuclides is between 9 and 21 times higher among them than among adults, which also increases the danger of both somatic and genetically remote consequences” (Volosnikov *et al.* 1994).

“The most terrible thing,” in the opinion of village doctors, “is not even the mutants born in the zone but the mutations of the diseases themselves” (Galimova 1994). Epidemiological studies show an increase in the total number of cancer cases among those Techa people who have received the largest doses of radiation. According to data cited by G. Ia. Galimova and N. A. Solov’eva, the percentage of persons with cancer at Musliumovo hospital was three times higher than

the percentage of such patients in the district at large (*Galimova et al.* 1994). In the contaminated zone, the majority of the Techa people displayed a characteristic complex of symptoms: constant weakness, muscle pains (myalgia), nose bleeds, bleeding of the gums, dizziness, etc.

This complex of illnesses caused by radiation, and called by the local people “river disease,” has received the name “Musliumovo syndrome.” It is similar in its symptoms to the Chernobyl syndrome and the Kainar syndrome (*Solov'eva et al.* 1994). During the course of our research, it became clear that even today the Techa people continue to use the Techa River, and especially its floodplain, extensively, in spite of the fact that they have been informed about the dangers of contamination (*Komarova* 1999).

The victims of the Techa tragedy belong to various ethnic groups (Bashkirs, Tatars, Russians, and others) and religions (Muslims and Christians). At the present time, Tatars and Bashkirs constitute over half the population of the zone – 51.3% (Tatars – 45%, Bashkirs – 6.3%); Russians constitute 46%; gypsies, 0.6%; and other nationalities (Ukrainians, Belarussians, Germans, Estonians, Kazakhs, Moldovians, Chuvash, Nenets/Samoyedes, Azerbaijanis and Chechens) account for the remaining 2.1%.

### **The Religious Factor**

An initial observation of the elevated radiation zone reveals that the various inhabitants conduct themselves differently, not only according to their age, educational level, material circumstances, and so on, but also according to the ethnic group to which they belong and the ethnic norms and religious views by which they are guided (*Komarova* 1996). Accordingly, in the extreme conditions of life in the region, an understanding of ethnic and religious behavioural features can be useful in determining ways of rendering assistance to the people. In our opinion, first of all, the population of the floodplain of the Techa River, as in the past, lacks vital social and medical aid and also information about the rules of conduct in a contaminated zone. Secondly, during the past decade, the local population's level of ecological consciousness has fallen greatly. Thirdly, as indicated by surveys conducted among the population, the level of religious consciousness of the people has risen significantly. Indeed, the re-Islamization of the Techa floodplain people is proceeding especially actively.

**Table 1**

*The Population's Attitude to Religion (in %)*

	<b>1993</b>	<b>1998</b>
<b>Very religious</b>	15.3	21.3
<b>Religious</b>	43.8	59.4
<b>Non-religious</b>	27.0	9.2
<b>Atheist</b>	2.2	1.7
<b>Does not know</b>	6.2	4.1
<b>No answer</b>	5.5	4.3

**Table 2**

*Confessional Affiliation of Believers (in %)*

<b>Muslims</b>	76.2
<b>Orthodox Christians</b>	14.6
<b>Others</b>	5.8
<b>Unable to answer</b>	3.4
<b>Total</b>	100

In the region Islam operates mainly in the family and everyday spheres. Ritual and ceremonialism are indications of religiosity among Muslims. According to our research data, the number of Muslims who considered religious rites as necessary acts accompanying the most important stages in a person's life grew in five years by almost three hundred percent. The number of families that did not observe any Muslim ceremonies, customs, or holidays was very small – less than three percent of those interviewed.

Our research revealed that in the life of the Techa people, who often suffer severe post-traumatic stress disorder, religious faith has great psychotherapeutic value (Komarova 2000). For example, Techa Muslims emphasized in particular in their questionnaires that the Islamic teaching that “the day of a person's death becomes the day of his birth into eternal life” was extremely important to them. They noted that belief in this doctrine gave them the strength to go on living.

As in the past, steadfast adherents of Islam constitute an insignificant proportion of the Muslim population, although in comparison with 1993 their number has increased somewhat. The majority of Muslims

visit mosques and participate in religious holidays, but they are not inclined to subordinate their whole life to strict religious requirements. Among this majority, so-called “*narodny*” (popular) Islam predominates. The local religious officials, in order to propagate the creed, consciously simplify complex Islamic rituals and norms. Believers are permitted to perform Islamic prayer (*namaz*) just once a day (instead of five times), to observe *uraza* (the month-long fast of Ramadan) for just three days, and so on. The following view is widely held by Islamic clerics in the region: “Mullahs should make every effort to bring the following basic precepts of Islam to the people. 1) Trust in Allah with all one’s soul; 2) fulfil His requirements – recite the *namaz*, observe *uraza*, do not drink vodka or eat pork; 3) and most importantly, think about the purity of one’s soul and one’s conscience and be a decent person everywhere and in everything” (Cited from *Vatanyum Tatarstan [Tatarstan Is My Motherland]*, the official newspaper of Tatarstan).

Nevertheless, in recent years the influence of *Sharia* on the population of the zone has grown significantly in many spheres. Moreover, one finds excesses in its interpretation of the kind that the well-known Tatar physician G.G. Khasanov was pointing to already at the beginning of the previous century: “In the consciousness of individual Muslims, and especially Muslim women, the conviction has become consolidated and carried to an extreme that the areas of the body covered by clothes cannot be revealed to anyone of the opposite sex, apart from one’s spouse, of course, and even more, not to someone of a different faith. So when they get sick, they avoid going to a doctor and turn to sorceresses. There are thousands of such cases” (*Khasanov* 1909).

Physicians today confirm the same phenomenon and note that, as a rule, members of the Muslim population of the Techa floodplain, especially the elderly, consider diseases, abnormalities, and pathologies as punishments from Allah. They, therefore, try to hide any deviation from the norm from the people around them, try to avoid attracting any attention, and suffer in silence. They go to medical examinations only reluctantly. Efforts at preventive measures and the treatment of gynaecological diseases among the Muslim women of the villages are complicated by the fact that they also avoid medical examinations and try to treat themselves on their own. Muslim tradition also prohibits autopsies, which is one of the reasons why there is no reliable data on the incidence of disease among the irradiated population of the zone.

As the population becomes more religious, the Muslim clergy plays a more important role in the social life of the region. In our surveys

people expressed their respect for their spiritual mentors thus: "More is done for us in the mosque than in the village council." "In our times, only the mullah can be trusted." "Today the mullah is for us the party committee and the local trade union committee." Indeed, it is difficult to overrate the role of the clergy in Islam. Researchers of the Muslim peoples of the Ural-Volga region always noted that "the activity of the mullahs is not limited to the mechanical performance of religious rites. The mullah for the Muslim is a teacher, judge, and physician" (*Fuks* 1901). In this sense, it is important that Muslim clerics, in expounding the basic obligations of Muslims, take into consideration not only the demands of contemporary civilization, but also the special living conditions of people in a zone of elevated radiation; they should enlist Islamic traditions in their efforts to safeguard the people's health.

Islam's high standards with regard to hygiene, food and various aspects of maintaining well-being are well known "... Allah loves those who purify themselves" (The Koran, Sura 9, Ayat 108).

*Sharia* prescribes and elaborates a large number of hygienic measures for keeping courtyards, dwellings, domestic animals, public places, roads, etc. clean. It also contains numerous instructions and admonitions regarding rules of personal hygiene that also aid in maintaining the adherents' health. Thus, the rules of Islam prescribe over seventeen forms of ablution (*takharat*).

Prophylactic measures such as rinsing of the mouth and throat and washing five times a day seemingly comply completely with the requirements for preserving one's health. Unfortunately, however, this is not the case in the living conditions prevailing in the floodplain of the Techa River, whose water is the main cause of numerous diseases (*Komarova* 1995).

For example, the available data indicates that the rate of gynaecological oncology cases is lower among Muslims than among non-Muslims. This can be explained by the high level of hygiene among Muslims (regular washing, use of individual articles of personal hygiene, shaving of the pubis, etc.), in combination with the positive effect of such Islamic precepts as *sunnat* (the classical meaning of which is manners, behaviour, and the general meaning of which is morals, ethics) (*Aidarov* 1993; *Kantanov* 1899; *Sukharev* 1904; *Modan* 1980). Nevertheless, studies of the state of health of women in the Techa region indicate that among devout Muslim women, above all the elderly, gynaecological oncological diseases are more widespread than among other women in the zone. Local physicians, pointing to the religious requirement to wash repeatedly as the cause, also confirm this fact

Whenever a woman leaves her home, for example, to go into the woods, she carries with her a special container (*kumgan*, a type of jug) with water for washing. Under normal circumstances such a hygienic norm as this would be an excellent means of preventing disease, but for the inhabitants of the Techa floodplain the river's deadly waters are the cause of numerous maladies, including gynaecological diseases.

Islam requires that children must be breast-fed at least up to the age of two. This precept, however, does not take into consideration the fact that in the Techa region the mother's milk might contain a high level of radionuclides and therefore might often do more harm than good to the child. Whereas in the past this religious requirement actually helped make infant mortality among children in the Muslim population lower than among Orthodox Christians, that is no longer so in the specific conditions of the Techa region today (*Vorob'ev* 1953; *Fuks* 1901; *Sukharev* 1904).

### **Nutrition and the Risk of Irradiation**

In our research, we devoted special attention to the diet of the population groups in the region under consideration because under the conditions of elevated radiation that exist in the Techa River floodplain, locally supplied food and river water can serve as the main means of internal irradiation of the human organism (*Kosenko* 1995; *Chechetkin, Khotuleva* 1993). Of importance is Odum's conclusion that in conditions of radiation contamination, a person's position in the food chain and the methods used to prepare and process their food [can] protect him/her somewhat (*Odum* 1975: 586).

According to the results of our study, on the whole, it is difficult to speak about any stability or nutritional balance in the daily diet of significant numbers of Techa people. This circumstance reflects the deep economic crisis in which the region finds itself. During the last five years, the areas' residents have cut down on meat consumption and somewhat on milk, while the consumption of potatoes and other vegetables has increased.

Significant numbers of people do not consume many of the products recommended by experts. Only the consumption of potatoes, pasta products and milk exceeds the norm. An analysis of the daily diet of children up to the age of sixteen in terms of basic nutrients and calories reveals a particularly gloomy picture. There is a deficiency of nutrients that determine growth and development (animal protein,



vitamins A and B, calcium, phosphorus, iodine and iron). There is also a shortage of other important elements.

A study conducted in 1998 revealed that the majority of residents in the zone of elevated radiation provide for their food needs as in the past, relying, as in the early 1990s, mainly on their own home-grown produce. Previously, this was a consequence of the scarcity of available goods in the region. In recent years the stores and markets began to offer a larger selection of produce, but the purchasing power of the majority of Techa people is so low that they buy only what is most necessary. Thus, the possibility of purchasing “pure” (uncontaminated) food products remains as problematic for the local people as it ever was. Our data indicates that only three or four percent of the Techa population purchases basic goods (and by no means all of them) produced in uncontaminated regions.

The Techa people know that the main source of their internal irradiation is milk and meat (beef) from local animals. In addition, it has been established that when beef is boiled, up to 70 percent of the radionuclides passes over into the bouillon, and about 15 percent remains in the meat and bones. It is recommended not to prepare such popular Russian dishes as bouillon, jellied meat, aspic, roast, stew, and so on from the meat of animals raised in the zone. The offal traditionally used in Russian dishes also amasses large amounts of radionuclides. Muslims are prohibited by their religious laws from using these by-products in their food. It is called “*kharam*.” Two basic precepts govern the Muslim’s way of life, “*kharam*” – what is prohibited, and “*khalal*” – what is permitted.

Pork is the main product absolutely forbidden to Muslims, who must not even trade in it. However, it has been established that of all the forms of meat in the zone of elevated radiation, pork is the least radioactive, first, because it has more fat and meat in proportion to bone than mutton, beef, goose, and other meats. Secondly because, under local conditions, pigs are one of the few domestic animals that do not forage in the floodplain of the river, and, consequently, are less exposed to its radioactive influence. Also, feed prepared from plants growing on the shores of the river is not part of the pigs’ diet. Our survey of the population indicated that some of the Techa Tatars and Bashkirs eat pork.

Elderly Muslims adhere to a traditional type of diet, based mainly on milk and meat: beef, mutton, fowl and sometimes horsemeat if it is available. In the past, horsemeat was a traditional type of meat for

Tatars and Bashkirs. In the past decade it has again formed part of their diet. And although devout Muslims, according to the Koran, are not supposed to use it for food, this prohibition is only indirect. In addition, Islam makes an exception for the Turkic peoples. Russians view horsemeat as something exotic and, if given a choice, prefer beef, pork and fowl.

In recent years a certain group of Techa people has begun to change its views on what is beneficial or harmful for one's health, and a return to tradition has become noticeable. In particular, they have again begun to value sour milk products, many of which had been forgotten in previous decades. For example, Tatars and Bashkirs always considered *kumis* (a drink made from mare's milk) to be a curative for any illness. Techa women, who are always preparing sour milk products, have noticed that the mould removed from these products (cheeses, cottage cheese, sour cream, buttermilk/whey), which was always used in folk medicine to heal wounds, possesses another miraculous quality – products covered by the mould lose their radioactivity, as if the mould “eats” it. This observation was made with the help of household monitors (dosimeters) that were supplied to the population of the polluted region.

The Techa women's discovery is confirmed by scientific data. Scientists know that when milk contaminated by radionuclides is processed into cream, only five percent of the strontium-90 is passed on, into cottage cheese – 27 percent, into cheese – 45 percent. Cesium-137 is passed on at a rate of ten percent for cheese, nine percent for sour cream, 21 percent for cottage cheese, and 15 percent for butter (Iadernaia entsiklopediia 1996). For this reason it is recommended that the Techa people avoid using whole milk and increase their consumption of sour milk products. However, *Sharia* recommends whole milk, along with honey, as the best food for devout Muslims.

Other groups inhabiting the Techa region tend to avoid preparing various traditional dishes now considered harmful to their health. For example, Tatars and Bashkirs try not to prepare a dish that was very popular among them, made from dough fried in fat, because they assume that this mode of preparation is more carcinogenic than others. For the same reason, various smoked foods that used to be very popular among the nomads are now considered harmful to health – dishes like dried and cured goose, smoked meat, and the dish called “greasy flour,” prepared from grains fried in oil or butter. Incidentally, the grain from plants sown on lands contaminated by radiation accumulates especially large amounts of radionuclides. However, when flour is prepared from

it, the harmful element is partially eliminated. In addition, the finer the grain is ground, the less contaminated (purer) the flour becomes.

In recent years a given food's health value has become one of the main criteria for Muslims' borrowing dishes from Russians and vice versa. The Russian population has learned from the Muslims how to brew and use tea correctly. As they say, "Tea lives for 5-7 minutes, and in this time it washes away radionuclides. Old, already brewed tea leaves, however, only cause harm. Water for tea absolutely must be allowed to stand and settle." Green tea is considered especially beneficial, and the Russians borrowed recipes for making it from the Tatars and Bashkirs.

The Techa people believe, not without some basis, that homemade preserves (canned foods), pickles, marinades, sauerkraut, pickled mushrooms, jam, fruit and berry (from both garden and forest) compote, and so on contain fewer radionuclides. And if vegetable and mushroom preparations are kept in sunflower seed oil before being served on the table, the amount of radionuclides is reduced even more.

In recent years some of the floodplain inhabitants either refrain altogether from eating mushrooms from their region or try not to use the kinds of mushrooms that, in their opinion, accumulate large amounts of radionuclides, preferring "purer" (less contaminated) types of mushrooms. In general, the popular beliefs about which types of mushrooms are more "contaminated" and which are more "pure" correspond to the data of scientific studies.

It is possible to cite numerous examples of how life under the conditions of ecological catastrophe changes people's understanding of what is beneficial and what is harmful to their health. Thus, certain recommendations that physicians might give under normal circumstances (for example, to eat chicken soup or drink fresh milk when one is ill), become inadvisable in the contaminated floodplain of the Techa. Sometimes, even when people know they should not eat such radioactively contaminated foods as offal, bones, bouillon, etc., they may still not be able to refrain from using them. Quite often, for economic reasons, everything available is used for food. Also, certain holiday and ritual dishes may be difficult or impossible to prepare without these items.

The majority of Techa people use water from wells or pumps in the preparation of food, even while expressing their dissatisfaction with its quality and considering, as they always have, that the water from the river tastes better. In the zone, water is usually left standing to settle before use because this is considered more beneficial to one's

health. Sometimes filters or simply activated pieces of coal are used to purify drinking and cooking water.

On the whole, the representatives of the various nationalities prefer their traditional types of food and ways of preparing it. In addition, the current eating habits of residents in the area of elevated radiation reflect not only their ethnic preferences or confessional precepts but also their level of material well-being. The ability to adopt “beneficial” innovations creatively and to avoid “harmful” food traditions can, to a certain degree, reduce the consequences of contamination.

After the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, various specialized scientific research institutes of the then USSR and nowadays Russia began working on the development of products with therapeutic and preventive properties. However, as a survey conducted in 1998 shows, the inhabitants of the Techa River floodplain not only do not receive such products, but also they are not even aware of their existence.

### **Social and Psychological Models of Conduct**

When the activity of the Maiak complex became public knowledge, the flood of information that swamped the Techa people threw them into confusion and evoked a severe emotional reaction. The vast majority of the inhabitants of the zone responded by “withdrawing into the disease,” by manifesting symptoms of suffering, and by developing psychosomatic illnesses against the background of and in addition to diseases caused by radiation. In contrast, the rest of the population tried to cease being a passive object or a “guinea pig in atomic experiments,” to punish those responsible for the Techa tragedy, and to fight for their lives and health and for that of those close to them. These two contradictory ways of looking at life – the passive and the active – found expression in the Techa region population’s attitudes toward the very problem of radiation contamination and the danger of living in the zone and also in their different approaches to organizing their life support systems in conditions of elevated radiation.

The passive group, even when aware of the danger of living in the zone, continues to live as it did during the previous half century, without changing its customary way of life. As a rule, these people are not prepared to take active steps in order to protect their health and to struggle with the radiation danger. Among the majority of the population, a mood of dependency prevails, accompanied by complete

disregard of the most elementary norms of protection from radiation and the failure to observe any rules about how to live in a contaminated area. The ambiguous and uncertain situation disorients people, hampering their ability to make the right decisions and to act in a way that would best protect them.

The psychological stress suffered by the “passive” group of the population is manifested in feelings of anxiety, moods of hopelessness, and fear of the future. These people tend to hold the state responsible for aiding those who are suffering. They thus channel all their activity into insisting on their rights as “victims” and demanding benefits. The terms of compensation granted to people living in an area where there is a radiation risk acquire supreme significance for this group of Techa people. Everything else – work, their children’s education, supporting their family, health care – becomes of secondary importance.

“Conservative stability” as a cultural phenomenon is, on the whole, very typical of Russia. The basis of “conservative” or “regressive stability” lies in the tendency to protect and aid the employer and to attach him to the enterprise, organization, or system. This is a culture of dependency, paternalism, subordination, and “assignment” [jobs, housing, health services]. Paternalism constitutes the core of “conservative stability” as a cultural phenomenon. A passive outlook makes people indifferent to the state of their environment, to everything around them, and engenders social infantilism. They perceive every risk, man-made danger, or disaster resulting from the industrial and technological order as an act of nature or an unlucky accident, as something inevitable, in the face of which an individual is helpless.

The example of the Techa people is very instructive in this regard. The surveys demonstrated that many of the victims have adjusted to all the consequences of the Techa tragedy – and other technological tragedies in the southern Urals as well – in terms of traditional culture. They call them a “calamity,” an “accident,” “bad luck.” They understand them as an unavoidable evil, an act of nature, “divine punishment.” It is precisely these people who most often hope to solve their problems by turning to religion. Meanwhile, they forget the most important thing: the long-suffering quality that was a basis of stability in the former traditional society is destructive under conditions of radiation contamination.

Some rehabilitation work was carried out in the Techa floodplain in the past, but it was only partial and clearly inadequate. Furthermore, the system of restrictions in effect now in the zone not only is

not conducive to the development of a normal life for the Techa people, but it also accustoms people to the existing situation and leads to their ignoring basic requirements, which can only lead to additional irradiation of the population.

The majority of Techa males, no matter what ethnic group they belong to, have a passive attitude toward life. The devout adherents of Islam belong to this group of the population, independently of their age, sex, or ethnic origin. This type of reaction to a situation of great stress – passively ignoring the problem of radiation contamination, becoming dependent, submissive, and apathetic, and passively marking time – is typical above all of people on a low social and educational level. The majority of people of the Techa zone belong to this category (according to our data, no less than 85 percent of the population).

The second group of the population, which is quite small (no more than 10-15 percent), has a more active outlook. These people are united, they fight for their rights, they appeal to the responsible official bodies, and they write to the newspapers. They are disturbed not only by their own fate and health but also by the situation as a whole. An elevated level of anxiety is characteristic of the “activist” Techa people, but this is a normal reaction for persons who find themselves in extreme circumstances. It is not “radiophobia,” which is often ascribed *a priori* to the entire population in areas contaminated by radioactivity.

According to contemporary medical science, the characteristic features of a phobia are: the subject’s awareness of his disorder; the inability to overcome it by rational arguments and logical conclusions, which often only promote the strengthening and generalization of the fear (thus confirming its physiological basis); avoidance of any information about the object of the phobia because not only the concrete cause of fear but also any mention of it evokes a negative reaction; and attendant ritual actions.

However, the activist segment of the Techa floodplain population responds in exactly the opposite manner. First of all, these people manifest an active interest in any type of information about the radiological conditions in their region. Secondly, they adjust their behaviour in accordance with any new information they receive, and in particular, recommendations by physicians. Thirdly, they try to find a rational explanation for their own anxieties.

Although few in number, the “activists” among the Techa people are helping to develop a system of everyday, domestic knowledge and

popular experience in organizing the life support system in the region. For example, information is available regarding the spheres of garden farming and tending of cattle, proper diet, personal hygiene, means of self-healing and disease prevention, and so forth. A framework of empirical knowledge is being developed by various means and, above all, by preserving those operative traditions that are, in people's opinion, most "useful" for their health in an area of ecological disaster; by rejecting those traditions that may be widespread and generally accepted, but are "harmful to health" under these conditions; by restoring to active practice the most valuable and beneficial customs of the folk culture; by acquiring new traditions and adding innovations in the context of the living culture; and by creatively using and adapting scientific knowledge that may be applicable in some degree to local conditions.

This process advances at different rates in the different ethnic and confessional environments and has its own specific ethnic characteristics. In particular, the process of changing social behaviour under extreme conditions is proceeding least actively among the Muslims of the zone. This can be explained to a certain extent by this society's strict religious prohibitions. Even though some of the requirements of Islam have clearly lost their rationality in the radioactively contaminated floodplain of the Techa River, the true believer continues to be obligated to observe them as in the past.

Our research indicated that women constituted the majority among the Techa group of "activists." They, more than the men, tend to turn to their traditional ethnic culture, to rational and irrational means of disease prevention and home remedies, to folk recipes for healing foods, to techniques of personal hygiene, and to traditional means of garden farming. Women also take the lead in trying to introduce innovations into family life, such as adopting new modes of behaviour that, in their view, protect against disease. On the whole, women tend to hold up better than men in ecologically disastrous conditions, first of all, because they are more oriented to protecting not only their own health but also that of those close to them, especially their children. These qualities stood out in a survey of the female population of the Techa zone conducted in 1995.

The harsh living conditions in the zone force the women, in particular, to find creative solutions for problems. The activist segment of Techa women is made up of representatives of various ethnic groups. Most of them have special secondary or a higher education. There are

religious women among them, but almost no strictly religious Muslims.

Techa women constituted the majority of those survey respondents who considered that the safety and health of persons living in the Techa zone depended to some extent at least on the residents themselves. About 15 percent of the female respondents specified that the female head of the household should be the one responsible for the family's safety in the contaminated zone. One can't overestimate the contribution of Techa women to the resolution of the ecological and social problems of their region (Komarova 1994). While the local and regional officials, who are mostly men, always tried to reduce the problem to one of resettling the people and moving their homes from the villages to a distance of 1.5-2 kilometres from the river, the activist group, of which women constitute the majority, insisted that a radical solution be found for the "Techa problem."

A 1998 survey showed that although the majority of Techa people, both men and women, approved of the activities of the ecological movements, there were practically no men among the local activists, and the local leaders were women (with the exception of the group called the "Techa" movement). The overwhelming majority of employees and heads of the social service centres that have begun to operate in recent years in the Techa villages are also women. The great majority of rural teachers, educators, cultural workers, and medical personnel in the Techa floodplain are also women (according to our data from 1997, about 92 percent). At the end of the 1990s a revival took place of women's councils (*soviets*), which had been disbanded during the *perestroika* years.

At the same time the proportion of women who have become victims of tragic circumstances is quite large. Thus, the study of the social and hygienic status of the population living in the radioactively contaminated zone revealed that the level of reactive anxiety and especially the level of protracted anxiety among Techa women was higher than among men. Among women in particular the level of protracted anxiety grew significantly with advanced age and chronic illnesses. Sadly over the past decade, an increasing proportion of Techa women began to consider vodka as the sole salvation from the elevated radiation and often used it as a means of reducing their physical suffering and psychological and emotional stress. The women who drink are of different nationalities, including Tatar and Bashkir women. However, there are no devout Muslims among them. Like devout Muslim men, devout Muslim women never consume alcohol nor smoke.



The 1998 study of the Techa people showed a direct relationship between the respondents' (male and female) adherence to Islam and the absence of harmful habits among them. In general, Techa women almost never smoke. There were no women smokers at all among our respondents. About 45 percent of the men smoke, as a rule, a great deal. The proportion of those consuming alcohol more than once a week was higher among the Russians (both men and women) than among the Tatars and Bashkirs. At the same time, Tatars and Bashkirs constituted the vast majority of those who never use alcohol. The proportion of women who never drink was lowest among the Russians.

Our analysis of the entire complex of social and everyday characteristics that have an influence on the health and, in particular, on the aging process of the Techa people (smoking, alcohol consumption, conditions of water consumption, type and size of dwelling, existence of a vegetable garden, domestic animals, etc.) has revealed the correspondences described below. Early aging is more characteristic of the villagers living close to the Techa River than of those living farther away. Similarly, early aging is more typical of persons having dairy cows, meat cattle, and kitchen gardens. We may conclude from this data that the influence of radiation is considerable even against a background of other factors that promote early aging (*Varaksin, Kazantsev, and others* 1994). Thus, on the whole, the contemporary inhabitants of the Techa zone display two basic attitudes toward life – the passive and the active.

The results of a 1993 survey, in-depth interviews, and field observations among the Techa people point to a third behavioural type under the conditions of severe stress such as existed at the beginning of the 1990s, which may tentatively be called "constructive." The segment of the population that adopted this line was made up mainly of young and middle-aged people, socially active, financially secure, with special secondary and higher education, middle level managers, rural experts, former party and soviet workers, etc. They, like all the inhabitants of the floodplain, on the whole also reacted to the stream of negative information sharply and tensely and experienced stress. But in contrast to the vast majority of Techa people, the constructivists did not try to ignore the problem (as did the first, passive, segment of the population), nor did they pour out their emotions, demands, and appeals publicly (as did the second, active, segment of the Techa people). They did not set out to destroy anything nor to ignore the problem of living in the zone, but rather, they tried to understand, study, and con-

trol the situation. The typical orientation of such people was a focus on constructive and consistent, logical actions and a search for “step by step” solutions. The constructivists, in contrast to the other two groups of Techa people, had a definite program and acted, as a rule, in the same way. Once they understood that the hopes they had pinned on the 1993 Law were not justified, and having assessed their rights and possibilities in the developing situation, they simply left the contaminated zone, having prepared the ground beforehand for the resettlement of their family and relatives. The constructivists included representatives of all the nationalities, but the majority were Russians, who, as a rule, were not native inhabitants of the region. The majority of those who left were from the socially active, financially well-to-do stratum, and also that segment of the younger population most capable of functioning. By the middle of the 1990s this type of social behaviour had become practically non-existent in the zone (Komarova 2002a).

Our on-site study of the Techa people led to the conclusion that it is vitally important to carry out preventive medical work and to institute specialized campaigns against illiteracy and universal education projects. This is vital, first of all, because the Techa people’s state of health depends not only on how far away they live from the Maiak plant but also on a whole series of additional factors. The latter include, in particular, the special characteristics determined by the ethnic and religious groups to which people belong and the way their life support systems are organized.

In this respect, the problem of protecting the health of the Techa area people from irradiation may be approached on two levels. We may start with the scientific view that internal irradiation of the human organism by radionuclides is caused mainly by animal and vegetable food products, along with the water used and the air breathed. This approach means, in theory, that under the conditions prevailing in the Techa region, any person can guarantee himself protection, to a certain degree, from the risk factors connected with the internal irradiation of his organism. In particular, a person can stop the oral entry of radionuclides by not eating dangerously irradiated foods and water and by controlling their entry through inhalation. This approach need not take into consideration the person’s ethnic or confessional background and special behavioural characteristics.

The second level of defence from internal irradiation is conditioned by the fact that in an environment of elevated radiation, which is dangerous for everyone to an equal degree, a person’s ethnic or religiously determined behaviour might serve as a factor that could raise or lower

the dose of irradiation absorbed. Such an approach envisages various models of conduct by the representatives of the different ethnic groups and religious confessions. In this respect, three basic models of behaviour – which we may term conditionally “Russian,” “Muslim,” and “Tatar-Bashkir” – can be distinguished among the Techa people. In addition, these models can be correlated with the two basic types of social behaviour – i.e., the active and the passive – that we have delineated.

The “Russian” model of behaviour is typical not only of the ethnic Russians in the Techa River basin but also of the less numerous ethnic Ukrainians, Belarussians, Mordovians, and Chuvash. The persons in this group as a rule manifest a low level of ethnic self-identification. Their specific ethnic features can be observed most clearly in the type of diet they follow and the way they organize their private kitchen gardens. The few who are religious believers are mainly Orthodox Christians. For them, their faith plays an important psychologically therapeutic role in the extreme conditions under which they live. In addition, it is important to emphasize that the observance of Christian religious norms that regulate diet and approaches to personal hygiene, etc., in no way threaten to aggravate the believer’s situation under the conditions of elevated radiation. Orthodox believers have the right to choose products and ways of preparing them that will not harm their health, taking into consideration the radiation contamination all around them. Their situation is quite different to that of observant Muslims. They are not obligated, for example, when no “pure” (that is, “uncontaminated”) water is available, to use the contaminated water of the Techa River just because the time has arrived for a ritual ablution.

The majority of Techa people who have adopted the activist position and who thus try to improve the living conditions in the zone and struggle for the rights of the people there are characterized by this “Russian” model of behaviour.

The “Muslim” model of behaviour is precisely defined by the dogmas of the sacred Koran and *Sharia*. However, strict observance of all the precepts of Islam under the conditions prevalent in the Techa region is likely to harm the believer’s health. The “Muslim” model of behaviour is characteristic mainly of elderly Tatars and Bashkirs, although it has also been adopted by some of the youth of those ethnic groups, as well as by the not so numerous Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs and Chechens in the region. These people generally deal passively with the radiation contamination problems of the region. As true Muslims, the most typical expressions one hears from these people are: “I rely on Allah”; “The soul should not die other than with Allah’s permission”;

“Nothing ever happens to us other than what Allah has inscribed.”

The level of religious consciousness among the adherents of the “Tatar-Bashkir” model of conduct has increased in recent years. However, so-called “*narodny*” (“popular”) Islam, whose adherents are not inclined to subordinate their entire life to the dogmas of the Koran, still predominates among them. Thus, for example, on the one hand, they participate in various religious rituals and rites, and, on the other hand, they eat pork and drink alcohol. Those adopting this model of behaviour, like those adopting the “Russian” model, are much more open than strict Muslims to the possibility of different ethnic cultures influencing each other and to the adoption of innovations in their life style.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

The problem of survival under conditions of elevated radiation extends far beyond the borders of the Techa River floodplain. Nineteen regions of the former Soviet Union suffered from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. And the waters of the Techa, through the Iset, Tobol, Irtysh, and Ob Rivers, continue to contaminate broad regions of western Siberia. This means that the radionuclide factor exerts its destructive influence not only on the inhabitants of this particular elevated radiation zone in the southern Urals.

Today the danger of elevated radiation has become a universal problem that does not recognize political, ethnic or other borders. Nevertheless, it is important to draw conclusions about the people who must continue to live in the Techa zone of elevated radiation and to give them guidance on how to behave in order to protect themselves. While the objective conditions of the region are equally dangerous for all the inhabitants, their adherence to different cultures and religious norms with the attendant behavioural patterns may improve or aggravate their mental and physical state of health and prevent or stimulate diseases connected with radiation. The Techa people need to know how their behavioural patterns can raise or lower the dosage of irradiation they absorb.

In the given circumstances of the region under study, in our view, definite means of protecting the health of the people are available, as are measures capable of lowering the radiological and radio-ecological consequences of the contamination of the Techa River. At present the authorities are unable to undertake any radical action, such as expeditiously resettling all the Techa inhabitants in uncontaminated regions, nor are they able even to guarantee them uncontaminated food products

and water, or essential medical and social services. The research material, gathered and systematized, with an account of the recommendations of various types of specialists, could be utilized for preventive medical work with the inhabitants of this zone. The specialized aid given to the population should include, at the very least, complete and objective information about the unfolding radiation situation in the floodplain area, as well as concrete steps aimed at putting an end to the population's ignorance about both radiation and health matters.

Moreover, our study of the ethnic and cultural aspects of the Techa radiation disaster demonstrates very clearly that culture, which is, without a doubt, a specific universal adaptive mechanism of human society, can also operate in a manner harmful to adaptation. The world has accumulated a sufficient quantity of nuclear weapons and waste products of atomic power plants and the military-industrial complex to destroy humanity, as well as a large part of the biosphere. The inept or careless handling of nuclear energy can place mankind in a situation of mortal danger or, at the least, subject its health to severe risks. People have not been able to adapt to conditions of radioactive contamination. Thus, on the one hand, cultural progress (in this case, nuclear technology) sometimes subjects people to mortal danger, and, on the other hand, under conditions of intensifying anthropogenic degradation of the environment, traditional culture (for example, the promotion of religious precepts) tends to lose its life-protecting value. Traditional culture may not only fail to provide people with adequate protective mechanisms for self-defence, but, on the contrary, its norms and precepts may sometimes increase the risks and deter innovative behaviour.

Every human culture is made up of both "ecophilic" and "ecophobic" elements. In our opinion, the twentieth century added to this a new, paradoxical phenomenon – a culture capable of possessing "anthropo-phobic" features. Yet people do not have any means of foreseeing or, at the very least, minimizing the negative by-products of cultural progress apart from culture itself.

## **Appendix**

### **Some Historical Data about the "Maiak" Industrial Complex**

#### **Chronology of Events**

1948, June – A complex of plants for the production of weapons-grade uranium, the Maiak Nuclear Complex, began to operate in the southern Urals (near Cheliabinsk).

- 1949–1956 – Radioactive waste products from the Maiak complex were dumped into the Techa River in an unsupervised manner. As a result, 2.75 million curies of radioactivity [beta rays] were discharged into the Techa, Iset, Tobol and Irtysh rivers hydrographic system and 124,000 inhabitants of the region were subjected to internal and external irradiation.
- 1953–1961 – Twenty-two villages with a population of about 7,500 persons were evacuated from the Techa River floodplain. One of the largest villages, Musliumovo (located 30 kilometres from Maiak), was left in place, together with nine other villages, although a number of villages further down the Techa, that is, further away from Maiak, were resettled. Today this is an ecological disaster zone.
- 1957, 29 September – An explosion occurred in one of the Maiak radioactive waste repositories. Twenty million curies of radioactivity were emitted. The Eastern Urals Radioactive Trail (Russian initials, VURS) was formed. Its length (measured by a density of contamination exceeding 0.1 curies of strontium-90 per square kilometre) was 300 kilometres; 272,000 persons were subjected to irradiation.
- 1967, July – As a result of a drought, a strip of soil was exposed along the shoreline of Lake Karachai. This area served as a repository for high-level radioactive waste products from Maiak. The wind caused erosion to take place, and in July a small tornado carried off dried sediments from the lake, forming a cloud containing 600,000 curies of radioactivity. It spread contamination over 2,700 square kilometres, exposing 42,000 persons to radiation.
- 1990–2003 – The amount of radiation exposure in the region between the Techa and Misheliak Rivers (30 square kilometers) was abnormally high. Over 200 repositories of high-level radioactive waste products were concentrated in this region. Liquid radioactive waste products with radioactivity of about 900 million curies were held in special reservoirs. There were also about a dozen exposed radioactive storage ponds in the region. Lake Karachai itself represents a most potent source of exposed radioactivity (120 million curies).

Although the official position is that the Maiak plant stopped discharging radioactive waste into the Techa River in 1956, radionuclides continue to enter the river system, coming from leakage out of the industrial water reservoirs at Maiak.

In order to determine the extent to which the Techa floodplain was being used for different purposes, we conducted a door-to-door sur-

vey of private homes along with our survey of the condition of the population. The results revealed that households that fed their cattle hay (grass) from the Techa floodplain were polluted with radionuclides to a significant degree. In order to determine who were the people coming into close contact with the Techa floodplain and in order to assess their possible dosages of external irradiation, on-site surveys were conducted at the river itself. They showed that children spent on average about half an hour a day by the river and teenagers about an hour and a half a day. In spite of all the prohibitions issued by the adults, and even though it is well known that proximity to the river is a basic factor in distinguishing those who are singled out by the Geiger counter, children and teenagers were always to be found on the shores of the Techa (Berzina et al.1993). It is no accident that, alongside the adult inhabitants of the floodplain born in the years 1949–1956 and in whose organisms the greatest amount of strontium-90 has accumulated, and children up to the age of two years who receive the greatest expected dose of internal irradiation from the strontium-90 they ingest every day, teenagers from 12 to 17 years of age, subjected to the greatest amount of external radiation, also belong to the critical group (Kravtsova et al.1994).

The closest contact with the river was found among those Techa people who are compelled to work in the floodplain. For example, village shepherds spend up to eleven hours a day there. On the whole, comparative analysis of the results of our surveys conducted in 1993 and 1998 indicated that in recent years use of the Techa floodplain has grown more intensive (Komarova 2002).

Studies by I.G. Berzina, M.V. Khotuleva, and V.A. Chechetkin (1992–1994) revealed that the particular landscape and geochemical features of the Techa region contribute to the intensive accumulation of radionuclides in the water, silt, and grass, which serve as the source of the radionuclides that enter the human organism through the trophic (food) chains. At least three basic ways for radionuclides to gain entry through the food chain were examined: 1) the contaminated soil of the river – grass – water-fowl – man; 2) the contaminated soil of the river – grass – large horned cattle – milk – man; 3) the contaminated soil of the river – grass – domestic cattle – meat – man.

As our own study (Komarova 2001) revealed, Techa fish also serve as a basic source for radionuclides entering the human organism. Fishing is not simply a leisure-time activity for Techa people, including children and teenagers. Having lost their former sources of

livelihood, the local people have resorted natural resources more than in the past. This is a strategy of survival, a source of additional – and sometimes the family’s basic – income.

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## **LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF YUGRA: THE EXPERIENCE OF COOPERATION\***

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Here using the example of Yugra (the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area), we contemplate the complexity of the interaction between official authorities and the indigenous peoples of Siberia, within the context of post-Soviet state policy on ethnicity and the current state of aboriginal cultures. It is concluded that despite continuing problems and difficulties in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area, the dialogue between governmental and aboriginal structures has been modified and attempts are now being made to resolve the disputes that had emerged.

The history of Russian state policy towards the indigenous peoples of the North and Siberia has experienced several swings of the ideological pendulum: from non-interference and conservation of the traditional way of life to attempts at full integration and modernization. In the late 1980s the new socio-political situation changed the authorities' attitude towards these peoples [See: *Ot paternalizma k partnerstvu* 1998 and etc.]. The recognition of their special status was closely connected to the so-called ethnic mobilization of the indigenous peoples of the North: a social movement in defence of their rights and traditional cultural values.

Examining contemporary models of interaction between the authorities and indigenous peoples, their advantages and disadvantages, is crucial both for social practice and academic research. For instance, for ethnologists it is important to understand the ethnic consequences of the socio-political transformations in the North region. In this respect, the experience of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug – Yugra (henceforth, KhMAO), aimed at supporting the indigenous peoples and their cultures, may be of interest.

**The specifics of the ethno-cultural situation in KhMAO** are determined to a large extent by the existence of oil and gas fields. Because of the rapid development of the petroleum industry in 1970–

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1980s, labour migration increased, causing population growth in the region. Nowadays KhMAO continues to attract migrants because of its favourable economic conditions. According to the 2002 National Census, the population of KhMAO increased by 11.7% (compared to the 1989 census). By 2010 the population of Yugra had grown another 6.9%, reaching 1.5 million. However, in the 2010 census, 80% of respondents stating ethnic identity cited the three biggest ethnic groups of Russian Federation: Russians, Tatars and Ukrainians. Khanty and Mansi, despite being the so-called “titular nations”, make up only 2% of KhMAO’s population.

Considering the vast territory of Yugra (534,801 sq.km), the ethno-cultural potential of small indigenous groups can hardly play a decisive role in the socio-economic development of the region. However, the status of KhMAO as a constituent entity of the Russian Federation is determined by the indigenous peoples living in its territory – a point specifically emphasized in its Basic Law (*Ustav*). Thus regional authorities consider the preservation of indigenous identities an important political and cultural task.

Nevertheless, the current socio-cultural situation in KhMAO – Yugra still predetermines the existence of the indigenous peoples’ problems, some of which have their origins in the 1970–1980s: ecological problems, regulations on the use of natural resources, unemployment and a low standard of living, the erosion of native languages and cultural traditions under the influence of migration and industrialization, and many others. A solution for these problems would require both state support and the mobilization of indigenous peoples’ inner resources.

**Non-governmental organizations and social movements.** In 1989, coinciding with a so-called ethnic renaissance, a non-governmental organization “Saving Yugra” was created in KhMAO. Since then it has initiated numerous programs aimed at the support of Khanty and Mansi traditional culture and language. Nowadays there is a network of indigenous social organizations in Yugra, including the *Union of small indigenous peoples’ of the northern communities*, the *Union of private reindeer herders*, and the *Union of traditional craftsmen of the indigenous peoples of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug*. Another example of local initiative is the “Council of Elders of Small Indigenous Peoples of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug” – a deliberative assembly participating in discussions concerning the socio-economic and cultural development of the minority indigenous peoples of KhMAO. In 1995 the *Youth organization of*

the Finno-Ugric peoples of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (YO-FUP) was created. In collaboration with Youth Policy Committee of KhMAO, YOFUP implements the program *With the past to the future*.

**Science and education.** The activity of indigenous researchers' plays an important role in the development of KhMAO. Several influential initiatives were started in the region: the *Ob-Ugric Institute of Applied Research and Development* (previously the *Institute for the social-economic and national revival of the Ob-Ugric peoples*), Khanty and Mansi folklore collections, the ethnographic cultural reserve *Torum Maa*, etc. Native researchers assumed the crucial task of publishing works dedicated to their own cultures as well as to the problems of the adaptation of indigenous peoples to the new political and socio-economic reality.

The educational programs of regional state schools include eight ethno-cultural subjects: native language; native literature; local history; the geography of KhMAO; the ecology of KhMAO; the history of KhMAO; gamekeeping and fishery; and the culture of the indigenous peoples of the North. Additional disciplines, such as beadwork, national sports, and native arts are also available. In 2011 Yugra approved a list of regional experimental "ethno-saving" schools for children of indigenous minority peoples of the North living together with their parents on the territories of traditional natural resource use. One of the participants is the *Ugut Boarding School*: a project created by its teachers which won the regional *School as an ethno-cultural entity* competition, thus earning 416,000 roubles in financial support [EOSGO KhMAO (EOCTO XMAO) 2013.08.02]. The Department of Education and Youth Policy of KhMAO organizes annual competitions aimed at the conservation of the language and culture of the Ob-Ugric peoples. Another successful project is a network of "Ethnic Nomad Camps" that allow children to become familiar with native cultures during summer school holidays. There is also a creative studio for children *Lylyng Soium* operating in Khanty-Mansiysk, while the local newspapers *Khanty Yasang* and *Luima Seripos* (in the Khanty and Mansi languages respectively) reflect the problems of the Ob-Ugric peoples' contemporary lives.

A target program of KhMAO–Yugra, "Socio-Economic Development of Small Indigenous Peoples of the North in KhMAO–Yugra", provides state support for low-income indigenous students, compensating tuition fees (up to 100,000 roubles for university students and up to 50,000 roubles for college and technical school students)



and travel costs for returning home during the holidays; providing a monthly allowance to cover food costs, an annual allowance for buying textbooks and stationery, and a further annual allowance for first-year and last-year students in order for them to buy clothes and shoes.

**Normative legal documentation.** The regional *Duma* of KhMAO includes a special institute representing the interests of indigenous peoples: the *Assembly of the Representatives of Small Indigenous Peoples of the North*. The Assembly helps implement regional legislation concerning the status of indigenous peoples, the funding of various programs aimed at native peoples' socio-economic development, and providing grants for ethno-oriented projects. As of now, the region has accumulated an impressive amount of normative legal documents regulating the relationship between indigenous peoples and local government in the fields of protection of rights, traditional environment and traditional ways of life. The documents address the following problems: subsurface resource management, housing, hunting and fishery, tax deductions, culture, education, youth policy, traditional ethnic arts and handicrafts, etc. *Ustav* (the Basic Law) of KhMAO-Yugra, as well as sectorial laws ("On the subsurface resources management", "On regulation of separate land relations in KhMAO-Yugra") include regulations aimed at the preservation of the traditional native environment. Several regional laws of the autonomous *okrug* pursue the same aim: "On the regional territories of traditional natural resource use of small indigenous peoples of the North", "On the sanctuaries of small indigenous peoples". The regional laws also protect various spheres of the traditional indigenous way of life, including culture ("On the folklore of small indigenous peoples", "On the languages of small indigenous peoples", "On the support of media published in the languages of small indigenous peoples"), economy ("On factories (trading posts)", "On the development of northern reindeer breeding", "On the support of organizations incorporating the traditional industries of small indigenous peoples of the North") and others [Cf.: Aipin 2013 and etc.]. Unfortunately, the improvement of the native minorities' socio-economic conditions is often hindered by contradictions between different legislative acts, lack of coordination in their execution and the absence of legal means of control.

The rights of the minority indigenous peoples of the North are guaranteed by governmental authorities and the local self-government of the autonomous *okrug* in correspondence with the state target programs. In July 2013, the public hearings of the state pro-

gram “Socio-Economic Development of Small Indigenous Peoples of the North Living on the Territory of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug – Yugra (years 2014–2020)” were held in Khanty-Mansiysk. The purpose of the state program is to encourage the development of traditional industries of minority indigenous peoples and ethnographic tourism, thus increasing living standards, reviving and developing native culture, languages and handicrafts. The Department of natural resources and non-primary economic sector of KhMAO is responsible for the realization of the program.

In accordance with the target programs, the local budget assigns means for supporting native minorities and their cultures. Thus, G.F. Bukhtin, the deputy governor of KhMAO, called the funds that KhMAO spends on ISNPN housing improvement “unprecedented for the Russian Federation”: “In 2011 we allocated one billion roubles, and that allowed us to provide housing for 570 families. In 2012 we allocated 560 million. This year we hope to be able to provide the same amount. Besides financing the housing improvement program, the KhMAO budget allocates around 240 million roubles for different programs annually” [EOSGO KhMAO (EOCTO XMAO) 2013.01.02].

In May 2011, the Government of KhMAO approved the “Program of sustainable development of small indigenous peoples of the North living on the territory of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug – Yugra”, defining the priorities of state programs towards indigenous peoples. To coordinate the activities of local government, educational institutions and NGOs in preserving the indigenous languages and cultures, a deliberative assembly, the “Academic Coordination Council for Preservation of Languages and Traditional Culture of Small Indigenous People of the North”, has been created. The current chairman of the Council is G.F. Bukhtin, the first deputy governor of KhMAO. As N.V. Komarova, the Governor of KhMAO, suggests, “This program will help to incorporate the traditional industries of indigenous peoples into the KhMAO economy without disturbing their unique identity” [EOSGO KhMAO (EOCTO XMAO) 2011.08.09]. As of now, it is difficult to say how solid this claim is. The native representatives, however, question it, pointing out the declarative nature of the aforesaid document and expressing their concerns over the dismantling of the Department for the Affairs of the Small Indigenous Peoples of the North.

The KhMAO – Yugra Government Decree N228, “On the KhMAO – Yugra grant support of projects aimed at conservation,

development and popularization of folklore, traditions, language and handicrafts of small indigenous peoples of the North”, which took effect in 2008, should be specifically mentioned as it allows the publishing of Ob-Ugrian folk song CDs, the creation of animated films, the reconstruction and recording of traditional craft techniques (e.g. building Northern Mansi birch bark tents (*chums*), traditional wood-carving, etc.). The native experts say that “participating in such projects is a good way to learn to be independent; it helps to maintain the culture in general” (AFM 2010). On the other hand, the problem of grant support resulting in the emergence of people with “project minds”, i.e. that specialize in acquiring budget funds, is widely discussed in the media.

**Conclusion.** The KhMAO – Yugra has managed to accumulate valuable experience of cooperation between local government and NGOs in protection of indigenous peoples’ rights and interests. However, the Ob-Ugrian activists are still somewhat dissatisfied with the local authorities. According to T.S. Gogoleva, a KhMAO *Duma* deputy, in the last ten years the *okrug* has been lacking a clear and effective national policy: “The officials just weren’t listening. Our Assembly kept writing letters, but in response to them the KhMAO government initiated their project – obviously a mere formality”. Gogoleva says that positive moments are few: “The Assembly of the Representatives of Small Indigenous Peoples of the North has remained part of the Yugra *Duma*, although for a while its fate hung by a thread. After seven years we finally managed to pass the law on factories (trading posts)” [RITs Iugra Inform (ПИЦ Югра Информ) 2011.14.01].

Moreover, some of the key problems still haven’t received legal resolution: the land rights of minority indigenous peoples, the issue of nature management, the rights of native minorities as regards different kinds of compensation and so on. Although KhMAO – Yugra has developed an extensive budget program of social protection measures, the experts point out that these measures are not selective enough and cannot solve the main problems leading to the risk of poverty [See: Prostranstvo, liudi, ekonomika Iugry: 203, 221].

The authorities are criticized for the gap between the proclaimed legal norms and real minority policy. Another problem is the “formalization” of indigenous minority status in legal documents. In spite of various lists and registers existing in KhMAO (the register of traditional nature management subjects, list of traditional industries, list of objects of intangible heritage of indigenous peoples), native contem-

porary economic and cultural activities exceed their limits [See: Novikova 2012]. So far, the question of documentary proof of belonging to an indigenous minority group (necessary for securing the rights of minority indigenous peoples) is also unresolved.

However, despite the above-mentioned problems, the local government and indigenous NGOs of KhMAO together try to find the ways to resolve the confrontation. In the last ten years, indigenous culture has become more prestigious, and northern indigenous ethnicity has turned into a valuable socio-political resource; the choice of a more “prestigious” ethnic identity has become a common adaptation strategy. These tendencies are clearly reflected in the results of the last two censuses (conducted in 2000 and 2010): the indigenous population of KhMAO has significantly increased. The main reason for this growth is that the children born in interethnic marriages start to define themselves as a part of a native group. Apart from purely economic motives, such affinity with the minority indigenous peoples of the North shows that indigenous ethnicity has been “revaluated”, liberating itself from the stereotype of a “wounded” identity. And this revaluation can be considered a sign of the positive socio-economic changes in KhMAO – and, surely, one of the most important results of the indigenous NGOs’ activity.

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### **Abbreviations**

EOSGO KhMAO (ЕОСГО ХМАО) – Единый официальный сайт государственных органов ХМАО

ХМАО – Ханты-Мансийский автономный округ – Югра

## **LEGAL IDENTITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS AS A KEY ASPECT OF MODERN NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY\***

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The Northern Caucasus is a special region of the Russian Federation, characterised by the many different ethnic groups inhabiting it: Kabardians, Balkars, Circassians and other peoples. Most belonged to Islam, a faith which began to penetrate the Caucasus in its first century (the seventh century of the Christian era), though Islamisation of the north-eastern Caucasus only started in earnest in the 10th – 12th centuries. By the 19th century, however, all the peoples of the North Caucasus were Muslims (*Bobrovnikov, Babich* 2007: 185).

Caucasian legal history can be divided into three periods: 17<sup>th</sup> – C. 1917, 1920–1990 and, 1990–2010. Until the 1920s, the legal system of the Caucasus was a fusion of standards of *'adat*, sharia and state law established by the Russian Empire during the 19th century.

Some communities were dominated by *'adat* (north-western and central Caucasus), though with several *sharia* family norms disseminated through the region, and others - by the *sharia* (eastern and north-eastern Caucasus: Chechnya, Dagestan, Azerbaijan). Shamil's role in the dissemination of *sharia* in the North Caucasus during the period of Imamatus (1834–1859) was important.

Before Islamisation, the peoples of the North Caucasus had used the *'adat* (Ar. *'ada*, – 'customary law'), based on oral tradition: the absence of a state and a system of law favouring its survival Islam, however, introduced its own legal system – the *sharia*.

The rivalry between the two systems developed into a coexistence. The Russian conquest of the area and the introduction of Russian legal norms resulted in a pluralistic legal system which included the *'adat*, the *sharia* and the (Russian) state law. Thus, it can be said that customary law has gone through three stages: customary law before annexation to Russia (17<sup>th</sup> – mid 19th centuries), reformed customary law (second half of 19th – early 20th centuries) and customary law in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods (1920–1990s).

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This article is based on fieldwork in the north-western Caucasus (1990–2010) and on materials from Russian archives [Moscow, Nalchik, Krasnodar] (*Babich* 2004).

The aim of this article is to describe general tendencies and specific features of modern legal life and to study the influence of the *sharia* (Islamic law) unofficially established by modern Islamic leaders during 1990–2010 on the official legal, social and political situation in the North Caucasus.

The traditional Caucasian customary law can be described as an unwritten code combined with a community control system. Its underlying concept is that a crime is damage done to the collective. The basic principles of the '*adat*' are vengeance and/or compensation for damage. In customary law man, family, clan and community are all accepted as legal persons (*Leontovich* 1882).

Once incorporated into the Russian Empire, the North Caucasus underwent between the 1860s and the 1910s a series of changes and reforms, including in the sphere of law and its enforcement. The '*adat*' was codified and made an integral element of Russian state law as applied in the northern Caucasus, although the Russian administration preferred to support the *sharia* rather than the customary law. The legal norms of the *sharia* with regard to the division of property and heritage were introduced as binding in the legal practice of the Russian State Court in the North Caucasus, known as the "Mountain Court" [*Gorskii Sud*] (*Agishev, Bushen, Reinke* 1912).

Nonetheless, '*adat*' (Kab. *mendetyr*, Tr. *tere*, Russ. *Mediatorskii*) courts continued to function, with the government enforcing their decisions through a system of fines for non-compliance. Their procedure remained verbal, but the decisions had now to be written down (in Russian).

'*Adat*' courts included 5-10 judges/arbitrators with a command of the '*adat*' norms. They were selected from among the elderly men in accordance with Caucasian social traditions and the veneration of elders.

In customary law, the legal persons were: man, family, clan, community and, community union. Groups of men, family relatives and a collective of communities could stand as a legal person in some cases.

In the *sharia* court, the *Qadi* (Ar. judge) settled all the cases, using *sharia* literature in Arabic. Both '*adat*' and *sharia* courts could hold proceedings only if a party to a dispute or their relatives (close or distant) applied. In both types of courts proceedings were held in four consecutive stages: first the plaintiff was heard, then – the defendant, followed by the witnesses, and finally – the sentence was passed.

Criminal cases were heard according to the '*adat*' and, later, Russian law; while civil cases were subject to Russian legal standards. The family law norms which regulated divorce and partition of property and inheritance filled a separate niche, strongly influenced by Islamic law. The application of Islamic law to questions of land and finance (bonds, unpaid debts, and the imposition and payment of fines) could only be observed in Dagestan and Azerbaijan.

The introduction of Russian court into the Caucasus came in 19th century, with the: Highland Verbal Court (*Gorskiy* Courts). Meanwhile, women had acquired the light to go to Russian courts independently. Obstacles to women's going to law that still existed included: 1) the narrow range of cases tried by Russian courts; 2) and the pressure of Caucasian and Islamic standards regarding the social status of women. The Highland Courts tried virtually no cases concerned with women, and Caucasian women rarely used courts as a means to fight for their rights.

This pluralistic system continued to function until the early 1920-s, when Soviet power and law were established and all other legal systems were banned.

At first, the Soviet administration supported the *sharia* Courts, which considered all cases, criminal as well as civil, according to the legal norms of the *sharia*. In the late 1920-s, however, the *sharia* courts were closed and replaced by Soviet courts which functioned in accordance with the Soviet criminal and civil codes. At the same time the Soviet administration curbed the ritual and educational spheres of Islamic life. Almost all mosques and Islamic schools in this region were closed down and the Islamic leaders (*mullahs*) were persecuted. As a result most of the Islamic traditions of the people in the North-western Caucasus had weakened during the Soviet period.

Since 1920, when the Soviet law was put in force, '*adat*' norms have survived fragmentarily and illegally. The Soviet law that replaced them introduced the concepts of domestic crime (1920–1940s) and the distinction between useful and harmful customs (1950–1980s). The useful ones ('*adats*') included, respect for elders, mediation at negotiations, peacekeeping and the protection of property. Harmful '*adats*' were, inter alia, blood revenge and the repression of women. Thus, the 1960 criminal code of the Russian Federation and of the Caucasian autonomies included a special section (chapter 11) which consisted of three categories of crimes that represented 'relics of local customs':

1 – Crimes against the equality between women and men, namely:



the payment and acceptance of *kalym* (bride money); compelling a woman to marry, or conversely the obstruction or preventing of her marriage, forcing a woman to continue marital cohabitation, the abduction of a woman for marriage, bigamy and polygamy.

2 – Crimes against the physical or moral development of minors of both sexes, such as marriage to, or cohabitation with an underage partner.

3 – Avoidance of reconciliation, blood feuds, the murder and femicide “on the basis of the relics of past attitudes towards women” (*Menshagin, Durmanov, Kriger* 1964: 393–394).

Moreover, women in the Caucasus had the opportunity to use the state legal system for defending their rights. Theoretically, Caucasian women could act as both plaintiff and defendant, although in fact fathers, husbands or brothers were - and indeed still are representing women in the Soviet and today’s Russian courts in the Caucasus. Women use the state courts to fight for their rights as rarely as before. Statistics from the Caucasus shows that the majority of cases with women as petitioners are concerned with rape.

Major obstacles to the active use of the modern courts by Caucasian women include the survival of the traditional sense of justice and the preservation of traditional social statuses of both men and women which rely partly on Islamic ideology.

The present religious and legal policy of the Russian State in the northern Caucasus suffers from internal contradictions. On the one hand, the Russian administration tries to restrict the attempts at legal reforms attempted by the republics of the northern Caucasus. On the other hand, the Russian administration allows the same local republics in the northern Caucasus to support the process of Islamic revival. Yet at the same time it wages a struggle against the so-called ‘Wahhabis’ not only in Chechnya, but in the republics of the north-western Caucasus as well. However, in this struggle Russia lacks a proper legal basis. The law enforcement agencies have no clear legal criteria defining who is a ‘Wahhabi’ and who is not. Basically, they use certain articles of the Criminal code, especially those related to acts of terror. This leaves them with no legal tools to tackle an ideology supporting terrorism or the ideological struggle of the radical Muslims. As a result, Russian law enforcement bodies use unofficial rules and consider most (if not all) Muslims as potential terrorists.

**The Modern Islamic community** (*jamaats*). The number of *jamaat* members is difficult to determine, – as there is no clear-cut cri-

teria to determine whether a person is a member or not. *Jamaats* can be formed by four categories of Muslims: 1) Muslims who do not go to mosque but offer occasional *namaz* (prayers) and observe fasts at home (this category of Muslims includes many women); 2) Muslims who only go to mosque on the major Islamic holidays, do not offer *namaz* at home nor observe fasts; 3) Muslims who offer the Friday *namaz* at mosque and choose whether to offer it or not at home the other days; 4) Muslims who offer *namaz* at mosque every day if possible [this category includes many young people] (*Babich* 2007).

The majority of middle-aged and elderly men consider themselves believers though they do not go to mosque or go there very occasionally, for example on major holidays. Few of them consider themselves atheists. The process of Islamic revival has primarily affected young people aged from 15 to 35 and living in towns and villages.

This situation is repeated in most republics of the northern Caucasus, although the situation in Dagestan is slightly different. There, the Islamic revival has touched on all the age groups; and the older generation is no less religiously active than the youth. In Dagestani villages, especially highland ones, almost all the inhabitants across generations attend mosque.

The second half of the 1990s saw the emergence of an intra-Islamic intergenerational rivalry between community and mosque chiefs for the leadership of society. Many young Muslims dissociate themselves from so-called 'ethnic' Muslims (i.e., traditional Muslims), amongst whom they count the North Caucasus residents who do not offer *namaz* neither at home or at mosques but nonetheless consider themselves Muslims. The ethnic Muslims usually remember Islam only at funerals, weddings, and on major Islamic holidays. That is why young Muslims call the Islam of the older generation 'funeral', 'folk', or 'traditional' Islam. At the same time, young Muslims call themselves 'praying' or – 'young' Muslims, developing a new, purer version of Islam (*Babich* 2002). Young Muslims seek to promote and partly modernize Islamic life that had been weakened significantly during the 20th century, and had barely survived by the 1990s. Young Muslims justly believe that most Muslims of the older generation lack the necessary knowledge of Islam and Islamite behaviour. But the very activities of the Muslim youth are riddled with mistaken ideas and actions, misunderstandings of the political situation, the same religious ignorance of earlier generation above all impatience. Gradualism is one of the main principles of faithful Muslims, but it is largely

violated by the young Muslims who are eager to change the Islamic life in Kabardino-Balkaria immediately and abruptly. The older generation of Muslims has rejected their activities, which they have taken as a threat to the special privileged of the elders.

This problem is current mostly in the republics of north-western Caucasus. Nevertheless, it also has its local particularities. For example, after the situation was brought under strict control in Karachai-Cherkessia, many youth leaders either left the republic (together with the recognized leader Muhammed Biji-ulu) or broke away from religious activity (like the former imam of one of the Uchkeken mosques, Rasul Botashev). The situation in Dagestan is more complex. Of course, the Wahhabi *jamaat* leaders are mainly young men who tried to compete with *imams* of previous generations. However, the followers of traditional Sufism - dominant in most of the republic - have a strong youth organization. The Spiritual Board of the Muslims of Dagestan often sends young graduates from local colleges to work in Dagestani villages as imams. In other words, the local administrations in KBR and KCR control the imams' activities, while in Dagestan it is often an imam (*dibir*) who controls the activities of the local authorities.

**Islamic Ideology.** The Islamic ideology of the young Muslims which began to form in the 1990s is based upon the idea of activation and partial modernization of Islamic life in the republics. The methods used to form the Islamic ideology in the minds of young Muslims are as follows (*Babich* 2003):

- Forming a system of Islamic education.
- Promoting Islamic ideology in general high schools and sports schools.
- Educating a strong body of preachers for delivering Friday *hutbas* sermons, where the basic postulates of Islamic ideology are explained.
- And the re-evaluation of national traditions. Young Muslim leaders consider the national (traditional) culture as a cultural space which should be analyzed through the Islamic traditions (*hadith*) and that the new Islamic culture can contain only those highland traditions which are not contrary to Islam (Encyclopedia 2004):
  - In the northern Caucasus there is still a widely spread practice of bride abduction used when the parents of the young people do not agree to their wedding. Islam stands against such a

- practice admitting only proper matchmaking procedures.
- In the northern Caucasus alcohol drinking traditionally permeates all festival customs and eating habits, but young Muslims try to limit alcohol intake. Thus the weddings of young Muslims are celebrated either entirely without alcohol or with a separate table set aside for the Muslims who do not drink alcohol.
  - Whereas the north Caucasian traditional dance culture includes a wide variety of dances and musical instruments. Islamic canons prohibit dancing between men and women. Young Muslims practice male – only dances accompanied by drums and trick riding.
  - Caucasian hospitality customs involve a *tamada* – (toast-master), appointed to conduct a feast, a tradition not contemplated by Islamic rules
  - The northern Caucasian tradition of honouring the elders is still widely respected. Accordingly, as well as other rules, when meeting an older man, the younger person should first address him wherever he stands – on the left or on the right side, and then proceed to greet others. Islamic customs, however, do not demand the honouring of elders, but rather, in the situation described above, special honour would be paid to the person sitting or standing on the right, age notwithstanding. The tradition also prescribes reserving the places at the front of the mosque for the elders, whereas according to Islamic rules the persons who arrived at the mosque earliest occupy the best places.
  - According to the north Caucasian traditions the widow should mourn her diseased husband for a year, while Islamic rules command her to remarry soon.
  - Clan structure remains an important parameter in north Caucasian society while in Islam kinship does not have priority in relations between the community members.
  - Young Muslims do not follow Caucasian funeral and wake customs.
  - Finally, the tradition of naming children according to Islamic canon almost vanished in the northern Caucasus, and young Muslims are attempting to revive the tradition of naming both children and adults with Muslims Islamic names.

Everything described above as typical characterizes in the northern Caucasian republics. For the Chechen, Stavropol and in the part

the Dagestani young Muslims it is furthermore characteristic to pay a great deal of attention to the military and physical training. In the training camps in Chechnya (Urus-Martan) and Dagestan (Karamahi) basic Islamic studies take up approximately the same time as physical and military training. In other words, ideological training included preparation for “small scale” armed *jihad*.

The re-evaluation of the Caucasian traditions can be observed everywhere in the northern Caucasus, and especially in the sphere of funeral-wake rituals and changing personal names. For example, the leader of the Astrakhan Wahhabis, the Dagestani Ayub took this Islamic name (after the prophet Job) instead of his pre-Islamic name Anguta. Even though not rejecting their national roots, the young Muslims are still marking their new Islamic identity.

Islam and Muslim law have gradually become part of the national-religious struggle of the peoples in the northern Caucasus against the conservative governments of their republics. Consequently, all over the area (with the exception of the Chechen Republic) local political leaders started to display an interest in Muslim law. This was a gradual process. At the beginning nationalist leaders in the republics of the north-western Caucasus became interested in customary law. They, thus, used the media to describe the positive role of the ‘*adat*. By the mid-1990s national leaders were replaced by religious (Islamic) ones and interest shifted from customary to Muslim law.

During the 1990s, officials and politicians in the Caucasus gradually limited Soviet rules and juridical institutions at local level and tried to include norms from the ‘*adat* and the sharia in the republican Legal Codes. They did so not only because of pressure from nationalist leaders, but more important was the fact that in reality mediation based on customary law had been practiced even in the Soviet period, its aim being “to mollify relations between the clans” and to try to diminish Russian punishment and in some cases even to avoid it completely.

Thus, mediation based on customary law is used in cases of quarrels, drunken brawls, theft, injuries, murders and especially injuries and killings caused by road accidents. Significantly, rape cases are excluded. The mediators decide on the compensation in money or in kind for each crime. If the injured person recovers the guilty person and his family arrange a reconciliation dinner for the victim and his relatives to try to reach an agreement on compensation. If the victim dies, the family of the killer gives money and cattle, participates in the organization and expenses of the burial and funeral repast and

helps in bringing up the orphans. If reconciliation fails, the guilty family leaves its settlement either of its own will or following a decision taken by the rural assembly. This move might be temporary, but is sometimes – permanent.

What this means is that the solution of problems in the political, social and daily life in the republics of the Northern Caucasus depends on a compromise between the official Russian legal code (and its legal ideology based on International Law) and Caucasian legal norms and ideology supported by the local authorities (based partly on the Customary Law and partly on the *sharia*). The republican authorities, therefore, wanted to create a mixed legal system based on both Russian legal norms and on norms taken from the *'adat* and the *sharia*. Some republics in the northern Caucasus even took steps towards that end. In Dagestan, for example, the new Constitution of 1996 granted village meetings some legal functions (*Babich* 2003).

The Russian administration, however, rejects negotiations with the republics on this issue and refuses to recognise such steps. One reason for that might be the attempts to make the *sharia* into the official code of law. In Dagestan, for example, individual *sharia* norms had been used by people in everyday life, especially in matters relating to the family, land ownership and economic activities. However, the radicalization of Islam has brought this issue into the spotlight. Chechnya under Maskhadov proclaimed itself officially an Islamic state and the *sharia* – its only civil and criminal law code. In Dagestan an 'Islamic state' was established in the community of Kadar in 1998–1999, with the *sharia* its 'constitution and law'. And in Adygeia and Kabardino-Balkaria, Muslim law is followed unofficially by the young and more or less radically-minded Muslims.

As for the revival of Islam, during the 1990s the institutions and values of Islam quickly regained their influence, – which they seemed to have lost during the Soviet period, – on the social and political life of the northern Caucasus (*Babich, Iarlykapov* 2003: 30). Islam in the northern Caucasus has deep historical and cultural roots and a rich spiritual tradition and its revival has been felt particularly among intellectuals and the youth. Religion has become one of the most important factors of public life. This process has been more intense in the north-eastern Caucasus (Dagestan and Chechnya), but it has influenced the north-western Caucasus too.

The *sharia* allows women to have a share in property, while according to the *'adat* only men can share it. No strict principles ex-

ist, although an important factor is whether there are children or not. In the former case the property is divided between the oldest child (irrespective of gender and all the male children. The Adighe from Kosovo, who had been recently resettled in Adygeia, apply Muslim laws of inheritance and follow Muslim stipulations about the last will and testament<sup>1</sup>. Anzor Astemirov, one of the young radical Islamic leaders of Kabardino-Balkaria, maintains that local Muslims have been showing an interest in this practice and gradually embracing it (Astemirov 2004: 183–184).

Organising Muslim education became the main activity of the Muslim administration (*muftis*) in the 1990s. In Kabardino-Balkaria, for example, there are now 54 training institutions in which 1612 men are enrolled. There are also *madradas* (rural Muslim schools) where Muslims learn some Arabic, the *Qur'an* and *namaz*. Also popular literature available to rural Muslims contains information about fasting, the *namaz*, funeral rites etc., but nothing about the legal norms of the *sharia*. Such information can be obtained in lectures about the legal norms of *sharia* at the Islamic Institute in Nalchik. The teachers in this institute all come from Turkey and the Arab states. The institute offers courses in the history of religion, Islamic sciences and Arabic. Many young people study Arabic and the basics of Islam in this institute. Others go on to study in Islamic universities in Turkey and the Arab states.

The Muslims seek to enhance and partly modernize the Islam which in the north Caucasus has survived only in fragments. They rightly believe that most Muslims of the older generation lack essential knowledge of Islam and of how to behave in accordance with it. However, their activities reveal a great deal of flawed ideas and misguided actions: misunderstanding the political circumstances; religious ignorance no less than that of their opponents; and, above all, – impatience. Patience is one of the main values of devoted Muslims, and they were offended by the young Muslims' eagerness to change Islamic life in Kabardino-Balkaria immediately and abruptly. The older generation of Muslims opposed their activities also because they regarded them as endangering the privileges of the elders and the historically formed balance of the Kabartay and Balkar societies.

The governments of Adygeia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkesia seem to have followed the popular trend. During the early and mid – 1990s they supported the Islamic revival, and even financed it (by allocating funds to build mosques for example). By the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, these policies changed in view

of the development of radical forms of the Islamic movement. The authorities in all the republics of the north-western Caucasus decided to curb Islamic communities, mosques and educational institutions

At the beginning of 1990-s the dissolution of the USSR and the decline of Soviet law led to the creation of a new legal and socio-legal situation in the northern Caucasus. This new situation influenced many other the issues. In the north-western Caucasus the main issues were the policies of conservative republican authorities, the preservation of some traditional norms of behaviour in social life, including some norms of customary law, and the revival of Islam and some norms of Muslim law. By the end of 1990s, however, as the Islamic revival led to radicalization, both the central Russian and the local republican authorities changed course and attempted to curb this.

As a result in the modern north Caucasus there is a change in the legal identity of the different peoples: the legal consciousness of the Caucasian peoples has connection not only with the official state legal system, but also with both *adat* and *sharia*. From my point of view, modern *adat* is a part of the national (traditional) identity, and *sharia* is a part of the religious identity. Sometimes, national and religious identity are similar, sometimes they are different, sometimes these legal systems are in conflict. It is all connected with the conflict between the national and religious life in then north Caucasus – and the conflict between the national and religious identity of the modern Caucasian peoples (*Babich 2002*).

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> In Kosovo there were no restrictions on the practice of Islam.

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## **ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE KOSTROMA REGION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION\***

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The study of migration and local attitudes towards migrants arriving in Russia from other countries, especially neighbouring countries, is one of the most urgent in modern science. The problem of relations between local communities and people of other nationalities in the central regions of Russia is in fact poorly studied. Russian science considers migration issues from the perspective of geographical, socio-economic and sociological theories. Starting with the research school of T. Zaslavsky, migration was studied from the standpoint of human behavioural analysis which allowed a wide range of causes of migration to be addressed, as well as taking into account not only objective, but also subjective factors in migrants' decision-making related to their change of domicile.

Other aspects of migration research, in particular in the context of urbanization, were developed by B.S. Horev and presented in the work of his students: V.N. Capek, S.A. Polish, S.G. Smidovich, A.G. Grishanova, V.A. Penniless, I.A. Danilova et al. A special place in the scientific literature was taken by L.L. Rybakovsky's ideas of a three-step migration process seen as a consecutive chain of events.

B.C. Ayrapetova, J.A. Zayonchkovskaya, A.V. Dmitriev, V.A. Tishkov, V.V. Stepanova, N.M. Lebedeva, A.I. Kuropyatnik, G.S. Vitkovskaya, E.A. Nazarova, N.P. Kosmarskaya et al. addressed the issues of complex interactions between migration processes and migrants' adaptation to the host social environment, factors that determine adaptation, level and period of adaptation in different types of situations, and the problems of tolerance and potential conflict in the context of interaction between ethnic migrants and local populations.

The Kostroma region is one of the largest in the Central Federal District of Russian Federation. The region's population numbers 656,400 people as of January 1, 2014. It is an industrial as well as

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agricultural zone known for forestry, agriculture, electric power industry, mechanical engineering and the textile industry. Its current state is classified by experts as 'problematic', while the region is seen as 'underdeveloped'. The main natural resources are wood and peat.

There are 2,209 legal foreign workers in the region, though in reality this number is clearly higher. Foreigners are involved in manufacturing industries, construction, agriculture, forestry, and tertiary industries. Most foreign workers do the jobs that are most in demand: bricklayers, plasterers, painters, concreters, seamstresses. A quarter of foreigners work as ancillary workers, porters, cleaning specialists. An average level of migrant workers' wages in Kostroma region in 2013 amounted to 8,000 roubles. In most cases people searching for a job come to the Kostroma region from Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Armenia, Tajikistan, China and Vietnam.

The region is ranked ninth for the number of migrants in the Central Federal District. "Apparently, our region does not look very attractive to them; 17,643 foreigners arrived, while 21,405 left the region (in 2012)", said A. Shainov, the head of the Russian Federal Migration Service in the Kostroma region. "This means that there are more migrants leaving the region, probably they cannot find a job here. In addition, last year 311 trained employees from countries outside the CIS were given jobs. Normally they worked at *Kronostar* factory in the city of Sharya and *Russky brat* factory in Galich". In 2014, the employment quota for foreign citizens amounted to 4,414 people, 9% less than in the previous year. It should be noted that employers' demands for migrant labour is much higher: they requested 10,000 foreign workers. Authorities found this number unreasonably exaggerated stating that there are enough local specialists in the region. Around a half of these employment quota workers (about 2,000) will work in the construction sector. I. Korsun, the first deputy governor of Kostroma region, noted: «A series of requests was rejected because some employers did not report their taxes, some showed zero income, others have not been able to provide housing for migrants. According to the rules, we cannot give them job quotas for migrants».

Despite the small volume of migrant workers inflow, concerns are expressed regarding the level of interethnic and interfaith tension. To study public opinion on the issues of migration and intercultural integration, the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (Russian Academy of Sciences) and the Network for Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning (EAWARN) have conducted a pilot survey of Kostroma residents in September 2014. According to the study's design, 200 ques-

tionnaires had to be filled in by people (both men and women) aged over 18 and resident in the region for more than 1 year, belonging to different age and education groups (see Table 1). As a result of the survey 215 people were polled, in full agreement with the sample. All interviews were conducted in person, which allowed answers to be clarified if needed.

**Table 1**

*Survey on the issues of migration and intercultural integration in Kostroma, 2014 (composition of respondents)*

Age	Education	All	Men	Women
<b>In total</b>		<b>200</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>112</b>
18-29 years	Higher	10	4	6
	Incomplete higher	5	2	3
	Specialised secondary	21	12	9
	Secondary	7	4	3
	Incomplete secondary	2	1	1
	Primary or no education	0	0	0
	<b>In total aged 18-29</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>22</b>
30-59 years	Higher	26	10	16
	Incomplete higher	3	2	1
	Specialised secondary	56	25	31
	Secondary	15	7	8
	Incomplete secondary	5	3	2
	Primary or no education	2	2	0
	<b>In total aged 30-59</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>58</b>
60 and over	Higher	9	3	6
	Incomplete higher	2	1	1
	Specialised secondary	19	5	14
	Secondary	8	4	4
	Incomplete secondary	5	1	4
	Primary or no education	5	2	3
	<b>In total aged 60 and over</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>32</b>

Comments of people aged 30 and over with specialized secondary education were subjected to the most intense scrutiny. According to the 2010 census, in Kostroma a half of the region's population have

specialized secondary or secondary education. The so-called “cheap labour”, represented by foreign migrant workers with this level of education, makes locals potentially more vulnerable in the regional labour market. Moreover, in spite of the difficult economic situation in Kostroma, local people do not tend to move to different regions. In our pilot survey, only 31% of respondents stated that they would like to leave Kostroma for permanent residence in another region of Russia. This is mainly the younger generation of Kostroma residents aged 18 to 35 years. Moscow, St. Petersburg and Yaroslavl appear to be the most popular and attractive destinations for young people. As preferred places to live, respondents pointed to localities where their relatives live; more rarely, people wanted to change region due to climatic conditions. However, very often people said they would leave the city because of its underdeveloped economy, social infrastructure or low standard of living. A 22-old female respondent stated: “I would like to move to a region with substantially higher salaries than we have in Kostroma. It’s very difficult to get a good job here.” In the meantime, the ratio of people not willing to move to other regions of Russian Federation amounted to 62% of all those interviewed.

**Table 2**

*Ratio of Kostroma respondents willing to move  
to other regions of Russia*

<b>Would you like to move to another region of Russia for a long time or permanent residence?</b>	<b>In total, in %</b>	<b>Men, in %</b>	<b>Women, in %</b>
1) Yes	31	33	28
2) No	61	63	56
3) Cannot say	8	4	16

These views are probably related to age, as well as the social status or housing conditions of the people interviewed: many people have families and cannot leave them without support. Due to low migration activities in the region, we would like to analyse the ethnic situation, as well as the attitudes of the local population towards migrants.

Clashes between people of various nationalities were recorded in major cities and regional centres of the Kostroma region in 2010-13. Usually the collisions started from individual confrontations, and then escalated to relatively massive protests with anti-migrant slogans.

According to the data of the Kostroma regional government, the

official meetings of collegial and consultative government bodies held in 2013 addressed the most problematic issues in the sphere of international relations and anti-extremism activities. As a result of measures taken, no mass disorders or other activities aimed at inciting national, racial or religious hatred with repercussions in the media had been reported in Kostroma as of December 31, 2013. Government authorities did not allow any unauthorized protests on the part of local national communities, nor by members of informal youth groups.

According to the Kostroma region public prosecutor's office, in the first half of 2014 the number of registered crimes committed against foreign citizens decreased by 50%. Meanwhile the number of crimes committed by foreign citizens increased during the same period. The 52% increase was most probably induced by changes in the law coming into effect from January 1st, 2014, which introduced criminal liability for the forging of registration documents by foreign citizens.

The respondents to our survey were asked the following question: "Do you share the opinion that migrants are more likely to commit crimes than locals?"

**Table 3**

*Breakdown of respondents answering the question "Do you share the opinion that migrants are more likely to commit crimes than locals?", in %*

Possible answers	Both men and women, %	Men, %	Women, %
1). Yes	42,0	47,0	40,0
2). No	30,0	25,0	34,0
3). Cannot say	28,0	28,0	26,0

Thus, the ratio of respondents who share this opinion is 42%. It should be noted that men are more likely to evaluate non-Russian population as dangerous. Thus, the local population perceives a hidden threat on the part of migrants; their connection to 'diasporas' and mutual support networks make locals treat foreigners with suspicion.

V.Yu. Zorin states that, according to the research conducted by the Network for Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning (EAWARN), ethnic intolerance in Russia has been growing since 2008. "This is an alarm bell which indicates that both the state and society should reconsider their attitudes to interethnic relations". The reasons for ethnic intolerance in Russia, as well as throughout the world, are economic.

All in all, it must be noted that local attitudes towards migrants coming from different countries are not homogeneous, which is confirmed by the data in Table 4.

**Table 4**

*Countries, citizens of which should have limited entry to Russia, according to respondents' opinions, answers in %.*

<b>Country</b>	<b>Limited entry</b>	<b>Unlimited entry</b>	<b>Cannot say</b>
Belarus	17.5	70.5	12.0
Kazakhstan	34.0	46.0	20.0
China	56.0	27.5	16.5
Baltic States	57.0	24.5	18.5
Ukraine	40.5	44.0	15.5
Moldova	49.5	33.0	17.5
Georgia	66.5	18.5	15.0
Azerbaijan	68.0	18.0	14.0
Armenia	57.0	27.5	15.5
Abkhazia	53.0	30.5	16.5
South Ossetia	52.0	32.5	15.5
Kyrgyzstan	61.5	22.0	16.5
Tajikistan	68.5	16.5	15.0
Uzbekistan	63.5	21.5	15.0

As we can see from Table 4, the majority of respondents (70.5%) have friendly attitudes towards visitors from Belarus, the participants pointed to the closeness of these peoples, good-neighbourly relations between the states and mutual respect towards each other. The most undesirable country appeared to be Tajikistan (68.5% people stated that Tajiks should have limited entry to Russia). According to respondents, this attitude is probably caused by the fact that migrants from this country do not know Russian and have a poor understanding of the culture of the local population with which they make little effort to integrate culturally or linguistically, while conversely their diasporas are closed to outsiders. Visitors from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and the Baltic states were regarded as “undesirable”; probably due to the fact that cultures and languages of these people are very different from Russian, while the local population has difficulty understanding their lifestyles.

Intolerant attitudes towards migrants are partly shaped by government policies of the states where migrants come from. For example,

the proportion of respondents who would restrict entry of Ukrainians into Russia reached 41%, and this is undoubtedly connected with the political situation in Ukraine and the attitude of its government towards the Russian population within its territory. Before that, the Ukrainian population was perceived as friendly (similar to attitudes towards Belarusians).

To sum up, it should be noted that, as illustrated by the results of the survey in the Kostroma region, residents of the central regions of Russia treat migrants with caution. The reasons for this are personal issues with employment: the perception of migrants as real or imaginary competitors for job vacancies. Moreover, local people often point to the reluctance of migrants to adapt to Russian society. In addition, attitudes towards migrants depend on the international situation and geopolitical relations between Russia and migrants' place of origin (for instance, current relations between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between Russia and the Baltic states).

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## **PART 4. TOWARDS CULTURAL INTERACTION: RUSSIA AND THE BASQUES**

### **THE RUSSIAN TRADITION OF BASQUE STUDIES\***

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Regarding interest in Russia towards Basque culture, we can distinguish different clusters of people and ideas supporting it in conditions that are, for several reasons, almost never favourable. In the pages that follow I will structure my analysis around the following trends in the Russian tradition of Basque studies: 1) linguistics; 2) ethnography; 3) translation; and 4) non-academic writing.

1. The study of the Basque language in the USSR or Russia is often confused with the development of the Basque-Caucasian theory, as epitomised by the figure of the Academician Nikolai Marr. Russian linguists have long since highlighted the merits and demerits of his conceptual framework (*Zitsar* 1987: 8–51; *Zitsar* 1994: 209–226; *Zelikov* 2005: 363–381; *Alpatov* 2004), and reading Marr's texts and trying to follow the thread of his reasoning, which is not always straightforward, one gets a feel for his often quite controversial methods of observation. However, one should recognize that Marr was a promoter of Basque studies in the USSR, although he never attempted to found a school of Basque studies *per se*.

We should also take into account that, as another Russian baskologist Yuri Zitsar noted, “the first and one of the two best works by N. Marr dedicated to the Basque language was practically never edited in its most concrete and important part in a language accessible for baskologists of the West” (*Zitsar* 1987: 12). He is referring to Marr's essay “About the Japhetic origins of the Basque language” (*Marr* 1920: 131–142) written before his first trip to the French Basque country; its second edition came out in the Soviet Union nearly 70 years later (*Marr* 1987: 52–80). More than any other works by Marr related to our topic it is convenient to highlight this one (*Marr* 1921:

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725–739; 1925: 1–64; 1927: 1–62), alongside two papers he published in French (Marr 1926: 193–260; 1922: 1–30).

Particularly confused are Marr's impressions relating to the landscape and cultural characteristics of Zuberoa, which seemed to him very similar to those of his homeland, the Guria region in Georgia, ideas that he formulated during his stay in the French Basque country in 1927 (Marr 1927: 1–62). We believe that Marr's narration is of most interest to contemporary anthropology because it seems to be an authentic verbatim report of a researcher lost in a maze of endless paragon. Indeed, "il croit y voir la Géorgie partout" ["he thought he could see Georgia everywhere"] (Morvan 1996: 56 note 7).

Some of his attempts to relate the Basque data with the history of material culture fail to demonstrate a well-argued approach<sup>1</sup>, and over time his theories became marginalized and even generated some erroneous suspicions. Thus, in the obituary he dedicated to Marr, Julio Urquijo wrote about the "Japhetic-Etruscan-Basque working hypothesis" as follows: "The Russian linguist seems to have failed to clearly formulate his doctrine which appears rather confused even in his later writings where, incidentally, political considerations are added that force one to suspect an extra scientific purpose in his research that was initially non-existent or hidden" (Urquijo 1934: 720). It seems, however, that the perhaps overly ambitious scholar himself recognised and indeed clarified the problem quite concisely with the phrase: "there is an outlook too wide before us, and our forces are too weak" (Marr 1921: 735).

In 1940 Vladimir Shishmarjov, a prominent Romanist from Leningrad, prepared a chapter on the Basque language for the collective monograph titled *Culture of Spain* (Shishmarjov 1940: 296–326). A year later a revised and expanded version of the article was included in his book "Essays on the History of the Languages of Spain" (Shishmarjov 1941: 1–44) and subsequently served as one of main sources for the first ethnographic essay in Russian about the Basques (Ivanova 1965: 498–513). That his work proved so influential comes as no surprise since it is full of carefully presented ethnographic data, and among Shishmarjov's sources we can cite Francisque-Michel, P. Broca, J. Vinson, J. M. Barandiaran, E. Cordier, V. Piskorski. Moreover, he considered the well-known book by P. de Lancre (Lancre 1612), a valuable document for the study of Basque medieval life. Even today the forty pages of Shishmarjov's "Basque language" constitute an example of precision and scientific dignity within our historiography.

From his earliest works Yuri Zitsar (1928–2009), a Russian baskologist and linguist from St. Petersburg and an honorary member of the Euskaltzaindia from 1991, revealed his deep interest in the history and workings of Euskara (Zitsar 1955; 1955: 52–64). With both a firm knowledge and a panoramic view he referred to the tradition of Basque studies (Zitsar 1958: 3–55), displaying his knowledge of the work of T. Aranzadi, A. Schulten, P. Bosch Gimpera, J. Caro Baroja and other authorities in the world of archaeology and ethnography, while also exercising his fondness of proposing interesting hypotheses.

The cited paper contains an important observation: “composed in a different style the already referred to study by V. F. Shishmarjov (see his *Essays on the history of Hispanic languages*, chapter “The Basque language”; I know of no more works of this genre) addressed the history of the Basque problem until the 1930s. I used it so much that my publication may be considered a revised and expanded continuation of that work” (Zitsar 1958: 7 note 1). I think that the significant continuity referred to here must be stressed: Shishmarjov was one of two main teachers of Zitsar, along with G.V. Stepanov (Zitsar 1988: 5). It seems that we can draw an imaginary temporal line that joins, at least, two generations of linguists from St. Petersburg dealing with Basque issues (N. Marr, V. Shishmarjov, Yu. Zitsar). Therefore we can safely speak, without denying other contributions (E.g. Zhirkov 1945: 158–166), of a *St. Petersburg school* or, at least, tradition of Basque studies which was then “moved” to Georgia by Zitsar when he became a professor at Tbilisi State University from 1976–1990. Even more interestingly, in Georgia the initiatives of Zitsar obtained all-round support from the academician Sh. Dzidziguri, himself a disciple of Professor S. Bykhovskaja, both also having worked with or consulted N. Marr (Dzidziguri 1979: 6)<sup>2</sup>. All this is explained by the profound academic traditions and substantial library resources of St. Petersburg, which was still the case decades after the transfer of the main centres of the Academy of Sciences to Moscow in the 1940s.

No doubt, the works of Yu. Zitsar are of great interest to us. If we refer to his lecture on “Euskara and cultural peculiarities of the Basques” (Sadomskaja 1966: 90–95) or his informative report at the *VII International Congress of Anthropology and Ethnography* (Zitsar 1970: 799–808), an essay on Pyrenean etymologies (Zitsar 1974: 305–323), abundant comparative data (Zitsar 1980: 131–137; 1980: 165–178; 1984: 127–150; Zitsar, Yrizar 1984: 755–782; Zitsar 1989: 37–44) or linguistic reconstructions (Zitsar 1976: 55–64; 1986: 115–

123; 2000: 211–238), we can observe his special attention to ethnographic facts. The work “On the ancient religion and calendar of the Basques” by J. Caro Baroja encouraged Zitsar to reflect on the Basque calendar (Zitsar 1984: 145–159)<sup>3</sup> and approximate the etymology of the Basque words such as “argizagi” (Zitsar 1984: 731–737) and “il-argi” (Zitsar 2000: 29–36). He also broached the interesting topic of numbering systems (Zitsar 1983: 709–729)<sup>4</sup>.

We should also mention the outstanding publications by Yu. Zitsar on the current situation of the Basque language and culture (Zitsar 1980: 192–216; 1983: 174–195), and his monograph “Reconstructions in the field of the Basque language” (Zitsar 1988: 7–36)<sup>5</sup>. Zitsar’s personal charisma also proved attractive to his Basque colleagues such as the philologist Xabier Kintana or Roberto Serrano, co-author of the first Basque-Russian (and *vice-versa*) dictionary (Euskara-errusiera 1997), while his academic development is made clear in his correspondence with the extraordinary linguist Koldo Mitxelena (Zitsar 2001: 111–122; 2004: 165–178; 2005: 453–462).

Zitsar put a lot of effort into developing Basque studies in Georgia. With the support of Sh. Dzidziguri he was able to prepare at least six Georgian baskologists among whom perhaps the outstanding one is Tamar Makharoblidze (Makharoblidze 2005), while we should also mention Salome Gabunia (Gabunia 1983: 196–200; 1988), Medea Glonti (Glonti 1983: 108–117; 1988), Ketevan Megreli (Megreli 1984), Georgi Shalamberidze (Shalamberidze 1983: 208–215) and Natela Sturua (Sturua 1983: 163–170; 1983: 201–207).

Within the *Tbilisi school*, besides the problems of Basque language, literature and culture, the question of the Basque-Caucasian relationship was of central importance<sup>6</sup>. There were some mistakes made in this field, mostly due to the neglecting of important details<sup>7</sup>. Thus Sh. Dzidziguri’s book is full of quotes that serve to enhance that relationship but not all of them are presented with the necessary rigor. For example, an observation by the eminent Russian biologist N. I. Vavilov about an Asturian kind of spelt and a unique method of gathering it that seemed to him very similar to an endemic type of wheat and a farming method in Western Georgia (Vavilov 1962: 214). Citing it, Dzidziguri doesn’t refer to Asturias but presents the reference as if it is talking about a crop and agrotechniques from the Basque country (Dzidziguri 1979: 94), despite the fact that Vavilov in his essay argues that he hasn’t found any genuine kind of spelt in the Basque Country (Vavilov 1962: 217)!

A decade after the fall of the USSR, in the new Russia there are re-

newed efforts to organize the academic teaching of Basque; we might say that under new conditions Basque studies in Russia have received a new impetus. Thus, since 2000, a course of Euskara is taught at the Department of Structural and Applied Linguistics (Faculty of Philology of Lomonosov Moscow State University). This initiative has been further strengthened by the linguist Aleksandr Arkhipov and Basque lecturer Amaia Egilegor in 2005 when for the first time at this university the special course “Introduction to Basque language and culture” took place.

In late 2002, Mikhail Zelikov, a professor at the Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia (St. Petersburg) inaugurated a special optional course entitled “Introduction to Basque Philology” at St. Petersburg State University. M. Zelikov is interested in the study of the interaction between the Basque and Ibero-Romance languages (Zelikov, Agud, Tovar 1993: 161–185; Zelikov 1999; 2000: 183–191; 2005; 2013: 128–133; 2013: 36–43; 2010: 78–88), while also being interested in the topics of Basque mythology, language and cultural relations within the Atlantic world in general.

Finally, in 2009 Natalia Zaika defended her thesis “The verbs with dative actant in Basque (problems of variability of valence and personality of the verb)” and now continues developing Russian Baskology at the Institute for Linguistic Studies of Russian Academy of Science (St. Petersburg) and at St. Petersburg State University (E.g. Zaika 2014: 233–272).

2. Ethnographic studies of any human group require a fairly broad knowledge of the facts that characterize that group in general. In this sense it is difficult to overestimate the articles on Basque issues in encyclopedias. In fact, they were and still are the true points of departure for many researchers, who moreover seek in them references which ensure the continuity of academic tradition.

The encyclopedias published in Russia before the installation of the Soviet regime contain some useful data about Basque culture, perhaps as a result of relatively free access to foreign publications and cooperation with European researchers (Baski 1911: 51–53; Deniker 1912: 342–344). In later encyclopedias we observe the influence of Marr (*Bykhovskaja* 1927: 30–33) and Stalinist depersonalization [anonymous texts dedicated to Basque topics] (Baski 1950: 283–285), a series of introductory texts to Basque history and ethnography tailored to Soviet audiences (*Ponomarjova* 1962: 154–155; *Ivanova* 1970: 28; *Kozhanovski* 1998: 81–82) and an article from the perspective of a Basque philologist (*Baskiskij jazyk* 1970: 28–29; *Zitsar* 1990: 70–71).

Secondly, we should emphasize the influence of the events of the XX century on the nature of the texts written by Russians devoted to the study of Basque history and culture. There are few works from the Tsarist period dedicated to the Iberian Peninsula clarifying the political development of Spanish Basque country (*Piskorski* 1909) or the state of the Pyrenean communities (*Luchitski* 1883:57–78, 467–506, 415–442)<sup>8</sup>. Even after the revolution of 1917 some studies based on the earlier tradition would still appear (E.g. *Adamov* 1925). One decade later, however, the situation had changed radically, and, for example, what the “Red Academician” Ilya Trainin wrote on the situation in the Spanish Basque country in the 1930s is striking in its exalted revolutionary fever (*Trajinin* 1931; 1937). On another tack, not even a moderately knowledgeable reader would be satisfied with the text composed by one of Marr’s disciples, stitched together with the maestro’s quotations referring to Iberians, Ligurians, etc. (*Peters* 1940: 106–120) By way of contrast, the work of the academician Ivan Majski [Ljakhovetski] (*Majski* 1957) is interesting, exquisite even, and in a sense the edition of this book marks a decisive moment for historical and cultural Hispanism in the USSR, although Basque issues are taken up only in passing, as is the case in another noteworthy book of that period (*Mishulin* 1952).

Of great importance for the development of ethnographic studies of the Basques was the creation of the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of the Sciences of USSR in 1933 (today the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences), and Basque topics have emerged in a series of studies by members of this institution from the 1960s onwards.

In writing the chapter “Basque” for the Institute’s edition *The peoples of Western Europe*, the ethnographer Yulija Ivanova consulted a whole range of works, among them, T. Aranzadi, P. Bosch Gimpera, J. Caro Baroja, Ph. Veyrin, R. Gallop, V. Shishmarjov, Yu. Zitsar, etc. (*Ivanova* 1965: 498–513). It is curious that Yu. V. Ivanova devoted her entire life to the ethnography of Albanians and Greeks, except for the chapter just mentioned and similarly an article titled “Baski” in the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (*Ivanova* 1970: 28).

Her colleague Natalia Sadomskaja, who was successfully researched the peoples of Spain [see her excellent chapter in “The peoples of Western Europe” (*Sadomskaja* 1965: 419–498), an essay on Spanish folk art (*Sadomskaja* 1965: 185–190) or an article about bullfighting (*Sadomskaja* 1969: 113–128)], also paid attention to the

Basques (*Sadomskaja* 1962: 159–160 [about Basque folk art]; *Laxalt* 1969: 38–39 [comments on the translation of R. Laxalt]). She prepared considerable material with reference to all of Spain's regions for the academic edition *Calendar rites and customs in European countries*, but in 1974 emigrated to the United States, which meant that her name was removed from that edition, although, nonetheless, the texts written by her were introduced with her permission (*Tokarev* 1973: 33–67; *Serov* 1977: 49–69; *Serov, Tokarev* 1978: 39–57). The sources of N. Sadomskaja referring to the Basque-Spanish country are among others: J. Caro Baroja, J. M. Iribarren, J. M. Satrústegui. There is no mention of J. M. Barandiaran, perhaps as a result of the lack of his work in our libraries at the time. Whatever the reason, the most important researchers of the Iberian Peninsula for Sadomskaja have always been P. Bosch Gimpera and J. Caro Baroja.

Finally, the anthropologist Aleksandr Kozhanovski wrote articles on nuptial rites and childbirth in Spain with references to the Spanish Basque country (*Kozhanovski* 1989: 134–166; 1995: 252–301) and also analyses Basque post-war problems (*Kozhanovski* 1978: 237–253; 1993: 102–123; 2006: 58–73, 141–154). Ekaterina Samsonkina, a researcher from Lomonosov State University, is engaged in the study of topical and acute problems of Basque society (*Samsonkina, Khenkin* 2011), and various aspects of Basque traditions are illuminated by Juliette Meskhidze from Peter the Great Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography [St. Petersburg] (*Meskhidze* 2013: 360–382; *O brachnykh* 2012: 303–307; *Meskhidze* 2011: 341–345, etc.).

3. Since the late XIX century, translations of Élisée Reclus' voluminous work *Nouvelle géographie universelle* are well known in Russia and it deals, inter alia, with the Spanish Basque provinces (*Reclus* 1892: 683–704). Some thoughts on the Euskara by the baskologist Hugo Schuchardt and translated from German are also gathered in the book (*Schuchardt* 1950: 141–173). The abbreviated translation of the work of Spanish historian in exile Rafael Altamira y Crevea, where we can find some data on the Basque territories, was published in Moscow the following year (Altamira y Crevea 1951). The Canadian writer Robert Laxalt, author of "Sweet Promised Land" (1957), has also contributed to the Soviet public's knowledge of the Basque Country (*Laxalt* 1969: 36–45).

The translation of texts by the baskologist René Lafon (*Lafon* 1984)<sup>9</sup> is the result of work by a group of Georgian Baskologists coordinated by Yu. Zitsar. We must say that this important edition was



preceded by the publication of the Georgian translations of an anthology of R. Lafon and of Antonio Tovar's *The Basque Language*.

The ethnographic works of J. Caro Baroja and J. M. Barandiaran have also been recently published in Russian (*Caro Baroja* 1971).

It seems that not many literary works set in the Basque country are accessible to Russian readers. However there is a fantastical story by the German writer Moritz Hartmann published in St. Petersburg in 1909 [1913] (*Gartman* 1909), the famous novel by Pierre Loti (*Loti* 1910), one of the most famous of Pio Baroja's novels (*Baroja* 1908: 481–612), another by Ramiro Pinilla (*Pinilla* 1960), a collection of Basque and Catalan folk tales (*Pirenejskie skazki* 1987), one novel by B. Atxaga [the nom de plume of J. Irazu Garmendia] (*Atxaga* 2006), an anthology of Basque short stories [by B. Atxaga, A. Lertxundi, J. Sarrionandia, L. Oñederra, I. Zaldua, etc.] (VV. AA., *Dozhd' v okne* 2006), and novels by L. Oñederra (*Oñederra* 2008) and A. Urretabizkaia (*Urretabizkaia* 1998).

Since 2009 the publishing house *Gernika*, based in Moscow and founded by initiative of Roberto Serrano is publishing translations of Basque contemporary fiction, including works by G. Aresti, A. Lertxundi, R. Saizarbitoria, B. Atxaga, J. M. Irigoien, K. Uribe, J. Gabiria, I. Jimenez, T. Martinez de Lezea, J. Muguruza, K. Jaio, J. Olasagarre, etc.<sup>10</sup>

4. Non-academic writing has also inevitably added to our knowledge of the world. Travellers, many of them professional writers and journalists, but also many less experienced authors have contributed to the creation of our mental image of the Basque country, with a number of pleasant or at least harmless topics, but also with a few that actually have little to do with the history of the Basques or their tongue. For example, there are the perceptive but unfortunately rather few impressions of V. P. Botkin from his summer trip of 1845 (*Botkin* 1857) and the lengthy but superficial notes of I. Yakovlev (I. Ya. Pavlovsky) from a tour in 1884 (*Yakovlev* 1889). In an attempted “ethnographic essay” about the Basque Country by A. Tishanski we can also find a number of interesting observations (*Tishanski* 1878: 329–352).

The Russian writer Ekaterina Balobanova published a book that presents the folk tales, almost all moralistic in tone, recorded, according to her, in Bagnères de Bigorre (*Balobanova* 1913: 3–67). In this context, it is interesting to read the observations of Yu. Zitsar on the unpublished archive of E. Balobanova containing material from her visits to the French Basque country (*Zitsar* 1984: 537–539).

Finally, the development of information technologies and the

expansion of international cooperation have opened up new horizons for the promotion of Basque culture. Since 2008 the bilingual Basque-Russian online magazine “Gernika” is seeking to stimulate interest in Basque culture among the widest possible audience<sup>11</sup>, while between 2008–2010 at the Cervantes Institute in Moscow Leire Orduña gave a course in Euskara for a group of enthusiastic baskophiles.

We are now beginning a new page of Basque studies in Russia. For us it is an important and at once exciting time, and we hope that the great interest in the history, language and culture of the Basques that there has always been in Russia continues generating fruitful and noteworthy studies.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> See e.g. Marr 1926; Marr 1937: 124–160.

<sup>2</sup> See here also the literature on the Basque studies.

<sup>3</sup> Also are used the works by J. Vinson, T. Aranzadi, J. M. Barandiaran, etc.

<sup>4</sup> In collaboration with his sons Vladimir and Alexei: Yu.V., V. Zitsar. Zitsar, Sobre el origen del numeral “uno” en las lenguas de Eurasia partiendo del vasco, *Fontes Lingvæ Vasconum. Studia et documenta*, Pamplona, 2001. Vol. 88. Pp. 377–382; Yu.V., V. Zitsar, A. Zitsar. Para una tipología y etimología de los numerales 8 y 9 como derivados desde 10, *Fontes Lingvæ Vasconum. Studia et documenta*. Pamplona, 2002. Vol. 90. Pp. 219–232.

<sup>5</sup> In Spanish: Yu.V. Zitsar. Escalera de compuestos de tipo mujer-criatura en el vasco, *Fontes Lingvæ Vasconum. Studia et documenta*. Pamplona, 1987. Vol. 49. Pp. 15–28.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. Dzidziguri 1977: 152–154 (in Spanish); Dzidziguri 1983: 136–147.

<sup>7</sup> See the first critical studies: Bokarjov 1954: 41–53; Georgiev 1954: 42–75.

<sup>8</sup> The works of E. Cordier are used in a large measure.

<sup>9</sup> Translated from French by Yu.V. Zitsar, R.O. Chanturia, K.B. Megreli, O.G. Zedgenidze, M.O. Machavariani.

<sup>10</sup> www.gernikapress.com: Aresti G., *Kamen' i narod* [Harri eta Herri, 1964] (2009); Gabiria J., *Konnemara v nashem serdtse* [Connemara gure bihotzetan, 2000] (2009); Uribe K., *A poka voz 'mi moju ruku* [Bitartean heldu eskutik, 2001] (2010) and Uribe K., *Bilbao – Nju Jork – Bilbao* [Bilbao-New York-Bilbao, 2008] (2013); Irigoien J. M., *Kak v skazke* [Ipuin batean bezala, 2002] (2010); Olasagarre J., *Nesnosnye chemodany* [Ezinezko mailetak, 2004] (2010); Muguruza J., *V otsutstvii Laury* [Laura kanpoan da, 1999] (2011); Martínez de Lezea T., *Legendy Euskalerrii* [Euskal Herriko leiendak, 2004] (2011); Jimenez I., *Tuda – ne znaju kuda* [Nora ez dakizun hori, 2009] (2012); Lertxundi A., *Ubirajsja v ad, dorogoj* [Zoaz infernura, laztana, 2008] (2013); Saizarbitoria R., *Sindrom Rossetti* [Rossetti-ren obsesioa, 2001] (2012); Jaio K., *Muzyka v vozduhe* [Musika airean, 2009] (2013); Atxaga B., *Obabakoak* [Obabakoak, 1988] (2015). From Euskara and Spanish translated by R. Serrano, R. Ignatiev, E. Kisel', Z. Khibrikova, V. Luarsabishvili, N. Mechtaeva, V. Zitsar, N. Zaika.

<sup>11</sup> www.gernika.ru.

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## **BASQUE LITERATURE TRANSLATED INTO RUSSIAN\***

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The present article would like to map the relationship between two different literary systems in general, but will primarily focus on the process of translation of literary works from Basque into Russian. It is widely known that Basque literature is a small and marginal corpus that, however, since 1978 has experienced a certain level of overseas expansion through translation.

### **1. The internationalization Basque-language Literature**

To see Basque literature set alongside the other literatures of Europe, known and read beyond the geographical borders of the Basque language, is a desire that has been present from the very first Basque authors.

For example, The 16<sup>th</sup>- century poet Bernat Detxepare, whose work was edited in 1545, declared, in his first ode to the Basque language, Euskara, his desire to see the Basque language become known throughout the world:

“Heuskara,  
Ialgi hadi plazara! [...]  
Heuskara  
Ialgi hadi mundura! [...]  
Heuskara  
Habil mundu guzira!” (1968, 126)

[“Euskara/get out on the street! [...] ¡Euskara/go out into the

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world! [...] ¡Euskara/Walk around the world!”].

The need for external projection was reinforced in the generation of modernist writers of the 20th Century, such as José María Agirre, or Xabier Lizardi (1896–1933) who in his book *Bihotz Begietan* [*In the heart and in the eyes*] (1932) described Basque in the following manner:

“Baina nik, hizkuntza larrekoa,  
ai aunat ere noranaikoa:  
yakite-egoek igoa;  
soiña zaar, berri gogoa;  
azal orizta, muin betierakoa” (1983, 176).

[“But, rural language,/ I want you universal/ raised by the wings of knowledge;/ old of body, young in soul/ of yellowish skin, of eternal essence”] [Translated by the author of this article].

The modernists advocated a literature that would unite the local and the universal, the local and what was cosmopolitan. Years later, it seemed that with the international popularity of Bernardo Atxaga’s works, the dream inscribed within the literary system had already become reality. Nonetheless, the process of internationalization has clearly been further reinforced over the last few years.

For the moment let us leave aside an important element in the discussion: What is the status of Basque literature written in Spanish in the Basque Country? Does it qualify as Basque Literature? The answer cannot be eluded and, of course, must take into account the process of shaping national identities during the 19th Century. From the identitarian perspective, Basque Literature consists only of the literature written in the Basque language – a point of view rejected by writers who write in Spanish in the Basque Country. Since this article cannot give a satisfactory answer to the question, we shall continue by considering Basque literature as consisting of only the works written in the Basque language. Nonetheless, many of the translations into Russian have been of authors that write in Spanish and, thus, explanations will be given further on to clarify what is being discussed when dealing with Basque literature.

Thus, when referring to the process of internationalization this article will focus on Basque literature written in Euskara – the Basque language. Basque Literature has grown to develop its own literary system since the death of the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco (1975) and the creation of the institutions that constitute the Basque

Autonomous Government (1977). From that point onwards there was a new context for Basque Literature: the Law of Basque Language Normalization and the introduction of that language into the educational system in the form of a compulsory subject for all students. Nevertheless, there have been other factors such as the development of culture into a cultural industry, the growth of a cultural market and the blooming of new forms of leisure and cultural entertainment.

There have been two basic tools that have helped Basque literature on its path towards internationalization:

a) *The importance of the Spanish National Novel Award.*

Among the winners of the National Novel Award of the Government of the Spanish Kingdom, in chronological order, we will find Bernardo Atxaga (Asteasu, Gipuzkoa, 1951), Unai Elorriaga (Algorta, Bizkaia, 1973) and Kirmen Uribe (Ondarroa, Bizkaia, 1970), who have won the award in the prose category for, respectively, *Obabakoak* (1988, translated into Spanish in 1989), in 2002 for *SPrako tranbia* (*Un tranvía a SP* (2003) [*A tram to SP*]) and in 2009 for *Bilbao-New York-Bilbao*. Furthermore, Anjel Lertxundi (Orio, Gipuzkoa, 1948) was awarded the National Novel Award in the non-fiction category for *Eskarmentuaren paperak* [*The papers of experience*] (2009). There have been winners in other categories such as Mariasun Landa (Errenteria, Gipuzkoa, 1949) who was awarded the prize in the juvenile literature category, in the year 2003, for *Kokodrilo bat ohe azpian* (2002) / *Un cocodrilo bajo la cama* (2004) [*A crocodile under the bed*].

Not only because it was first, and indeed there are other more complex reasons for its success, but the most widely known Basque work is *Obabakoak* by Bernardo Atxaga. *Obabakoak* is inscribed in a context where the image of the Basque writer was undergoing a process of change in order to seek internationalization, hence, Bernardo Atxaga was established as a Basque and international writer. In that cultural context, the Basque writer who sought to become professional, and to write full-time instead of writing and publishing periodically, would have to adapt to the strategies and the demands of the literary market. And so, internationalization became a route desired by other Basque authors. At present all Basque writers want to be translated in order to reach a broader public than that offered by the Basque literary system. Alongside tools such as the contracting of agents, and promotion done by the Instituto Cervantes or the newly established Etxepare Basque Institute (2010), the National Novel Award is an important factor since it leads to the translation of works of Basque Literature

into Spanish, following prior selection by *Euskaltzaindia* – *Real Academia de la Lengua Vasca* (*The Royal Academy of the Basque Language*), and for the winner of the award, ensures meaningful promotion, not only within Spain but in overseas markets as well.

Bernardo Atxaga's novel, *Obabakoak*, has achieved a certain degree of success which makes it paradigmatic. It has been translated into the following languages: Albanian, Asturianu (the language of the region of Asturias in Spain), Catalan, Spanish, Danish, German, French, Portuguese, Swedish, Arab, Turkish, English – with a re-edition in the USA in 2010 – and will soon be translated into Russian. Such success allowed a small literary system to first become visible alongside the most important cultural systems in the world. In other words, *Obabakoak* put Basque Literature on the map of world literature. The number of languages *Obabakoak* has been translated into has resulted in an impact that Basque Literature had never dreamed of.

However, if we consider the other prize-winning works, we note that their overseas impact has been considerably less than that of *Obabakoak*.

Unai Elorriaga's *SPrako tranbia* has been translated into Spanish, Catalan, Galician, German, Estonian, Serbian and Italian. A different novel by Elorriaga has been translated into English but not the one that was awarded the National Novel Award. Mariasun Landa's work has been translated into Spanish, Catalan, Galician, Korean and Russian. In parallel with her lesser overseas impact, the symbolic status of Landa's work within the Basque literary system is similarly much less than that of Bernardo Atxaga's *Obabakoak*. As for Unai Elorriaga and Kirmen Uribe, the fact that they received the National Novel Award relatively recently, has meant there has not really been enough time for them to develop an international profile. However, Kirmen Uribe did have some first-hand experience of the process with his book of poetry *Bitartean heldu eskutik* / *Mientras tanto dame la mano* (2001) / *Meanwhile take my hand* (2007), which was translated into Spanish (two editions), French, English (with an edition in the USA) and Russian. As of today, Kirmen Uribe's novel, *Bilbao-New York-Bilbao* (the winner of the National Novel Award) has been translated into Spanish, Galician, Catalan, Portuguese, French, English and Japanese.

It is clear that the National Novel Award stands as a beacon for Basque writers' ambition to be known beyond the geographical borders of the Basque language and the Basque literary system, which is, in a sense, regarded as too small and tension-filled as a result of con-

flicting literary stances and cliques. Thus, the author seeks an external projection that will moderate internal (in the sense of taking place within the Basque Country, that is) criticism of his work.

b) Basque Autonomous Government funding for translation

In 2003 the Basque Autonomous Government started a program of funding for translation which, although not limited to works in the Basque language, has been taken advantage of much more effectively by writers in Euskara and has become a primary asset to Basque-language literature seeking to obtain literary repercussion outside its natural boundaries.

As regards the translation of Basque literary works into Russian, the following institutions have taken advantage of the decree: the publishing service of the University of Saint Petersburg and Gernika publishing house, created by the professors Roman Ignatiev and Roberto Serrano, who also publish an online magazine in Russian and Basque: [www.gernika.ru](http://www.gernika.ru).

## **2. Features of Basque literature translated into Russian.**

First of all, it is important to highlight that there are two different periods as far as translation of Basque literature – both in Spanish and in Euskara – into Russian is concerned. The works translated at the beginning of the 20th Century into Russian, such as Pio Baroja's, will not be analysed in the present article. The year 2000 can be regarded as a point of inflection, before then all translations into Russian shared two characteristics:

a) An important part of the corpus produced by Basque writers in Spanish has been translated into Russian: Miguel de Unamuno being the most translated author (between 1962 and 1997 six of his works having been translated), followed by Pio Baroja (two titles in 1964 and 1973).

### **Miguel de Unamuno:**

- Унамуно М. де. *Назидательные новеллы*. Л., 1962
- Унамуно М. де. *Туман; Авель Санчес*. – В кн.: Унамуно М. де. *Туман; Авель Санчес; Валье Инклан Р. дель. Тиран Бандерас; Бароха П. Салакаин Отважный; Вечера в Буэн Ретиро*. М., 1973
- Унамуно М. де. *Избранная лирика*. М., 1980
- Унамуно М. де. *Избранное*, тт. 1–2. Л., 1981
- Унамуно М. де. *Искусство и космополитизм*. – В



кн.: Называть вещи своими именами. Программные выступления мастеров западно-европейской литературы XX века. М., 1986

- Унамуно М. де. *О трагическом чувстве жизни у людей и народов*. М., 1997

**Pio Baroja:**

- Бароха П. *Алая заря*. М., 1964
- Бароха П. *Салакаин Отважный. Вечера в Буэн-Ретиро*. М., 1973

b) The motives for translation often seem to have originated in admiration for the authors, in some cases for ideological reasons - as happened with Ramiro Pinilla - and in others because of recent success, as is the case with Juan Bas - who has probably arrived in the Russian literary system for commercial reasons.

- Ramiro Pinilla. *Las ciegas hormigas*, 1973
- Juan Bas. *Tratado sobre la resaca* 2004, *Escorpiones en su tinta* 2008.

Since the beginning, in 2003, of the financial aid program for translation, literature in Basque has acquired a greater presence in the world of translation. As mentioned before, there are three institutions that translate works with any regularity: the University of Saint Petersburg through Elena Zernova has translated the following works:

- Arantxa Urretabizkaia, *Koaderno gorria*, 2007.
- Lourdes Oñederra, *Sugeak emakumeari esan zion*, 2008.
- Asbooka publishing house has translated the following:
- Atxaga, *Soinujolearen semea*, 2006.
- Harkaitz Cano, *Jazz v Aliaske*, 2008, translation by Vadim Podzidaev.

In general terms it could be said that these publishing houses have paid more attention to the Basque literary canon, to which both Arantxa Urretabizkaia (1947) and Bernardo Atxaga (1951) belong, however, there is a certain equilibrium established with the translation of Lourdes Oñederra, the author of a single published work, and the young writer Harkaitz Cano (1975).

The commitment of the Gernika publishing house covers a wider range. On the one hand, it does not constrain itself to the literary field, translating works from various disciplines such as anthropology, philology, grammar and history of literature. On the other hand, Gernika publishing house has a broader vision of Basque literature compared to the previous publishing houses or University printing services,

mainly because it has incorporated into its collection both canonical and younger authors. As far as the former are concerned, it is important to highlight the publishing of Gabriel Aresti's (1933–1975) emblematic *Harri eta Herri* (1964) [*Stone and Folk*], the cradle for Basque poetry, the imminent publishing of Bernardo Atxaga and the attention Gernika has given to new trends in poetry represented by Kirmen Uribe's *Bitartean heldu eskutik* (2001) / *Meanwhile take my hand* (2007). Last but not least, Gernika has also translated Joan Mari Irigoien's (1948) *Ipuin batean bezala* (1989) [*As in a dream*].

It must be said that Gernika has also shown interest in authors that are not inside the Basque canon, but who have a consistent number of readers within the Basque literary system, as is the case with Julen Gabiria (1973) with *Connemara gure bihotzetan* (2000) [*Connemara in our hearts*] and Juanjo Olasagarre (1963) with *Ezinezko mailetak* (2004) [*The impossible suitcases*].

With upcoming publishing projects such as Javier Muguruza's *Laura kanpoan da* [*Laura is gone*] or Anjel Lertxundi's *Zoaz infernura, laztana* [*Go to hell, dear*] Gernika reinforces its investment in a strategy that combines both the canonical and the alternative as popular yet newer contributions to Basque literature.

Summarizing, it can be stated that the Basque Autonomous Governments labour in the promotion of Basque literature has proven most productive.

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SPAIN, RUSSIA AND THE CHALLENGES  
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